Taittiriya Upanishad

by A. Mahadeva Sastri | 1903 | 206,351 words | ISBN-10: 8185208115

The Taittiriya Upanishad is one of the older, "primary" Upanishads, part of the Yajur Veda. It says that the highest goal is to know the Brahman, for that is truth. It is divided into three sections, 1) the Siksha Valli, 2) the Brahmananda Valli and 3) the Bhrigu Valli. 1) The Siksha Valli deals with the discipline of Shiksha (which is ...

Chapter VII - Māyā and Īśvara

Māyā described.

Māyā is the upādāna or material cause of the whole universe which is made up of elements of matter and material objects, from ākāśa down to man. Being itself the material cause, Māyā makes Brahman also, in whom it inheres, the prakṛti or material cause. The peculiar nature of Māyā is clearly described in the Nṛsiṃha-Uttara-Tāpanīya-Upa-niṣad in the following words:

And Māyā is of the nature of darkness (Tamas), as-our experience shows. It is insentient; it is ignorance itself; it is infinite, void, formed of ‘this,’ pertaining to This here, and revealing It eternal. Though ever non-existent, Mayā appears to the deluded as if it were one with the Self. It shows the being and non-being of This here, as manifested and unmanifested, as independent and dependent.[1]

To explain:[2]


Māyā as a fact of common experience.

Māyā is of the nature of Tamas,—darkness, nescience (ajñāna). The proof of its existence lies in our own experience, as the śruti itself declares. So the common question— how can ajñāna inhere in Brahman who is pure consciousness?—is answered by an appeal to our own experience. The association of Brahman (Consciousness) with Māyā or Avidyā (nescience) is a fact of experience, and there is no use putting the question. “It is insentient (jaḍa), it is ignorance in these words the śruti appeals to the facts of our experience to prove the existence of Māyā. All objects other than the Chit or Consciousness, such as pots, are insentient; and this insentiency of the external objects is none other than the insentiency experienced in suṣupti. When intellect fails to perceive a thing, people call it ignorance (moha). ‘I am ignorant;’ ‘This is ignorant;’ the ignorance which manifests itself in this form is none other than the ignorance which supervenes the Self in the state of suṣupti (deep dreamless sleep); and the ignorance of the suṣupti state, too, is a fact of every one’s experience. Thus, the insentient and delusive Māyā is experienced by all people in their ordinary life. As all persons, from the most intelligent down to children and cowherds, experience the Māyā, it is said to be infinite, i. e., universal. Likewise, the ignorance of the suṣupti state is all-comprehending; and there is nothing which does not come within the sweep of ignorance even in the waking state. Ignorance (moha) is therefore infinite (ananta). The infinite insentient Māyā, of the nature of ignorance, is thus a fact of every man’s experience, and therefore the teaching of the śruti that Māyā is the cause of the universe is not opposed to experience. And it is with a view to give us to understand the non-duality of Brahman that the śruti teaches that the whole universe is nothing but Māyā (a strange inexplicable phenomenon), of the nature of Tamas (darkness) or avidyā (nescience)


Maya as inexplicable.

Though Māyā is a fact of every one’s experience, it is not real, because, from a rational point of view, it is inexplicable (anirvachanīya), as the śruti has described it in the words “Then it was not ‘asat,’ it was not ‘sat.’”[3] We cannot say that it is ‘a-sat’, that it does not exist: because it is present before consciousness. Neither can we say that it is ‘sat,’ that it exists: because it is denied in the śruti in the words “there is no duality whatever here”.[4]—Māyā is inexplicable from another point of view. In the state of dreamless sleep there is in us no other light than the self-luminous Chit or Consciousness, and Māyā is experienced as inhering in that pure Consciousness, as we have already seen. We are at a loss to explain how the insentient Māyā can thus inhere in pure Consciousness (Chit).


Māyā as a non entity.

It is from the stand-point of wisdom (vidyā) or right knowledge that Māyā is declared in the śruti to be a nonentity (tuchchha); for, in the vision of the enlightened, Māyā is ever absent.

It is in this Māyā or Avidyā experienced in the suṣupti that the whole universe, everything comprised in the vast Evolution, is contained in the form of vāsanās or latent tendencies and impressions. Thus Māyā is of three kinds differing with the three stand-points of view. It is at all times non-existent, a mere void (tuchchha), from the standpoint of the śruti, which represents the right knowledge of the enlightened. It is inexplicable from the stand-point of reason. It is a fact from the standpoint of ordinary experience.


Māyā is rooted in the pure Ātman.

(Objection):—Where does the root of this Māya or Avidyā lie? It cannot be in jīva, because jīva is subservient to Avidyā, he being a creature thereof. The question is, wherein,—prior to the evolution of jīva and other things in the universe—does Māyā rest? and what is that thing which being an object (viṣaya) of Avidyā,—i. e., which being unknown,—jīva and other things in the universe come into being? Neither in Īśvara is Māyā rooted; for, He is omniscient in Himself and a product of Avidyā.[5]

(Answer): —Yes; for the reasons adduced above, Māyā is rooted neither in Īśvara nor in jīva. On the other hand, it pertains to This here; it is rooted in the pure Chit, in the Absolute Conciousness, which shines forth self-luminous to the whole world in the suṣupti, constituting the basis as well as the object of Avidyā whereon rests all differentiation of jīva and Īśvara.


Māyā tends to make Ātman the more luminous.

It is no doubt evident from the fact of every one’s experience expressed in the words “I do not know myself”, that ajñāna or nescience is primarily rooted in the Ātman alone, in the Absolute Consciousness, and that it is this Absolute Consciousness which being primarily unknown, the universe presents itself to Consciousness. This relation, however, of Ātman to Avidyā never really detracts in the least from His purity: on the other hand, like clarified butter poured into the fire, it only tends to increase His luminosity as its Witness.

(Objection): —Then, as the blazing fire burns up the clarified butter, Ātman may burn up Avidyā; so that there can be no Avidyā at all?

(Answer):—Yes: Avidyā is ever non-existent.

(Objection):—Then, how is it that Avidyā is spoken of as the cause of the universe?

(Answer):—Though Avidyā is really non-existent, the ignorant, who cannot discriminate, imagine that it exists and that it is one as it were with the Ātman. The non-existent appears to the ignorant as if it were existent. From the stand-point of the ignorant, therefore, Avidyā may be spoken of as the cause of the universe.


Māyā differentiates Ātman into jiva and Īśvara.

Māyā or Avidyā reveals the ‘being’ or existence of Consciousness,—the locus as well as the object of Avidyā, —by way of constituting the object witnessed by Consciousness and thus enabling Consciousness to shine forth, notwithstanding that the pure Consciousness cannot in Itself be spoken of either as being or non-being in the ordinary sense of these terms; while, in the case of the ignorant, Māyā renders Consciousness non-existent by veiling It. When Consciousness is manifested, it is a being; when It is unmanifested it is a non-being. The absolute undifferentiated Consciousness, existing by virtue of Its own inherent power, becomes manifested by contact with Avidyā, by way of bringing that Avidyā into light, just as light diffused in space becomes manifested by bringing corporeal objects into light. Though Consciousness is self-luminous, still It becomes unmanifested when the insentient preponderates,— such being the very nature of Avidyā. According as Ātman is manifested or unmanifested, He is independent or dependent, He is the Īśvara or ajiva. Ātman is independent with reference to Māyā in so far as, while able to manifest Himself, He makes it appear to exist and contributes to its creative power, (arthakriyākārin). And Ātman becomes dependent on Māyā when Consciousness appears to be subordinate to the Māyā which abides in Him, and as a result the Self is identified with the Māyā itself. Thus the One Consciousness appears in the differentiated form of jīva and Īśvara, according as It is or is not associated with ahaṅkāra (egoism).


Māyā and the Universe.

Māyā exhibits the being and non-being of the universe by evolution and involution, by unrolling and rolling in, like a cloth with painted pictures. Māyā is dependent, inasmuch as it is not perceived apart from Consciousness. It is also independent because it brings about a change in the Self who is unattached. It converts Ātman, who is immutable and free from attachment, into the universe, and has also created Īśvara and jīva out of a semblance of Consciousness.


Māyā as a wonder-worker.

Without affecting at all the Immutable Self (Kṇṭastha) Māyā creates the universe and all. There is here naught that is surprising to us, since it is in the very nature of Māyā to bring about the impossible. Just as liquidity is an inherent property of water, heat of fire, hardness of stone, so also the achievement of the impossible is an inherent property of Māyā. It is not due to external causes. One’s mind is filled with astonishment at a juggler’s phenomenon so long only as one does not know that it is caused by the juggler; once it is known, one rests satisfied that it is a mere māyā.

All questions arise against those only who maintain the reality of the universe. No question can arise against Māyā because it is itself a question, a wonder. If you raise a question against this question itself, I raise another question against your question. Wherefore the question should be solved, but it should not be attacked by a counter question. Māyā, which is a wonder by its very nature, is a question by itself; and all intelligent persons should, if they can, try and find a solution for it.


The Universe is a Māyā.

(Objection):—That the universe is a Māyā has itself yet to be made out.

(Answer):—If so, we shall proceed to determine it. Let us first see what sort of a thing that is which we call māyā in common parlance. That which presents itself clearly to our mind, but which it is not possible to explain,—people apply to that the term māyā, as for instance, the indrajāla, the phenomenon produced by a juggler. Now, the universe clearly presents itself to our consciousness; but its explanation is impossible. Therefore the universe is a mere Māyā, as you may see if you view the matter impartially.

Even if all learned men were to join together and proceed to explain the universe, ignorance stares them in the face in some one quarter or anotner. What answers, for instance, can you give to the following questions?—How are the body, its sense-organs and the rest produced from semen? How has consciousness come to be there?—Do you say that such is the very nature of semen?—Then pray tell me how you have come to know it. The inductive method of agreement and difference fails you here; for there is such a thing as sterile semen. “I know nothing whatever:” this is your last resort. It is for this reason that the Great Ones regard the universe to be a magic. On this the ancients say: “what else can be a greater magic than that the semen abiding in the womb should become a conscious being endued with various off-shoots springing from it such as hands, head and feet, and that the same should become invested with the marks of infancy, youth, and old age following one another and should see, eat, hear, smell, go and come?” As in the case of the body, so in the case of the fig seed and tree and the like. Ponder well. Where is the tiny seed, and where is the big tree? Therefore rest assured that the universe is a māyā. As to the Tārkikas (logicians) and others who profess to give a rational explanation of the universe, they have all been taught a severe lesson by Harṣamiśra and others. Manu says that those things which are beyond thought should not be subjected to argument, and it is indeed impossible to imagine even in mind how the universe has been produced. Be assured that Māyā is the seed endued with the potentiality of producing what is unthinkable. This seed, Māyā, is alone present to consciousness in suṣupti or deep dreamless sleep.


Various views as to the origin and purpose of Creation.

The Śvetāśvataras speak of the Maheśvara, the Great Lord, as one who owns this Māyā and excercises control over it. That He is the creator is also declared by the Śvetāśvataras in the following words:

“From that, the magic Master (Māyin) brings this all; in this another by His magic power (Māyā) is held in bonds.”[6]

As to the origin and purpose of Creation, Gauḍapādāchārya states in his memorial verses on the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad the various views on the subject in the following words:

“Others who contemplate on Creation deem it an expansion (vibhṇti). By others Creation is supposed to be of the nature of a dream (svapna) or māyā. ‘ Creation is a mere will of the Lord thus has been Creation determined (by some). Those who contemplate on Time think that all beings proceed from Time.

Some say that Creation is for the sake of pleasure; others hold that it is for sport. It is the inherent nature of the Shining One (Deva): what desire can He have who has attained all pleasures?”[7]

To explain:[8] Several views are held as regards the nature and purpose of Creation. One view is that the Īśvara creates the world with the view of manifesting His own glory as the Lord of the Universe, i. e., with a view to shew how great and mighty He is. This and other views to be explained below as to the nature and purpose of Creation are advanced only by those who study evolution, whereas those whö study the Absolute Truth lay no stress on evolution. The śruti says that “It is the Lord who by His Māyā shines in all the various forms.”[9] A juggler, for instance, projects the magical thread in space (ākāśa); and thereby ascending into the air, weapons in hand, he goes far beyond our ken, is there hacked by the sword into pieces in battle, falls down in pieces on earth, and again rises up alive in the presence of the spectators; but these spectators do not care to find out the truth or otherwise of the māyā and the phenomenon produced by the māyā. Similarly, here, the three states of consciousness, namely, suṣupti, (deep sleep), svapna ṭdream) and jāgrat (waking state), are like the magic thread projected in space by the juggler. The reflections of Ātman in these states, called respectively the Prājña (wise), the Taijasa (luminous), the Viśva (penetrating), and so on, may be compared to the juggler who appears to ascend into the air by the magic thread. Entirely distinct from the thread and from the man who ascends by it is the juggler (māyāvin), the real personage who has all the while been standing invisible on the earth, veiled by his māyā; and like him is the Supreme Reality, the Fourth One lying beyond the three states of consciousness. Consequently, those Āryas (noble persons) who seek liberation take to the study of the Supreme Reality alone, not to the fruitless study of Creation. Therefore the various views here referred to are the theories held by students of evolution.

Accordingly, there are also persons who hold that Creation is, like a dream, a casual manifestation, occurring in the absence of enquiry; and there are others still who hold that evolution is a māyā, the sole purpose being the exhibition of a wonder-working power. These two theories are to be distinguished from the siddhānta or othodox Vedāntic view. The things seen in a dream have a real counterpart in the waking consciousness; and as such they may be real in one sense. Similarly the māyā, inhering in the magical stone or the like which is a real substance, may be so far real in one sense. According to the orthodox view, the universe has not even this much of reality in it.

A fourth view as to the nature of Creation is that it is controlled entirely by the mere will (ichchhā) of the Īśvara. When many dishes of sweet viands are placed before a man, it depends entirely on his own choice as to which one or more dishes he will partake of. So also here. Īśvara’s will is unfailing, unobstructed. A pot, for instance, is a mere act of the potter’s will and nothing more; for, he first forms within in his mind an idea of what its image and form and name ought to be and then produces the thing in the external world. So the Īśvara’s creation is His mere thought and nothing more. Such is the view of Creation held by some Theists.

Others, again,—namely, the jyotir-vids, the students of astronomy,—maintain that Time, not the Īśvara, is the cause of the universe, the Īśvara remaining quite an indifferent impartial spectator. Trees put forth flowers and fruits at particular seasons of the year, so that this budding forth and ripening of fruits depends upon time. Similarly the manifestation of the universe depends on Time.

Thus various views are held as to the origin of the universe. Divergent views prevail even as regards the purpose of Creation. According to some, God creates the universe for His own enjoyment, in the same way that a man engages in agriculture or commerce for his own enjoyment; while according to some others, God engages in the creation of universe for mere sport, just as a man plays at dice or engages in other games as a matter of diversion.


Orthodox theory as to the nature of Evolution.

Last comes the orthodox theory of the Vedānta. Evolution is the very nature (svabhāva) of the Divine Being, and is a creation of Māyā which is inherent in Him, and which, as has been already shewn, is a fact of universal experience. Just as Brahman is, in His essential nature, Real, Consciousness, and Bliss and nothing else, so birth, existence, and destruction of the universe are natural to Brahman endued with Māyā; so that no specific purpose need be sought for, as He is devoid of all desire. This is the orthodox theory.

The two theories as to the purpose of Creation just discussed are false. “What desire can He cheṛṣ who has attained all pleasures?” Thus does the Teacher (Gauḍapādāchārya) set aside the two views regarding the purpose of Creation.

Or it may be that here the Teacher sets aside all the foregoing theories in the words, “what desire can He have who has attained all pleasures?” But for Māyā, the Supreme Self who is in possession of all pleasures can never be supposed to think of evolving the universe with the object of manifesting His own glory and lordly power. The universe created out of māyā and dream cannot but be of the nature of māyā and dream; and the words ‘māyā’ and ‘dream (svapna)’ denote what is unreal. Neither is it ever possible for the Supreme One, who is essentially Bliss and Bliss alone, to cheṛṣ a desire (ichchhā) or to engage in a voluntary act. Being never subject to any change in Himself, He can never cheṛṣ a desire or engage in a voluntary act. To Brahman unaffected by Māyā, no pleasure or sport can be ascribed. Therefore all creation by the Lord is a mere illusion (māyā).

Now as to the theory that all beings proceed from Time (kāla). The rope appears to be a serpent in virtue of its own nature, owing to our ajñāna, i. e., when we are ignorant of its real nature; similarly the Supreme manifests Himself as ākāśa and so on by virtue of His own inherent power, owing to Māyā or our ignorance of His true nature. The śruti nowhere declares that Time is the cause of all beings, whereas it expressly declares that ākāśa is born from the Self.


Īśvara is the Dispenser of the fruits of actions.

(Objection):—It is the former acts (karmas) of sentient creatures which generate the bodies in which those creatures reap the fruits of their acts. Of what avail is the Īśvara spoken of?

(Answer):—Not so; Īśvara alone is the Dispenser of all fruits of actions as has been established in the Vedānta-sūtras III. ii. 38 — 41. There the point is discussed as


(Question):—Is it the act (karma) itself that dispenses its fruit, or is it the Īśvara worshipped by means of the act?

(Prima facie view):—An act is no doubt of only a temporary duration. It does not, however, according to the ritualistic school of Jaimini, disappear altogether without generating something new called apūrva, which may be supposed to be either a form put on by the act after it has disappeared from view, or a form put on by the effect prior to its manifestation at a subsequent period. And through this apūrva the act done, which to all appearance is temporary, may itself produce the effect. To maintain therefore that Īśvara is the Dispenser of fruits involves a needless assumption.

(Conclusion):—The apūrva of karma is insentient in itself and has therefore no power to dispense the fruit of the act just in accordance with its specific nature and magnitude. In our own experience we see no such power possessed by an act of service, which is insentient. Therefore it should be admitted that, as it is the king to whom service is rendered that dispenses the fruits of the service, so it is Īśvara worshipped by works that dispenses the fruits of the works. Certainly, this view involves no needless assumption; for, Īśvara is revealed in the Vedas and is therefore not an assumption. That Īśvara alone is the dispenser of the fruits of good and bad deeds, of dharma and adharma, and that He alone impels men to those acts is taught by the śruti in the following words:

“For, He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed.”[10]

On the contrary, as Īśvara is thus proved by proper evidence, it is the objector’s position that involves a gratuitous assumption, the alleged apūrva being nowhere spoken of in the śruti. Hence the conclusion that Īśvara who is worshipped by works is the dispenser of the fruits of those works.


Īśvara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

That Īśvara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe has been established in theVedānta-sūtras I. iv. 23 - 27, as follows:

(Question):—The Upaniṣads teach that Brahman is the cause of the universe. The question is: Do they teach that He is the mere efficient cause of the universe? or that He is the material cause as well?

(Prima facie view):—He is only the efficient cause of the universe. For, in the words “He thought” the śruti refers to His having thought of the universe to be evolved. Certainly the thinking of the effect to be produced makes Him the mere efficient (nimitta) cause.

(Conclusion):—“He thought, ‘may I be born manifold:’” in these words the śruti declares that the Thinker Himself becomes manifold by being born in various forms. Therefore, Īśvara is the upādāna or material cause as well. Further, the śruti declares that the One Brahman being known, the whole universe, though not taught, becomes known. That is to say, to know the One is to know all. This dictum can be explained only if Brahman is the material cause of all; for, then, it is easy to justify the dictum on the ground that the universe is evolved from Brahman. If, on the contrary, Brahman were the mere efficient cause of the universe, all things comprised in the evolved universe would be distinct from Brahman; how, then, could one be said to know all by knowing Brahman? Therefore the śruti means that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.


No self-contradiction in the Upaniṣads as to the Brahma = vada.

In the Vedānta-sūtras (from I. i. 5 to I. iv. 13) it has been shewn that all the Upaniṣads teach, in one voice, that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This interpretation has been justified in the Vedānta-sūtras I. i. 14-15, by way of explaining all apparent self-contradictions on the subject.

(Question):—Are we right or not in construing thus the Vedānta teaching as to the Cause of the universe?

(Prima facie view):—It would seem that this interpretation is not right; for, the Upaniṣads are full of self-contradictions and cannot be regarded as a pramāṇa or right source of knowledge at all. The Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, for instance, teaches that Brahman creates ākāśa, etc., whereas the Chhāndogya-Upaniṣad teaches that He creates light,etc. In the Aitareyaka it is said that He begins His creation with “these worlds,” while the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad teaches that He starts with the creation of prāṇa and so on. Thus there are self-contradictions in the teachings of the Upaniṣads as to the things created by Brahman. Even their teaching as to the nature of the Cause involves a self-contradiction. The Chhāndogya speaks of the Cause as Existence in the words “Existence alone this at first was,” whereas the Taittirīyaka speaks of it as Non-existence in the words “Non-existence verily this at first was,” and the Aitareyaka says that the Self is the Cause, in the words “The Self, verily, this at first was, one alone.” Owing to such self-contradictions as these, it is not right to maintain that an harmonious self-consistent doctrine as to the Cause of the universe can be made out from the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

(Conclusion):— Granted that a difference exisfs in the teaching of the Upaniṣads as to the things created such as ākāśa, and also as to the order in which they are created. Ākāśa and other created things are mentioned in the Upaniṣads not for their own sake, but solely with a view to impart a knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, there is no difference whatever in the teaching of the Upaniṣads as to the nature of Brahman, the Creator of the universe, who forms the main subject of discourse. Brahman spoken of in one place as Existence is designated in another place as the Self (Ātman) with a view to teach that Brahman Himself is in the form of the jīva or Ego in all. When the śruti speaks of the Cause as Non-existence, it refers to the Avyākṛta, the Undifferentiated, but not to an absolute Non-existence; for, elsewhere, in the words “How can existence come out of non-existence?” the śruti expressly teaches that Non-existence cannot be the Cause. All the apparent self-contradictions thus admitting of an easy explanation, we are right in maintaining that the śruti teaches in one accord that Brahman is the Cause of the universe.


The Upaniṣads do not support other doctrines of Cause.

In the Vedānta-sūtra I. iv. 28, the same interpretation that we have put upon the teaching of the Upaniṣads as to the Cause of the universe has been upheld by way of shewing that the śruti does not lend any support to the doctrine that the atoms, etc., are the cause of the universe.

(Question):—Does the Upaniṣad anywhere teach that, like Brahman, the atoms, the void (śūnya), and the like are the Cause of the universe? Or does it teach everywhere that Brahman alone, and nothing else, is the Cause?

(Prima facie view):—The śruti teaches also that atoms, etc., are the Cause of the universe, for, it illustrates the Cause by the example of a fig seed. To explain: In the sixth adhyāya of the Chhāndogya-Upaniṣad, where one Uddālaka instructs his pupil Śvetaketu, the former refers by way of illustration to fig seeds which hold mighty trees in their womb, with a view to shew how the vast external universe of gross physical objects is comprehended within the one subtle principle. From this we may understand that the śruti means that atoms (paramāṇus), corresponding to the fig seeds in the illustration, are the Cause of the universe. And the void (śūnya) also is directly declared to be the Cause of the universe in the words “Non-existence this in the beginning was.”[11] The theories of Nature (svabhāva) and Time are also referred to in the words “Svabhāva, the inherent nature, is the cause, as some sages say; Time as some others hold.”[12] Therefore the śruti supports those theories also which respectively maintain that atoms, etc., are the Cause of the universe.

(Conclusion) —The dictum that, the One being known, all is known, cannot be explained in the light of nihilism (śūnya-vāda) or other theories. The śūnya and the like being incapable of producing Brahman, Brahman cannot be known by knowing the void (śūnya) and the like. The illustration of fig seeds and so on can be explained on the ground that Brahman, who is beyond the ken of the senses, is very subtle. It has been said[13] that the word “non-existence” denotes the Avyākṛta or the Undifferentiated, devoid of name and form. Nature (svabhāva) and Time theories are referred to in the śruti only as theories which should be rejected. Hence the conclusion that Brahman alone, as taught in the śruti, is the Cause of the universe,— not the atoms, or the like.


Footnotes and references:


Op. cit. 9.


A clear explanation of this passage is given by Vidyāraṇya in his commentary on the Upaniṣad, as also in the Chitradīpa, the sixth section in the Vedānta-Panchadasī. The accompanying explanation is derived from both.—(Tr.)


Taitt. Brā. 2-8-9.


Kaṭha. Up. 4-11.


That is to say, Isvara as distinct from jīva is a being evolved from Chit by Avidyā.


Op. cit. 4–9.


Op. Cit. i. 7-9.


The explanation is taken from the commentaries of Śāṅkarā-Chārya, Ānandagiri, and Vidyāraṇya.


Bṛ. Up. 2-5-19.


Kaus. Up. 3-8.


Tait. Up. 2-7-1


Śvetā 6-l.


Vide ante p, 358

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