by E. B. Cowell | 1882 | 102,190 words | ISBN-13: 9788174791962
The Sarva-darsana-samgraha (English translation) of Madhava Acharya is a compendium of different philosophical schools of Hindu thought and Pancadasi, an important text in the Advaita Vedanta tradition. Full title: Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha or Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy (author Mādhava Ācārya)...
We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the system of the Theistic Sāṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the so-called Yoga Śāstra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sāṅkhya Pravacana," or detailed explanation of the Sāṅkhya. In the first chapter thereof the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration" (yoga), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Śāstra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (samādhi). In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds the practical part of yoga proper to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the three internal subservients—attention, contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name "subjugation" (saṃyama), and also the various superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called "perfections" (siddhis). This school accepts the old twenty-five principles [of the Sāṅkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth—a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions, and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.
"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have declared—
"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which torment,
And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."
It has been also said by Patañjali, "The power of the enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an object which is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof."
Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or reflected,—i.e., in the thinking principle or the understanding,—it experiences the modifications thereof, i.e., the power of intelligence, being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions," ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.
The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The word "now" (atha) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, [as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word atha; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their gender [the Amara Koṣa Dictionary] gives many such meanings. 'Atha is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,—after,—now (inceptive),—what? (interrogatively),—and all (comprehensively).' Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly suitable, i.e., 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for singling out the last." This objection, however, will not stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of "after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation, i.e., "previous existence [relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else; and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle atha to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance [which the presumed cause should have]. "But why should we not hold that the word atha implies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition" (anuśāsana), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by which the yoga is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors, in accordance with the words of Śruti: "Therefore having become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in the soul." Nor can the word atha imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, even granting that both these are present, they need not to be mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still [however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the exposition of the yoga ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present. But it is clear that the exposition in question is such a cause, since we have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, ii. 12]: "By the acquirement of yoga or intense concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛti as that [in the Bhagavad Gītā, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attain yoga." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to interpret atha as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body strong].
But in the case of the Vedānta Sūtras, which open with the aphorism, "Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Ācārya has declared that the inceptive meaning of atha must be left out of the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after," i.e., that this desire must follow a previous course of tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called "means."
"Well, then, let us grant that atha cannot mean 'after;' but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of yoga, since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain. Therefore it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that "the exposition of the yoga is auspicious;" for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning of atha or its secondary meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?" We reply, that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that "verbal expectancy can be fulfilled by words alone."
"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a Śāstra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since it has been said by the wise, 'Those śāstras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'? Now the word atha implies 'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛti which says,
"'The word Om and the word atha,—these two in the ancient time,
"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they are both auspicious.'
"Therefore let the word atha stand here as signifying 'auspiciousness,' like the word 'vṛddhi' used by Pāṇini in his opening sūtra 'vṛddhir ād aich.'" This view, however, is untenable; since the very word atha, when heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How can the particle atha have any other effect, if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly can have such other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey. Nor does this contradict the smṛti, since the smṛti will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean only that they produce an auspicious effect.
Nor can the particle atha have here the meaning of "reference to a previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, as to whether this particular atha means "the inceptive now" or "after," if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the atha of the sūtra, the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now this is the Viśvajyotis," the particle atha is accepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, just as the atha in the commencement of the Mahābhāshya, "now comes the exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of Grammar. This has been declared by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, "the atha in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;" and Vācaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may be considered as settled that the atha here indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this atha implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the śāstra through the attainment of the yoga, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not the smṛti of Yājñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable Patañjali, that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the Purāṇas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his anuśāsana,—the preposition anu implying that it was a teaching which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system.
Since this atha in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the institute for the exposition of the yoga is now commenced." In this institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, is yoga [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption (kaivalya) is the highest "end" of the yoga when it is produced. The "connection" between the institute and yoga is that of the producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between yoga and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is well known from Śruti and Smṛti, as I have before shown. And it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedānta sūtras, "Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedānta. For the word atha, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no place." The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the "subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of "śruti"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'—when any of these come into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more remote" [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus summed up—
"But surely if yoga is held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to these negations; and consequently in accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow; because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindered, such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ (citta), since the power of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul has not been proved, since there is an argument to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially pure substance which abides always the same; and as it is this which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces an impression; and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is not affected is not known; for the understanding is called "susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet,—this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just as these do iron,—coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,—all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañcaśikha declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the understanding are always known,—this arises from the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is notoriously threefold, i.e., a change of "property," of "aspect," and of "condition." When the subject, the understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of "property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition" when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation of the perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their "suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.
[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above.] "But if we accept your definition that 'yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the citta,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or suspension] of the modifications found in kṣipta, vikṣipta, mūḍha, &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called kṣipta, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the attainment of the summum bonum. Let us examine this more closely. For the understanding is called kṣipta, 'restless,' when it is restless [with an excess of the quality rajas], as being tossed about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called mūḍha, 'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality tamas]. It is called vikṣipta, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the first state [as filled with the quality sattva]." We must here, however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gītā (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Kṛṣṇa, is fickle, turbulent, violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the Yoga Sūtras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and instability,—these distractions of the mind are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition of yoga.
We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the three conditions of the mind called kṣipta, mūḍha, and vikṣipta, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called yoga], this does not apply to the other two conditions called ekāgra and niruddha, which are to be pursued and attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as yoga. Now by ekāgra we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the sattva quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by niruddha we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.
Now this samādhi, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition" (saṃprajñāta), and "that in which distinct recognition is lost" (asaṃprajñāta) [Yoga S., i. 17, 18]. The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect is thoroughly recognised (samyak prajñāyate) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold division, as savitarka, savicāra, sānanda, and sāsmita. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (bhāvanā), which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds, being either Īśvara or the twenty-five principles. And these principles also are of two kinds—senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent, or in the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative" (savitarka). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative" (savicāra). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and "darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" (sānanda), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation of joy. When pondering is pursued, having as its object the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (sāsmita), because here personal existence only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].
But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.
"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts."
The "afflictions" (kleśa) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word avidyā, "ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an avyayībhāva compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "above-board"? or is it a tatpuruṣa [or karmadhāraya] compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk"? or is it a bahuvrīhi compound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in avidyā (i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, or prasajya-pratishedha); and consequently, as avidyā would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by (a + vidyā), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛtti, "there is a bahuvrīhi compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of this subsequent word"—we must explain this supposed bahuvrīhi compound avidyā as follows: "That buddhi is to be characterised as avidyā (sc. an adjective), of which there is not a vidyā existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an avidyā could not become the source of the "afflictions;" and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source, even though it were associated with the suppression of all the "modifications," and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in the sāsmita meditation].
Now it is said [in the Yoga Sūtras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field [or place of origin, i.e., source] of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be "dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them. This has been expressed by Vācaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyāsa's Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:—
"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which are absorbed in the tattvas [i.e., not embodied, but existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the 'extenuated' are found in yogins; but the 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact with worldly objects."
"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound avidyā as a dvandva compound, where both portions are equally predominant, because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' would be overthrown."
[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation called paryudāsa [where the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that avidyā means a contradictory [or wrong] kind of knowledge, the reverse of vidyā; and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been said—
"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root; thus the words abrāhmaṇa and adharma respectively signify, 'what is other than a Brāhman' and 'what is contrary to justice.'"
"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested from the use in which it has been already employed."
Vācaspati also says, "The connection of words and their meanings depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we occasionally see that a tatpuruṣa negation, where the latter portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even here too [in avidyā] the real meaning is something contrary to vidyā" [i.e., the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the positive "ignorance"]. It is with a view to this that it is said in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally) eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." Viparyaya, "misconception," is defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing," [i.e., in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the "eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, i.e., a jar, or the imagining the "pure" in the "impure" body, when it has been declared by a proverbial couplet—
"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original place [the womb],—from its primal seed,—from its composition [of humours, &c.],—from perspiration,—from death [as even a Brāhman's body defiles],—and from the fact that it has to be made pure by rites."
So,—in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii. 15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything, or through the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],—ignorance transfers the idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, e.g., garlands, sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul," e.g., the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said—
"But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of 'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;
"This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is liberation."
Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.
But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance should there not be given some general definition applying to them all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be established? For thus it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila—
"'Without some general definition, a more special definition cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even mentioned here.'"
This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as "the imagining of a thing in its opposite."
"Egoism" (asmitā) is the notion that the two separate things, the soul and the quality of purity, are one and the same, as is said (ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of sight." "Desire" (rāga) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (dveṣa) is the feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;" "Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).
Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this word anuśayin ('dwelling') as formed by the kṛt affix ṇini in the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the taddhita affix ini in the sense of matup? It cannot be the former, since the affix ṇini cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as anuśī; for, as the word supi has already occurred in the Sūtra, iii. 2, 4, and has been exerting its influence in the following sūtras, this word must have been introduced a second time in the Sūtra, iii. 2, 78, supy ajātau ṇinis tācchīlye, on purpose to exclude prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sūtra, vii. 2, 115, acho ñṇiti, that the radical vowel must be subject to vṛddhi, and so the word must be anuśāyin, in accordance with the analogy of such words as atiśāyin, &c. Nor is the latter view tenable (i.e., that it is the taddhita affix ini), since ini is forbidden by the technical verse—
'These two affixes are not used after a monosyllable nor a kṛt formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with a word in the locative case;'
and the word anuśaya is clearly a kṛt formation as it ends with the affix ach [which brings it under this prohibition, and so renders it insusceptible of the affix ini]. Consequently, the word anuśayin in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is very hard to justify." This cavil, however, is not to be admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of essential importance. Hence the author of the Vṛtti has said—
"The word iti, as implying the idea of popular acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of this rule [i.e., it is not an absolute law]."
Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as kāryin, kāryika [where the affixes are added after a kṛt formation], taṇḍulin, taṇḍulika [where they are added after a word meaning "genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after kṛt formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of the affix ini is justified, although the word anuśaya is formed by a kṛt affix. This doubt therefore is settled.
The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence" (abhiniveśa), is what prevails in the case of all living beings, from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as the "afflictions" (kleśa), since they afflict the soul, as bringing upon it various mundane troubles.
[We next describe the karmāśaya of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or "merits" in the mind.] "Works" (karman) consist of enjoined or forbidden actions, as the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, brāhmanicide, &c. "Stock" (āśaya) is the balance of the fruits of previous works, which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].
Now "concentration" [yoga] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications [i.e., a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather the site of this non-existence,—a particular state of the thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully described hereafter], madhumatī, madhupratīkā, viśokā, and saṃskāraśeṣatā. The word nirodha thus corresponds to its etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed (nirudhyante). This suppression of the modifications is produced by "exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13]. This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling. "Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case, sthitau, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its skin." "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from perceiving the imperfections attached to them.
Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and to attain meditation, the yogin must first direct his attention to practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gītā [vi. 3]—
"Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to yoga;
But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be the means."
Patañjali has thus defined the practical yoga: "Practical concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yājñavalkya has described "mortification"—
"These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly consecrated.
"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the 'awakening,'
"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'
"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the 'concealing,'—these are the ten consecrations of mantras.
"The 'begetting' (janana) is the extracting of the mantra from its vowels and consonants.
"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the mantra, each united to Om,
"According to the number of the letters. This they call the 'vivifying' (jīvana).
"Having written the letters of the mantra, let him smite each with sandal-water,
"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air. This is called the 'smiting' (tāḍana).
"Having written the letters of the mantra, let him strike them with oleander flowers,
"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the 'awakening' (bodhana).
"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his own special tantra,
"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling' (abhisheka).
"Having meditated on the mantra in his mind, let him consume by the jyotir-mantra
"The threefold impurity of the mantra. This is the 'purification' (vimalī-karaṇa).
"The utterance of the jyotir-mantra, together with Om, and the mantras of Vyoman and Agni,
"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch of kuśa grass,
"The satiating libation over the mantra with mantra-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (tarpaṇa).
"The non-publication of the mantra which is being muttered—this is its 'concealing' (gopana).
"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all tantras;
"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition obtains his desire;
"And ruddha, kīlita, vichinna, supta, śapta, and the rest,
"All these faults in the mantra rites are abolished by these excellent consecrations."
But enough of this venturing to make public the tantra mysteries connected with mantras, which has suddenly led us astray like an unexpected Bacchanalian dance.
The third form of practical yoga, "resignation to the Lord" (īśvara-praṇidhāna), is the consigning all one's works, whether mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the Supremely Venerable. As it has been said—
"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
"That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."
This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is sung in the Bhagavad Gītā [ii. 47]—
"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the fruits;
"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou attached to inaction."
The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.—When this steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply to the special kinds, as rechaka, pūraka, and kumbhaka." We reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found in all these special kinds. Thus rechaka, which is the expulsion of the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and pūraka, which is the [regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the "inspiration;" and kumbhaka is the internal suspension of breathing, when the vital air, called prāṇa, remains motionless like water in a jar (kumbha). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt is needless.
Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two ghaṭikās and a half in each artery (nāḍi), like the revolving buckets on a waterwheel. Thus in the course of a day and night there are produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said by those who know the secret of transmitting the mantras, concerning the transmission of the ajapāmantra—
"Six hundred to Gaṇeśa, six thousand to the self-existent Brahman,
"And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the performed muttering."
So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been thus explained by the wise—
"Let each artery convey the air two ghaṭīs and a half from sunrise.
"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.
"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take place [in the hour],
"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand six hundred in a day and night.
"That time elapses while the air passes along in the interval between two arteries.
"They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by the self-restrained.
"Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;
"Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.
"They bear along in order,—air, fire, water, earth, ether;
"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting arteries.
"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.
"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the reason that the two arteries are so disturbed
"Is that earth has five properties, water four,
"Fire has three, air two, and ether one.
"There are ten palas for each property; hence earth has fifty palas,
"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the five properties of earth
"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness; and these decrease one by one.
"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by the influence of 'quiet,'
"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,' 'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'
"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and ether are now declared;—
"Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of the second arises desire;
"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness of mind;
"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental impressions of latent merit.
"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners of his eyes,
"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the earth and the other elements within him,
"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue spots,—the ether has no symbol."
When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been said—
"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the breath."
"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,
"So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of the breath."
Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to attain "self-mastery" (saṃyama) and "restraint" (pratyāhāra). "Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to the nature of the mind, which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference. This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn to it (ā + hṛ), away from them (pratīpa).
"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore, could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of concernment with their several objects for the sake of being accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in the Viṣṇu-purāṇa [vi. 7, 43, 44]—
"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which ever tend to pursue external objects,
"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the mind;
"By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady senses;
"If they are not controlled, the yogin will not accomplish his yoga."
"Attention" (dhāraṇā) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of the sushumṇā artery, &c., or something external, as Prajāpati, Vāsava, Hiraṇyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism, "'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too, say the followers of the Purāṇas—
"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by restraint the senses,
"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of his mind."
The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is "contemplation" (dhyāna); thus it is said, "A course of uniform thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said—
"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of that kind and desiring no other,
"This is 'contemplation,'—it is thus effected by the first six of the ancillary things."
We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (samādhi, see p. 243). By this practice of the ancillary means of yoga, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and "dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the names Madhumatī and the rest.
"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous words from the dialects of Karṇāṭa, Gauḍa, and Lāṭa?" We do not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.
i. The Madhumatī perfection,—this is the perfection of meditation, called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of "goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of "passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c. Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," i.e., to the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," i.e., when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second yogin. For the yogins or devotees to the practice of yoga are well known to be of four kinds, viz.,—
i. The prāthamakalpika, in whom the light has just entered, but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The madhubhūmika, who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The prajñājyotis, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The atikrānta-bhāvanīya, who has attained the highest dispassion.
ii. The Madhupratīkā perfections are swiftness like thought, &c. These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs" is the attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential conditions. These perfections are severally sweet, each one by itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second state is called Madhupratīkā [i.e., that whose parts are sweet].
iii. The Viśokā perfection consists in the supremacy over all existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses, to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished], and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised upon. The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named," is "omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous immediate cognition, free from sorrow [may produce steadiness of mind]."
iv. The Saṃskāraśeṣatā state is also called asaṃprajñāta, i.e., "that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;" it is that meditation "without a seed" [i.e., without any object] which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest "dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [i.e., that in which distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of thought after the departure of all objects] [i.e., saṃskāraśeṣa, i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed, there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded "discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects into the primal prakṛti; and the soul, which is the power of pure intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all connection with the phenomenal understanding (buddhi), or with existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (kaivalya). Final liberation is described by Patañjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is the repressive absorption of the 'qualities' which have consummated the ends of the soul, i.e., enjoyment and liberation, or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv. 33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the individual be born again even though this should have been attained?" for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a possibility. And so, too, says the Śruti, "A blind man found a jewel; one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a dumb man praised it."
Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the Yoga-śāstra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-śāstra also treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from; the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof. The same fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in other Śāstras also. Thus all has been made clear.
E. B. C.
Footnotes and references:
On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sāṅkhya Pr. Bhāsh., p. 20; S. Sāra, p. 11.
I.e., he revealed the Veda, and also originated the meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind in the arts of life.
I read ye for te with Dr. Hall's MS. Tapya means rather "susceptible of suffering."
This is really Vyāsa's comm. on Sūt., iv. 21.
Cf. Bhāshā-pariccheda, 15, a.
Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.
I read in the second clause tadbhāve'pi, understanding by tad the different conditions which atha is supposed to assume as being necessarily present.
These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, &c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.
It may be sukha-janaka, but it is not itself sukha.
Granting that atha does not here mean "auspicious," why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the particle atha does produce an auspicious influence?
i.e., a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without some other word to complete the construction.
This is found with some variations in the Mahābhāshya (p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)
The commentators hold that the word vṛddhiḥ is placed at the beginning of the first sūtra, while guṇaḥ in the second is placed at the end (ad eṅ guṇaḥ), in order to ensure an auspicious opening, vṛddhi meaning "increase," "prosperity," as well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."
In the old Bengali poem Caṇḍī, we have an interesting list of these omens. The hero Candraketu, starting on a journey, has the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Brāhman, a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling "milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya," dūrvā grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing a guana (godhikā). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to all śāstras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.
These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the officiating Brāhmans.
He is here called phaṇipati, "lord of snakes,"—Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāshya, being represented as a snake in mythology.
Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedānta-Sūt., iii. 3, 49.
This is the Mīmāṃsā rule for settling the relative value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1. Śruti, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. Liṅga, "a sign," or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. Vākya, "the being mentioned in one sentence," i.e., the context, as in the text "'(I cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words "(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words "I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. Prakaraṇa, "the subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its parts," as in the darśa-pūrṇamāsa sacrifice, where the prayāja ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, a mystic influence (apūrva) which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the prakaraṇa proves them to be ancillary. 5. Sthāna (or krama), "relative position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn Śundhadhvam, &c., "Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention of the sānnāyya vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. Samākhyā, "title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the adhvaryu priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are prima facie to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the first, śruti, being the most important; the last, samākhyā, the least. Cf. Jaimini's Sūtras, iii. 3, 14; Mīmāṃsāparibhāshā, pp. 8, 9.
I.e., Yogi-Yājñavalkya, the author of the Yājñavalkya-gītā. See Hall, Bibl. Index, p. 14; Aufrecht, Bodl. Catal., p. 87 b.
Karman seems here used for kriyâ, which properly belongs only to the body, as the soul is draṣṭṛ.
Scil. samādhi, or the restraining the mind and senses to profound contemplation.
Scil. "forbearance, religious observance, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation (samādhi)."
See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, samyag ādhīyate mano yatra sa samādhiḥ.
Thus, e.g., the antecedent non-existence and the destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by intimate relation (samavāya-sambandha).
I read niroddhavyānām for nirodhānām.
Chit-śakti and chiti-śakti = soul.
The sattva of the buddhi or the internal organ.
This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" (buddhi, citta), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the image of the object on a second looking-glass (sc. soul).
Vācaspati explains lakṣaṇa as kālabheda.
I take ādi as meaning asphuṭatva. The change of state takes place between the several moments of the lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma. Cf. the Commentaries on iii. 13.
These are generally called the five states of the thinking principle, cittabhūmayas or avasthās. Cf. Commentary, i. 2, 18.
These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and gods.
Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.
Can citta mean "soul" here?
I.e., as, e.g., whether the senses produce the elements or the elements the senses, &c.
In p. 164, line 4 infra, read sukhaprakāśamayasya.
In p. 164, line 2 infra, read sattāmātra for sattva-. Bhoja well distinguishes asmitā from ahaṃkāra.
For these see infra, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.
I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the English translation.
Where the negation is prominent it is called prasajya-pratishedha; but where it is not prominent, we have the paryudāsa negation. In the former the negative is connected with the verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word, as, e.g.—
(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."
The former corresponds to the logician's atyantābhāva, the latter to anyonyābhāva or bheda.
Cf. the vārttika in Siddhānta Kaum., i. 401.
Thus adhana stands for avidya-mānadhana, with vidyamāna omitted in the compound.
As its subject would confessedly be buddhi.
As it is avidyā after all.
In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Vācaspati's Gloss), sarvavṛttinirodhasampannāyā api tathātvaprasaṅgāt.
I read tanvavasthāśca with the printed edition of Vācaspati's Gloss. If tanudagdhāśca is correct, it must mean tanutvena dagdhāh.
As in rāmalakṣmaṇau, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa.
I read pakṣatraye for pakṣadvaye.
In his Comm. on Sūt., ii. 5.
Thus inimicus is not a "friend," nor, on the other hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So agoṣpada is said to mean "a forest."
Cf. Yoga Sūt., i. 8.
In p. 166, line 4 infra, read kāyādau for kāryādau.
This couplet is quoted by Vyāsa in his Comm. on Yoga Sūtras, ii. 5, and I have followed Vācaspati in his explanation of it; he calls it vaiyāsakī gāthā.
Since the continued enjoyment of an object only increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret (cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).
Literally, "it has four feet."
Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification of the quality of sattva unobstructed by rajas and tamas.
"Let the affix ṇini be used after a root in the sense of what is habitual, when the upapada, or subordinate word, is not a word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."
"Let vṛddhi be the substitute of a base ending in a vowel, when that which has an indicatory ñ or ṇ follows;" ṇini has an indicatory ṇ.
Sc. anuśaya + ini = anuśayin.
Ini and ṭhan, which respectively leave in and ika; thus daṇḍa gives daṇḍin and daṇḍika. The line is quoted by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Pāṇ. v. 2, 115, and is explained in the Kāśikā, ad loc. The different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples:—(1.) svavān, khavān; (2.) kārakavān; (3.) vyāghravān, siṃhavān; (4.) daṇḍavatī śālā (i.e., daṇḍā asyāṃ santi).
By iii. 3, 56.
It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.
See the Kāśikā on Pāṇ. v. 2, 115. For vivakṣārtha (meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Pāṇ. ii. 2, 27. The edition in the Benares Pandit reads viṣayaniyamārtha.
i.e., Thus nirodha is not vṛtter abhāvaḥ, but abhāvasyāśryaḥ.
I read in p. 168, last line, prakāśapravṛttiniyamarūpa, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.
See Kāśikā, ii. 3, 36.
This passage probably occurs in the Yājñavalkya-gītā of Yogi-yājñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, note.
Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, ii. 1, 35-37.
The tantras are not properly concerned with what is nitya or naimittika; they are kāmya.
The vīja of air is the syllable jaṃ.
The vīja of water is the syllable baṃ.
Tāṇḍava is the frantic dance of the god. Śiva and his votaries.
Literally "they take severally in order the gender of one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Bœotiæ caput est," Livy, xlii. 44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem," Cic., Legg, i. 7.
I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's translation of the Sāhitya-darpaṇa.
Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of longevity.
I.e., an hour, a ghaṭikā being twenty-four minutes.
The nāḍīs or tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal nāḍīs. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.
Mādhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a waterwheel (ghaṭīyantravat); hence the seasons never pause in their course."
This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, as their sound expresses the word so'haṃ (i.e., haṃsaḥ), "I am he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; it is called the ajapāmantra, i.e., the mantra uttered without voluntary muttering.
I.e., that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath.
I cannot explain this. We might read guruvarṇānām for guṇavarṇānāṃ, as the time spent in uttering a guruvarṇa is a vipala, sixty of which make a pala, and two and a half palas make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the fifth act of the Mālatīmādhava.
Sixty palas make a ghaṭikā (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 = 150, i.e., the palas in two and a half ghaṭikās or one hour).
Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.
Literally "the being ever more."
For these colours cf. Chāndogya Up., viii. 6; Maitri Up., vi. 30.
This is an anonymous quotation in Vyāsa's Comm.
This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of the Amṛta-nāda Up. See Weber, Indische Stud., ix. 26.
This is defined in the Yoga Sūt., iii. 4, as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, attention, and meditation.
I.e., the internal organ (citta).
This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the reading of the Bombay edition of the Purāṇa (only reading in line 3 calātmanām).
Viṣṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The "perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.
The old name for the central part of Bengal.
A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it is the Λαρικἡ of Ptolemy.
In p. 178, l. 2, infra, read pravṛtta for pravṛtti. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyāsa's Comm.)
Read vikaraṇabhāvaḥ; Vācaspati explains it as "videhānām indriyāṇāṃ karaṇabhāvaḥ."
Vyāsa has karaṇapañcakarūpajaya; Vācaspati explains rūpa by grahaṇādi (cf. iii. 47).
I read in p. 179, l. 11, vyava-sāyavyavaseyātmakānām, from Vyāsa's Comm.
I.e., as past, present, or future.
This is explained by Vācaspati, "The latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called vyutthāna (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or 'darkness,' iii. 9) and nirodha (when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; this in 'egoism' (asmitā); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' (i.e., buddhi); and buddhi into the 'irresolvable' (i.e., prakṛti)." Prakṛti consists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant.
This curious passage occurs in the Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka i. 11, 5. Mādhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and quotes the Śvetāśv. Up., iii. 19. Mādhava here takes avindat as "he pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the Comm.
This is taken from Vācaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.