Appendix on the Upādhi

[As the upādhi or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of the sections in the Bhāshā-pariccheda and the Siddhānta-muktāvalī, which treat of it.]

cxxxvii. That which always accompanies the major term (sādhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), is called the Condition (upādhi); its examination is now set forth.

Our author now proceeds to define the upādhi or condition,^[1] which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person;—"that which always accompanies," &c. The meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being produced from wet fuel," as an upādhi, since "wet fuel" is necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as e.g., in a red-hot iron ball.]

"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not follow that (a) in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrā's, whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitrā's son,' we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'^[2] as a 'condition,'—inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (b) Again, in the argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense^[3] because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably accompany perceptibility]. (c) Again, in the argument,'Destruction is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of existence'^[4] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called "emergent," dvaṃśābhāva], inasmuch as periṣability is found in antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this,—that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariably to accompany. Thus (a) the "being produced from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitrā's son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (b) Again, "possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term "the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.^[5] (c) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, "antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]

But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms, i.e., there is nothing there which invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term which is too general, the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,^[6] or else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but excluding the said condition;^[7] and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major term, and not always accompanying the middle term."^[8]

cxxxviii. All true Conditions reside in the same subjects with their major terms;^[9] and, their subjects being thus common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general in regard to the Condition and the major term.^[10]

cxxxix. It is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the Condition has to be employed.

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of having a condition at all. (a.) Thus, where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited^[11] major term, we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied. (b.) But where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany,—there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, "B is dark because he is Mitrā's son," the middle term "the fact of being Mitrā's son" is too general in regard to the sādhya, "dark colour," because it is too general in regard to the upādhi, "feeding on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrā's second son [Mitrā's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrā herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth].

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument].

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in "the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,^[12] [thus the upādhi here is a means of overthrowing the false argument].

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.^[13] But "the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy.^[14]

E. B. C.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The upādhi is the "condition" which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid; if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if the mountain has wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is Mitrā's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.

[2]:

The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from her living on ghee.

[3]:

By Bhāshā-parich. śl. 25, the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, are sparśavat, but by śl. 27 of these air is neither pratyakṣa nor rūpavat.

[4]:

This condition would imply that we could only argue from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive existence, not non-existence.

[5]:

"Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was not soul, but air.

[6]:

As, e.g., the mountain and Mitrā's first son in the two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" (when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and "Mitrā's first son A is dark because he is Mitrā's offspring" (when her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective sādhyas or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.

[7]:

As, e.g., the red-hot ball of iron and Mitrā's second son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire" and "the being Mitrā's offspring" do not possess the respective conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor, consequently, the respective major terms (sādhya) "smoke" and "dark colour."

[8]:

This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in (a), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for, though they are the sites of the sādhya "dark colour," they do not admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term "the being Mitrā's son."

[9]:

I.e., wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in their extension.

[10]:

Where the hetu is found and not the sādhya (as in the red-hot ball of iron), there the upādhi also is not applicable.

[11]:

I.e., one which requires no determining fact or mark, such as the three objected arguments required in § 137.

[12]:

The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,—i.e., one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point." Here the proposed upādhi "the being always found elsewhere than in fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the hetu "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the sādhya "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.

[13]:

As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing a body." See Kusumāñjali, v. 2.

[14]:

In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a true condition must be consistent with either party's opinions.