Chapter IV - Brahman Defined

An Explanatory Verse.

In the words “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme” the śruti has aphoristically set forth knowledge and mokṣa, the means and the end; and their nature has been determined in the Vedānta-Sūtras as shewn in the foregoing chapter. Now the śruti cites a certain verse which forms a short commentary on the aphorism.

“The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme:” this is to express in an aphoristic form the whole teaching of the Second Book (Ānanda-Vallī). Now the following verse (ṛch) is quoted (i) with a view to determine the nature of Brahman—who, as has been indicated in the words “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme,” is the Thing to be known, but whose characteristic nature has not been stated definitely—by way of giving a definition which will set forth His characteristic nature as distinguished from all else; (2) with a view that Brahman, of whom it has been but vaguely said that He should be known, may be more definitely known, ī. c., in order that we may know that Brahman, as defined below, is the same as our own Inner Self (Pratyagātman) and no other; and (3) with a view to shew that the fruit of Brahmavidyā declared above in the words “the knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme” consists in attaining to the state of the Universal Being (Sarvātma-bhāva, lit., all-Self-ness), in being Brahman Himself who is beyond all attributes of samsāra.

तदेषाऽभ्युक्ता । सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ॥ २ ॥

tadeṣā'bhyuktā | satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma || 2 ||

2. On that, this has been chanted: “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman;....”

As referring to what is taught in the foregoing Brāhmaṇa text, the following verse (ṛch) is chanted: “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman;...”

For a clear understanding of what has been taught in the foregoing aphoristic statement, this sacred verse is cited. That is to say, the whole meaning of the aphorism is clearly explained in the verse. In the foregoing aphoristic expression, the śruti speaks of the “knower of Brahman.” Now, one will be inclined to ask what Brahman is. Accordingly, the śruti describes the nature of Brahman in the four words “Real, Consciousness, Infinite (is) Brahman.”

 

Definition of Brahman.

The sentence “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman” forms a definition of Brahman. The three words, “Real,” “Consciousness,” and “Infinite” are the attributive adjuncts^[1] (viśeṣaṇārtha) of Brahman, the substantive (viśeṣya). Brahman is the substantive, because, as the Thing to be known, Brahman forms the subject of discourse. Because of their relation as substantive and attributive, the words—“Real” and so on—are in the same case, all of them referring to one and the same thing—(samāna-dhikaraṇab When qualified by the three epithets, “Real,” etc., Brahman is distinguished from all other substances. Indeed, a thing is known only when it is distinguished from all else, as, for instance, when we speak of “a blue big sweet-smelling lily.”

That is to say,—just as the epithets ‘blue,’ ‘big,’ and ‘sweet-smelling’ serve to define a lily, so the epithets ‘Real’ etc., serve to define Brahman, the Supreme Being. When so defined by the epithets “Real” and so on, Brahman is distinguished from all other subtances, none of which possess the said attributes of Brahman, (i.e., which are all unreal, insentient and finite). A thing is said to be known when known as distinguished from all else. A blue lily, for instance, is said to be known only when known as distinguished from the red lily and the lilies of other colours. Similarly, Brahman can be said to be known only when known as distinguished from all else, (from the unreal etc.), since, otherwise, there can be no definite conception of Brahman.—(Ś).

Since the words ‘Real,’ etc., are of the same case, all referring to one and the same thing, they must be related as attributive and substantive (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya), just as in the phrase “a blue big sweet-smelling lily” the words are related as attributive and substantive. In the passage of the śruti under consideration, Brahman must be regarded as the substantive, because, as having been declared to be the knowable, Brahman forms the main subject of discourse; and the words ‘Real’ etc., mark off Brahman from all that are unreal etc.

 

What is a definition?

(Objection):—A substantive is specified by an attributive, only when it also admits of qualification by quite a different attributive, like, for instance, the lily, which is either red or blue or of some other colour. When there are many substances coming under one genus, each being distinguished by a distinctive attribute, then only do the attributes have a meaning, but not when there is one thing alone of the kind; for then it admits of no qualification by any other attributive. Just as there is only one sun which we see, so there is only one Brahman; there are no other Brahmans from whom He may be distinguished, unlike the blue lily (which can be distinguished from the red lily and other varieties.)

A substantive is a thing which admits of being qualified by various attributives in turn. As there is no Brahman of another kind, how can Brahman be a substantive?—(S). That is to say:—When a substantive denotes a thing which exists in various forms of manifestation, each form being distinct from others, then that substantive needs qualification by an attributive if any particular form of the thing should be denoted. The lily, for instance, being of various kinds, each distinct from others, it has to be qualified by ‘red’ or ‘blue’ or the like, in order that a particular variety may be denoted. Brahman being secondless, there are not many Brahmans, and therefore Brahman cannot be qualified by an attributive.— (A).

Besides the blue big sweet-smelling lily spoken of at present, there are other kinds of lily, namely, a red lily, a small lily, a slightly fragrant lily, which are all met with in common experience. Therefore, in this case, the words ‘blue,’ etc., serve to distinguish the lily meant here from other lilies. But there are no other kinds of Brahman; there is no Brahman who is not real, there is no Brahman who is insentient, there is no Brahman who is finite. Just as the sun we see is only one, so Brahman also is one alone. Since there are no other Brahmans from whom the one meant here has to be distinguished, the adjuncts ‘Real,’ etc., are of no use.

(Answer): —No, because of the adjuncts being intended as a definition.—To explain: The objection does not apply here.—Why?—For, the main purpose of the attributives here is to define Brahman, not merely to state His specific attributes.—What is the difference between a definition and the defined on the one hand, and the attributive and the substantive on the other?—We shall tell you. The attributives serve to distinguish the substantive from others of the same genus only, while a definition aims to distinguish the thing defined from all else, as when we say “ākāśa is the space-giving substance.” And we have said that the sentence ‘ Real... is intended as a definition.

If ‘Brahman’ and ‘real’ etc., be respectively regarded as the substantive (viśeṣya) and the attributive (viśeṣaṇa), then the objection may apply. But, since we regard them as the defined (lakṣya) and definition (lakṣaṇa) respectively, the foregoing objection cannot in the least apply to our interpretation. Now, that is termed attributive (viśeṣaṇa) which abides in a heterogeneous thing it qualifies, and which is a coinhering attribute distinguishing it from others of the same class.—(Ś). That is to say, an attributive is that which always coexists with the substantive in consciousness, distinguishing it from others (of the same genus)— (A). The substantive (viśeṣya) is that which exists both as a genus and as particulars,and which is possessed of various attributes, each of these attributes being sometimes found and sometimes not found in association with it—(Ś). That is to say, the substantive (viśeṣya) is that which denotes a thing as distinguished only from others of the same genus— (Ā). A definition or characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) is that attribute which isolates all things from the thing defined, i.e., which enables one to distinguish in consciousness the thing defined from all others, and which always inheres in the thing defined—(Ś). That is to say, a definition distinguishes the thing defined from all else, of the same and other genera.—(Ā). A thing is said to be defined by a definition, when the definition marks it off from others of the same genus as also of other and therefore opposed genera.—(Ś). That is to say, a thing is defined when it is marked off from all else.—(Ā).

The words “real,” etc., form defining adjuncts of Brahman, and there do exist things which have to be excluded from the conception of Brahman. A simple attributive serves merely to distinguish the thing described from others of the same class; whereas the defining adjunct serves to distinguish the thing defined from all else. Accordingly the words ‘real,’ etc., serve to distinguish Brahman from all things that are not Brahman,—from all unreal, insentient and finite things. When we define ākāśa as space, the definition serves to distinguish ākāśa from all corporeal substances, and yet there is nothing else belonging to the same class, i.e., no other ākāśa, from which it has to be distinguished. Similarly, here, all unreal, insentient and finite things are excluded from the conception of Brahman.

The words ‘real,’ ‘consciousness’ and ‘infinite’ do not qualify one another, because they are all intended to qualify something else. Here, they qualify the substantive ‘ Brahman.’ Therefore, every one of these adjuncts is independent of the other adjuncts and is directly related to Brahman. Thus: Brahman is the Real, Brahman is Consciousness, Brahman is the Infinite.

 

Brahman is the Real.

Whatever does not deviate from the form in which it has been once ascertained to be is real; and whatever deviates from the form in which it has been once ascertained to be is unreal.

When a thing never puts on a form different from that form in which it has been once proved to be, that thing is real, and as such it must be quite distinct from kārya or what is produced.—(Ś).

All changing form (vikāra) is, therefore, unreal, as the sruti definitely says;

“(All) changing form (vikāra) is a name, a creation of speech; what is called clay is alone real: thus, Existence (Sat) alone is real.”^[2]

Thus, in the words “Brahman is real,” the śruti distinguishes Brahman from all changing forms (vikāra).

When a thing which has been ascertained to be of a certain form never deviates from that form, then that thing is real, we say,—as, for example, the rope which has been mistaken for a serpent. That thing is unreal which deviates from its (once ascertained) form, as, for example, the serpent which comes up in idea when in reality there is. only a rope. Similarly Brahman, who forms the basis of the whole universe, is real because of the absence of deviation even in mukti. As proving false when right knowledge arises, the universe is subject to deviation in mukti and is therefore unreal. Accordingly the Māṇḍṇkya-Upani-shad teaches the unreality of the universe in the words “a mere myth (māyā) is this duality.”^[3] The Chhandogas, too, declare, by way of illustration, the unreality of pots and other changing forms (vikāra) and the reality of clay, the material cause (prakṛti), as follows:

“(All) changing form is a name, a creation of speech; what is called clay is alone real: thus, Existence (Sat) alone is real.”^[2]

 

Brahman is Consciousness.

From this,^[4] it may follow that Brahman is the cause. And it may also follow that, being the cause, Brahman, like any other substance is a factor of an action, and is like clay insentient (achit). The śruti, therefore, says that Brahman is Consciousness.

The meaning is: consciousness alone is absolutely real, while the insentient matter is real only from the standpoint of our ordinary worldly experience (v^yavahāra).

The word ‘jñāna’ means knowledge, consciousness. Here the word ‘jñāna’ should be derived so as to mean ‘knowledge’ itself, but not “that which knows,” since the word is used as an adjunct of Brahman along with ‘real’ and ‘infinite.’

The word ‘jṃraa’ maybe derived in four ways: it may denote, with reference to the act of knowing, either the agent of the act, or the object of the act, or the instrument of the act, or the act itself; i.e., it may mean the knower, or the object known, or the instrument of knowledge, or the act of knowing. The question is, which one of these is here meant? Because the word is used to distinguish Brahman from all else, and because it goes along with the adjuncft ‘infinite,’the word should, in all propriety, mean ‘knowledge’; since, otherwise, it is open to many objections. By ‘jñāna’ we should understand that knowledge which is real (i. e., unfailing,) and infinite. Thus, as standing best to reason, the word ‘jñāna’ should be derived so as to mean knowledge itself.— (S) Elsewhere this etymology would make ‘jñāna’ mean the act of knowing; but, here, from its association with the adjuncts ‘real’ and ‘infinite,’ the word ‘jñāna’ denotes Consciousness pure and simple, the undifferentiated unconditioned Consciousness.—(Ā)

Brahman, indeed, cannot be real and infinite if He were the agent of the act of knowing: how can Brahman be real and infinite while undergoing change as the agent in the act of knowing? That, again, is infinite which is not limited by anything else. If Brahman were the knower, He would be marked off from what is known and from (the act of) knowing and cannot therefore be infinite, as the śruti elsewhere says:

“Where one sees nothing else,......understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. But where one......understands something else, that is the finite.”^[5]

(Objection):—Since in the passage “where one understands nothing else” it is only the knowing of non-self that is denied, the śruti may mean that one knows one’s own Self.

(Answer): —No; for, the passage is intended to convey a definition of the Infinite.—The śruti quoted above, “where one sees nothing else......” is intended to define the nature of the Infinite (Bhūman’. Taking for granted the prevalent notion that “what one sees is something else, (something other than one’s own self), the śruti here gives us to know the nature of the Infinite in the words “where there is no seeing of something else, that is the Infinite.” Since the words “something else” are used in the śruti where it seeks to deny what we prima facie understand by seeing etc.,^[6] the passage cannot convey the idea that one can act upon (i. e., know) one’s own Self. Owing to the absence of duality in one’s own Self, there can be no knowing of one’s own Self. If the Self were the thing known, there would be no knower, inasmuch as the Self is concerned in the act only as the thing known. It cannot be contended that the one Self alone is concerned in both ways, both as the knower and as the known; for, as devoid of parts, the one Self cannot be both the knower and the known simultaneously. Being indivisible, the Self cannot, indeed, be the known and the knower, at the same time. Moreover, if the Self be know-able like a pot, etc., all instruction through the scriptures as to the knowledge thereof would be useless. Indeed, instruction as to the knowledge of what can be known in the ordinary way like a pot, etc., would, indeed, be of no use. Therefore, if Brahman be the knower, He cannot be infinite. If Brahman be subject to special conditions of existence as the knower and so on, He cannot be the Existence pure and simple, and the pure and simple Existence alone is real, as elsewhere the śruti says “That is real.”^[7] Therefore the word ‘jñāna’ being used as an adjunct of Brahman along with the words ‘real’ and ‘infinite,’ the word should be so derived as to mean knowledge or Consciousness, and the expression ‘Brahman is Consciousness’ serves to dispel the notion that Brahman is an agent or any other factor of an action, as also the notion that He is, like clay, etc., an insentient (achit) thing.

 

Brahman is the Infinite.

Brahman being defined as Consciousness, it will perhaps be thought that He is finite, since we find that all worldly consciousness is finite. To prevent this supposition the śruti says “Brahman is Infinite.”

Brahman is infinite or endless, i. e., having no limit or measure.—(Ś)

To prevent the supposition that Brahman spoken of as Consciousness is finite like the consciousness of a pot, the śruti says that ‘Brahman is infinite’. In common parlance, the word ‘ jñāna’ (knowledge or consciousness), which etymologically means ‘that through which something is known or shines forth,’ is applied to that particular mode (vṛtti) of mind (antaḥ-karaṇa), which connects a pot or the like with Consciousness; and this state of mind is material (bhautika) inasmuch as the śruti says “formed of food (annamaya), verily, my dear, is manas.”^[8] It stands to reason that such jñāna (consciousness) is limited. But here (in the definition of Brahman) the word is derived so as to mean knowledge itself and denotes the very consciousness (sphuraṇa). As this consciousness is immaterial, it is infinite, limitless. There are three kinds of limit, due respectively to space, to time, and to other things. Now, there is no limitation (in Brahman) due to space or time, inasmuch as in the words “like ākāśa, He is all-pervading and eternal,” the śruti gives us to understand that He is present at all times and in all places. Like His presence at all times and in all places, His essential oneness with all things is declared in the śruti as follows:

“Aye, this immortal Brahman is before; Brahman is behind, on right and left, stretched out above, below. This Brahman is surely this all. He is the best.”^[9]

So, since there exists nothing distinct from Brahman, there is no limitation caused by other existing things either. Thus, the passage means: Brahman is that which is distinguished from all that is unreal, from all that is insentient, from all that is finite.

 

Brahman is not a non entity.

(Objection):—Since the attributives, ‘Real,’ etc., serve to merely exclude unreality and the like, and since Brahman, the substantive, unlike such (substantives) as ‘lily,’ is not known^[10], it would appear that the passage “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” conveys the idea of a non-entity (śūnya) like the following:

“Bathed in the waters of the mirage, crested with sky-flowers, here goes the son of a barren woman, carrying a bow of the hare’s horn.”

This objection has been started against the statement already made that the attributives ‘Real’ etc., are meant to exclude the unreal etc., (vide p. 238). The meaning of the objection is this: As a matter of fact, all substantives such as lily denote things which fall within the range of other sources of knowledge than śabda or word, whereas Brahman, the substantive here, is not a thing knowable from any other source of knowledge than the scriptures; and the mere word ‘Brahman’ cannot be a proof as to His existence and nature. And since the words ‘real,’ etc., are merely meant to exclude the unreal, etc., the passage ‘Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman’ cannot give us an idea of a positive entity.

(Answer):—This passage does not refer to anon-entity for the following reasons:

(1) We have nowhere experienced an illusion which does not embrace (i. e., rest on) some reality. Accordingly all illusion rests only on some reality.—(S).

That is to say, when the passage “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman,” excludes the unreal etc., it means to teach that Brahman is the reality lying at the basis of the illusory manifestation of the whole universe.—(Tr).

(2) A word such as ‘lily’ conveys to us an idea of the thing denoted by the word; it cannot convey an idea of the absence of the thing,—an idea which forms the import of a vākya or assemblage of words.—(S).

That is to say, ‘not unreal,’ ‘not insentient,’ ‘not unlimited,’—each of these is an idea that can be imported only by an assemblage of words, and therefore the single words ‘real’ etc., cannot convey the negations referred to. These words, on the other hand, convey respectively the ideas of supreme reality, self-luminosity, and fullness (infinity).—(A).

(3) One grasps from a word first the thing denoted by the word, and then comes to know of the absence of the opposite, because of their mutual opposition, as in the case of inimical animals, the slayer and its victim__(S).

When we see a place infested with rats, we infer the absence there of-their enemy, the cat. Similarly, from the word “real,” etc., we first obtain the idea of supreme reality, and so on; and then we infer (by arthāpatti, Presumption)^[11] the absence of the opposite,—of unreality and the like,—since such contraries as reality and unreality cannot abide in one and the same thing. Accordingly, as knowable primarily from a different source of knowledge (mānāntara), the absence of what is opposed to the thing directly denoted by a word cannot be the primary sense of that word.—(A).

(4) From a proposition (śabda) we understand, in the first instance, the relation (sangati), of the substance and the attribute (dbarmin and dharma), whereas the absence of the contrary is known from quite a different source of knowledge (mānāntara) and is not therefore looked upon as the import of the proposition.—(S).

The proposition ‘Brahman is real’ imports, in the first instance, the idea of the co-existence (tādātmya) of Brahman and reality as the substance and the attribute; and then on a second consideration,—namely, If Brahman is real, how can He be unreal?— i.e., by arthāpatti or presumption which is a quite different source of knowledge, the absence of unreality in Brahman is known. Accordingly, not being unknowable from other sources of knowledge, the latter does not form the main import of the proposition. The meaning derived secondarily from the import of a proposition, cannot be itself the import of the proposition.—(A).

(5) The idea of blue does not arise without involving the idea of the thing that is blue; so, too, the idea of a substance does not arise without involving that of the attribute.—(S).

The ideas of substantive and attributive are always correlated, so that the śruti speaking of Brahman as Real, Consciousness and Infinite, cannot refer to a mere nothing.—(A).

(6) Every word such as ‘blue’ primarily conveys to us the idea of a thing as related to something else. This is why there always arises the question, what is it that is blue?—(S).

Since no non-entity can be related to anything, no word in a sentence can ever denote a non-entity.—(A ).

 

Brahman is not a momentary existence.

The passage cannot refer to a momentary existence (kṣaṇika) either. The Vārtikakāra says:

Similarly, as may be determined by pratyakṣa or immediate perception, it is not possible to establish the momentariness of anything whatever.—(S).

It is acknowledged by all that every pramāṇa or instrument of knowledge is such only as revealing what has hitherto remained unknown. And as a thing cannot be both known and unknown at the same moment, this difference must be due to its different conditions at different moments of its existence. Accordingly, there is no evidence for the momentary existence of anything whatever. The śruti, moreover, declares that Ātman’s vision is never obscured,—(A).

(2) Moreover, the idea of the destruction of a thing is inconceivable.—(A).

Destruction of a pot cannot take place when the pot exists; nor even can (the attribute of) destruction inhere in the pot. If it should inhere in the substance (pot) as its attribute, then the pot has not been destroyed at the moment any more than before—(S).

A pot cannot be said to have undergone destruction so long as it exists. Since existence and destruction are opposed to each other, they cannot pertain to a thing at the same moment. Destruction cannot take place when the pot does not exist; for, what is there to be destroyed? Perhaps the opponent may say: though destruction has taken place when the pot exists, the destruction itself has been destroyed in its turn on facing its opposite, the existence of the pot. As against this, the Vartikalcāra says (A).

Do you maintain that destruction itself has been destroyed? Then, we agree. May you live a hundred years! My contention is that the pot is not subject to destruction, and so far you do not argue against it. The act of destruction cannot do away with the thing, such as a pot, which undergoes destruction,—i. e., in which the action takes place,— any more than the act of going can do away with the goer. How can anything, which depends for its existence upon something else existing, do away with that other thing— (S).

 

Brahman defined here is a positive entity.

Admitting that here the words ‘real,’ etc., are meant as mere attributives pointing to the denial of what the substantive is not, we have tried to shew that the passage refers neither to anon-entity nor to a momentary existence. Now in point of fact, as said before, the passage is meant to define the essential nature of Brahman in Himself and cannot, therefore, point to a non-entity or to a momentary existence. So, the Bhāṣyakāra proceeds to answer the objection as follows:—(A).

The objection cannot apply here, because the passage is intended as a definition.

For Brahman to be a substantive, it is enough if we have an idea that He exists; and it is not necessary that He should fall within the range of some other pramāṇa or source of right knowledge.^[12] And we form an idea of the possibility of Brahman’s existence on the following consideration: Where a rope is mistaken for a serpent, we know that the false serpent rests on a reality, namely, the rope. Similarly, there should exist some reality at the basis of the whole manifested universe, which is false because, like the illusory serpent, it is a phenomenon (dṛśya), an appearance. The śruti, therefore, defines here not a mere non-entity, but the essential nature of Brahman who is thus presumed to exist. Moreover, we should understand that no specifying attributes of Brahman are sought here, inasmuch as Brahman’s essential nature is not itself known already.—(A).

We have said above^[13] that, though they are mere attributives, ‘real’ and other adjuncts are intended, in the main, to define the essential nature of Brahman. If the thing defined were anon-entity (śūnya), the  definition would serve no purpose.^[14] Thus, because the passage is intended as a definition, we think that it does not refer to a mere non-entity. Though serving to exclude the opposite, the adjuncts ‘real,’ etc., do not, of course, abandon their own connotation.

The word ‘real’ connotes unfailing existence, the word ‘consciousness’ connotes self-luminous knowledge of objects, and the word ‘infinite’ connotes all-pervading-ness. Thus, each of the adjuncts conveys a positive idea while excluding the opposite, and therefore does not signify a mere negation.—(A).

Certainly, if the adjuncts ‘real,’ etc., were to connote mere negation (śwnya), they cannot be the determinants of a substantive. If, on the other hand, the adjuncts convey positive ideas of their own such as reality, then we can understand how they serve to determine the nature of Brahman, the substantive, as distinguished from other substantives which are possessed of the opposite attributes. Moreover, even the word ‘Brahman’ conveys a positive idea of its own.

In conjunction with other words,—‘real’ etc.,—the word ‘Brahman’ connotes a positive idea of its own, namely, greatness. Absolute greatness consists in being unlimited in space and time and being secondless; and nothing here warrants a limitation of the greatness connoted by the word. The word ‘Brahman’ connotes a being who is of unsurpassed or absolute greatness. This is another reason why the passage cannot refer to a non-entity.—(A).

The word ‘Brahman’ has a known meaning of its own as conveyed by the root ‘bṛh’ to grow. His Holiness (Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya) has shewn (elsewhere), in another way, how the word ‘Brahman’ has a definite sense of its own:

“As Brahman is the Self of all, everybody knows of His existence. Every one, indeed, feels the existence of the Self.^[15]”

Thus, as the Self of all, Brahman’s existence is familiar to every one. And that Brahman is the Self is declared by the śruti in the words “This here, the Self, is Brahman.”^[16] Thus, since the passage does not refer to a mere non-entity, we can understand how the words ‘real,’ etc., serve to specify Brahman and define Brahman’s essential nature. Otherwise, what is there to be specified? or whose essential nature has to be defined?

Of these (attributive words), the word ‘infinite’ constitutes a qualifying adjunct by way of denying all limitation, while the words ‘real’ and ‘consciousness’ are qualifying adjuncts by themselves conveying some (positive) ideas of their own.

The exclusion of the opposite is, as was already shewn,^[17] only an implication, not the primary import of the words.—(Ś)

 

As one with the Self, Brahman is infinite.

Since in the passage “From Him, verily, from this Self (Ātman), was ākāśa born,”^[18] etc., the word ‘Self’ (Ātman) is used with reference to Brahman, Brahman is the very Self of the knower. And in the words “He unites with this blissful Self”^[19] the śruti declares that Brahman is the Self. And also because of His entrance: in the words “having created it, He entered into that very thing,^[20]” the śruti shews that Brahman Himself has penetrated into the body in the form of jīva. Brahman is, therefore, the knower’s own Self.

Brahman will be spoken of as “one hid in the cave,”^[21] and again as the Self (Ātman) in the words “From Him, verily, from this Ātman here, was ākāśa born”.^[22] From these two passages we may conclude that the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘Ātman’ denote one and the same thing.^[23] Do you maintain that the Supreme Brahman is spoken of as distinct from the conscious Self?^[24] Then how could the distinction, alleged to be taught by the Scripture as an absolute truth, be ever set aside?^[25] If the Self be notin Himself the Supereme Brahman, how can His nature be altered by the mere command^[26] of the śruti,—how can it be altered by something else (i. e., by constant meditation of the unity?) From him who directs his mind to the Inner Self, who has rid himself of all attributes alien to the Self, and who has then attained, in accordance with the teaching of the scriptures, the knowledge that ‘I am Brahman’,—how can the Supreme be different from him? If all such attributes ns “not gross,”^[27] be held to be the attributes of Brahman who is distinct from the Self, of what avail are they, all of them being alien to the Self? If, on the other hand, they are the attributes of the Self, they serve to obliterate the idea of all distinction between the Self and Brahman. The śruti^[28] opens with the word ‘Brahman’ and ends with the word ‘Ātman’. Each of the words ‘Brahman’ and ‘Ātman’ will find its complete signification only when it includes the connotation of the other, and this is not possible if Brahman and Ātman were two distinct entities.—(S).

 

Brahman is the eternal, infinite, independent Consciousness.

(Objection):—If so, Brahman being the Self, He is the knower, the agent of the act of knowing. It is a well-known fact that the Self is the knower. “He desired:”^[29] in these words the śruti gives us to understand that he who has desire is the knower.^[30] Thus, as Brahman is the knower, it would not be proper to speak of Brahman as knowledge or consciousness.^[31] It would also make Brahman non-eternal. If Brahman were knowledge,—i. e., the dhātvartha, the root-sense, the very act of knowing,—then Brahman would be noneternal. And then Brahman would also be relative or dependent; for, the act signified by the root ‘jñā’ to know depends upon the operation of kārakas or accessories of action; and knowledge or consciousness being here the meaning of the root, it is non-eternal and dependent.

(Answer): —No; for, as it is not distinct from the essential nature (of the Self), knowledge or consciousness is spoken of as an effect, only by courtesy. Consciousness is the essential nature of the Self (Ātman); it is not distinct from the Self, and it is therefore eternal. Now to explain: The manifestations—in the form of sound, etc.,—of the buddhi, which is an upādhi of (the Self), and which, passing through the eye and other sense-organs, puts on the forms of sense-objects, are objects of Ātman’s consciousness; and whenever they arise, they become permeated by Ātman’s consciousness; and it is these manifestations of buddhi,—illumined by the Ātman’s consciousness and spoken of as consciousness itself,—which constitute the meaning of the root ‘jñā’ = to know and are imagined by the undiscriminating men to be the inherent attributes (dharmas) of Ātman Himself, changing every now and then.

The changes which take place in the buddhi are ascribed to the Self owing to non-discrimination. The Self is not the agent in the act of knowing, because knowledge or consciousness which is the essential nature of the Self is not distinct from Him. It is the buddhi which gives rise to the cognitions, and its agency is ascribed by courtesy to the Witness thereof. For, the buddhi gives rise to vṛttis or cognitions permeated by Ātman’s consciousness—all embraced by the consciousness—as sparks of incandescent iron (are permeated by fire). On seeing that these cognitions to which the buddhi has given rise are all set with Consciousness, the ignorant think that Consciousness itself is produced, though It is eternal, immutable (Kṇṭastha). What other witness can be cited to prove the agency of that Witness whose evidence is the only one men have as to the manifestation and obscuration of the buddhi? As Consciousness is unaffected prior to the rise of any particular state of buddhi, so, too, even on the rise of that state, Consciousness remains unaffected, as our own experience proves.—(S) That is to say, there exists no evidence to prove that any change has taken place in Consciousness which witnesses the absence as well as the presence of a state of buddhi. The Witness-Consciousness remains unaffected by the state of buddhi while merely witnessing the absence or presence of buddhi’s modes.—(A)

As to Brahman’s Consciousness, however, it is, like the sun’s light or like the heat of the fire, not distinct from Brahman’s essential nature (svarūpa); nay, it is the very essential nature of Brahman, not dependent on any external cause, inasmuch as it is His own eternal nature. As all beings are undivided from Him in time and space, as He is the cause of time and ākaśa and all else, as He is extremely subtle,—to Him there is nothing unknowable, however subtle, concealed and remote it may be, whether past or present or future. Wherefore, Brahman is all-knowing. And there is also the following mantra:

“Without hands, without feet, He moveth, He graspeth; eyeless He seeth, earless He heareth. He knoweth what is to be known, yet is there no knower of Him. Him call they first, mighty, the Man.”^[32]

The Śruti further says:

“Knowing is inseparable from the knower, because it cannot peṛṣ. But there is then no second, nothing else different from Him that He could know”^[33]

Because Brahman is not different from the Conscious one (Self) and has not to rely (for His Consciousness) on the sense-organs and other instruments of knowledge, we must understand that, though essentially of the nature of Consciousness, Brahman is yet eternal. His Consciousness is not what is connoted by the root (namely, the temporary act of knowing), inasmuch as It is immutable. And for the same reason, Brahman is not the agent of the act of knowing.

 

Brahman is beyond speech.

For the same reason, Brahman cannot be designated by the word ‘jñāna’. On the other hand, by the word ‘jñāna’ which refers only to a semblance of His (Consciousness) and denotes a state (dharma) of buddhi, Brahman is indicated, but not designated, inasmuch as Brahman is devoid of attributes such as genus (quality, act, etc.), through denoting which words can be applied to things, and inasmuch as the word refers to the same thing to which ‘real’ and ‘infinite’ refer.

As Brahman illumines agents and acts, words which designate agents and acts can but remotely indicate the Supreme Brahman; they do not directly designate Him. Brahman’s Consciousness, which is inseparate from all, which is immutable and is not different from Brahman, is immanent in all as their Innermost Self.—(S)

Neither can Brahman be designated by the word ‘Real.’ Being in His essential nature devoid of all alien elements, Brahman, when defined as real, is only indicated by the word which denotes the genus or universal of being (sattā-sāmānya) in the external world. Brahman cannot indeed be primarily denoted by the word ‘satya’.

Accordingly, in their close mutual proximity, the words ‘real,’ etc., determine the sense of one another; and while thus shewing that Brahman cannot be directly designated by the words ‘real’ etc., they serve also to indicate the essential nature of Brahman.

These words, without giving up their own meaning, indicate the nature of the Supreme by eliminating every thing alien to His nature and removing the ignorance which is the root of all illusion. ‘Real’ and other words used here have different meanings only in so far as they serve to eliminate different ideas such as unreality. When the elimination has taken place, all these words point to the one essential nature of Brahman, which is not therefore a complex idea conveyed by an assemblage of words (vākya).—(S)

Hence the unspeakableness of Brahman by a word, as the śruti declares in the following words:

“Whence (all) words return without attaining, as also manas.”^[34]

“He finds his fearless mainstay in the Unuttered, in the Homeless.”^[35]

Hence, too, is He, unlike the blue lotus, not denoted by an assemblage of words.

All such passages as these can have a meaning only when Brahman is of the nature described above.

Thus (the meaning of the words in the definition is as follows); The word ‘real (satya)’ signifies immutability (kūtastha-tā), and the word ‘jñāna (knowledge)’ consciousness. Consciousness being in itself immutable (and forming the nature of Brahman), the knower, (i. e., the Witness, Brahman) is infinite (ananta), i. e., One.—(S).

 

‘Real,’ etc., construed as specifying attributives.

Though in reality there is only one Brahman and no more, still, as associated with upādhis which are unreal, insentient, and limited, three other Brahmans—belonging to the same genus of Brahman as the Real Brahman, but who are respectively unreal, insentient, and limited,—may appear to exist, from the stand-point of an ignorant person. Accordingly, the words ‘real’, etc., serve to distinguish the Brahman meant here from the other Brahmans.

 

‘Real’ etc., construed as defining attributives.

But when the passage is regarded as a definition, it serves to distinguish the one Brahman from the upādhis which belong to a different genus altogether. Elsewhere, for example, the śruti has defined the Infinite (Bhūman) by distinguishing It from all ordinary consciousness which is triple (tripuṭī), i. e., which always comprises the three elements of perceiver, perception and percept. The Chhando-gas read as follows:

“Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, and understands nothing else, that is the Infinite.”^[36]

Here the śruti teaches that the Infinite is that thing in which the threefold consciousness of one seeing another is absent and thus points to the Reality which is beyond all ordinary experience by distinguishing It from everything else. Similarly, here, too, we may understand that in the words ‘real,’ etc., the śruti defines Brahman to be untinged with unreality and so on by way of distinguishing Him from all that is unreal.

 

‘Real,’ etc., define Brahman by mutual government.

Now, when construed as mere (specifying) attributives, the three words—‘real,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘infinite’— combine together by way of governing the meaning of one another and point to the essential nature of Brahman.

To explain: The word ‘real,’ which means absence of bādha or liability to prove false, denotes three kinds of reality, namely—

1. Prātibhāsika or pertaining to illusion,
2. Vyāvahārika or pertaining to practical or ordinary life,
3. Pāramārthika or absolutely true.

In the case in which the mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, the silver does not prove false so long as the illusion (pratibhāsa) lasts, and this sort of reality is therefore spoken of as Prātibhāsika. Earth and other elements of matter, as also the body (śarīra) and other material compounds, do not prove false in our conseriousness of practical life, and their reality is therefore spoken of as Vyāvahārika or pertaining to ordinary or practical life. Not proving false even after the attainment of the knowledge produced by the Vedānta (Upaniṣad), the reality of Brahman is Pāramārthika or absolutely true. The word ‘real’ applied to the three kinds of reality alike, points here to Brahman, as it is governed— i.e., as its application is restricted—by the words ‘consciousness (jñāna)’ and ‘infinite (ananta).’ The real of the illusory and the ordinary consciousness are neither conscious nor infinite. Even the word ‘jñāna (knowledge or consciousness),’ applied alike to Consciousness (Chit) and to the vṛttis or modes of buddhi, points here to Brahman whose essential nature is Chit or Consciousness, since the use of the word is restricted by the words ‘real’ and ‘infinite.’ Certainly, unlike Brahman, the buddhi-vṛttis or states of mind are neither absolutely real (abādhya),—i. e., beyond all liability to prove false,—nor devoid of the three^[37] kinds of limitation. The word ‘infinite’, too, applied alike to the ākāśa which is unlimited in space and to Brahman who is devoid of all kinds of limitation, applies to Brahman alone when its use is restricted by the words ‘real’ and ‘consciousness,’ for the reason that ākāśa is neither consciousness nor absolutely real. Thus governing one another, the three words ‘real,’ ‘consciousness’ and ‘infinite’ point to Brahman who is immutable, conscious, and secondless.

So the teachers of old say:

“‘Real’ means immutable, ‘jñāna(knowledge)’ means consciousness, and ‘infinite’ means one. Thus by the three words is Brahman denoted.”

Of the three words, the word “infinite” denotes Brahman by merely excluding all else, whereas the words “real” and “consciousness” refer to Brahman by primarily signifying in themselves immutability and consciousness and incidentally excluding falsity and insentiency (jñḍya) as the Vārtikakāra has said.^[38] There the Vārtikakāra has said that the idea of exclusion is not the primary import of the sentence and that it is derived from another source of knowledge. This other source of knowledge is the inexplicability of a coexistence of the pairs of opposites—reality and unreality, consciousness and unconsciousness.

It is true that the relation (here imported) of substance and attribute is not real; still, it does forma gateway to the knowledge of Brahman in His true nature in the same way as a reflection, which is false in itself, leads to a knowledge of the real object, or in the same way as the seeing of a woman in a dream indicates the good that is to come. In so far as from the three adjuncts we thus get a knowledge of the essential nature of Brahman, they constitute a definition of Brahman.

 

Brahman defined as the Real.

Or, each of these adjuncts is in itself an independent definition of Brahman. The unreal,—namely, ajñāna and its effects,—being excluded by the word ‘real,’ there remains one thing alone, the indivisible (akhaṇḍa) Consciousness, i. e., Brahman. The attribute of reality, which has thus hinted at the essential nature of Brahman, is itself an effect of ajñāna and therefore false; and as such it is excluded by the very word ‘real.’ The kataka^[39] dust, for example, when dropped into the muddy water, removes the muddiness, and itself disappears. Or, to take another example: a drug swallowed for the digestion of the food already eaten causes the digestion of itself and of the food. It should not be supposed that, as the attribute of reality is thus excluded, it will follow that Brahman is false. For, unreality has been already excluded. On the disappearance of the kataka dust, for example, the former muddiness does not again appear; nor, when the drug has been digested, does the food again become undigested. Both reality and unreality having been thus excluded, the result is to define that Brahman is attributeless. Does any one imagine that such a thing is non-existent? He should not; for then the Thing cannot be Existence (Sat) and the Self (Ātman). The Chhandogas declare ‘Brahman is Existence and the Self.’ Having begun with the Reality under the designation ‘Existence (Sat)’—in the words “Existence alone, my dear, this at first was”—they read “That is real (satya), That the Self (Ātman).”^[40] Thus the very thing, that is here (in the Taittirīya-upaniṣad) spoken of as ‘real’ is in the Chhāndogya-Upaniṣad declared to be Existence and the Self. Certainly, Existence cannot be non-existent, any more than light can be darkness. We have already refuted the idea of the non-existence of the Self by citing the bhāṣyakāra’s (Śaṅkarāchārya’s) words.^[41] Moreover, Brahman cannot be non-existent, because He is the basic reality whereon rests the illusory notions of reality, falsity, and so on. There can, indeed, be no illusion without an underlying basic reality. To this end, the Chhāndogya-Upaniṣad first expounds, as the opponent’s view, the theory of Non-existence in the words, “On that, verily, some say that Non-existence alone this at first was, one alone without a second; from that Non-existence the existence was born;” then it condemns that theory in the words “How, indeed, my dear, can it be thus?, he said, how can existence be born of Non-existence?and then finally it concludes with the theory of Existence, as its own, in the words “Existence alone, verily, my dear, this at first was, one alone without a second.”^[42] And this theory alone is consistent with experience. If, on the other hand, Non-existence were the upādāna or material cause of the universe, (i. e., if the universe is made up of Non-existence), then the whole universe would present itself to consciousness in association with non-existence,—thus: earth does not exist, water does not exist, and so on. But the universe is not so regarded. Wherefore, Brahman, the Cause of the Universe, is Existence itself.

Just as in the Chhāndogya are expounded the merits and faults of the theories of Existence and Non-existence in regard to Brahman, the Cause, so also here in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad will be expounded the merits and faults of the theories of Existence and Non-existence with reference to Brahman in His aspect as the Inner Self (Pratyagātman):

“Non-being, verily, doth one become if he doth Brahman as non-being know. Brahman is!—if thus one knows, they then as being Him do know.”^[43]

The Kaṭhas also read, “‘He exists’—thus alone is He to be known.”^[44] Therefore, though actually devoid of the attribute of reality or being, still, as the basic reality whereon rests that illusory notion, Brahman is Being,—Existence itself.

(Objection):—If a thing cannot exist in either of the only two possible alternative modes of existence, no other mode of existence is indeed possible. On this principle, we think that it does not stand to reason that Brahman is devoid of both the attributes, reality and unreality.

(Answer):—Not so. It is possible, as in the case of a eunuch (napuṃsaka). A eunuch is neither of the -male sex nor of the female sex. So here.

(Objection):—The existence of this third class of persons is proved by immediate or sensuous perception.

(Answer):—If so, Brahman also is known from the śruti (to be neither real nor unreal.)

(Objection):—But, in the words “Brahman is real,” the śruti says that Brahman is denoted by the word ‘real’ and thus admits of the attribute of reality.

(Answer):—No, because of the sruti declaring that Brahman is beyond speech in the words, “whence all words turn back.”^[45] But the word ‘real’ which in common parlance is applied to the real of our ordinary consciousness, and which, on the strength of the attribute of such reality falsely ascribed to Brahman, excludes the opposite attribute of unreality, points to the real Brahman, the mere Existence devoid of both the attributes, just as a person extracts by one thorn another that has pierced into his sole, and then, casting aside both, leaves the sole alone. Thus, the definition that ‘Brahman is real’ is faultless.

 

Brahman defined as Consciousness.

(Objection)As jñāna (knowledge, consciousness), Brahman may be concerned in an act. Jñāna may mean either that by which something is known, or the very act of knowing. In the former case, Brahman becomes an instrument in the act of knowing, and in the latter He becomes an act. But, properly speaking, Brahman cannot be either. “Partless, actionless, tranquil;”^[46] in these words action is altogether excluded. Therefore the definition of Brahman as jñāna is fallacious.

(Answer):—Not so. Like the word ‘real (satya)Ā the word ‘ consciousness (jñāna)’ also is a lakṣana, an indicator. The root, in itself, denotes only a mode of mind (buddhi-vṛtti). Accordingly in the Upadeśa-sahasrī it is said:

“The Ātman’s semblance (ābhāsa) is the agent, and the act of buddhi is the meaning of the root. Both these, combined together without discrimination, form the meaning of the word ‘knows.’ Buddhi has no consciousness, and the Atman has no action; so that, properly speaking, neither of these can alone be said to know.”^[47]

The word ‘jñāna’ which denotes primarily the buddhi or mind having consciousness reflected in it, and manifesting some sense-object as sound, touch, and so on, ascribes to Brahman the attribute of cognition, with a view first to exclude inertness and insentiency (jaḍatva) from Brahman and then to indicate the true nature of Brahman as devoid of even that attribute, i. e., as the Pratyagātman (Inner Self), as the Eternal Consciousness. All this has been clearly explained by the Vārtikakāra.^[48] The śruti says:

“Sight is indeed inseparable from the seer.”^[49]

“As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, indeed, has the Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.”^[50]

In these passages the śruti declares that the Self is one Eternal Pure Consciousness, and it is the actionless Self of this nature that is here hinted at by the word ‘jñāna (consciousness) Therefore the definition that Brahman is Consciousness is free from all faults.

 

Brahman defined as the Infinite.

(Objection):—The definition that Brahman is the Infinite excludes the three kinds of limitation, so that, it follows that Brahman has the absence of limitation for its attribute. To say, for instance, that there is no pot here on this piece of land is to signify that the piece of land has the absence of a pot for its attribute. Accordingly, the passage cannot point to one Indivisible Essence (akhaṇḍa-eka-rasa).

(Answer):—When limitation of Brahman by a second thing is excluded, even abhāva or non-existence as something distinct from Brahman has been excluded: so that the word ‘infinite’ first predicates of Brahman an association with abhāva or non-existence,—which is itself a product of māyā,—with a view to exclude limitation, and then excluding, on the principle of the kataka dust,^[51] even that abhāva, it points only to the One Essence, the One Existence. Thus alone can we explain the śruti which says elsewhere, “Existence alone, my dear, this at first was.” Therefore the definition of Brahman as the Infinite is faultless. Accordingly the Vārtikakāra says:

“As the Śelf is the womb of time and space, as the Self is the All, as nothing else exists, the Supreme Self is absolutely infinite.

“There can be indeed no limitation of the Uncreated Reality by the fictitious. Time and other things (we experience) here are all fictitious, because of the śruti ‘mere creation of speech is all changing form.’”^[52]

 

Other definitions of Brahman.

On the same principle of construction that has been adopted in interpreting the expression ‘Brahman is real,’ we should construe, as forming each an independent definition, such words as ‘bliss (ānanda),’ ‘self-luminous (svayaw-jyotis),’ ‘full (pūrṇa),’ occurring in the passages like the following:

“Consciousness and Bliss is Brahman.”^[53]

“There he becomes the self-luminous Puruṣa.”^[54]

“Full is That, Full is This.”^[55]

Accordingly, bliss and other attributes should be gathered together in this connection. Such plurality of definitions is due to the plurality of the popular illusions—concerning the nature of Brahman—which have to be removed; and Brahman is not, on that account, of many kinds. It is the Unconditioned (Nir-viśeṣa) alone that all the definitions ultimately refer to.

The principle of the gathering together (upasaṃhāra) of bliss and other defining adjuncts in this connection has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras III. iii. n -13 as follows:

(Question):—The Taittirīya-Upaniṣad describes the Supreme Brahman as ‘Bliss,’ ‘Real,’ and so on in the following passages: “Bliss is Brahman;” “Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman.” The question is: Is it necessary or not necessary to take into account these attributes of Brahman when studying the teaching of the Aitareyaka and other Upaniṣads concerning the Supreme Brahman, as contained in such passages as “Consciousness (prajñāna) is Brahman?”^[56]

(Prima facie view):—Not necessary, because such attributes are peculiar to the Vidyā (upāsana) inculcated in that particular Upaniṣad, as in the case of the attributes like “the Dispenser of blessings.”—To explain: In the Upakosala-Vidyā, Brahman is spoken of as “the Dispenser of blessings,” “the Dispenser of Light,”^[57] and so on, while in the Dahara-Vidyā, He is spoken of as “one of unfailing desires and unfailing purposes.”^[58] But the attributes mentioned in the one Vidyā are not to be taken into account in the other. A similar assortment should be made here in the case of ‘bliss’ and other attributes.

(Conclusion):—The two cases are not quite analogous. Since the attributes such as “the Dispenser of blessings” are mentioned where specific courses of contemplation are enjoined (for specific purposes), each group of attributes should be held quite apart from other groups in strict accordance with the injunctions. But the attributes such as ‘ bliss’ are calculated to give rise to a knowledge of Brahman, and, as such, they do not form subjects of injunction. Accordingly, since there is no room at all here for injunction pointing to a particular assortment of attributes, and since all of them alike are calculated to lead to a knowledge of Brahman, they should all be taken into account in determining the essential nature of Brahman.

 

Brahman is unconditioned.

That Brahman is unconditioned has been discussed in the Vedānta-sūtras, III. ii. 11-21 as follows:

(Question):—Is Brahman conditioned or unconditioned?

(Prima facie view):—“This Brahman is four-footed:”^[59] in such words as these the śruti declares Brahman to be conditioned. “Not gross, not subtle:”^[60] in these words the śruti declares Brahman to be unconditioned. Therefore, Brahman actually exists in both ways.

(Conclusion):—It is the Unconditioned that is taught in the scriptures, inasmuch as it is the Unconditioned that other sources of knowledge cannot tell us anything about. On the contrary, Brahman, conditioned as the author of the universe, can be known by a process of inference such as the following: the earth and all other things must have a cause because they are effects. Therefore, when in the upāsana section the conditioned Brahman is presented for contemplation, the śruti only reiterates the nature of Brahman as ascertainable from other sources of knowledge. But that is not the idea concerning the nature of Brahman which the śruti aims, in the main, to inculcate. We should not, however, suppose that Brahman really exists in both ways, as made out respectively by inference and from the śruti. To say that one and the same thing is both conditioned and unconditioned is a contradiction in terms. Thus, inasmuch as the notion that Brahman is conditioned does not constitute the chief aim of this teaching, it must be a mere illusion; and therefore Brahman is in reality unconditioned. It is this Brahman, the One Indivisible Essence, that is referred to in the passage ‘Real, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman.’

 

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

i. e., epithets stating the specific attributes of Brahman.—(A)

[2]:

Chhā. Up. 6-1-4.

[3]:

Gauḍapāda-Kārikās i—17.

[4]:

i.e., from the analogy of day.

[5]:

Chhā Up. 7-24-1.

[6]:

i. e., to deny the seeing, hearing, etc., of things beyond the Self.—(Tr)

[7]:

Chhā Up. 6-7-8.

[8]:

Chhā. Up. 6-5-4.

[9]:

Muṇḍ. Up. 2–2–11.

[10]:

there being no source of knowledge, other than śruti, concerning Brahman.

[11]:

Vide Minor Upaniṣads Vol. II. p. 26,

[12]:

As the opponent suggests. Vide ante p. 216.

[13]:

Vide ante p. 238.

[14]:

A non-entity need not be defined simply because it is a non entity.—(A).

[15]:

Vide the Bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtras, Vol. I, p. 14 (S. B. E).

[16]:

Maṇḍ. Up. 2.

[17]:

Vide ante pp.247-248.

[18]:

Taitt. Up. 2-1.

[19]:

Ibid. 2-8.

[20]:

Ibid. 2-6.

[21]:

Ibid. 2-1. i. e. as the witness of the buddhi, i. e., again as the Self (Ātman)—(A)

[22]:

Ibid.

[23]:

Therefore Brahman cannot be limited by the Self.—(A)

[24]:

In such passages as “who abides in the Self (Ātman)” etc., Bṛ. Up. 3-7 (Mādhyandina-Śākhā)—(A)

[25]:

That is to say, inasmuch as it could not be set aside, we should understand that the śruti merely reiterates the distinction, as set up by illusion, with a view to teach unity.—(A)

[26]:

The alleged Vedic command being “Let the mind dwell in the thought that ‘thou art That’.”—(A)

[27]:

Bṛ. Up. 3-8-8.

[28]:

The passage here referred to is “Tell me Brahman who is visible, not invisible, the Self (Ātman) who is within all” Bṛ. Up, 3–4–1.– (A).

[29]:

Bṛ. Up. 1-2; 1-4.

[30]:

And as shewn in the Tarka-śāstras or the Sciences of Logic, it is but proper that the Self (Ātman) is an agent—(S)

[31]:

As was done before. Vide ante p. 242.

[32]:

Śvetā. Up. 3-19.

[33]:

Bṛ. Up. 4-3-30.

[34]:

Taitt. Up. 2-4.

[35]:

Ibid. 2-7

[36]:

Chhānd. Up. 7-24-1.

[37]:

Vide ante pp. 245, 246.

[38]:

Vide ante p. 248.

[39]:

The clearing-nut, a seed of the plant Strychnos Potatorum, which being rubbed upon the inside of the water-jars occasions a precipitation of the earthy particles diffused through the water and removes them.

[40]:

Chhā, Up. 6-9-4.

[41]:

Vide ante p. 253.

[42]:

Op. cit. 6-2-1, 2.

[43]:

Taitt. Up. 2-6.

[44]:

Kaṭha. Up. 6-13.

[45]:

Śveta. Up. 6-19.

[46]:

Tait. Up. 2-4.

[47]:

Op. cit. (Verse) xviii. 53-54.

[48]:

Vide ante p. 257.

[49]:

Bṛ. Up. 4-3-23.

[50]:

Ibid. 4-5-13,

[51]:

Vide ante p. 265.

[52]:

Tait. Up. Vārtika, Brahmavallī, 134–135.

[53]:

Bṛ. Up. 3-9-28. 

[54]:

Ibid. 4-3-9.

[55]:

Ibid. 5-1-1.

[56]:

Ait. Up. 5-3.

[57]:

Chhā. Up. 4-15-3, 4.

[58]:

Ibid. 8-1-5.

[59]:

Chhā. Up. 3-18-2.

[60]:

Bṛ. Up. 3-8-8.