Chapter IV - The Jīva

Now, to discuss some points concerning the nature of jīva.

 

Jīva is not the Creator.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iv. 20 - 23.)

In the Vedānta-sūtras, it has been shown that jīva is not the creator of Names and Forms. The disquisition is digested in the following form:

(Prima facie view):—The five elements having been created by Īśvara, it must be jīva and none else who creates Names and Forms, the material objects we perceive, such as the mountains and the like. For, in the words, “Let me now enter these three beings in the form of this jīva, who is myself, and let me then reveal Names and Forms,”^[1] the śruti declares that it is in the form of jīva that Īśvara is engaged in the creation.

(Conclusion):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: In the śruti we see that it is only in the act of entering that Īśvara assumes the form of jīva; for, the expression “in the form of jīva” should be construed with “enter” owing to their mutual proximity. To construe the expression with “reveal” would be to connect it with a more remote verb. Indeed, jīva has not the power of creating mountains and rivers; whereas Īśvara has all powers, as the śruti says “Supreme is His power, and of all sorts.”^[2] Besides, the verb “I shall reveal” in the first person admits of a better interpretation when construed with īśvara. Wherefore Īśvara is the creator of Names and Forms. As to the potter and the like being the makers of jars, cloths and the like, they become such only when impelled to the acts by the Lord. Therefore we conclude that īśvara Himself is the creator of all.

In the same work, the Vedānta-sūtras, the nature of jīva has been discussed in eight disquisitions. Their digests are given hereunder.

 

Jīva is not subject to birth and death.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 16.)

(Question):—Is it jīva or the body that undergoes birth and death?

(Prima facie view):—In common parlance we say “a son is born to me and the śāstra prescribes sacraments such as the birth-ceremony. So birth and death pertain to jīva.

(Conclusion):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Birth and death which really pertain to the body are, by courtesy, spoken of as pertaining to jīva; for, if it be admitted that birth and death pertain to jīva, it would be impossible to avoid the two fallacious conclusions that jīva’s acts in this birth vanish without producing their effects, and that he reaps in this birth the fruits of acts which he never did. The common parlance and the scriptural ordinance of the birth-ceremony are based upon birth and death ascribed by mere courtesy to jīva. In the words “when devoid of jīva, forsooth, this body dies, jīva never dies,”^[3] the Upaniṣad teaches that it is the body devoid of jīva that really dies, and denies jīva’s liability to death. Therefore birth and death pertain to the body.

 

Jīva is not of the Creation.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. ii. 17.)

(Question):—Is jīva born, as ākāśa, &c., are born, at the beginning of the Kalpa? or is he not born?

(Prima facie view):—The non-duality of Brahman prior to creation, taught by the śruti in the words “One alone without a second”^[4] cannot be explained if jīva, as distinguished from Brahman, had no birth. And the śruti, moreover, refers to the birth of jīva by comparing it to the sparks of fire:

“As from fire small sparks start up around, just so, from this one,the Self, all vital energies, all worlds, all gods, all beings, all these seifs, start up around.”^[5]

Therefore, at the beginning of the Kalpa, jīva is born from Brahman, like the ākāśa, &c.

(Conclusion):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Brahman, who is non-dual, Himself enters as jīva

into the mind (buddhi) that is born, as the śruti says, “This having sent forth, into that very thing He then entered.”^[6] Whence it cannot be said that in the absence of jīva’s birth, the non-duality taught in the śruti does not hold good. As to the passage in which jīva is compared to the sparks of fire, it must simply refer to the birth of the jīva as related to the upādhi; otherwise, we would be driven to the fallacious conclusion that acts done here undergo annihilation and the fruits of acts not done before are reaped here in this birth. From the stand-point of reality, however, the śruti teaches the eternality of jīva: “the eternal of the eternal, the sentient of the sentient.”^[7] Therefore, jīva is not born at the beginning of the kalpa.

 

Jīva is the self-conscious principle.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 18.)

(Question):—Is Jīva a conscious or an unconscious principle?

(Prima facie view):—As Tārkikas (the followers of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems) maintain, jīva is an unconscious principle; for, consciousness fails in the states of suṣupti, swoon, and samādhi; and in the waking state, the quality of consciousness is produced by the conjunction of Ātman with mind (manas).

(Conclusion):—This view is wrong; for, the śruti says that the conscious Brahman Himself has entered the body as jīva. And consciousness does not fail in suṣupti and such other states; it is still present as the witness of these states, inasmuch as, otherwise, there could be no subsequent reference to the experience thereof. Now it may be asked, how is it that there is then no consciousness of the external world of duality? It is, we answer, because of the nonexistence of duality. Accordingly the śruti says:

“As to the saying that then He sees not, (we say that) while seeing, verily, He then sees not. For, no failure there is of the Seer’s sight, as it is undying; but no second one exists, distinct and separate from Him, which he might see.”^[8]

This passage means -What the people aver,—that then, in suṣupti, jīva sees nothing,—is not true. While jīva then actually sees, it is merely through illusion that people say that jīva does not see. Whence his vision? The śruti explains thus: There is indeed no failure of the Self’s inherent vision, because in itself it is never-failing. Otherwise, even for him who maintains that consciousness fails in those states, it is not possible to speak of a failure not witnessed by consciousness. How is it then, it may be asked, that people think, though erroneously, that jīva is not conscious? The śruti explains thus: The duality of the universe,—as distinguished from the conscious principle of Brahman,— made up of action, of various factors in action, and of the fruits of action, does not then exist, because it has become merged in the cause; so that there is no consciousness of the perceiver, perception and objects of perception, as in the waking state. Hence the erroneous belief of the people that jīva does not see. Therefore, jīva is a conscious principle.

 

Jīva is all-pervading.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 19 - 32).

(Question):—Is jīva infinitesimal (aṇu)? or is he all-pervading?

(Prima facie view):—“This One, the Self, is very small (aṇu); He is to be known by mind;”^[9] thus the śruti says that jīva is very small. His departure is also spoken of in the words “from this body he departs”;^[10] his goal in the words “to the moon verily do they all go”;^[11] and his return in the words “from that world he again comes back.”^[12] Of course, the departure, &c., are not possible in case jīva is all-pervading. They can, no doubt, be explained on the supposition that he is of a middling size; but then it would be opposed to the śruti which teaches that he is very small (aṇu), and his impermanency would then be inevitable. Therefore jīva is very small.

(Conclusion):—The mind (buddhi) containing reflected consciousness is not all-pervading. Jīva being conditioned by the mind as his upādhi or vehicle, it is easy to explain the śruti speaking of his smallness, departure, &c. In himself, however, jīva is one with Brahman and is therefore all-pervading. The śruti declares that he is all-pervading in the words “He, verily, this One, theSelf is a great being;”^[13] “he is all-pervading, the inner Self of all beings.”^[14] Therefore jīva is all-pervading.

 

Jīva is the agent.
(Vedānta-sutras, II. iii. 33 - 39).

(Question):—Is jīva the agent or not?

(Prima facie view):—The Sāṅkhyas hold that agency, which means engagement in action, pertains to the mind (buddhi) because it is subject to transformation (pariṇāma), but not to the jīva or self who is unattached.

(Conclusion):—This view is unsound. It being evident that the mind serves as an organ or instrument, it cannot be regarded as the agent. Instruments such as an axe never act as agents. If the mind were the agent, we would have to look out for something else which might serve as its organ. You cannot say, let there be no agent at all; for, the sacrificial acts enjoined in the first section of the Veda, the study of theosophy and the like enjoined in the second, and all worldly occupations such as cultivation, presuppose an agent. Therefore jīva is the agent.

 

Jīva’s agency is illusory.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 40).

(Question):—Is jīva’s agency which has been established in the previous article, real or illusory?

(Prima facie view):—Being uncontradicted, it must be real.

(Conclusion):—As against the foregoing we say: Agency which is an attachment is denied by the śruti in the words, “Devoid of attachment, verily, is this one, the Puruṣa.”^[15] Just as, owing to the proximity of the white crystal stone to the china-rose (japā) flower, the red colour of the latter is ascribed to the former, so also, agency is ascribed to the Self owing to His proximity to the mind (antaḥ-karaṇa).

 

Jīva is impelled to action by Īśvara.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 41 - 42).

(Question):—Is it the Supreme Lord or passion that impels jīva to action?

(Prima facie view):—In the ordinary affairs of the world we see likes and dislikes alone impelling cultivators and other agents to action. In accordance with this, we should regard that likes and dislikes alone impel jīva to action when he engages in righteous and unrighteous acts, dharma and adharma. If īśvara were the impeller, the conclusion would be inevitable that He is partial, as impeH'ng some jīvas to righteous acts, and some others to unrighteous acts. Therefore it is not īśvara that impels jīva to action.

(Conclusion):—In the first place, īśvara does not become guilty of partiality, inasmuch as He is a general cause like rain. Though rain is the cause of the growth of corn, still it is the seeds that make them different, as rice, barley, and so on Similarly, though the Lord is the general impeller of jīvas to action by way of willing “let the jīvas act each in his own way” still He is not partial, inasmuch as differences in their lots are due to their respective acts in farmer births and their respective vāsanās or tendencies.

(Objection):—Acts bring forth only their fruits; they do not cause other acts.

(Answer):—True. As impelling jīva to action with a view to yield their own fruits in the form of pleasure and pain, they indirectly bring about other acts, and thus we are forced to the conclusion that one act causes another act.

Vāsanās or tendencies, however, are the direct causes of acts. Such being the case, where is room for the charge of partiality against īśvara?

As to the assertion that passion is found to impel men to action, we grant that it is so. This, however, cannot in any way vitiate the view that Īśvara impels jīva to action; for, even passion is subject to the control of Īśvara who is the Antaryāmin, the Ruler of all from within. Therefore it is īśvara that impels jīva to action.

 

Jīva as distinguished from Īśvara.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. iii. 43).

(Question):—Is there any distinction between jīva and Īśvara, or are they indistinguishable?

(Prima facie view):—The śruti teaches identity of jīva and Īśvara in such words as “That thou art.”^[16] Again in the words “the Ātman should be seen,”^[17] they are distinguishable as seer and the one to be seen. So that, in the first place, as the śruti speaks of them as distinct, it is not possible to ignore the existence of jīva; since the śruti speaks also of their identity, neither is it possible to maintain the existence of jīva as distinct from Īśvara. The inevitable conclusion is that jīva exists, but that he is indistinguishable from Īśvara. And as a corollary of this, jīvas are mutually indistinguishable, because of their identity with Īśvara. Therefore, in the Brahmavādin’s theory, jīva and īśvara are indistinguishable.

(Conclusion):—Though there is no real absolute distinction between jīva and īśvara such as there is between a cow and a buffalo, still the scriptures define the nature of jīva in three ways in accordance with his distinctive features arising from the^- upādhis or conditions with which he is associated in our ordinary experience. It is taught that he is an aṃśa or constituent portion of īśvara in the words, “A portion of Myself, in the world of jīva, constituting the very life and eternal”^[18] In the words “He, being equal with it, both regions he traverses,”^[19] the śruti represents jīva in his aspect of intelligence (vijñāna) as of equal extent with the mind (buddhi) designated as intellect, and thus gives us to understand that he is Īśvara limited by intellect, as ākāśa is limited by a jar. It is also taught that he is a reflection of Īśvara in the following words:

“One alone, verily, is the Self of all beings, separate in each being; in one way as also in many ways is He seen, like the moon in water.”^[20]

Therefore the Brahmavādin can easily distinguish the jīva and the īśvara from each other. And it is easier still for him to explain the mutual distinction among jīvas themselves as observed in our experience, on the analogy of the manifold images of the sun reflected in manifold vessels of water. Thus this doctrine is open to no objection whatever.
 

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Chhā. Up. 6-3-2.

[2]:

Śve. Up. 6-8.

[3]:

Chhā. Up. 6-11-3.

[4]:

Ibid. 6-2-1

[5]:

Bṛ. Up. 2-2-20.

[6]:

Tait. Up. 2-6-7.

[7]:

Kaṭha. Up. 5–13.

[8]:

Bṛ. Up. 4-3-23.

[9]:

Muṇḍ. 3-1-9.

[10]:

Chhā. 8-6-5.

[11]:

Kauṣ. 1-2.

[12]:

Bṛ. 4-4-6.

[13]:

Bṛ. 4-4-22.

[14]:

Śve. 6-11.

[15]:

Bṛ. 4-3-15.

[16]:

Chhā. Up. 6-2-7.

[17]:

Bṛ. Up. 2-4-5.

[18]:

Bha. Gītā. 15-6.

[19]:

Bṛ. 4-3-7.

[20]:

Brahmabindu. Up. 12.