Chapter XIV - Vijñānamaya-kośa

To him who has completely withdrawn from the Prāṇamaya, the śruti teaches the Vijñānamaya with a view to lead him still farther within, beyond even the Manomayakośa.

 

The relation between the Manomaya and the Vijñānamaya.

तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः ॥ ३ ॥

tasmādvā etasmānmanomayāt | anyo'ntara ātmā vijñānamayaḥ | tenaiṣa pūrṇaḥ || 3 ||

3. Than that, verily,—than this one formed of Manas,—there is another self within, formed of Vijñāna. By him this one is filled.

This should be interpreted as before. The inner self of the Manomaya is the Vijñānamaya. It has been shewn that the Manomaya is made up of the Vedas. Vijñāna or Intelligence is the knowledge of what is taught in the Vedas,—the certain or determinative knowledge (niśchaya). And this determinative knowledge^[1] (adhyavasāya) is an attribute (dharma) of the antaḥ-karaṇa, the inner sense. Made up of this,— i. e., formed of these determinative cognitions, which are regarded as pramāṇas or right cognitions—is the Vijñānamaya self. Indeed,^[2] the sacrificial rites, etc., are performed by one only after ascertaining their nature from right sources of knowledge; and the śruti says in the verse (to be quoted below) that Vijñāna is the source of all sacrificial rites.

The Manomaya, which has been described to be made up of the Vedas, is mainly composed of vṛttis or states of mind, while the next one is the owner of those states. Buddhi, which is made up of determinative cognitions (vyavasāya), is regarded as the owner of the states of mind. The śruti says, “Intelligence performs the sacrifice:” this will have no meaning unless Intelligence (Vijñāna) is regarded as an agent, as the owner of the mental states, as one who passes through those states. Buddhi or Intelligence itself,—not the Ātman, because He is immutable,—containing within it a semblance of Ātman’s Consciousness, is the agent. Since the Ātman cannot be the agent, Vijñāna must be the performer of the sacrificial rites. If Vijñāna were not the agent, no sacrificial rite would be possible.—(S).

 

The nature of the Vijñānamaya.

The Manomaya is made up of mental states such as kāma and saṃkalpa,—desires, impulses and formative thoughts. Being the upādhi of the Pratyagātman,—i. e., being a medium or vehicle in which the Inner Self manifests Himself,—the Manomaya has been spoken of as the self. Behind this self,—which manifests itself in consciousness as “I desire, I imagine” and so on,—there is another self called Vijñānamaya, the Intelligence-made. By the Vijñānamaya lying within, the Manomaya—the external one,—is filled. When the jñāna-śakti or the knowing principle which is evolved out of the Sattva-guṇa is influenced by the Tamas, Manas or thought-principle is formed, with its Tāmasic attributes of attachment, hatred, etc. So Vijñāna or the cognising principle, with its Rājasic attribute of agency, is formed out of a combination of the knowing principle and the Guṇa of Rajas. Among the states of consciousness, there is a particular one in the form “I am the agent,” and the principle apprehended in this particular state of consciousness with the attribute of agency pertaining to it is the thing denoted by the word ‘Vijñāna’; and ‘Vijñānamaya’ means “formed of Vijñāna.” Vijñāna, which is evolved from Sattva associated with Rajas, assumes the form of the Ego, apprehended as ‘I’ in consciousness. It is this principle of Ego that all people think of as ‘I.’ There are two sets of ideas, the idea of ‘this’ and the idea of ‘I.’ The idea of ‘this’ refers to what is known, to something distinct from the knower, to something that is outward; whereas the idea of ‘I’ refers to the inward, to the knower himself. Tljis analysis should not be objected to because of the fact that the knower (pramātṛ) and the known (prameya) are always found mixed up; for, this mixture is a fact of experience, and it cannot therefore vitiate our analysis. It is a well-recognised principle that no ascertained fact of experience should be dismissed on the ground of its inexplicability. The Ego apprehended in consciousness as ‘I,’ who is the cogniser of all knowledge through whatsoever organ obtained, is the one here spoken of as the Vijñānamaya. Having in view this principle, the Ātharvaṇikas first enumerate all instruments of knowledge and all things knowable through them, and then mention quite separately—as distinct from them all—him who experiences them:

“Both sight and what must be seen, both hearing and what must be heard,...............He is the seer, toucher, hearer, smeller, taster, the mind of impulse and of reason, the agent, the knowing self, the man.”^[3]

And the Kauṣītakins also first declare, from both the positive and negative points of view, that all experience of objects through senses depends upon Manas, and then mention, as distinct from them all, the subject of all those experiences:

“Having by prajñā (self-conscious knowledge) taken possession of speech, he obtains by speech all words......Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker.”^[4]

(Objection):—The subject of all experiences is Ātman Himself, not the fourth sheath called Vijñānamaya. Hence, it is that in discussing the nature of the jīvātman, the Blessed Bādarāyaṇa has said “(Ātman) is the agent (kartṛī) because then the scriptures will have a meaning”(II. iii. 33).

(Answer);—There is no room for such objection; for, the agency of the Ātman is due to an upādhi, as has been shewn in the Vedānta-sūtra II. iii. 40. This sūtra says: Just as a carpenter can build a house with external implements, such as a hatchet, and cannot at all build without them, so also, Ātman is in Himself quite unattached and becomes an agent when associated with the senses, such as the sense of speech.

(Objection):—Then the Ātman becomes an agent in association with the Manomaya composed of the inner sense (antaḥ-karaṇa) and the external senses. What purposes does the Vijñānamaya serve?

(Answer): —Not so; for on this principle, one might urge that even the carpenter is useless. Since the brāhmaṇas and others may build a house with hatchets and other implements, the carpenter would be quite useless. If the carpenter is necessary because of the absence,— in others such as brāhmaṇas,— of the requisite knowledge and skill concerning the structure, then, here, too, there is a necessity for the Vijñānamaya which has the power of knowing and acting in all matters of experience. And this two-fold power cannot pertain to Ātman, the real Self, except by false imputation; and we say that an attribute is falsely imputed to a thing only when that attribute really pertains to some other thing. A serpent, for instance, really exists in a hole, and it is for a serpent, actually existsing in a hole, that a rope is mistaken. Accordingly, here too, the two-fold power of knowing and acting, which really inheres in the Vijñānamaya, is falsely imputed to the pure Conscious Ātman. This is what the Vājasaneyins mean when they read:

“He is within the heart, surrounded by the prāṇas (senses),—the self-luminous Spirit (Puruṣa) consisting of knowledge. Becoming equal with it, He wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving.”^[5]

To explain: Puruṣa (Spirit) is in Himself the pure self-luminous Consciousness; but, when in association with the upādhi of the Vijñānamaya, He becomes coextensive with it, i. e., limited by that upādhi; and with the wandering upādhi, He Himself wanders through the two worlds. Though Puruṣa does not Himself wander at all, He appears to wander because of the upādhi wandering. Indeed when a pot is carried from one place to another, the ākāśa within the pot is carried as it were to that other place, whereas in fact the ākaśa is not carried from the one place to the other. This idea is clearly conveyed by the words “as if.” When the upādhi thinks, one imagines that the self-conscious Ātman Himself thinks. Similarly, when the upādhi moves, one imagines that the Ātman Himself moves. This wandering of Ātman in saṃsāra,—this departing (from the body), going and returning,—as caused by His connection with the upādhi, has been explained by the Blessed Bādarāyaṇa in the Vedānta. sūtra (II. iii. 29). So that we must admit that even agency (karṭṛtva) really abides in the upādhi of the Vijñanamaya and is falsely imputed to the Ātman. The Vijñānamaya endued with agency is the inner self of the Manomaya which acts only as an instrument.

(Objection);—The Mīmāmsā-śāstra (the Vedānta-sūtra) treats of the Liṅga-śarīra as made up only of the eleven senses (including Manas) and of prāṇa in its five aspects: No such principle as Vijñāna has been spoken of in the work.

(Answer):—Though not described in connection with the prāṇas or senses (II. iv.), still it has been discussed in the previous section (II. iii. 29, et seq.) as the principle which is the source of the imputation of the attributes of saṃsāra to the jīvātman. Moreover, it is only by admitting the principle of Buddhi or Vijñāna that the number seventeen of the Liṅgaśarīra can be made up. The number enters into the Blessed Teacher’s description of the Liṅgaśarīra: “the primary unquintupled elements of matter and their products make up the liṅga-śarīra composed of seventeen principles.” And these seventeen principles have been enumerated by Viśvarūpāchārya^[6] as follows: “Five organs of perception and as many organs of action, five airs, with Buddhi and Manas, are the seventeen principles, as they say.”

(Objection);—Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Chitta,— these four are four different vṛttis or modifications of the one antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense. Manas is the state of mind called doubt (saiṇśaya); Buddhi, is that known as niśchaya or determinate knowledge; Ahaīṇkāra is that known as Egoism; and Chitta is that known as imagination. These vṛttis or states of mind, as well as the objects they relate to, are enumerated by the Ātharvaṇikas in the following words:

“Both impulse (Manas) and what impulse must seek, both reason (buddhi) and what one must reason, both that which makes things ‘mine’ and things that must be referable to ‘me,’ imagination (chitta) too and what must be imagined.......”^[7]

All these different states of mind are momentary, and arise only at different times. Indeed, everybody knows that one characteristic feature of Manas is the non-simultaneity of its cognitions. Thus, the Manomaya and the Vijñānamaya are mere vṛttis or states of mind and cannot therefore be regarded as distinct principles (tattvas) like the Annamaya and the Prāṇamaya; and since those states of mind arise at different moments, it is not right to regard the one as informing the other.

(Answer): —You cannot say so; because, we hold that, as the agent (kartṛ) and the instrument (karaṇa) respectively, they are distinct principles. The four states of mind above referred to—namely, doubt, determinate knowledge, egoism, and imagination—are different functions of the instrument (karaṇa). But the agent is quite a different principle from the instrument; and it has been here and there designated as Vijñāna (intelligence), or as Buddhi (understanding), or as Ahaṃkāra (Egoism). The Kaṭhas, for instance, designate the agent as Buddhi in the following passage:

“Know the Self as the lord of the chariot, the body as only the car, know also the reason (buddhi) as the driver, and the impulse (Manas) as the reins. The senses, they say, are the horses, the objects for them are the roads.”^[8]

To explain: The Chidātman, the Conscious Self, is the lord of the chariot. The charioteer is Buddhi, which is insentient in itself, the seat of agency, or the medium in which Consciousness (chaitanya) is reflected. Buddhi becomes sentient when impregnated with a semblance of the Chit or Consciousness; and thus becoming an agent, it is independent, and, like a charioteer, controls the senses by means of manas, as the charioteer controls horses by means of reins and thus drives the chariot of the body. Thus Buddhi and Manas are two distinct principles (tattvas). We are further given to understand that Buddhi is permanent and coeval with Manas. The word ‘vijñāna’ is also applied to the same thing in the same context:

“Aye, the man who hath reason (vijñāna) for driver, holding tight unto impulse’s reins, he reacheth the end of the journey, that supreme home of Viṣṇu.”^[9]

In the same context, with a view to shew that Buddhi lies within Manas, it is declared that the one is superior to the other:

“Beyond the senses are the rudiments; beyond the rudiments, impulsive mind (Manas); beyond this mind, the reason (Buddhi)”^[10]

So also, when the teaching of the Nirodha-samādhi,—the samādhi which consists in the entire suppression of Manas, as a means of intuiting the Pratyagātman, — the śruti declares that Buddhi lies inside Manas:

“The wise should sink speech into mind; this he should sink in the jñānātman (reason.)”^[11]

That is to say, speech and other external senses should first be sunk in the internal Manas. Then Manas should be sunk in the conscious self, (jñānātman) which lies farther inward than even Manas. Here the term ‘jñānātman’ denotes the Vijñānamaya,—not the Chidātman, the Supreme Conscious Self; for the latter is in the sequel mentioned as the Śānta-Ātman, the Tranquil Self. The first upādhi in which the Supreme Brahman, the True Self (Pratyagātman), enters into saṃsāra or transmigratory existence, is Vijñāna, the next is Manas, and outside even this Manas is Prāṇa. This order has been adopted by the Vājasaneyins in their description of saṃsāra:

“The self is indeed Brahman consisting of reason (vijñāna), impulsive mind (manas),life (prāṇa), etc.”^[12]

It is the principle designated as Vijñāna or Buddhi that, in common parlance, is spoken of as‘I.’ While explaining, in His commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, the adhyāsa or false imputation, the Bhāṣyakāra (the Commentator, Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya) first 'illustrates the imputation in the case of son, wife, the physical body, the senses and manas; and then, as a further illustration, he refers to the imputation of the Vijñānamaya in the following words:

“Thus falsely identifying Ahampratyayin— the subject that feels as ‘I’—with the Pratyagātman, the True Self, the Witness of all its conduct,” etc.

And so also, when commenting on the Vedānta-sūtra I. i. 4, he says:

“By the same Ahaṃkartṛ or principle of Ego, by the Ahaṃpratyayin—the subject that feels as ‘I,’—all acts are accomplished, and he alone is the enjoyer of their fruits.”

It is this agent and enjoyer or experiencer (karṭri and bhoktṛ) that the jfollowers of the Nyāya school regard as the jīvātman. And the Sāṅkhyas say that the antaḥkaraṇa is threefold: Manas, the eleventh of the senses, being one, Ahaṃkāra the second, and the principle of Mahat the third. They define Ahaṃkāra as “Egoism (abhimāna).” It is the Ahaṃkāra, impregnated with a semblance of Chit or Consciousness (Chit-chhāyā), which is here spoken of as Vijñānamaya. The Manomaya is penetrated by the Vijñānamaya; and the Annamaya is penetrated by the Prāṇamaya which is itself penetrated by the Manomaya; so that there arises, throughout the Annamaya from head to foot, the notion of egoism, that “I am a man.”

 

Contemplation of the Vijñānamaya.

With a view to enjoin the contemplation of the Vijñānamaya as a means of confirming the notion that the Vijñānamaya is the self, the śruti proceeds to describe the form in which it should be contemplated:

स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं पुरुषविधः । तस्य श्रद्धैव शिरः । ऋतं दक्षिणः पक्षः । सत्यमुत्तरः पक्षः । योग आत्मा । महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥ ४ ॥

sa vā eṣa puruṣavidha eva | tasya puruṣavidhatām | anvayaṃ puruṣavidhaḥ | tasya śraddhaiva śiraḥ | ṛtaṃ dakṣiṇaḥ pakṣaḥ | satyamuttaraḥ pakṣaḥ | yoga ātmā | mahaḥ pucchaṃ pratiṣṭhā || 4 ||

4, He, verily, this one, is quite of man’s shape. After his human shape, this one is of man’s shape. Of him faith surely is the head, righteousness is the right wing, truth is the left wing, Yoga is the self, and Mahaḥ is the tail, the support.

He who has acquired (through Vedas) a determinate knowledge, first cherishes faith(śraddhā)as to the things he has to do. As faith is a primary element in all things to be done, it is the head as it were of the Vijñānamaya.

Faith is the head because of the smṛti “Whatever is sacrificed, given, or done, and whatever austerity is practised, without faith, it is called unrighteous, O Pārtha; it is naught here or hereafter.”^[13]

‘Śrat’ means truth, and ‘dhā’ means to hold. Śraddhā is according to the Mahātmans, the conviction that the Pratyagātman (the Inner Self) alone is true.—(S)

‘Righteousness’ and ‘truth’ have been already explained.^[14] Yoga—composure, meditation—is the self, the trunk as it were. As limbs serve their purposes when resting in the trunk, so it is only when a man is self-composed by the practice of meditation that faith, etc, enable him to acquire a knowledge of the Reality. Therefore, meditation (yoga) is the self (the trunk) of the Vijñānamaya. Mahaḥ is the principle of Mahat,^[15] the First-born,—“the Great Adorable One, the Firstborn”^[16] as the śruti elsewhere says. As the support of the Vijñanamaya, Mahat is the tail. Certainly, the cause is the support of the effects, as the earth is the support of the trees, shrubs &c. And the principle of Mahat is the source of all knowledge possessed by Buddhi. Therefore Mahat is the support of the Vijñānamaya self.

The agent who, as has been shewn above, is so universally recognised by the Śruti, by the Nyāya and other systems of philosophy, as well as by the ordinary experience of people, is the same principle that we all experience in consciousness as “I am the agent”; and that agent is here spoken of as the Vijñānamaya. After the pattern of the Manomaya—represented in contemplation with a head, wings and so on,—the Vijñānamaya is of human form, represented alike with a head, wings, etc. Though faith, etc., are only vṛttis or states of mind, and are, as such, functions of the Manomaya, still, inasmuch as the Vijñānamaya is the agent and is therefore the owner of the instrument (manas) and its functions, these states of mind may also form part of the Vijñānamaya and may be represented as the head and so on. Śraddhā is the highest faith that what is taught by the teacher and the scriptures is true and that the knowledge of the teaching and the means to that knowledge as prescribed in the śruti are fruitful. ‘Righteousness’ and ‘truth’ here stand for the agency concerned with those two states of mind. Yoga is the samādhi of both kinds, (1) the saṃprajñāta-samādhi and (2) the asaṃprajñāta-samādhi—i. e., (1) the samādhi in which there still remains a consciousness of the distinction as cogniser, the cognised and cognition, and (2) the samādhi in which there is no such consciousness, the mind being entirely en rapport with the object of meditation and putting on the form of that one object exclusively. Yoga is, indeed, defined “as the restraint of all modifications of the thinking principle.”^[17] ‘Mahat’ here means the principle of Mahat, the Hiraṇyagarbha, the first thing evolved out of the Avyākṛta,—out of that Undifferentiated Roet of matte: which is described in the śruti as lying beyond the Mahat. This principle is the aggregate of all agents presenting themselves in the consciousness of individual beings as ‘I,’ and is therefore the support of the Vijñānamaya. It is this principle of Mahat that is described in the Nṛsiṃha-Uttara-Tāpanīya as “The Universal Ego, the Hiraṇyagarbha.”^[18]

तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ ५ ॥
                        [इति चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः]

tadapyeṣa śloko bhavati || 5 ||
                        [iti caturtho'nuvākaḥ]

5. On that as well there is this verse:

Contemplation of Vijñāna as the Hiraṇyagarbha.

                        अथ पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः

विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते । कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च । विज्ञानं देवाः सर्वे । ब्रह्म ज्येष्ठमुपासते । विज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेद्वेद । तस्माच्चेन्न प्रमाद्यति । शरीरे पाप्मनो हित्वा । सर्वान् कामान्समश्नुत इति ॥ १ ॥

                        atha pañcamo'nuvākaḥ

vijñānaṃ yajñaṃ tanute | karmāṇi tanute'pi ca | vijñānaṃ devāḥ sarve | brahma jyeṣṭhamupāsate | vijñānaṃ brahma cedveda | tasmāccenna pramādyati | śarīre pāpmano hitvā | sarvān kāmānsamaśnuta iti || 1 ||

(Anuvaka V.)

1. Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice, and deeds as well does it accomplish. Intelligence do all Gods worship as Brahman, the Eldest. If Intelligence as Brahman one knows, if from That he swerves not, in body sins forsaking, he all desires achieves.

Just as there are verses throwing light on the teachings of the Brāhmaṇa concerning the Annamaya, etc., so there is a verse concerning the Vijñānamaya. “Intelligence accomplishes sacrifice.” It is indeed a man of intelligence who in due faith performs a sacrifice. Hence the agency of Vijñāna or Intelligence. And it performs deeds^[19] as well. Because all is done by intelligence (Vijñāna), therefore the Vijñānamaya self^[20] is Brahman. All Gods such as Indra^[21] contemplate the Intelligence-Brahman, who is the eldest because He is the First-born or because He^[22] is the source of all activities. When thus contemplating, they identify themselves with the Vijñānamaya Brahman. It is in virtue of the contemplation of this Brahman,—the Mahat,—that they are endued with higher knowledge and power (jñāna and aiśvarya).^[23]

It is the very Supreme Brahman, wearing of His own accord the coat of Buddhi or Intelligence, that is here spoken of as the Intelligence-Brahman. Buddhi illuminates pots and other objects by putting itself en rapport 'with them. Accordingly Buddhi should place itself en rapport with Brahman, the Absolute Consciousness, so that it may illumine Brahman.—(S). By speaking of Brahman as associated with Buddhi, the śruti shews that the seeker of mokṣa may easily attain a knowledge of Brahman.—(A). Agni and other Devas always worship this Being, the Firstborn, the Intelligence-Brahman, with a view to attain Him. And the śruti says:

“He behind whom the year (sa;ṇvatsara-Pra-jāpati) revolves with the days, Him the Gods worship as the Light of lights, as immortal Time.”^[24]—(S).

It is this Intelligence (Vijñāna), acting as the agent of all works, that performs the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrificial rites. What intelligence performs is falsely imputed to the witness thereof, the pure Conscious Ātman. Similarly, all worldly acts, such as those concerned with industry, trade, ect., are achieved only by Vijñāna. This intelligence in the individual, the agent in all worldly and spiritual activities, is worshipped by Indra and other Gods as one with Brahman, the First-born, the principle of Mahat designated as the Hiraṇyagarbha, whose body is the first-born and therefore the eldest.

“This one, the Mahat, the First-born, the Adorable”^[25]

“The Hiraṇyagarbha came into existence first.”^[26]

“He, verily, is the first embodied one; He verily is called Puruṣa; Brahmā the first creator is He of all beings; He came first into being.”

 

The fruits of the contemplation of the Hiraṇyagarbha.

If a person realises this Intelligence-Brahman, and further, if after realisation he never swerves from that Brahman,-—for, it is possible that, in virtue of the external non-egos having been long regarded severally as the Self, he may fail, on occasions, to regard the Vijñānamaya Brahman as the Self,—that is to say, if he ceases to regard as Self the Annamaya and the like, and dwells constantly in the thought that the Vijñānamaya Brahman is the Self, then the following will be the result: In this body he abandons sins. Indeed, all sins arise only from self-identification with the body; and it stands to reason that their cessation should be brought about by self-identification with the Vijñānamaya Brahman, just as the shade is removed by the removal of the umbrella. Accordingly he leaves in the body itself all sins born of the body, all sins arising from self-identification with the body, and, becoming one in essence with the Vijñānamaya Brahman, he attains completely all desires, remaining all the while as the Vijñānamaya self.

Since the seat of all sins is the body, which is made up of nāma, rūpa, kriyā,—names (or thoughts), forms, and deeds,—the removal of the body puts an end to all sins. Firm in the idea that “I am Intelligence and Intelligence alone,” he deposits all sins in the body itself and attains all wishes. The devotee, becomes one with the Intelligence, the Hiraṇyagarbha, endued with all the wonderful powers of Aṇimā and the like;^[27] and, as such, he attains all objects of desire in the world of effects, inasmuch as the world of effects is pervaded by the Cause, the Hiraṇyagarbha, the source of all fruits of action.—(S) He who, like Indra and other Gods, is devoted to a contemplation of Brahman in the upādhi of Vijñāna, and he who, thus contemplating till death, never turns away from that Brahman, he, that is to say, who never breaks the continuity of the thought that “I am the Intelligence-Brahman” and who never feels like ordinary men that “I am a man, I am the doer and the enjoyer, I am happy, I am miserable”—he, while remaining in the body, is rid of all sins leading to the misery of future birth; and then, after enjoying in the Brahma-loka all pleasures, which he will compass by merely willing them, he will attain true knowledge and be finally released.

 

How Brahmavidyā is acquired by persons other than the twice born.

Though Indra and other Gods have no occasion to study the Veda, any more than women and the śūdras, still they have access to the Brahmavidyā as taught in the Veda. The śūdras and women, on the other hand, are not entitled to receive Brahmavidyā through the Vedas, though it may be taught to them through the smṛtis, purāṇas, and so on.

 

Devas acquire Brahmavidyā through the Veda.
(Vedānta-sūtras I. iii. 26 — 33)

(Question):—“Whoever among Devas awoke, he indeed became That'; and so with Ṛṣis and men.”^[28] Whoever among Devas knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman. Now the question arises, Are Devas qualified for Brahmavidyā or not?

(Prima facie view):—It would seem that Devas, Īṛṣis, and the like are not qualified for Vidyā. It is said that a Vedic command is meant for him alone who seeks the fruit of the act enjoined, who is competent to observe the command, who has the requisite knowledge to do the act enjoined, and who does not belong to the class of persons specifically excluded by the scripture. These qualifications are not all found in disembodied beings such as Devas. It cannot be urged that the Vedic hymns (mantras) and explanatory passages (arthavādas) speak of Devas as embodied beings; for, these texts are intended to point to what is taught in the mqin injunction, but not to what their words literally mean.

(Conclusion):—The arthavādas or explanatory passages which are subsidiary to injunctions (vidhis) are of three kinds: (1) Guṇa-vādas, figurative speech; (2) Anuvādas repetition; (3) Bhṇtārthavāda, narration of real facts or past events. To explain: The śruti says: “The sun is the sacrificial post;” “The Sacrificer is the prastara (the handful of kuśa grass).” These texts being opposed to observed facts when literally understood, they should be interpreted in a figurative sense. The sacrificial post is spoken of as the sun because of its lustre, and the sacrifi-cer is spoken of as the kuśa grass because of his important share in the achievement of a sacrifice. Such passages are Guṇa-.vādas. Again, “Fire is the antidote for frost;” “The air is the swiftest God:” such passages as these repeat merely what we have ascertained from other sources of knowledge and are therefore classed as Anuvādas. “Indra raised the vajra (thunder-bolt) against Vṛtra; ” since

passages like this describe things as they are or as they happened and are unopposed to what we have learnt from other sources, there is nothing to prevent the impression that what they teach is true, so long as we admit that the Veda is an independent source of knowledge. Such passages as these, which are spoken of as bhṇtārthavādas, incidentally teach as truths the ideas which they convey when their words are construed by themselves, while their main purpose is to contribute, to the meaning of the main injunctions, that part which can be made out by construing together the whole sentences. The same principle applies to the mantras or original chants.^[29] Accordingly, on the authority of the mantras (hymns) and the arthavādas (explanatory and illustrative passages), we understand that the Devas and the like are embodied beings, and that, as such, they are competent to receive instruction. We can also easily conceive how, on seeing that their own glory is perishable and that there is a still higher one beyond, the Devas may seek for Brahmavidyā. Even the requisite knowledge is within their reach; for, though they neither undergo the ceremony of upanayana nor study the Vedas, still, the Vedas present themsālves to their vision. It is not, therefore, possible to exclude Devas from Brahmavidyā. It may be granted that the Saguṇa-Brahmavidyā (contemplation of the conditioned Brahman), involving as it does the contemplation of a particular Deva—as, for instance, Āditya, the sun—is not meant for that particular Deva, because there exists no other God of the same description, and because the state of Āditya to be attained as the fruit of the contemplation has been already attained by him; but the title of the Devas to Nirguṇa-Vidyā, to the contemplation of the Unconditioned, is beyond all question. So, Devas are qualified for Brahmavidyā.

 

Is Brahmavidyā accessible to the Śūdras?

The title of the Śūdras (the caste of labourers) to the Brahmavidyā is discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras (I. iii. 34 - 38) as follows:

(Question):—Is the śūdra entitled or not to instruction in the Vedic wisdom?

(Prima facie view):—In the Saṃvargavidyā occurs a passage which reads as follows:—

“Thou hast brought these, O śūdra, that by that means alone thou mayst make me speak.’^[30]

The meaning of the passage may be explained as follows: A certain disciple, named Jānaśruti, approached the teacher named Raikva and offered to him, as presents, one thousand cows, a daughter, a necklace of pearls, a car, and a certain number of villages. Then Raikva addressed him hus: “O Jānaśruti, O śūdra, thou hast brought these

things,—one thousand cows, etc.,—thinking that, by thus presenting the daughter, etc., to me, thou wilt please my mind and make me impart instruction.” From this passage it would seem that even the śūdra who is beyond the pale of the three twice-born classes is qualified for Vedic Wisdom; for, like the Devas who are beyond the pale of the three higher castes, the śūdra also may be qualified for Brahma-Vidyā, though he is beyond the pale of the three higher castes.

(Conclusion):—There is a difference between Devas and the śūdras. Though Devas do not undergo the process of upanayana and adhyayana,— of formal initiation and study,—still the Vedas present themselves immediately to their minds as a result of good acts they had done in the past. The śūdra, on the contrary, has done no such deeds in the past, and the Vedas, therefore, do not present themselves immediately to his vision. Neither has he any occasion to study the Vedas, inasmuch as he is not entitled to initiation (upanayana). In the absence of one of the qualifications for treading the path of Vedic Wisdom,— namely, the requisite knowledge,—the śūdra cannot tread the path.

(Objection):—Then, how is it that Jānaśruti, who iā addressed as a śūdra, has been taught Vedic Wisdom?

(Answer):-pThe word ‘śūdra’ as applied to Jānaśruti should not be understood in the sense in which it is commonly used. The word should be understood in its etymological sense. It then means he who, owing to the grief (Sk. ‘śuch’) that he was wanting in wisdom, has run (Sk. ‘dru’) to the teacher to obtain it. It should not be urged that common usage should prevail as against etymology. For, the common usage can convey here no sense at all. In the whole story there are many indications,—such as the ordering of the charioteer and other signs of wealth and power,—shewing that Jānaśruti is a Kṣatriya.

(Objection):—If the śūdra be not qualified for Vedic Wisdom, then he cannot attain mokṣa despite his intense aspiration for it.

(Answer):—Not so; he may acquire Brahmavidyā through the smṛtis and the purāṇas and thereby attain mokṣa. Therefore we conclude that the śūdra is not qualified for the Vedic teaching.

 

The Upasaka liberated before death.

That the devotee who has realised by contemplation the Saguṇa (conditioned) Brahman is rid of merit and demerit even before death, has been established in the Vedānta-sūtras (III. iii. 27 - 28):

(Question):—Does the release from good and had karma take place after death or before it, in the case of one who has by contemplation realised Saguṇa Brahman?

(Prima facie view):—It takes place after death on the way to Brahma-loka. The śruti teaches that it takes place after the crossing of the river that lies close to that loka: “He comes to the river Virajā and crosses it by the mind alone, and there shakes off his good and evil deed.”^[31]

(Conclusion):—It is useless to carry the karma till the crossing of the river, since on the way to the loka there remains no fruit to accrue from the good and bad deeds, the attainment of Brahman being the only fruit yet to be realised. Moreover, in the case of the disembodied, there could be no means whereby to shake off the good and bad deeds—which are alleged to have not been shaken off before death,—inasmuch as it is impossible for the disembodied to do an act whereby to shake them off. It cannot be urged that the assertion that they are shaken off before death is unfounded; for the Tāṇḍins declare that the soul shakes them off as “the horse shakes off the hair.” On these considerations, we should set aside the Kauṣītakin’s teaching that the good and bad karma is shaken off after the crossing of the river. Accordingly we conclude that it is before death that the upāsaka is released from his good and bad deeds.

 

The outcome of the study of the Vijñānamaya.

Now the śruti proceeds to shew that the realisation of the Vijñānamaya by the upāsaka leads to the conviction that the Manomaya is but a body:

तस्यैष एव शारीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ॥ २ ॥

tasyaiṣa eva śārīra ātmā | yaḥ pūrvasya || 2 ||

2. Thereof,—of the former,—this one is the self embodied.

Of the former,—i.e., of the Manomaya,—this one, namely, the Vijñānamaya, is the self, having the Manomaya for his body.

In ordinary experience we know that a hatchet or other instruments cannot be the self. So also, as a mere instrument, the Manomaya cannot be the self and must therefore be counted as a body.

 

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

including the determinative knowledge gained in ordinary experience.—(A).

[2]:

This is to shew that “Vijñāna” here means knowledge of the truths taught in the Veda concerning the sacrifices to be performed.

[3]:

Praśna. Up. 4–8, 9.

[4]:

Kauṣ. Up. 3-6, 8.

[5]:

Bṛ. Up. 4–3–7.

[6]:

alias Sureśvarāchārya.

[7]:

Praśna. Up. 4–8.

[8]:

Kaṭha. Up. 1–3–3,4.

[9]:

Ibid. 1–3–9.

[10]:

Ibid. 1–3–10.

[11]:

Ibid. 1–3–13.

[12]:

Bṛ. Up. 4–4–5.

[13]:

Bha. Gītā XVII. 28.

[14]:

Vide (ante p. 26) the Commentary on ‘the right’ and ‘the true,’

[15]:

The Hiraṇyagarbha, the Sūtra.—(Ah

[16]:

Bṛ. Up. 5-4-1.

[17]:

Yogasūtras i, 2.

[18]:

Op. cit. 9

[19]:

i.e., worldly acts. v

[20]:

Vijñāna has been describe I as the agent of all acts, with a view to establish a point of similarity between the Vijñānamaya and Brahman—i.e., Sūtrātman, the Cause of the universe, —so that the former may be contemplate 1 as one with the latter,

[21]:

The Vanamālā, a gloss on the bhāṣya, explains this to mean that the Devas practised this contemplation in a former birth and have become Devas in virtue of the contemplation.

[22]:

as the sūtrātman.

[23]:

That is to say, this higher knowledge and power which they possess indicates that Brahman has been worshipped in th'ṛr former birth.

[24]:

Bṛ. Up. 4-4-16.

[25]:

Ibid. 5-4-1.

[26]:

Tait. Saṃh. 4-1-8.

[27]:

Vide Minor Upaniṣads Vol. II. p. 135—130.

[28]:

Bṛ. Up. 1-4-10.

[29]:

The arthavādas come under the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda, which is intended to explain the meaning and purpose of the mantras. Vide ante pp.291-292.

[30]:

Chhā, Up. 4–2–5.

[31]:

Kauṣī. Up. 1-4.