The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya)
by Swāmī Mādhavānanda | 1950 | 272,359 words | ISBN-10: 8175051027
This Upanishad is widely known for its philosophical statements and is ascribed to Yajnavalkya. It looks at reality as being indescribable and its nature to be infinite and consciousness-bliss. Ethics revolve around the five Yajnas or sacrifices. This book includes the english translation of the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara. The Shankara-Bhashya is the...
The connection of the present section with the preceding portion is as follows: The individual self—the Brahman that is immediate and direct, the self that is within all—is identical with the Supreme Self. We know this from such Śruti texts as, ‘There is no other witness but Him’ (III. vii. 23), and ‘There is no other witness but This’ (III. viii. 11), as well as ‘This self has entered into these bodies' (I. iv. 7), and it is inferred from its functions of speech etc. That it exists and is different from the body, has been known in the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru (II. i.) in the Madhukāṇḍa from the denial of agency and enjoyment to the vital force etc. Nevertheless, in the section dealing with the question of Uṣasta, in the words, ‘That which breathes through the Prāṇa,’ etc. (III. iv. 1), it has been known in a general way, from the introduction of the functions of breathing etc., that the self is to be inferred from these functions, and in the words, ‘Witness of vision,’ etc. (III. iv. 2), it has been more particularly known as being by nature constant intelligence. It suffers transmigration owing to adventitious limiting adjuncts, as for instance the appearance of a rope, a desert, a mother-of-pearl, and the sky as a snake, water, silver and blue respectively, is due to the superimposition of foreign elements, not intrinsically. But devoid of the limiting adjuncts, it is known as indefinable, to be described only as ‘Not this, not this,’ the Brahman that is immediate and direct, the self that is within all, the Immutable, the Internal Ruler, the mighty Ruler, the Being who is to be known only through the Upaniṣads, Knowledge, Bliss and Brahman. That same Brahman which is immediate and within all has again been taught (by the mention of some particular ways of attaining It). (Lastly, it has been stated:) He who is called Indha (Vaiśvānara) takes fine food; beyond it, in the heart, is the self identified with the subtle body, which takes finer food; higher still is the self identified with the universe, which has the vital force for its limiting adjunct (i.e. the Prājña). By dissolving (in the Supreme Self) through knowledge even this self identified with the universe, which is but a limiting adjunct, like the snake, for instance, in the rope, (the transcendent Brahman referred to in the passage), ‘This self is That which has been described as “Not this, not this”’ (III. ix. 26), has been known. Thus did Yājñavalkya set Janaka beyond fear by a brief reference to scriptural evidence. Here, in a different connection, the states of wakefulness, dream, profound sleep and transcendence have heen introduced in the words, ‘Indha,’ ‘Has finer food,’ ‘The different vital forces,’ and ‘This self is That which has been described as “Not this, not this”’ Now Brahman is to be studied at length through those very states of wakefulness etc., with the help of valid reasoning; Janaka is to be helped to attain the Brahman that is beyond fear; the existence of the self should be established by the removal of the doubts raised against it; and it should be known as being different from the body, pure, self-effulgent, by nature identical with constant intelligence and superlative bliss, and beyond duality. For this purpose the present section is introduced. The story is meant to indicate the method of imparting and receiving the instruction, and is particularly a eulogy on knowledge, as is suggested by the granting of the boon etc.
जनकं ह वैदेहं याज्ञवल्क्यो जगाम; स मेने न वदिष्य इति स मेने न वदिष्य इति; अथ ह यज्जनकश्च वैदेहो याज्ञवल्क्यश्चाग्निहोत्रे समूदाते, तस्मै ह याज्ञवल्क्यो वरं ददौ; स ह कामप्रश्नमेव वव्रे, तं हास्मै ददौ; तं ह सम्राडेव पूर्वं पप्रच्छ ॥ १ ॥
janakaṃ ha vaidehaṃ yājñavalkyo jagāma; sa mene na vadiṣya iti sa mene na vadiṣya iti; atha ha yajjanakaśca vaideho yājñavalkyaścāgnihotre samūdāte, tasmai ha yājñavalkyo varaṃ dadau; sa ha kāmapraśnameva vavre, taṃ hāsmai dadau; taṃ ha samrāḍeva pūrvaṃ papraccha || 1 ||
l. Yājñavalkya went to Janaka, Emperor of Videha. He thought he would not say anything. Now Janaka and Yājñavalkya had once talked on the Agnihotra, and Yājñavalkya had offered him a boon. He had begged the liberty of asking any questions he liked; and Yājñavalkya had granted him the boon. So it was the Emperor who first asked him.
Yājñavalkya went to Janaka, Emperor of Videha. While going, he thought he would not say anything to the Emperor. The object of the visit was to get more wealth and maintain that already possessed. Yājñavalkya , although he had resolved not to say anything, explained whatever Janaka asked. Why did he act contrary to his intentions? The answer to this is given by the story here related. Sometime in the past there had been a talk between Janaka and Yājñavalkya on the subject of the Agnihotra. On that occasion Yājñavalkya, pleased with Janaka’s knowledge on the subject, had offered him a boon. Janaka thereupon had begged the liberty of asking any questions he liked; and Yājñavalkya had granted him the boon. On the strength of that boon it was the Emperor Janaka who first asked him, although Yājñavalkya was in no mood to explain and was silent. That Janaka had not put his question on the previous occasion was due to the fact that the knowledge of Brahman is contradictory to rituals (hence the topic would be out of place), and is independent: It is not the effect of anything, and serves the highest end of man independently of any auxiliary factors.
याज्ञवल्क्य किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष इति; आदित्यज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच, आदित्येनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ २ ॥
yājñavalkya kiṃjyotirayaṃ puruṣa iti; ādityajyotiḥ samrāḍiti hovāca, ādityenaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti; evamevaitadyājñavalkya || 2 ||
2. ‘Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ ‘The light of the sun, O Emperor,’ said Yājñavalkya, ‘it is through the light of the sun that he sits, goes out, works and returns.’ ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
Yājñavalkya —Janaka addresses him by name to draw his attention —what serves as the light for a man, which he uses in his everyday life? The question is about the ordinary man, with head, hands, etc., identifying himself with the body and organs. Does he use a light extraneous to his body, which is made up of parts, or does some light included in this aggregate of parts serve the purpose of a light for him? This is the question.
Question: What difference does it make if he uses a light extraneous to his body or one forming a part of it?
Reply: Listen. If it is decided that he by his very nature has to use a light extraneous to his body, then with regard to the effects of a light that is invisible we shall infer that they are also due to an extraneous light. If, on the other hand, he acts through a light not extraneous to the body, but part and parcel of himself, then, where the effects of a light are visible, although the light itself is invisible, we can infer that the light in question must be an inner one. If, however, there is no restriction as to whether the light which a person uses is within or without himself, then there is no decision on the matter of the light. Thinking thus Janaka asks Yājñavalkya. ‘What is the light for a man?’
Objection: Well, if Janaka is so clever at reasoning, what is the use of his asking questions? Why does he not decide it for himself?
Reply: True, but here the thing to be inferred, the grounds of inference, and their various relations are so subtle that they are considered a puzzle even for a number of scholars, not to speak of one. It is for this reason that in deciding subtle religious matters deliberation by a conference is sought. A good deal also depends upon individual qualifications. A conference may accordingly consist of ten persons, or three, or one. Therefore, though the Emperor ist skilled in reasoning, yet it is quite proper for him to ask Yājñavalkya, because people may have varying capacities for understanding. Or it may be that the Śruti itself teaches us through the garb of a story, by setting forth a mode of reasoning in conformity with our ways of thinking.
Yājñavalkya too, knowing Janaka's intention, desired to teach him about the light of the self that is other than the body, and took up a ground of inference that would establish this extracorporeal light. For instance, he said, ‘The light of the well-known sun, O Emperor.’ How? ‘It is through the light of the sun, which is outside his body and helps the function of the eyes, that the ordinary man sits, goes out to the field or forest, and going there works and returns the way he went.’ The use of many specifications is to indicate that the light is well known to be essentially different from the body; and the citing of many external lights is to show that the ground of inference is unfailing. ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति; चन्द्रमा एवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति, चन्द्रमसैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ ३ ॥
astamita āditye yājñavalkya kiṃjyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa iti; candramā evāsya jyotirbhavatīti, candramasaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti; evamevaitadyājñavalkya || 3 ||
3. ‘When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ 'The moon serves as his light. It is through the light of the moon that he sits, goes out, works and returns.’ ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
Likewise, ‘When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ ‘The moon serves as his light.’
अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति; अग्निरेवास्य ज्योतिर्भवति, अग्निनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति; एवमेवैतद्
याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ ४ ॥
astamita āditye yājñavalkya, candramasyastamite kiṃjyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa iti; agnirevāsya jyotirbhavati, agninaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti; evamevaitad
yājñavalkya || 4 ||
4. ‘When the sun and the moon have bor set, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ ‘The fire serves as his light. It is through the fire that he sits, goes out, works and returns.’ ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
When the sun and the moon have both set, the fire serves as the light.
अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽग्नौ किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति; वागेवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति, वाचैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति; तस्माद्वै सम्राडपि यत्र स्वः पाणिर्न विनिर्ज्ञायते, अथ यत्र वागुच्चरति, उपैव तत्र न्येतीति; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ ५ ॥
astamita āditye yājñavalkya, candramasyastamite, śānte'gnau kiṃjyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa iti; vāgevāsya jyotirbhavatīti, vācaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti; tasmādvai samrāḍapi yatra svaḥ pāṇirna vinirjñāyate, atha yatra vāguccarati, upaiva tatra nyetīti; evamevaitadyājñavalkya || 5 ||
5. ‘When the sun and the moon have both set, and the fire has gone out, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ ‘Speech (sound) serves as his light. It is through the light of speech that he sits, goes out, works and returns. Therefore, O Emperor, even when one’s own hand is not clearly visible, if a sound is uttered, one manages to go there.’ ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
When the fire has gone out, speech serves as the light. ‘Speech’ here means sound. Sound, which is the object of hearing, stimulates the ear, its organ; this gives rise to discrimination in the mind; through that mind a man engages in an outward action. Elsewhere it has been said, ‘It is through the mind that one sees and hears’ (I. v. 3). How can speech be called a light, for it is not known to be such? The answer is being given: ‘Therefore, O Emperor,’ etc. Because a man lives and moves in the world helped by the light of speech, therefore it is a well-known fact that speech serves as a light. How? ‘Even when, as in the rainy season, owing to the darkness created by clduds generally blotting out all light, one’s own hand is not clearly visible,—though every activity is then stopped owing to the want of external light—if a sound is uttered, as for instance a dog barks or an ass brays, one manages to go there. That sound acts as a light and connects the ear with the mind; thus speech (sound) does the function of a light there; With the help of that sound serving as a light, the man actually goes there, works at that place and returns.’ The mention of the light of speech includes odour etc. For when odour and the rest also help the nose and other organs, a man is induced to act or dissuaded from it, and so on. So they too help the body and organs. ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽग्नौ, शान्तायां वाचि किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति; आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिर्भवति, आत्मनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति ॥ ६ ॥
astamita āditye yājñavalkya, candramasyastamite, śānte'gnau, śāntāyāṃ vāci kiṃjyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa iti; ātmaivāsya jyotirbhavati, ātmanaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti || 6 ||
6. ‘When the sun and the moon have both set, the fire has gone out, and speech has stopped, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ ‘The self serves as his light. It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns.’ ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
When speech also has stopped and other external aids too, such as odour, all the activities of the mail Would stop. The idea is this: When the eyes and Other organs, which are outgoing in their tendencies, are helped in the waking state by lights such as the Sun, then a man vividly lives and moves in the world. So we see that in the waking state a light extraneous to his body, which is an aggregate of parts, serves as the light for him. From this we conclude that when all external light is blotted out in the states of dream and profound sleep, as well as in similar circumstances of the waking state, a light extraneous to his body serves the purpose of a light for him. We see also that the purpose of a light is served in dreams, as for instance meeting and parting from friends, going to other places, etc.; and we awake from deep sleep with the remembrance that we slept happily and knew nothing. Therefore there exists some extraneous light. What is that light which acts when speech has stopped? The reply is being given: ‘The self serves as his light.’ By the word ‘self’ is meant that light which is different from one’s body and organs, and illumines them like the external lights such as the sun, but is itself not illumined by anything else. And on the principle of the residuum it is inside the body; for it has already been proved that it is different from the body and organs, and we have seen that a light which is different from the body and organs and helps their work is perceived by the organs such as the eye, but the light that we are discussing (the self) is not perceived by the eye etc., when lights such as the sun have ceased to work. Since, ho we vex, we see that the usual effects of t light are there, we conclude that ‘it is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns Therefore we understand that this light must be inside the body. But it is different from lights such as the sun, and immaterial. That is why, unlike the sun etc., it is not perceived by the eye and so forth.
Objection (by the materialist): No, for we see that only things of the same class help each other. You are wrong to state as a proved fact that there is an inner light different from the sun etc. Why? Because we observe that the body and organs, which are material, are helped by lights such as the sun, which also are material and of the same cláss as the things helped. Here too we must infer in accordance with observed facts. Supposing that the light that helps the work of the body and organs is different from them like the sun etc., still it must be inferred as being of the same class as these, for the very reason that it helps them, as is the case with lights such as the sun. Your statement that because it is internal and is not perceived, it is different (from lights such as the sun), is falsified in the case of the eye etc.; for lights such as the eye are not perceived and are internal, but they are material just the same. Therefore it is only your imagination that you have proved the light of the self tö be essentially different from the body etc.
Moreover, as the existence of the light in question depends on that of the body and organs, it is presumed to possess the characteristics of the latter. Your inference, being of the kind that is not based on a causal relation, is fallacious, because it is contradicted! and it is by means of such an inference that yoa establish the light in question (the self) to be different from the body and organs, like the sun and so forth (being different from the objects they reveal). Besides, perception cannot be nullified by inference; and we see that this aggregate of body and organs sees, hears, thinks and knows. If that other light helps this aggregate like the sun etc., it cannot be the self, any more than the sun and the rest are. Rather it is the aggregate of body and organs, which directly does the functions of seeing etc., that is the self, and none else, for inference is invalid when it contradicts perception.
Reply: If this aggregate be the self that does the functions of seeing etc., how is it that, remaining as it is, it sometimes performs those functions and sometimes does not?
Objection: There is nothing wrong in it, because it is an observed fact. You cannot challenge facts on the ground of improbability. When you actually observe a fire-fly to be both luminous and non-luminous, you do not have to infer some other cause for it. If, however, you do infer it from some common feature, you may as well infer anything about everything, and nobody wants that. Nor must one deny the natural property of objects, for the natural heat of fire or the cold of water is not due to any other cause.
Reply: Suppose we say it all depends on the merits or demerits of people?
Objection: Then those merits or demerits themselves might habitually depend on some other cause. '
Reply: What if they do?
Reply: Not so, for in dreams and remembrance we notice only things seen before. What the advocate of the nature theory has said about the functions of sight etc. belonging to the body, and not to the self, which is different from it, is wrong, for if these functions really belonged to the body, one would not see in a dream only things already seen. A blind man dreaming sees only things that he has already seen, and not unfamiliar forms, which one would find in Śākadvīpa, for instance. This proves that he alone who sees in a dream only familiar things also saw things before, while the eyes were there—and not the body. If the body were the seer, it would not see in a dream only familiar sights when the eyes, the instruments of its vision, are taken out. And we know that even blind men, who have had their eyes taken out, say, ‘To-day I saw in a dream the Himalayan peak that I had seen before.’ Therefore it is clear that it is not the body, but he who dreams, that also saw things when the eyes were intact.
Similarly, in the case of remembrance, he who remembers being also the one who saw, the two are identical. Thus only can a person, after shutting his eyes, remember the forms he has seen before, just as he saw them. Therefore that which is shut is not the seer; but that which, when the eyes are shut, sees forms in remembrance, must have been the seer when the eyes were open. This is further proved by the fact that when the body is dead, no vision takes place, although the body is intact. If the body itself were the seer, even a dead body would continue to see and do similar functions. Therefore it is dear that the real agent of seeing etc. is not the body, but that whose absence deprives the body of the power of vision, and whose presence gives it that power.
Objection: Suppose the eyes and other organs themselves were the agents of vision and so forth?
Reply: No: the remembrance that one is touching the very thing that one has seen, would be impossible if there were different agents for these two acts.
Objection: Then let us say, it is the mind.
Reply: No; the mind also, being an object, like colour etc., cannot be the agent of vision and so forth. Therefore we conclude that the light in question is inside the body, and yet different from it like the sun etc.
You said, ‘Some light which is of the same olass as the body and organs must be inferred, since the sun and the like are of the same class as the things they help.’ This is wrong, for there is no hard and fast mle about this help. To explain: We see that fire is kindled with the help of straw, grass and other fuel, which are all modifications of earth. But from this we must not conclude that everywhere it is the modifications of earth that help to light a fire, for we notice that water, which.belongs to a different class, helps to kindle the fire of lightning and the fire in the stomach. Therefore, when something is helped by another, there is no restriction about their being of the same dass or of different classes. Sometimes men are helped by men, their own species, and sometimes by animals, plants, etc., which are of different species. Therefore the reason you adduced for your contention, that the body and organs are helped by lights that are of the same class as they, like the sun etc., falls to the ground.
Further you said that the argument put forward by us does not prove the light in question to be either internal or different from the body and organs, because the reason stated is falsified in the case of the eye etc. This is wrong; all we have to do is to add to it the qualifying phrase ‘except the eyes and other organs.’ Your statement that the light in question must be a characteristic of the body is also incorrect, for it involves a contradiction with inference. The inference was that the light must be something else than the body and organs, like the sun etc.; and this premise of yours contradicts that. That the existence of the light depends on that of the body has been disproved by the fact that the light is absent in a dead body. If you challenge the validity of an inference of the kind not based on a causal relation, all our activities, including eating and drinking, would be impossible, which you certainly do not desire. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance, are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed to adopt these means, expecting similar results; all this would be impossible. As a matter of fact, however, people who have the experience of eating and drinking infer on the ground of similarity that their hunger and thirst would be appeased if they ate and drank again, and proceed to act accordingly.
Your statement that this very body performs the functions of seeing etc. has already been refuted on the ground that in dreams and remembrance the seer is other than the body. This also refutes the view that the light in question is something other than the self. Your reference to the fire-fly etc. being sometimes luminous and sometimes not, is not in point, for the appearance or disappearance of the glow is due to the contraction or expansion of its wings or other parts of its body. You said that we must admit merit and demerit to have the nature of inevitably producing results. If you admit this, it will go against your own assumption. By this the objection of a regressus in infinitum is also refuted. Therefore we conclude that there is a light which is other than the body and within it, and it is the self.
कतम आत्मेति; योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः; स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति, ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव; स हि स्वप्नो भूत्वेमं लोकमतिक्रामति मृत्यो रूपाणि ॥ ७ ॥
katama ātmeti; yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ; sa samānaḥ sannubhau lokāvanusaṃcarati, dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva; sa hi svapno bhūtvemaṃ lokamatikrāmati mṛtyo rūpāṇi || 7 ||
7. ‘Which is the self?’ ‘This infinite entity (Puruṣa) that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, the (self-effulgent) light within the heart (intellect). Assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves between the two worlds; it thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were. Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world—the forms of death (ignorance etc.).’
Though the self has been proved to be other than the body and organs, yet, owing to a misconception caused by the observation that things which help others are of the same class as they, Janaka cannot decide whether the self is just one of the organs or something different, and therefore asks: Which is the self?
The misconception is quite natural, for the logic involved is too subtle to grasp easily. Or, although the self has been proved to be other than the body, yet all the organs appear to be intelligent, since the self is not perceived as distinct from them; so I ask you: Which is the self? Among the body, organs,
vital force and mind, which is the self you have spoken of—through which light, you said, a man sits and does other kinds of work? Or, which of these organs is ‘this self identified with the intellect’ that you have meant, for all the organs appear to be intelligent? As when a number of Brāhmaṇas are assembled, one may ask, ‘They are all highly qualified, but which of these is versed in all the six branches of the Vedas?’ In the first explanation, ‘Which is the self?’ is the question, and ‘This infinite entity that is identified with the intellect,’ etc., is the answer; in the second, ‘Which of the organs is the self that is identified with the intellect?’ is the question. Or the whole sentence, ‘Which is this self that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, the light within the heart?’ is the question. The words, ‘That is identified with the intellect,’ etc. give the precise description of the self that has been known only in a general way. But the word ‘iti’ in, ‘Which is the self,’ ought to mark the end of the question, without its being connected with a remote word. Hence we conclude that the expression, 'Which is the self,' is really the question, and all the rest of the sentence, beginning with, ‘This infinite entity that is identified with the intellect,’ etc., is the answer.
The word 'this' has been used wit reference to the self, since it is directly known to us. ‘Vijñāna-maya’ means identified with the intellect: the self is so called because of our failure to discriminate its association with its limiting adjunct, the intellect, for it is perceived as associated with the intellect, as the planet Rāhu is with the sun and the moon. The intellect is the instrument that helps us in everything, like a lamp set in front amidst darkness. It has been said, ‘It is through the mind that one sees and hears’ (I. v. 3). Every object is perceived only as associated with the light of the intellect, as objects in the dark are lighted up by a lamp placed in front; the other organs are but the channels for the intellect. Therefore the self is described in terms of that, as 'identified with the intellect.’ Those who explain the word ‘Vijñānamaya’ as a modification of the consciousness that is the Supreme Self, evidently go against the import of the Śrutis, since in the words ‘Vijñānamaya,’ ‘Manomaya,’ etc., the suffix ‘mayaṭ’ denotes something else than modification; and where the meaning of a word is doubtful, it can be ascertained by a reference to a definite use of the word elsewhere, or from a supplementary statement; or else on the strength of irrefutable logic. From the use of the expression, ‘Through its association with the intellect,’ a little further on, and from the words 'within the heart (intellect),' the word ‘Vijñānamaya’ ought to mean ‘identified with the intellect.’
The locative case in the term ‘in the midst of the organs ' indicates that the self is different from the organs, as ‘a rock in the midst of the trees’ indicates only nearness; for there is a doubt about the identity or difference of the self from the organs. 'In the midst of the organs’ means ‘different from the organs,’ for that which is in the midst of certain other things is of course different from them, as ‘a tree in the midst of the rocks.’ Within the heart: One may think that the intellect, which is of the same class as the organs, is meant, as being in the midst of the organs. This is refuted by the phrase ‘within the heart.’ ‘Heart’ is primarily the lotus-shaped lump of flesh; here it means the intellect, which has its seat in the heart. The expression therefore means ‘within the intellect.’ The word ‘within’ indicates that the self is different from the modifications of the intellect. The self is called light, because it is self-effulgent, for through this light, the self-effulgent Ātman, this aggregate of body and organs sits, goes out and works, as if it were sentient, as a jar placed in the sun (shines). Or as an emerald or any other gem, dropped for testing into milk etc., imparts its lustre to them, so does this luminous self, being finer than even the heart or intellect, unify and impart its lustre to the body and organs, including the intellect etc., although it is within the intellect; for these have varying degrees of fineness or grossness in a certain order, and the self is the innermost of them all.
The intellect, being transparent and next to the self, easily catches the reflection of the intelligence of the self. Therefore even wise men happen to identify themselves with it first; next comes the Manas, which catches the reflection of the self through the intellect; then the organs, through contact with the Manas; and lastly the body, through the organs. Thus the self successively illumines with its own intelligence the entire aggregate of body and organs. It is therefore that all people identify themselves with the body and organs and their modifications indefinitely according to their discrimination. The Lord also has said in the Gītā, ‘As the one sun, O Arjuna, illumines the whole world, so the self, the owner of the field of this body, illumines the whole body’ (G. XIII. 33); also, ‘(Know) the light of the sun (which illumines the entire world, to be Mine),’ etc. (G. XV. 12). The Kaṭha Upaniṣad also has it, ‘Eternal in the midst of transitory things, the intelligent One among all intelligent beings’ (Ka. V. 13); also, ‘It shining, everything else shines; this universe shines through Its light’ (Ka. V. 15). The Mantra also says, ‘Kindled by which light, the sun shines’ (Tai. B. III. xii. 9. 7). Therefore the self is the ‘light within the intellect,’ ‘Puruṣa,’ i.e. infinite entity, being all-pervading like the ether. Its self-effulgence is infinite, because it is the illuminer of everything, but is itself not illumined by anything else. This infinite entity of which you ask, ‘Which is the self?’ is self-effulgent.
It has been said that when the external lights that help the different organs have ceased to work, the self, the infinite entity that is the light within the intellect, helps the organs through the mind. Even when the external aids of the organs, viz. the sun and other lights, exist, since these latter (being compounds) subr serve the purpose of some other agency, and the body and organs, being insentient, cannot exist for them-selves, this aggregate of body and organs cannot function without the help of the self, the light that lives for itself. It is always through the help of the light of the self that all our activities take place. ‘This intellect and Manas are consciousness.... (all these are but names of Intelligence or the Ātman)’ (Ai, V. 2), says another Śruti, for every act of people is attended with the ego, and the reason for this ego we have already stated through the illustration of the emerald.
Though it is so, yet during the waking state that light called the self, being beyond the organs and being particularly mixed up in the diversity of functions of the body and the organs, internal and external, such as the intellect, cannot be shown extricated from them, like a stalk of grass from its sheath; hence, in order to show it in the dream state. Yājñavalkya begins: Assuming the likeness... it moves between the two worlds. The infinite entity that is the self-effulgent Ātman, assuming the likeness—of what?—of the intellect, which is the topic, and is also contiguous. In the phrase, 'within the heart’ there occurs the word ‘heart,’ meaning the intellect, and it is quite close; therefore that is meant. And what is meant by ‘likeness’? The failure to distinguish (between the intellect and the self) as between a horse and a buffalo. The intellect is that which is illumined, and the light of the self is that which illumines, like light; and it is well known that we cannot distinguish the two. It is because light is pure that it assumes the likeness of that which it illumines. When it illumines something coloured, it assumes the likeness of that colour. When, for instance, it illumines something green, blue or red, it is coloured like them. Similarly the self, illumining the intellect, illumines through it the entire body and organs, as we have already stated through the illustration of the emerald. Therefore through the similarity of the intellect, the self assumes the likeness of everything. Hence it will be described later on as ‘Identified with everything’ (IV. iv. 5).
Therefore it cannot be taken apart from anything else, like a stalk of grass from its sheath, and shown in its self-effulgent form. It is for this reason that the whole world, to its utter delusion, superimposes all activities peculiar to name and form on the self, and all attributes of this self-effulgent light on name and form, and also superimposes name and form on the light of the self, and thinks, ‘This is the self, or is not the self; it has such and such attributes, or has not such and such attributes; it is the agent, or is not the agent; it is pure, or impure; it is bound, or free; it is fixed, or gone, or come; it exists, or does not exist,’ and so on. Therefore ‘assuming the likeness (of the intellect) it moves’ alternately ‘between the two worlds’—this one and the next, the one that has been attained and the one that is to be attained—by successively discarding the body and organs already possessed, and taking new ones, hundreds of them, in an unbroken series. This movement between the two worlds is merely due to its resembling the intellect—not natural to it. That it is attributable to its resembling the limiting adjuncts of name and form created by a confusion, and is not natural to it, is being stated: Because, assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves alternately between the two worlds. The text goes on to show that this is a fact of experience. It thinks, as it were: By illumining the intellect, which does the thinking, through its own self-effulgent light that pervades the intellect, the self assumes the likeness of the latter and seems to think, just as light (looks coloured). Hence people mistake that the self thinks; but really it does not. Likewise it shakes, as it were: When the intellect and other organs as well as the Pranas move, the self, which illumines them, becomes like them, and therefore seems to move rapidly; but really the light of the self has no motion.
How are we to know that it is owing to the delusive likeness of the intellect that the self moves between the two worlds and does other activities, and not by itself? This is being answered by a statement of reason: Being identified with dreams, etc. The self seems to become whatever the intellect, which it zesembles, becomes. Therefore when the intellect turns into a dream, i.e. takes on the modification called a dream, the self also assumes that form; when the intellect wants to wake up, it too does that. Hence the text says: Being identified with dreams, revealing the modification known as dreams assumed by the intellect, and thereby resembling them, it transcends this world, i.e. the body and organs, functioning in the waking state, round which our secular and scriptural activities are centred Because the self stands revealing by its own distinct light the modification known as dreams assumed by the intellect, therefore it must really be self-effulgent, pure and devoid of agent and action with its factors and results. It is only the likeness of the intellect that gives rise to the delusion tḥat the self moves between the two worlds and has other such activities. The forms of death, i.e. work, ignorance, etc. Death has no other forms of its own; the body and organs are its forms. Hence the self transcends those forms of death, on which actions and their results depend.
Buddhist objection: We say there is no such thing as the light of the self similar to the intellect and revealing it, for we experience nothing but the intellect either through perception or through inference, just as we do not experience a second intellect at the same time. You say that since the light that reveals and the jar, for instance, that is revealed are not distinguishable in spite of their difference, they resemble each other. We reply that in that particular case, the light being perceived as different from the jar, there may well be similarity between them, because they are merely joined together, remaining all the while different. But in this case we do not similarly experience either through perception or through inference any other light revealing the intellect, just as the light reveals the jar. It is the intellect which, as the consciousness that reveals, assumes its own form as well as those of the objects. Therefore neither through perception nor through inference is it possible to establish a separate light which reveals the intellect.
What has been said above by way of example, viz. that there may be similarity between the light that reveals and the jar, for instance, that is revealed, because they are merely joined together, remaining all the while different, has been said only tentatively; it is not that the jar that is revealed is different from the light that reveals it. In reality it iś the self-luminous jar that reveals itself; for (each moment) a new jar is produced, and it is consciousness that takes the form of the self-luminous jar or any other object. Such being the case, there is no instance of an external object, for everything is mere consciousness.
Thus the Buddhists, after conceiving the intellect as tainted by assuming a double form, the revealer and the revealed (subject and object), desire to purify it. Some of them, for instance, maintain that consciousness is untrammelled by the dualism of subject and object, is pure and momentary; others want to deny that even. For instance, the Mādhyamikas hold that consciousness is free from the dual aspect of subject and object, hidden and simply void, like the external objects such as a jar.
All these assumptions are contradictory to this Vedic path of well-being that we are discussing, since they deny the light of the self as distinct from the body and illumining the consciousness of the intellect. Now to those who believe in an objective world we reply: Objects such as a jar are not self-luminous; a jar in darkness never reveals itself, but is noticed as being regularly revealed by coming in contact with the light of a lamp etc. Then we say that the jar is in contact with light. Even though the jar and the light are in contact, they are distinct from each other, for we see their difference, as between a rope and a jar, when they repeatedly come in contact and are disjoined. This distinction means that the jar is revealed by something else; it certainly does not reveal itself.
Objection: But do we not see that a lamp reveals itself? People do not use another light to see a lamp, as they do in the case of a jar etc. Therefore a lamp reveals itself.
Reply: No, for there is no difference as regards its being revealed by something else (the self). Although a lamp, being luminous, reveals other things, yet it is, just like a jar etc., invariably revealed by an intelligence other than itself. Since this is so, the lamp cannot but be revealed by something other than itself.
Objection: But there is a difference. A jar, even though revealed by an intelligence, requires a light different from itself (to manifest it), while the lamp does not require another lamp. Therefore the lamp, although revealed by something else, reveals itself as well as the jar.
Reply: Not so, for there is no difference, directly or indirectly (between a jar and a lamp). As the jar is revealed by an intelligence, so is equally the lamp. Your statement that the lamp reveals both itself and the jar is wrong. Why? Because what can its condition be when it does not reveal itself? As a matter of fact, we notice no difference in it, either directly or indirectly. A thing is said to be revealed only when we notice some difference in it through the presence oi absence of the revealing agent. But there can be no question of a lamp being present before or absent from itself; and when no difference is caused by the presence or absence, it is idle to say that the lamp reveals itself.
But as regards being revealed by an intelligence the lamp is on a par with the jar etc. Therefore the lamp is not an illustration in point to show that consciousness (of the intellect) reveals itself; it is revealed by an intelligence just as much as the external objects are. Now, if consciousness is revealed by an intelligence, which consciousness is it?—the one that is revealed (the consciousness of the intellect), or the one that reveals (i.e. the consciousness of the self)? Since there is a doubt on the point, we should infer on the analogy of observed facts, not contrary to them. Such being the case, just as we see that external objects such as a lamp are revealed by something different from them (the self), so also should consciousness— although it reveals other things like a lamp—be inferred, on the ground of its being revealed by an intelligence, to be revealed not by itself, but by an intelligence different from it. And that other entity which reveals consciousness is the self—the intelligence which is different from that consciousness.
Objection: But that would lead to a regressus in infinitum.
Reply: No; it has only been stated on logical grounds that because consciousness is an object revealed by something, the latter must be distinct from that consciousness. Obviously there cannot be any infallible ground for inferring that the self literally reveals the consciousness in question, or that, as the witness, it requires another agency to reveal it. Therefore there is no question of a regressus in infinitum.
Objection: If consciousness is revealed by something else, some means of revelation is required, and this would again lead to a regressus in infinitum.
Reply: No, for there is no such restriction; it is not a universal rule. We cannot lay down an absolute condition that whenever something is revealed by another, there must be some means of revelation besides the two—that which reveals and that which is revealed, for we observe diversity of conditions. For instance, a jar is perceived by something different from itself, viz. the self; here light such as ihai of a lamp, which is other than the perceiving subject and the perceived object, is a means. The light of the lamp etc. is neither a part of the jar nor of the eye, But though the lamp, like the jar, is perceived by the eye, the latter does not require any external means corresponding to the light, over and above the lamp (which is the object). Hence we can never lay down the rule that wherever a thing is perceived by something else, there must be some means besides the two. Therefore, if consciousness is admitted to be revealed by a subject different from it, the charge of a regressus in infinitum, either through the means or through the perceiving subject (the self), is altogether untenable. Hence it is proved that there is another light, viz. the light of the self, which is different from consciousness.
Objection (by the idealist): We say there is no external object like the jar etc., or the lamp, apart from consciousness; and it is commonly observed that a thing which is not perceived apart from something else is nothing but the latter; as for instance things such as the jar and cloth seen in dream consciousness. Because we do not perceive the jar, lamp and so forth seen in a dream, apart from the dream consciousness, we take it for granted that they are nothing but the latter. Similarly in the waking state, the jar, lamp and so forth, not being perceived apart from the consciousness of that state, should be taken merely as that consciousness and nothing more. Therefore there is no external object such as the jar or lamp, and everything is but consciousness. Hence your statement that since consciousness is revealed, like the jar etc., by something else, there is another light besides consciousness, is groundless: for everything being but consciousness, there is no illustration to support you.
Objection: We deny it absolutely.
Reply: No. Since the words 'consciousness/ ‘jar’ and ‘lamp’ are different and have different meanings, you cannot help admitting to a certain extent the existence of external objects. If you do not admit the existence of objects different from consciousness, words such as ‘consciousness/ ‘jar’ and 'doth/ having the same meaning, would be synonymous. Similarly, the means being identical with the result, your scriptures inculcating a difference between them would be useless, and their author (Buddha) would be charged with ignorance.
Moreover, you yourself admit that a debate between rivals as well as its defects are different from consciousness. You certainly do not consider the debate and its defects to be identical with one’s consciousness, for the opponent, for instance, has to be refuted. Nobody admits that it is either his own consciousness or his own self that is meant to be refuted; were it so, all human activities would stop. Nor do you assume that the opponent perceives himself; rather you take it for granted that he is perceived by others. Therefore we conclude that the whole objective world is perceived by something other than itself, because it is an object of our perception in the waking state, just like other objects perceived in that state, such as the opponent—which is an easy enough illustration; or as one series of (momentary) consciousness , or any single one of them, is perceived by another of the same kind. Therefore not even the idealist can deny the existence of another light different from consciousness.
Objection: You are wrong to say that there is an external world, since in dreams we perceive nothing but consciousness.
Reply: No, for even from this absence of external objects we can demonstrate their difference from consciousness. You yourself have admitted that in dreams the consciousness of a jar or the like is real; but in the same breath you say that there is no jar apart from that consciousness! The point is, whether the jar which forms the object of that consciousness is unreal or real, in either case you have admitted that the consciousness of the jar is real, and it cannot be denied, for there is no reason to support the denial. By this the theory of the voidness of everything is also refuted; as also the Mīmāṃsaka view that the Self is perceived by the individual self as the ‘I’.
Your statement that every moment a different jar in contact with light is produced, is wrong, for even at a subsequent moment we recognise it to be the same jar.
Reply: No, for even in that case the momentariness is disproved. Besides, the recognition is due merely to an identity of species. When the hair, nails, etc. have been cut and have grown again, there being an identity of species as hair, nails, etc., their recognition as such due to that identity is unquestionable. But when we see the hair, nails, etc. that have grown again after being cut, we never have the idea that they are, individually, those identical hairs or nails. When after a great lapse of time we see on a person hair, nails, etc. of the same size as before, we perceive that the hair, nails, etc. we see at that particular moment are like those seen on the previous occasion, but never that they are the same ones. But in the case of a jar etc. we perceive that they are identical. Therefore the two cases are not parallel.
When a thing is directly recognised as identical, it is improper to infer that it is something else, for when an inference contradicts perception, the ground of such inference becomes fallacious. Moreover, the perception of similarity is impossible because of the momentariness of knowledge (held by you). The perception of similarity takes place when one and the same person sees two things at different times. But accoṛding to you the person who sees a thing does not exist till the next moment to see another thing, for consciousness, being momentary, ceases to be as soon as it has seçn some one thing. To explain: The perception of similarity takes the form of ‘This is like that.’ ‘That’ refers to the remembrance of something seen; ‘this’ to the perception of something present. If after remembering the past experience denoted by ‘that,’ consciousness should linger till the present moment referred to by ‘this,’ then the doctrine of momentariness would be gone. If, however, the remembrance terminates with the notion of ‘that,’ and a different perception relating to the present (arises and) dies with the notion of ‘this,’ then no perception of similarity expressed by, ‘This is like that,' will result, as there will be no single consciousness perceiving more than one thing (so as to draw the comparison). Moreover, it will be impossible to describe our experiences. Since consciousness ceases to be just after seeing what was to be seen, we cannot use such expressions as, ‘I see this,’ or ‘I saw that,’ for the person who has seen them will not exist till the moment of making these utterances. Or, if he does, the doctrine of momentariness will be contradicted. If, on the other hand, the person who makes these utterances and perceives the similarity is other than the one who saw those things, then, like the remarks of a man born blind about particular colours and his perception of their similarity, the writing of scriptural books by the omniscient Buddha and other such things will all become an instance of the blind following the blind. But this is contrary to your views. Moreover, the charges of obtaining results of actions not done and not obtaining those of actions already done, are quite patent in the doctrine of momentariness.
Objection: It is possible to describe a past experience by means of a single chain-like perception that takes place so as to include both the preceding and the succeeding perception, and this also accounts for the comparison, ‘This is like that.’
Reply: Not so, for the past and the present perceptions belong to different times. The present perception is one link of the chain and the past perception another, and these two perceptions belong to different times. If the chain-like perception touches the objects of both these perceptions, then the same consciousness extending over two moments, the doctrine of momentariness again falls to the ground. And such distinctions as ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ being impossible, all our dealings in the world will come to naught.
Moreover, since you hold everything to be but consciousness perceptible only to itself, and at the same time say that consciousness is by nature but the reflection of pellucid knowledge, and since there is no other witness to it, it is impossible to regard it as various such as transitory, painful, void and unreal. Nor can consciousness be treated as having many contradictory parts, like a pomegranate etc., for according to you it is of the nature of pellucid knowledge. Moreover, if the transitoriness, painfulness, etc. are parts of consciousness, the very fact that they are perceived will throw them into the category of objects, different from the subject. If, on the other hand, consciousness is essentially transitory, painful and so on, then it is impossible to conceive that it will become pure by getting rid of those characteristics j for a thing becomes pure by getting rid of the impurities that are connected with it, as in the case of á mirror etc., but it can never divest itself of its natural property. Fire, for instance, is never seen to part with its natural light or heat. Although the redness and other qualities of a flower are seen to be removed by the addition of other substances, yet even there we infer that those features were the result of previous combinations, for we observe that by subjecting the seeds to a particular process, a different quality iś imparted to flowers, fruits, etc. Hence consciousness cannot be conceived to be purified.
Besides you conceive consciousness to be impure when it appears in the dual character of subject and object. That too is impossible, since it does not come in contact with anything else. A thing cannot surely come in contact with something that does not exist; and when there is no contact with anything else, the properties that are observed in a thing belong naturally to it, and cannot be separated from it, as the heat of fire, or the light of the sun. Therefore we conclude that your assumption that consciousness becomes impure by coming temporarily in contact with something else, and is again free from this impurity, is merely an instance of the blind following the blind, and is unsupported by any evidence.
Lastly, the Buddhistic assumption that the extinction of that consciousness is the highest end of human life, is untenable, for there is no recipient of results. For a person who has got a thorn stuck into him, the relief of the pain caused by it is the result (he seeks); but if he dies, we do not find any recipient of the resulting cessation of pain. Similarly, if consciousness is altogether extinct and there is nobody to reap that benefit, to talk of it as the highest end of human life is meaningless. If that very entity or self, designated by the word ‘person’—consciousness, according to you—whose well-being is meant, is extinct, for whose sake will the highest end be? But those who (with US') believe in a self different from consciousness and witnessing many objects, will find it easy to explain all phenomena such as the remembrance of things previously seen and the contact and cessation of pain—the impurity, for instance, being ascribed to contact with extraneous things, and the purification to dissociation from them. As for the view of the nihilist, since it is contradicted by all the evidences of knowledge, no attempt is being made to refute it.
स वा अयं पुरुषो जायमानः—शरीरमभिसम्पद्यमानः—पाप्मभिः संसृज्यते; स उत्क्रामन्—म्रियमाणः—पाप्मनो विजहाति ॥ ८ ॥
sa vā ayaṃ puruṣo jāyamānaḥ—śarīramabhisampadyamānaḥ—pāpmabhiḥ saṃsṛjyate; sa utkrāman—mriyamāṇaḥ—pāpmano vijahāti || 8 ||
8. That man, when he is born, or attains a body, is connected with evils (the body and organs); ánd when he dies, or leaves the body, he discards those evils.
Just as in this world a man, in the same body, is identified with dreams and in that state lives in the light that is his own self, transcending the body and organs, so is that man who is being discussed, when he is horn, connected with evils, i.e. with their inseparable concomitants or effects, the body and organs, which are the support of merit and demerit. How is he born? When he attains a body, with the organs and all, i.e. identifies himself with it. When that very person dies, or leaves the body, to take another body in turn, he discards those evils, i.e. the body and organs, which are but forms of evil and have fastened themselves on him. The phrase ‘leaves the body’ is an explanation of ‘dies.’ Just as in his present body he, resembling the intellect, continuously moves between the waking and dream states by alternately taking and giving up the body and organs, which are but forms of evil, so does he continuously move between this ánd the next world by alternately taking and giving up the body and organs, by way of birth and death, until he attains liberation. Therefore it is proved from this injunction ānd disjunction that the. light of the self about which we have, been talking is distinct from these evils, the body and organs.
It may be contended that there are not those two worlds between which the man can move alternately through birth and death as between the’ waking and dream states. The latter of course are matters of experience, but the two worlds are not known through any means of knowledge. Therefore these waking and dream states themselves must be the two worlds in question. This is being answered by the following text:
तस्य वा एतस्य पुरुषस्य द्वे एव स्थाने भवतः—इदं च परलोकस्थानं च; सन्ध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानं; तस्मिन्सन्ध्ये स्थाने तिष्ठन्नेते उभे स्थाने पश्यति—इदं च परलोकस्थानं च । अथ यथाक्रमोऽयं परलोकस्थाने भवति तमाक्रममाक्रम्योभयान्पाप्मन आनन्दांश्च पश्यति; स यत्र प्रस्वपिति, अस्य लोकस्य सर्वावतो मात्रामपादाय स्वयं विहत्य, स्वयं निर्माय, स्वेन भासा, स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपिति, अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति ॥ ९ ॥
tasya vā etasya puruṣasya dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ—idaṃ ca paralokasthānaṃ ca; sandhyaṃ tṛtīyaṃ svapnasthānaṃ; tasminsandhye sthāne tiṣṭhannete ubhe sthāne paśyati—idaṃ ca paralokasthānaṃ ca | atha yathākramo'yaṃ paralokasthāne bhavati tamākramamākramyobhayānpāpmana ānandāṃśca paśyati; sa yatra prasvapiti, asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrāmapādāya svayaṃ vihatya, svayaṃ nirmāya, svena bhāsā, svena jyotiṣā prasvapiti, atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃ jyotirbhavati || 9 ||
9. That man has only two abodes, this and the next world. The dream state, which is the third, is at the junction (of the two). Staying at that junction he surveys the two abodes, this and the next world. Whatever outfit he may have for the next world, providing himself with that he sees both evils (sufferings) and joys. When he dreams, he takes away a little of (the impressions of) this all-embracing world (the waking state), himself puts the body aside and himself creates (a dream body in its place), revealing his own lustre by his own light—and dreams. In this state the man himself becomes the light.
That man has only two abodes, no third or fourth. Which are they? This and the next world. The present life, consisting of the body, organs, objects and their impressions, which we now perceive, and' the future life to be experienced after we have given up the body and the rest.
Objection: Is not the dream state also the next world? In that case the assertion about ‘only two abodes’ is wrong.
Reply: No, the dream state, which is the third, is at the junction of this and the next world; hence the definite pronouncement about two abodes. The junction of two villages does not certainly count as a third village. How do we know about the existence of the next world, in relation to which the dream state may be at the junction? Because staying at that junction he surveys the two abodes. Which are the two? This and the next world. Therefore, over and above the waking and dream states, there are the two worlds between which the man (the individual self), resembling the intellect, moves, in an unbroken series of births and deaths.
How does he, staying in the dream state, survey the two worlds, what help does he take, and what process does he follow? This is being answered: Listen how he surveys them. Whatever outfit—‘Ākrama’ is that by means of which one proceeds, i.e. support or outfit—the man may have for the attainment of the next world, i.e. whatever knowledge, work and previous experience he may have for this end, providing himself with that—just ready to take him to the next world, like a seed about to sprout—he sees both evils and joys. The plural is due ío the varied results of virtue and vice, meaning both kinds. ‘Evils' refer to their results, or sufferings, for they themselves cannot be directly experienced; thçN joys are the results of virtue. He feels both sufferings and joys consisting of the impressions of experiences of previous lives; while those glimpses of the results of merits and demerits that are to come in his future life he experiences through the urge of those merits and demerits, or through the grace of the gods. How are we to know that in dreams one experiences the sufferings and joys that are to come in the next life? The answer is: Because one dreams many things that ate never to be experienced in this life. Moreover, a dream is not an entirely new experience, for most often it is the memory of past experiences. Hence we conclude that the two worlds exist apart from the waking and dream states.
An objection is raised: It has been said that in the absence of the external lights such as the sun, the man identified with the body and organs lives and moves in the world with the help of the light of the self, which is different from the body and organs. But we say that there is never an. absence of lights such as the sun to make it possible for one to perceive this self-effulgent light as isolated from the body and organs, because we perceive these as always in contact with those external lights. Therefore the self as an absolute, isolated light is almost or wholly a nonentity. If, however, it is ever perceived as an absolute, isolated light free from the contact of the elements and ìheir derivatives, external and internal, thçn all Jfovṇ: statements will be correct. This is being answered,: #s .follows:
When he, the self that is being discussed, dreams freely, what is his outfit then, and in what way does he dream, or attain the junction between this world and the next? The answer is being given: He takes away a little of this all-embracing world, or the world we experience in the waking state. ‘All-embracing’ (Sarvāvat): Lit. protecting or taking care of every thing; it refers to the body and organs in contact with sense-objects and their reactions. Their all-embracing character has been explained in the section dealing with the three kinds of food in the passage beginning with, ‘Now this self,’ etc. (I. iv. 16). Or the word may mean, possessing all the elements and their derivatives, which serve to attach him to the world; in other words, the waking state.—‘Sarvāvat’ is the same as ‘Sarvavat.’—He detaches a portion of these, i.e. is tinged by the impressions of the present life. Himself puts the body aside, lit. kills it, i.e. makes it inert or unconscious. In the waking state the sun and other deities help the eyes etc. so that the body may function, and the body functions because the self experiences the results of its merits and demerits, The cessation of the experience of those results in this body is due to the exhaustion of the work done by the self; hence the self is described as killing the body. And himself creates a dream body composed of past impressions, like one created by magic. This creation too is the consequence of his past work; hence it is spoken of as being created by him. Revealing his own lustre, consisting in the perception of sense-objects, the mind itself being modified in the form of diverse impressions of the latter. It is these modifications that then take the place of objects, and are spoken of as being themselves of the nature of lustre in that state. With this his own lustre as object, and revealing it (the mass of impressions of sense-objects) by his own light, i.e. as the detached subject or witness possessing constant vision, he dreams. Being in this state is called dreaming. In this state, at this time, the man, or self, himself becomes the detached light, free from the contact of the elements and their derivatives, external and internal.
Objection: It is stated that the self then has glimpses of the impressions of the waking state. If so, how can it be said that ‘in that state the man himself becomes the light’?
Reply: There is nothing wrong in it, because the glimpses are but objects (not the subject). In that way alone can the man be shown to be himàelf the light then, and not otherwise, when there is no object to be revealed as in profound sleep. When, however, that lustre consisting of the impressions of the waking state is perceived as an object, then, like a sword drawn from its sheath, the light of the self, the eternal witness, unrelated to anything and distinct from the body and the organs such as the eye, is realised as it is, revealing everything. Therefore it is proved that ‘in that state the man himself becomes the light’?
Objection: How can the man himself be the light in dreams, when we come across at that time all the phenomena of the waking state dependent on the relation between the subject and object, and the lights such as the sun are seen to help the eye and other organs just the same as in the waking state? In the face of these how can the assertion be made that ‘in that state the man himself becomes the light’?
Reply: Because the phenomena of dreams are different. In the waking state the light of the self is mixed up with the functions of the organs, intellect, Manas, (external) lights, etc. But in dreams, since the organs do not act and the lights such as the sun that help them are absent, the self becomes distinct and isolated. Hence the dream state is different.
Objection: The sense-objects are perceived in dreams just the same as in the waking state. How then do you adduce their difference on the ground that the organs do not function then?
न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्ति, अथ रथान्रथयोगान्पथः सृजते; न तत्रानन्दा मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्ति, अथानन्दान् मुदः प्रमुदः सृजते; न तत्र वेशान्ताः पुष्करिण्यः स्रवन्त्यो भवन्ति, अथ वेशान्तान्पुष्करिणीः स्रवन्तीः सृजते; स हि कर्ता ॥ १० ॥
na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanti, atha rathānrathayogānpathaḥ sṛjate; na tatrānandā mudaḥ pramudo bhavanti, athānandān mudaḥ pramudaḥ sṛjate; na tatra veśāntāḥ puṣkariṇyaḥ sravantyo bhavanti, atha veśāntānpuṣkariṇīḥ sravantīḥ sṛjate; sa hi kartā || 10 ||
10. There are no chariots, nor animals to be yoked to them, nor roads there, but he creates the chariots, animals and roads. There are no pleasures, joys, or delights there, but he creates the pleasures, joys and delights. There are no pools, tanks, or rivers there, but he creates the pools, tanks and rivers. For he is the agent.
There are no objects such as chariots there, in dreams. Nor are thtre animals to be yoked to them, such as horses; nor roads for the chariots. But he himself creates the chariots, animals and roads. But how does he create them, since there are no trees etc., which are the means of the chariots and so forth? The reply is being given: It has been said (par. 9), ‘He takes away a little of this all-embracing world, himself puts the body aside, and himself creates.’ The modifications of the mind are a little of this world, i.e. are its impressions; the former, detaching the latter—in other words, being transformed into the impressions of chariots etc.—and being stimulated by the individual’s previous work, which is the cause of their perception, appear as the sense-objects; this is expressed by the words ‘and himself creates,’ and also by the clause, ‘He creates the chariots,’ etc. Really there are neither activities of the organs nor lights such as the sun that help them, nor objects such as the chariots to be illumined by them, but only their impressions are visible, having no existence apart from the palpable modifications of the mind that are stimulated by the individual’s previous work, which is the cause of the perception of those impressions. The light with constant vision that witnesses them, the light of the self, is perfectly isolated in this state, like a sword separated from its sheath.
Likewise there are no pleasures, kinds of happiness, joys such as those caused by the birth of a son etc., or delights, which are those very joys magnified, but he creates the pleasures, etc. Likewise there are no pools, tanks or rivers there, but he creates the pools etc. in the form of impressions only. For he is the agent. We have already said that his agency consists in merely being the cause of the work that generates the modifications of the mind representing those impressions. Direct activity is then out of the question, for there are no means. Activity is impossible, without its factors. In dreams there cannot be any factors of an action such as hands and feet. But in the waking state, when they are present, the body and organs, illumined by the light of the self, perform work that (later on) produce the modifications of the mind representing the impressions of the chariot etc. Hence it is said, ‘For he is the agent.’ This has been stated in the passage, ‘It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns’ (IV. iii. 6). There too, strictly speaking, the light of the self has no direct agency, except that it is the illuminer of everything. The light of the self, which is Pure Intelligence, illumines the body and organs’ through the mind, and they perform their functions being illumined by it; hence in the passage quoted the agency of the self is merely figurative. What has been stated in the passage, ‘It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7), is here repeated in the clause, ‘For he is the agent,’ in order to furnish a reason.
तदेते श्लोका भवन्ति ।
स्वप्नेन शारीरमभिप्रहत्यासुप्तः सुप्तानभिचाकशीति
शुक्रमादाय पुनरैति स्थानं हिरण्मयः पुरुष एकहंसः ॥ ११ ॥
tadete ślokā bhavanti |
svapnena śārīramabhiprahatyāsuptaḥ suptānabhicākaśīti
śukramādāya punaraiti sthānaṃ hiraṇmayaḥ puruṣa ekahaṃsaḥ || 11 ||
11. Regarding this there are the following verses: ‘The radiant infinite being (Puruṣa) who moves alone puts the body aside in the dream state, and himself awake and taking the shining functions of the organs with him, watches those that are asleep. Again he comes to the waking state.
Regarding this subject that has just been treated of, there are the following verses or Mantras:
The radiant —lit. golden; the light that is Pure Intelligence—infinite being who moves alone through the waking and dream states, this world and the next, and so on, puts the body aside, makes it inert, in the dream state, and himself awake, being possessed of the constant power of vision etc., and taking the shining—lit. pure—functions of the organs with him, watches those that are asleep, all external and internal things thát aTe centred in the modifications of the mind and appear as impressions—things that have ceased to be in their own forms. In other words, he reveals them through his own constant vision. Again he comes to the waking state, to work.
प्राणेन रक्शन्नपरं कुलायं बहिष्कुलायादमृतश्चरित्वा ।
स ईयतेऽमृतो यत्र कामं हिरण्मयः पुरुष एकहंसः ॥ १२ ॥
prāṇena rakśannaparaṃ kulāyaṃ bahiṣkulāyādamṛtaścaritvā |
sa īyate'mṛto yatra kāmaṃ hiraṇmayaḥ puruṣa ekahaṃsaḥ || 12 ||
12. ‘The radiant infinite being who is immortal and moves alone preserves the unclean nest (of a body) with the help of the vital force, and roams out of the nest. Himself immortal, he goes wherever he likes.
Likewise he preserves the unclean—lit. worthless—nest, the body, extremely loathsome as consisting of many filthy things, with the help of the vital force that has a fivefold function—otherwise it would be taken for dead—but he himself roams out of that nest. Though he dreams staying in the body, yet, having no connection with it like the ether in the body, he is said to be roaming out. Himself immortal, he goes wherever he likes: For whatever objects his desire is roused, he attains them in the form of impressions.
स्वप्नान्त उच्चावचमीयमानो रूपाणि देवः कुरुते बहूनि ।
उतेव स्त्रीभिः सह मोदमानो जक्शदुतेवापि भयानि पश्यन् ॥ १३ ॥
svapnānta uccāvacamīyamāno rūpāṇi devaḥ kurute bahūni |
uteva strībhiḥ saha modamāno jakśadutevāpi bhayāni paśyan || 13 ||
13. ‘In the dream world, the shining one, attaining higher and lower states, puts forth innumerable forms. He seems to be enjoying himself in the company of women, or laughing, or even seeing frightful tilings.
Further, in the dream jworld, the shining one, attaining higher and lower states, as gods and animals, for instance, puts forth innumerable forms, as impressions. He seems to be enjoying himself in the company of women, or laughing with friends, or even seeing frightful things, such as lions and tigers.
आराममस्य पश्यन्ति, न तं पश्यति कश्चन ॥ इति ।
तं नायतं बोधयेदित्याहुः । दुर्भिषज्यं हास्मै भवति यमेष न प्रतिपद्यते । अथो खल्वाहुः, जागरितदेश एवास्यैष इति; यानि ह्येव जाग्रत् पश्यति तानि सुप्त इति; अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति; सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्शाय ब्रूहीति ॥ १४ ॥
ārāmamasya paśyanti, na taṃ paśyati kaścana || iti |
taṃ nāyataṃ bodhayedityāhuḥ | durbhiṣajyaṃ hāsmai bhavati yameṣa na pratipadyate | atho khalvāhuḥ, jāgaritadeśa evāsyaiṣa iti; yāni hyeva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti; atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃ jyotirbhavati; so'haṃ bhagavate sahasraṃ dadāmi, ata ūrdhvaṃ vimokśāya brūhīti || 14 ||
14. ‘Everybody sees his sport, but nobody sees him.’ They say, ‘Do not wake him up suddenly.’ If he does not find the right organ, the body becomes difficult to doctor. Others, however, say that the dream state of a man is nothing but the waking state, because he sees in dreams only those things that he sees in the waking state. (This is wrong.) In the dream state the man himself becomes the light. ‘I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation.’
Everybody sees his sport, consisting of the impressions of villages, cities, women, eatables, etc. conjured by the self, butnobodysees him. What a pity that although the self is totally distinct from the body and organs and is present before their very eyes, people are yet unfortunate enough not to see it, notwithstanding its capacity of being seen! This is how the Śruti is sympathising with mankind. The idea is that in dreams the self becomes altogether distinct and is itself the light.
They say, ‘Do not wake him up suddenly.’ There is also a popular belief that proves the self to be distinct from the body and organs in dreams. What is that? Physicians and others say, ‘Do not wake up a sleeping man suddenly or violently.’ They say so only because they see that (in dreams) the self goes out of the body of the waking state through the gates of the organs and remains isolated outside. They also see the possibility of harm in this, viz. that if the self is violently roused, it may not find those gates of the organs. This is expressed as follows: If he does not find the right organ, the body becomes difficult to doctor. The self may not get back to those gates of the organs through which it went out, taking the shining functions of the latter, or it may misplace these functions. In that case defects such as blindness and deafness may result, and the body may find it difficult to treat them. Therefore from the above popular notion also we can understand the self-luminosity of the Ātman in dreams.
Being identified with dreams, the self transcends the forms of death; therefore in dreams it is itself the light. Others, however, say that the dream state of a man is nothing but the waking state —that the dream state, which is the junction between this world and the next, is not a state distinct from either of them, but identical with this world, i.e. the waking state. Supposing this is so, what follows from this? Listen. If the dream state is nothing but the waking state, the self is not dissociated from the body and organs, but rather mixed up with them; hence the self is not itself the light. So in order to refute the self-luminosity of the Ātman, these people say that the dream state is identical with the waking state. And they state their reason for taking it as the waking state: Because a man sees in dreams only those things, elephants etc., that he sees in the waking state. All this is wrong, because then the organs are at rest. One dreams only when the organs have ceased to function. Therefore no other light (than the self) can exist in that state. This has been expressed by the words, ‘There are no chariots, nor animals,’ etc. (IV. iii. 10). Therefore in the dream state the maṇ himself undoubtedly becomes the light.
By the illustration of dreams it has been proved that there is the self-luminous Ātman, and that it transcends the forms of death. Since it alternately moves between this world and the next, and so on, it is distinct from them. Likewise it is distinct from the nests of the waking and dream states. And Yājñavalkya has proved that since it moves alternately from one to the other, it is eternal. Hence, to requite the knowledge received, Janaka offers a thousand cows. ‘Because you have thus instructed me, I give you a thousand cows, sir. You have permitted me to ask any question I like, and I want to ask about liberation. What you have told me about the self is helpful for that; as subserving that end, however, it is only a part of what I want. Hence I request you to instruct me further about liberation, so that 1 may hear the decision about the whole of my desired question, and through your grace be altogether free from this relative existence.’ The gift of a thousand cows is for the solution of a part of the meaning of the term ‘liberation.’
What was stated at the beginning of this section, viz. ‘It is through the light of the self that he sits,’ etc. (IV. iii. 6), has been proved in the dream state by a reference to the experiences of that state in the passage, ‘In this state the man (self) himself becomes the light’ (IV. iii. 9). But regarding the statement, ‘Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world—the forms of death (ignorance etc.)’ (IV. iii. 7), it is contended that the self transcends merely the forms of death, not death itself. We see it plainly in dreams that although the self is separated from the body and organs, it experiences joy, fear, etc.; therefore it certainly does not transcend death, for we see the effects of death (i.e. work) such as joy and fear at the time. If it is naturally handicapped by death, then, it cannot attain liberation, for nobody can part with his nature. If, however, death is not the nature of the self, then liberation from it will be possible. In order to show that death is not the natural characteristic of the self, Yājñavalkya, already prompted by Janaka with the words, ‘Please instruct me further about liberation’ (IV. iii. 14), sets himself to this task:
स वा एष एतस्मिन्संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नायैव; स यत्तत्र किञ्चित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति; असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इति; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य, सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्शायैव ब्रूहीति ॥ १५ ॥
sa vā eṣa etasminsaṃprasāde ratvā caritvā, dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca, punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyonyādravati svapnāyaiva; sa yattatra kiñcitpaśyatyananvāgatastena bhavati; asaṅgo hyayaṃ puruṣa iti; evamevaitadyājñavalkya, so'haṃ bhagavate sahasraṃ dadāmi, ata ūrdhvaṃ vimokśāyaiva brūhīti || 15 ||
15. After enjoying himself and roaming, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil (in dreams), he (stays) in a state of profound sleep, and comes back in the inverse order to his former condition, the dream state. He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state, for this infinite being is unattached. ‘It is just so, Yājñavalkya. I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself.’
He, the self-luminous being who is under consideration, and who has been pointed out in the dream state, (stays) in a state of profound sleep, ‘Samprasāda’—the state of highest serenity. In the waking state a man gets impurities due to the commingling of innumerable activities of the body and organs; he gets a little joy by discarding them in dreams; but in profound sleep he gets the highest serenity; hence this state is called ‘Samprasāda.’ The self in a state of profound sleep will be later on described as, ‘For he is then beyond all the woes of his heart' (IV. iii. 22), and ‘Pure like water, one, and the witness’ (IV. iii. 32). He stays in a state of profound sleep, having gradually attained the highest serenity. How does he attain it? After enjoying himself —just before passing into the state of profound sleep—in the dream state itself, by having a sight etc. of his friends and relatives, and roaming, sporting in various ways, i.e. experiencing the fatigue due to it, and merely seeing, not doing, good and evil, i.e. their results (pleasure and pain). We have already said (p. 633) that good and evil cannot be directly visualised. Hence he is not fettered by them. Only one who does good and evil is so fettered; one certainly cannot come under their binding influence by merely seeing them. Therefore, being identified with dreams, the self transcends death also, not merely its forms. Hence death cannot be urged to be its nature. Were it so, the self would be doing things in dreams; but it does not. If activity be the -nature of the self, it will never attain Jiberation; but it is not, for it is absent in dreams. Hence the self can get rid of death in the form of good and evil.
Objection: But is not activity its nature in the waking state?
Reply: No, that is due to its limiting adjuncts, the intellect etc. This has been proved on the ground of apparent activity from the text, ‘It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7). Therefore, since the self wholly transcends the forms of death in dreams, death can never be urged to be natural to it, nor is liberation an impossibility. ‘Roaming’ in that state, i.e. experiencing the resulting fatigue, and afterwards experiencing the state of profound sleep, he comes back in the inverse order of that by which he went. i.e. retracing his steps, to his former condition, viz. the dream state. It was out of this that he passed into the state of profound sleep, and now he returns to it.
It may be asked, how is one to know that a man does not do good and evil in dreams, but merely sees their results? Rather the presumption is that as he does good and evil in the waking state, so he does them in the dream state also, for the experience is the same in both cases. This is being answered: He, the self, is untouched by whatever results of good and evil he sees in that dream state. If he actually did anything in dreams, he would be bound by it; and it would pursue him even after he woke up. But it is not known in everyday life that he is pursued by deeds done in dreams. Nobody considers himself a sinner on account of sins committed in dreams; nor do people who have heard of them condemn or shun him. Therefore he is certinly untouched by them. Hence he only appears to be doing things in dreams, but actually there is no activity. The verse has been quoted: ‘He seems to be enjoying himself in the company of women’ (IV. iii. 13). And those who describe their dream experiences use the words ‘as if’ in this connection, as. for instance, ‘I saw to-day as if a herd ot elephants was running.’ Therefore the self has no activity (in dreams).
How is it that it has no activity? (This is being explained:) We see that an action is caused by the contact of the body and organs, which have form, with something else that has form. We never see a formless thing being active; and the self is formless, hence it is unattached. And because this self is unattached, it is untouched by what it sees in dreams. Therefore we cannot by any means attribute activity to it, since activity proceeds from the contact of the body and organs, and that contact is non-existent for the self, for this infinite being (self) is unattached. Therefore it is immortal. ‘It is just so, Yājñavalkya. I give you a thousand (cows), sir, for you have fully shown that the self is free from action—which is a part of the meaning of the term “liberation.” Please instruct me further about liberation itself.’
स वा एष एतस्मिन्त्स्वप्ने रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति बुद्धान्तायैव; स यत्तत्र किञ्चित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति, असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इति; एवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य, सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्शायैव ब्रूहीति ॥ १६ ॥
sa vā eṣa etasmintsvapne ratvā caritvā, dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca, punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyonyādravati buddhāntāyaiva; sa yattatra kiñcitpaśyatyananvāgatastena bhavati, asaṅgo hyayaṃ puruṣa iti; evamevaitadyājñavalkya, so'haṃ bhagavate sahasraṃ dadāmi, ata ūrdhvaṃ vimokśāyaiva brūhīti || 16 ||
16. After enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil, he comes back in the inverse order to his former condition, the waking state. He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state, for this infinite being is unattached. ‘It is just so, Yājñavalkya. I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself.'
Objection: In the preceding paragraph the non-attachment of the self has been stated as the cause of its inactivity in the passage, ‘For this infinite being is unattached.’ It has also been stated before that under the sway of past work ‘he goes wherever he likes’ (IV. iii. 12). Now desire is an attachment; hence the reason adduced—‘For this infinite being is unattached’—is fallacious.
Reply: It is not. How? This is how the self is unattached: On his return from the state of profound sleep, after enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil, he comes back in the inverse order to his former condition—all this is to be explained as before —the waking state; therefore this infinite being (self) is unattached. If he were attached, or smitten by desire, in the dream state, he would, on his return to the waking state, be affected by the evils due to that attachment.
Just as, being unattached in the dream state, he is not affected,, on his return to the waking state, by the evils due to attachment in the dream state, so he is not affected by them in the waking state either. This is expressed by the following text:
स वा एष एतस्मिन्बुद्धान्ते रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नान्तायैव ॥ १७ ॥
sa vā eṣa etasminbuddhānte ratvā caritvā, dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca, punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyonyādravati svapnāntāyaiva || 17 ||
17. After enjoying himself and roaming in the waking state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil, he comes back in the inverse order to his former condition, the dream state (or that of profound sleep).
After enjoying himself and roaming in the waking state, etc.—to be explained as before. ‘He is untouched by whatever he sees in that—waking—state,, for this infinite being is unattached.’
Objection: How is the assertion made about his ‘merely seeing’? As a matter of fact, he does good and evil in the waking state, and sees their results too.
Reply: Not so, for his agency is attributable to his merely revealing the different factors of an action.. Such texts as, ‘It is through the light of the self that he sits,’ etc. (IV. iii. 6), show that the body and organs work, being revealed by the light of the self. For this reason agency is figuratively attributed to the self, which naturally has none. So it has been said, ‘It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7). The agency is simply due to its limiting adjuncts, the intellect etc., and is not natural to it. Here, however, the self is described from the standpoint of reality independently of the limiting adjuncts: ‘Merely seeing (the results of) good and evil,’ not actually doing them. Hence there is no fear of contradiction between this and the previous text, because the self, freed from its limiting adjuncts, really neither does anything nor is affected by the results of any action. As the Lord has said, ‘The immutable Supreme Self, O Arjuna, being without beginning and without attributes, neither does anything nor is affected by its results although It is in the body’ (G. XIII. 31). And the gift of a thousand cows is made because Yājñavalkya has shown the self to be free from desire. Similarly this and the preceding paragraph prove the non-attachment of the self. Because, passing into the dream state and that of profound sleep, it is not affected by what it did in the waking state—for we do not then find actions such as theft—therefore in all the three states the self is naturally unattached. Hence it is immortal, or distinct from the attributes of the three states.
He comes back to his former condition, the state of profound sleep (Svapnānta). Since the dream state, with its function of seeing visions, has already been mentioned by the word ‘Svapna,’ the addition of the word ‘Anta’ (end) will be appropriate if we take the word ‘Svapnānta’ in the sense of dreamless sleep, which state will also be referred to in the passage, ‘He runs for this state’ (IV. iii. 19). If, however, it is argued by a reference to the following passages, ‘After enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state’ (IV. iii. 34), and 'Moves to both these states, the dream and waking states' (IV. iii. 18), that here also the word ’Svapnānta' means the dream state, with its function of seeing visions, there is nothing wrong in that interpretation too, tor non-attachment of the self, which is sought to be established, certainly is established thereby. Therefore, on returning to the dream state ‘after enjoying himself and roaming in the waking state, and merely seeing (the results of) good and evil,’ he is not pursued by the evils of the waking state.
Thus the idea that has been established by the last three paragraphs is that this self is itself the light and distinct from the body and organs and their stimulating causes, desire and work, on account of its non-attachment—‘For this infinite being is unattached.’ How do we know that the self is unattached? Because it moves by turn from the waking to the dream state, from this to the state of profound sleep, from that again to the dream state, then to the waking state, from that again to the dream state, and so on, which proves that it is distinct from the three states. This idea has also been previously introduced in the passage, ‘Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world—the forms of death’ (IV. iii. 7). Having treated this at length, the Śruti now proceeds to give an illustration, which is the only thing that remains.
तद्यथा महामत्स्य उभे कूलेऽनुसंचरति पूर्वं चापरं च, एवमेवायं पुरुष एतावुभावन्तावनुसंचरति स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च ॥ १८ ॥
tadyathā mahāmatsya ubhe kūle'nusaṃcarati pūrvaṃ cāparaṃ ca, evamevāyaṃ puruṣa etāvubhāvantāvanusaṃcarati svapnāntaṃ ca buddhāntaṃ ca || 18 ||
In support of the idea set forth above, the following illustration is being given: As in the world a great fish that moves freely, never being swayed by the river-currents, but rather stemming them, swims alternately to both the banks of a river, eastern and western. and while swimming between them, is not overpowered by the intervening current of water, so does this infinite being move to both these states—which are they?—the dream and waking states. The point of the illustration is that the body and organs, which are forms of death, together with their stimulating causes, desire and work, are the attributes of the non-self, and that the self is distinct from them. All this has already been exhaustively explained.
In the preceding paragraphs the self-luminous Ātman, which is different from the body and organs, has been stated to be distinct from desire and work, for it moves alternately to the three states. These relative attributes do not belong to it per se; its relative existence is only due to its limiting adjuncts, and is superimposed by ignorance; this has been stated to be the gist of the whole passage. There, however, the three states of waking, dream and profound sleep have been described separately—not shown together as a group. For instance, it has been shown that in the waking state the self appears, through ignorance, as connected with attachment, death (work), and the body and organs; in the dream state it is perceived as connected with desire, but free from the forms of death; and in the state of profound sleep it is perfectly serene and unattached, this nonattachment being the additional feature. If we consider all these passages together, the resulting sense is “that the self is by nature eternal, free, enlightened and pure. This comprehensive view has not yet been shown; hence the next paragraph. It will be stated later on that the self becomes such only in the state of profound sleep: ‘That is his form—beyond desires, free from evils, and fearless’ (IV. iii. 21). As it is such, i.e. unique, the self desires to enter this state. How is that? The next paragraph will explain it. As the meaning becomes clear through an illustration, one is being put forward.
तद्यथास्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्शौ संलयायैव ध्रियते, एवमेवायं पुरुष एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कं चन कामं कामयते, न कं चन स्वप्नं पश्यति ॥ १९ ॥
tadyathāsminnākāśe śyeno vā suparṇo vā viparipatya śrāntaḥ saṃhatya pakśau saṃlayāyaiva dhriyate, evamevāyaṃ puruṣa etasmā antāya dhāvati yatra supto na kaṃ cana kāmaṃ kāmayate, na kaṃ cana svapnaṃ paśyati || 19 ||
19. As a hawk or a falcon flying in the sky becomes tired, and stretching its wings, is bound for its nest, so does this infinite being run for this state, where falling asleep he craves no desires and sees no dreams.
As a hawk or a falcon (Suparṇa), a swifter kind of hawk, flying or roaming in the external sky becomes tired, exhausted with undertaking different flights, and stretching its wings, is bound for, directs itself towards, its nest—lit. where it has a perfect rest—so does this infinite being run for this state, where falling asleep he craves no desires and sees no dreams. This last clause describes what is denoted by the word ‘state.’ The words ‘craves no desires’ shut out all desires of the dream and waking states without reservation, the negative particle having that all-inclusive force. Similarly with ‘and sees no dreams.’ The experiences of the waking state also are considered by the Śruti to be but dreams; hence it says, ‘And sees no dreams.’ Another Śruti passage bears this out: ‘He has three abodes, three dream states’ (Ai. III. 12). As the bird in the illustration goes to its nest to remove the fatigue due to flight, so the Jīva (self), connected with the results of action done by the contact of the body and organs in the waking and dream states, is fatigued, as the bird with its flight, and in order to remove that fatigue enters his own nest or abode, that is, his own self, distinct from all relative attributes and devoid of all exertion caused by action with its factors and results.
It may be questioned: If this freedom from all relative attributes is the nature of the Jīva, and his relative existence is due to other things, viz. the limiting adjuncts, and if it is ignorance that causes this relative existence through those extraneous limiting adjuncts, is that ignorance natural to him, or is it adventitious, like desire, work, etc? If it is the latter, then liberation is possible. But what are the proofs of its being adventitious, and why should ignorance not be the natural characteristic of the self? Hence, in order to determine the nature of ignorance, which is the root of all evil, the next paragraph is introduced.
ता वा अस्यैता हिता नाम नाड्यो यथा केशः सहस्रधा भिन्नस्तावताणिम्ना तिष्ठन्ति, शुक्लस्य नीलस्य पिङ्गलस्य हरितस्य लोहितस्य पूर्णा; अथ यत्रैनं घ्नन्तीव जिनन्तीव, हस्तीव विच्छाययति, गर्तमिव पतति, यदेव जाग्रद्भयं पश्यति तदत्राविद्यया मन्यते; अथ यत्र देव इव राजेव, अहमेवेदं सर्वोऽस्मीति मन्यते, सोऽस्य परमो लोकाः ॥ २० ॥
tā vā asyaitā hitā nāma nāḍyo yathā keśaḥ sahasradhā bhinnastāvatāṇimnā tiṣṭhanti, śuklasya nīlasya piṅgalasya haritasya lohitasya pūrṇā; atha yatrainaṃ ghnantīva jinantīva, hastīva vicchāyayati, gartamiva patati, yadeva jāgradbhayaṃ paśyati tadatrāvidyayā manyate; atha yatra deva iva rājeva, ahamevedaṃ sarvo'smīti manyate, so'sya paramo lokāḥ || 20 ||
20. In him are those nerves called Hitā, which are as fine as a hair split into a thousand parts, and filled with white, blue, brown, green and red (serums). (They are the seat of the subtle body, in which impressions are stored.) Now when (he feels) as if he were being killed or overpowered, or being pursued by an elephant, or falling into a pit, (in short) conjures at the time through ignorance whatever terrible things he has experienced in the waking state, (that is the dream state). And when (he becomes) a god, as it were, or a king, as it were, or thinks, ‘This (universe) is myself, who am all,’ that is his highest state.
In him, in this man with a head, hands, etc., those nerves called Hitā, which are as fine as a hair split into a thousand parts, and they are filled with white, blue, brown, green and red serums. Many and various are the colours of the serums, owing to the intermixture, in various proportions, of nerve matter, bile and phlegm. The subtle body with its seventeen constituents has its seat in these nerves, which have the fineness of the thousandth part of the tip of a hair, are filled with serums, white and so on, and spread all over the body.
All impressions due to the experience of high and low attributes of the relative universe are centred in this. This subtle body, in which the impressions are stored, is transparent like a crystal because of its fineness; but owing to its contact with foreign matter, viz. the serums in the nerves, it undergoes modifications under the influence of past merit and demerit, and manifests itself as impressions in the form of women, chariots, elephants, etc. Now, such being the case, when a man has the false notion called ignorance based on past impressions, that some people—enemies or robbers—have come and are going to kill him. This is being described by the text: As if he, the dreamer, Were being killed or overpowered. Nobody is killing or overpowering him; it is simply his mistake due to the past impressions created by ignorance. Or being pursued or chased by an elephant, or falling into a pit, a dilapidated well, for instance. He fancies himself in this position. Such are the false impressions that arise in him—extremely low ones, resting on the modifications of the mind brought about by his past iniquity, as is evidenced by their painful nature. In short, he conjures at the time, i.e. in dreams, when there is no elephant or the like, through the impressions created by ignorance, which have falsely manifested themselves, whatever terrible things such as an elephant he has experienced in the waking state.
Then when ignorance decreases and knowledge increases, (the result is as follows). The text describes the content and nature of the knowledge: And when he himself becomes a god, as it were. When, in the waking state, meditation regarding the gods prevails, he considers himself a god, as it were, on account of the impressions generated by it. The same thing is being said of the dream state too: He becomes ‘a god, as it were.’ Or a king, as it were: Having been installed as the ruler of a state (in the waking state), he thinks in his dreams also that he is a king, for he is imbued with the impressions of his kingly state. Similarly, when (in the waking state) his ignorance is extremely attenuated, and the knowledge that he comprises all arises, he thinks under the influence of these impressions in the dream state also, ‘This (universe) is myself, who am all.’ That, this identity with all, is his highest state, the Ātman’s own natural, supreme state. When, prior to this realisation of identity with all, he views the latter as other than himself even by a hair's breadth, thinking, ‘This is not myself,' that is the state of ignorance. The states divorced from the self that are brought on by ignorance, down to stationary existence, are all inferior states. Compared with these—states with which the Jīva has relative dealings—the above state of identity with all, infinite and without interior or exterior, is his supreme state. Therefore, when ignorance is eliminated and knowledge reaches its perfection, the state of identity with all, which is another name for liberation, is attained. That is to say, just as the self-effulgence of the Ātman is directly perceived in the dream state, so is this result of knowledge.
Similarly, when ignorance increases and knowledge vanishes, the results of ignorance are also directly perceived in dreams: ‘Now when (he feels) as if he were being killed or overpowered,’ etc. Thus the results of knowledge and ignorance are identity with all and identity with finite things, respectively. Through pure knowledge a man is identified with all, and through ignorance he is identified with finite things, or separated from something else. He is in conflict with that from which he is separated, and because of this conflict he is killed, overpowered or pursued. All this takes place because the results of ignorance, being finite things, are separated from him. But if he is all, what is there from which he may be separated, so as to be in conflict; and in the absence of conflict by whom would he be killed, overpowered or pursued? Hence the nature of ignorance proves to be this, that it represents that which is infinte as finite, presents things other than the self that are non-existent, and makes the self appear as limited. Thence arises the desire for that from which he is separated; desire prompts him to action, which produces results. This is the gist of the whole passage. It will also be stated later on, ‘When there is duality, as it were, then one sees something,’ etc. (II. iv. 14; IV. v. 15). Thus the nature of ignorance with its effects has been set forth; and as opposed to these, the effect of knowledge also, viz. the attainment of identity with all, has been shown. That ignorance is not the natural characteristic of the self, since it automatically decreases as knowledge increases, and when the latter is at its highest, with the result that the self realises its identity with all, ignorance vanishes altogether, like the nôtioṅ of a snake in a rope when the tnith about it is known. This has been stated in the passage, ‘But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the self, then what should one see and through what?’ etc. (Ibid.). Therefore ignorance is not a hàtural characteristic of the self, for that which is natural to a thing can never be eliminated, as the heat ahd light of the sun. Therefore liberation from ignorance is possible.
तद्वा अस्यैतदतिच्छन्दा अपहतपाप्माभयं रूपम् । तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्, एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्; तद्वा अस्यैतदाप्तकाममात्मकाममकामं रूपम् शोकान्तरम् ॥ २१ ॥
tadvā asyaitadaticchandā apahatapāpmābhayaṃ rūpam | tadyathā priyayā striyā saṃpariṣvakto na bāhyaṃ kiṃcana veda nāntaram, evamevāyaṃ puruṣaḥ prājñenātmanā saṃpariṣvakto na bāhyaṃ kiṃcana veda nāntaram; tadvā asyaitadāptakāmamātmakāmamakāmaṃ rūpam śokāntaram || 21 ||
21. That is his form—beyond desires, free from evils, and fearless. As a man, fully embraced by his beloved wife, does not know àṅything at all, either external or internal, so does this infinite being (self), fully embraced by the Supreme Self, not know anything at all, either external or internal. That is his form—in which all objects of desire have been attained and are but the self, and which is free from desires and devoid of grief.
Now liberation in the form of identity with all, which is the result, devoid of action with its factors and results, of knowledge, and in which there is no ignorance, desire, or work, is being directly pointed out. This has already been introduced in the passage, ‘Where falling asleep it craves no desires and sees no dreams’ (par. 19). That, this identity with all which has been spoken of as this highest state,’ is his form—beyond desires (Aticchandā). This word is to be turned into neuter, since it qualifies the word ‘Rūpa’ (form). ‘Chanda’ means desire; hence ‘Aticchandā' means transcending desires. There is another word ‘Chandas’ ending in s, which means metres such as the Gāyatri. But here the word means desire; hence it must end in a vowel. Nevertheless the reading ‘Aticchandā’ should be taken as the usual Vedic licence. In common parlance too the word ‘Chanda’ is used in the sense of desire, as in ‘Svacchanda’ (free), ‘Paracchanda’ (dependent on others’ will), etc. Hence the word must be turned into ‘Aticchandam’ (neuter) to mean that this form of the self is free from desires. Likewise, free from evils. ‘Evils’ mean both merits and demerits, for it has elsewhere (par. 8) been said, ‘Is connected with evils,’ and ‘Discards those evils.’ ‘Free from evils’ means ‘devoid of merits and demerits.’ Also, fearless. Fear is an effect of ignorance, for it has already been said that through ignorance he conjures terrible things (par. 20). Hence the word must be construed as denying the cause through the effect. ‘Fearless form’ means one that is' bereft of ignorance. This identity with all which is the result of knowledge is this form—beyond desires, free from evils and fearless. It is fearless because it is devoid of all relative attributes. This has already been introduced at the conclusion of the preceding section, by the scriptural statement, ‘You have attained That which is free from fear, O Janaka’ (IV. ii. 4). But here it is elaborated by argument to impress the meaning conveyed by the scriptural passage in question.
This Ātman is itself the light that is Pure Intelligence, and reveals everything by its own intelligence. It has been said (pars. 15 and 16) that (he is untouched by) the roaming or by whatever he sees, or enjoys, or knows in that (dream) state. And it is also proved by reasoning that the eternal nature of the self is that it is the light of Pure Intelligence. (Now an objection is being raised:) If the self remains.intact in its own form in the state of profound sleep, why does it not know itself as ‘I am this,’ or know all those things that are outside, as it does in the waking and dream states? The answer is being given: Listen why it does not know. Unity is the reason. How is that? This is explained by the text. As the intended meaning is vividly realised through an illustration, it goes on to say: As in the world a man, fully embraced by his beloved wife, both desiring each other’s company, does not know anything at all, either external to himself, as, ‘This is something other than myself,’ or internal, as ‘I am this, or I am happy or miserable’—but he knows everything outside and inside when he is not embraced by her and is separated, and fails to know only during the embrace owing to the attainment of unity—so, like the example cited, does this infinite being, the individual self, who is separated (from the Supreme Self), like a lump of salt, through contact with a little of the elements (the body and organs) and enters this body and organs, like the reflection of the moon etc. in water and so forth, being fully embraced by, or unified with, the Supreme Self, his own real, natural, supremely effulgent self, and being identified with all, without the least break, not know anything at all, either external, something outside, or internal, within himself, such as, ‘I am this, or I am happy or miserable.’
You asked me why, in spite of its being the light that is Pure Intelligence, the self fails to know in the state of profound sleep. I have told you the reason—it is unity, as of a couple fully embracing each other. Incidentally it is implied that variety is the cause of particular consciousness; and the cause of that variety is, as we have said, ignorance, which brings forward something other than the self: Such being the case, when the Jīva is freed from ignorance, he attains but unity with all. Therefore, there being no such division among the factors of an action as knowledge and known, whence should particular consciousness arise, or desire manifest itself, in the natural, immutable light of the self?
Because this identity with all is his form, therefore that is his form, the form of this self-effulgent Ātman, in which all objects of desire have been attained, because it comprises all. That from which objects of desire are different has hankering after them, as the form called Devadatta, for instance, in the waking state. But this other form is not so divided from anything; hence in it all objects of desire have been attained. It may be asked, can that form not be divided from other things that exist, or is the self the only entity that exists? The answer is, there is nothing else but the self. How? Because all objects of desire are but the self in this form. In states other than that of profound sleep, i.e. in the waking and dream states, things are separated, as it were, from the self and are desired as such. But to one who is fast asleep, they become the self, since there is no ignorance to project the idea of difference. Hence also is this form free from desires, because there is nothing to be desired, and devoid of grīef (Śokāntara). ‘Antara’ means a break or gap; or it may mean the inside or core. In either case, the meaning is that this form of the self is free from grief.
अत्र पितापिता भवति, मातामाता, लोका अलोकाः, देवा अदेवाः, वेदा अवेदाः । अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति, भ्रूणहाभ्रूणहा, चाण्डालोऽचण्डालः, पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः, श्रमणोऽश्रमणः,; तापसोऽतापसः, अनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन, तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान्हृदयस्य भवति ॥ २२ ॥
atra pitāpitā bhavati, mātāmātā, lokā alokāḥ, devā adevāḥ, vedā avedāḥ । atra steno'steno bhavati, bhrūṇahābhrūṇahā, cāṇḍālo'caṇḍālaḥ, paulkaso'paulkasaḥ, śramaṇo'śramaṇaḥ,; tāpaso'tāpasaḥ, ananvāgataṃ puṇyenānanvāgataṃ pāpena, tīrṇo hi tadā sarvāñchokānhṛdayasya bhavati || 22 ||
22. In this state a father is no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas. In this state a thief is no thief, the killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa no killer, a Caṇḍāla no Caṇḍāla, a Pulkasa no Pulkasa, a monk no monk, a hermit no hermit. (This form of his) is untouched by good work and untouched by evil work, for he is then beyond all the woes of his heart (intellect).
It has been said that the self-effulgent Ātman which is being described is free from ignorance, desire and work, for it is unattached, while they are adventitious. Here an objection is raised: The Śruti has said that although the self is Pure Intelligence, it does not know anything (in the state of profound sleep) on account of its attaining unity, as in the case of a couple in each other’s embrace. The Śruti has thereby practically said that like desire, work, etc., the self-effulgence of the Ātman is not its nature, since it is not perceived in the state of profound sleep. This objection is refuted by a reference to the illustration of the couple in each other’s embrace, and it is asserted that the self-effulgence is certainly present in profound sleep, but it is not, perceived on account of unity; it is not adventitious like desire, work, etc. Having mentioned this incidentally, the text takes up the topic under discussion, viz. that the form of the self that is directly perceived in the state of profound sleep is free from ignorance, desire and work. So it is a statement of fact to describe this form as beyond all relations. Since in the state of profound sleep the self has a form that is ‘beyond desires, free from evils and fearless,’ therefore in this state a father is no father. His fatherhood towards the son, as being the begetter, is due to an action, from which he is dissociated in this state. Therefore the father, notwithstanding the fact of his being such, is no father, because he is entirely free from the action that relates him to the son. Similarly we understand by implication that the son also ceases to be a son to his father, for the relation of both is based on an action, and he is beyond it then, since it has been said, ‘Free from evils’ (IV. iii. 21).
Likewise a mother is no mother, the worlds, which are either won or to be won through rites, are no worlds, owing to his dissociation from those rites. Similarly the gods, who are a part of the rites, are no gods, because he transcends his relation to those rites. The Vedas also, consisting of the Brāhmaṇas, which describe the means, the goal and their relation, as well as the Mantras, and forming part of the rites, since they deal with them, whether already read or yet to be read, are connected with a man through those rites. Since he transcends those rites, the Vedas too then are no Vedas.
Not only is the man beyond his relation to his good actions, but he is also untouched by his terribly evil actions. So the text says: In this state a thief, one who has stolen a Brāhmaṇa's gold—we know this from his mention along with one who has killed a noble Brāhmaṇa—is free from this dire action, for which he is called a thief, a despicable sinner. Similarly the killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa is no killer. Likewise a Caṇḍāla, etc. Not only is a man free from the actions done by him in his present life, but he is also free from those dire actions of his past life that degrade him to an exceedingly low birth. A Caṇḍāla is one born of a Śūdra father and a Brāhmaṇa mother.—‘Caṇḍāla’ is but a variant of the same word.—Not being connected with the work that caused his low birth, he is no Caṇḍāla. A Pulkasa is one born of a Śūdra father and a Kṣatriya mother.—‘Paulkasa’ is a variant of the same word.—He too is no Pulkasa. Similarly a man is dissociated from the duties of his particular order of life. For instance, a monk is no monk, being free from the duties that make him one. Likewise a hermit or recluse is no hermit. The two orders mentioned are suggestive of all the castes, orders, and so on.
In short, (this form of his) is untouched by good work, rites enjoined by the scriptures, as well as by evil work, the omission to perform such rites, and the doing of forbidden acts. The word ‘untouched’ is in the neuter gender as it qualifies ‘form,’ the ‘fearless form’ of the preceding paragraph. What is the reason of its being untouched by them? The reason is being stated: For he, the self of a nature described above, is then beyond all the woes, or desires. It is these desires for wished-for things that in their absence are converted into woes. A man who has either failed to attaSn those things or lost them keeps thinking of their good qualities and suffers. Hence woe, attachment and desire are synonyms. (The clause therefore means:) Because in the state of profound sleep he transcends all desires; for it has been said, ‘He craves no desires’ (IV. iii. 21), and ‘Beyond desires.’ Coming in the wake of those terms, the word ‘woe’ ought to mean desires. Desires again are the root of action; it will be stated later on, ‘What it desires, it resolves; and what it resolves, it works out’ (IV. iv. 5). Therefore, since he transcends all desires, it has been well said, ‘It is untouched by good work,’ etc.
Of his heart: The heart is the lotus-shaped lump of fle3h, but being the seat of the internal organ, intellect, it refers to that by a metonymy, as when we speak of cries from the chairs (meaning persons occupying them). The woes of his heart, or intellect—for, they abide there, since it has been said, ‘Desire, resolve, (etc. are but the mind)’ (I. v. 3). It will also be said later on, ‘The desires that dwell in his heart’ (IV. iv. 7). This and the other statement about ‘the woes of his heart’ repudiate the error that they dwell in the self, for it has been said that being ṇo more related to the heart in the state of profound sleep, the self transcends the forms of death. Therefore it is quite appropriate to say that being no more related to the heart, it transcends the relation to desires abiding in the heart.
Those who maintain that the desires and impressions dwelling in the heart go farther and affect the self, which is related to it, and even when it is dissociated from the self, they dwell in the latter, like the scent of flowers etc. in the oil in which they have been boiled, can find no meaning whatsoever for such scriptural statements as, ‘Desire, resolve,’ ‘It is on the heart (mind) that colours rest’ (III. ix. 20), ‘The woes of his heart,’ etc.
Objection: They are referred to the intellect merely because they are produced through this organ.
Reply: No, for they are specified in the words, ‘(That) dwell in (his) heart.’ This and the other statement, ‘It is on the heart that colours rest,’ would hardly be consistent if the intellect were merely the instrument of their production. Since the purity of the self is the meaning intended to be conveyed, the statement that desires abide in the intellect is truly appropriate. It admits of no other interpretation, for the Śruti says, ‘It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7).
Objection: The specification about ‘desires that dwell in his heart’ implies that there are others that dwell in the self too.
Reply: No, for it demarcates these desires from those that are not then in the heart. In other words, the epithet ‘that dwell in his heart’ contrasts not this particular seat of desires with some other seats, but contrasts these desires with those that are not in the heart at the time. For instance, those that have not yet sprung up—the future ones—or those that are past, having been checked by contrary ideas, are surely not in the intellect; and yet they may crop up in future. Hence the specification in contradistinction to them is quite in order, meaning those desires regarding some object that have sprung up and are present in the intellect.
Objection: Still the specification would be redundant.
Reply: No, because more attention should be paid to them as objects to be shunned. Otherwise, by ascribing the desires to the self, you would be holding a view which is contrary to the wording of the Śruti and is undesirable.
Objection: But does not the negation of a fact of normal experience in the passage, ‘He craves no desires’ (IV. iii. 19), mean that the Śruti mentions the desires as being in the self?
Reply: No, for the experience in question about the self being the seat of desires is due to an extraneous agency (the intellect), as is evidenced by the Śruti passage, ‘Being identified with dreams through its association with the intellect’ (IV. iii. 7). Besides there is the statementsabout the self being unattached, which would be incongruous if the self were the seat of desires; we have already said that attachment is desire.
Reply: No, that passage only means the absence of any other object of desire than the self.
Objection: Does not the reasoning of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems support the view that the self is the seat of desires etc.?
Reply: No; the arguments of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems are to be disregarded, since they contradict specific statements of the Śrutis such as, ‘(That) dwell in (his) heart’ (IV. iv. 7). Any reasoning that contradicts the Śrutis is a fallacy. Moreover, the selfeffulgence of the Ātman is contradicted. That is to say, since in the dream state desires etc. are witnessed by Pure Intelligence only, the views in question would contradict the self-effulgence of the Ātman, which is stated as a fact by the Śrutis and is also borne out by reason; for if the desires etc. inhere in the self, they cannot again be its objects, just as the eye cannot see its own particulars. The self-effulgence of the witness, the self, has been proved on the ground that objects are different entities from the subject. This would be contradicted if the self be supposed to be the seat of desires etc. Besides it contradicts the teachings of all scriptures. If the individual self be conceived as a part of the Supreme Self and possessing desires etc., the meaning of all the scriptures would be set at naught. We have explained this at length in the second chapter (p. 300). In order to establish the meaning of the scriptures that the individual self is identical with the Supreme Self, the idea that it is the seat of desires etc. must be refuted with the greatest care. If, however, that view is put forward, the very meaning of the scriptures would be contradicted. Just as the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, holding that wish and so forth are attributes of the self, are in disharmony with the ṛneaning of the Upaniṣads, so also is this view not to be entertained, because it contradicts the meaning of the Upaniṣads.
It has been said that the self does not see (in the state of profound sleep) on account of unity, as in the case of the couple, and that it is self-effulgent. Selfeffulgence is being Pure Intelligence by nature. Now the question is, if this intelligence is the very nature of the self, like the heat etc. of fire, how should it, in spite of the unity, give up its nature, and fail to.know? And if it does not give up its nature, how is it that it does not see in the state of profound sleep? It is self-contradictory to say that intelligence is the nature of the self and, again, that it does not know. The answer is, it is not self-contradictory; both these are possible. How?—
यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन्वै तन्न पश्यति, न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान् । न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत् ॥ २३ ॥
yadvai tanna paśyati paśyanvai tanna paśyati, na hi draṣṭurdṛṣṭerviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān | na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yatpaśyet || 23 ||
23. That it does not see in that state is because, although seeing then, it does not see; for the vision of the witness can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can see.
That it does not see in that state of profound sleep is because, although seeing then, it does not see. You think that it does not see in the state of profound sleep; but do not think so. Why? Because it is seeing then.
Objection: But we know that in the state of profound sleep it does not see, because then neither the eye nor the mind, which are the instruments of vision, is working. It is only when the eye, ear, etc; are at work that we say one is seeing or hearing. But we do not find the organs working. Therefore we conclude that it must surely not be seeing.
Reply: Certainly not; it is seeing; for the vision of the witness can never be lost. As the heat of fire lasts as long as the fire, so is the witness, the self, immortal, and because of this its vision too is immortal; it lasts as long as the witness does.
Objection: Do you not contradict yourself by saying in the same breath that it is a vision of the witness, and that it is never lost? Vision is an act of the witness; one is called a witness just because one sees. Hence it is impossible to say that vision, which depends on an act of the witness, is never lost.
Reply: It must be immortal, because the Śruti says it is never lost.
Objection: No, a Śruti text merely informs (it cannot alter a fact). The destruction of something that is artificially made is a logical necessity, and cannot be prevented even by a hundred texts, because a text only informs about a thing just as it is.
Reply: The objection does not hold. The vision of the witness is possible, like the sun etc. revealing things. Just as the sun and the like are naturally always luminous and reveal things through their natural, constant light, and when we speak of them as revealing things, we do not mean that they are naturally non-luminous and only reveal things by a fresh act each time, but that they do so through their natural, constant light, so is the self called a witness on account of its imperishable, eternal vision.
Objection: Then its function as a witness is secondary.
Reply: No. Thus only can it be shown to be a witness in the primary sense of the word, because if the self were observed to exercise the function of seeing in any other way, then the former way might be secondary. But the self has no other method of seeing. Therefore thus only can we understand its being a witness in the primary sense, not otherwise. Just as the sun and the like reveal things through their constant, natural light, and not through one produced for the time being, (so is the self a witness through its eternal, natural intelligence), and that is its function as a witness in the primary sense, for there cannot be any other witness besides it. Therefore there is not the least trace of self-contradiction in the statement that the vision of the witness is never lost.
Objection: We observe that the suffix ‘tṛc’ is used in words denoting an agent of temporary acts, such as ‘Chettṛ’ (cutter), ‘Bhettṛ’ (breaker) and ‘Gantṛ’ (traveller). So why not in the word ‘Draṣṭṛ’ (seer or witness) also in that sense?
Reply: No, for we see it otherwise in the word ‘Prakāśayitṛ’ (revealer).
Objection: We admit this in the case of luminous agencies, for there it can have no other sense, but not in the case of the self.
Reply: Not so, for the Śruti says its vision is never lost.
Objection: This is contradicted by our experience that we sometimes see and sometimes do not see.
Reply: No, for this is simply due to particular activities of our organs. We observe also that those who have had their eyes removed keep the vision that belongs to the self intact in dreams. Therefore the vision • of the self is imperishable, and through that imperishable, self-luminous vision the Ātman continues to see in the state of profound sleep.
How is it, then, that it does not see? This is being answered: But there is not that second thing, the object, separate from it which it can see, or perceive, Those things that caused the particular visions (of the waking and dream states), viz. the mind- (with the self behind it), the eyes, and forms, were all presented by ignorance as something different from the self. They are now unified in the state of profound sleep, as the individual self has been embraced by the Supreme Self. Only when the self is under limitations, do the organs stand as something different to. help it tp particular experiences. But it is now embraced by its own Supreme Self, which is Pure Intelligence and the Self of all, as a man is by his beloved wife. Hence the organs and objects do not stand as different entities; and since they are absent,, there is no particular experience, for it is the product of the organs etc., not of the self, and only appears as the product of the self. Therefore it is a mistake due to this (absence of particular experience) that the vision of the self is lost.
यद्वै तन्न जिघ्रति जिघ्रन्वै तन्न जिघ्रति, न हि घ्रातुर्घ्रातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यज्जिघ्रेत् ॥ २४ ॥
yadvai tanna jighrati jighranvai tanna jighrati, na hi ghrāturghrāterviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yajjighret || 24 ||
24. That it does not smell in that state is because, although smelling then, it does not smell; for the smeller’s function of smelling can never be lost, because it is immortal. «But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can smell.
यद्वै तन्न रसयते रसयन्वै तन्न रसयते, न हि रसयितू रसयितेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्रसयेत् ॥ २५ ॥
yadvai tanna rasayate rasayanvai tanna rasayate, na hi rasayitū rasayiterviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yadrasayet || 25 ||
25. That it does not taste in that state is because, although tasting then, it does not taste; for the taster’s function of tasting can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can taste.
यद्वै तन्न वदति, वदन्वै तन्न वदति, न हि वक्तुर्वक्तेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्वदेत् ॥ २६ ॥
yadvai tanna vadati, vadanvai tanna vadati, na hi vakturvakterviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yadvadet || 26 ||
26. That it does not speak in that state is because, although speaking then, it does not speak; for the speaker's function of speaking •can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can speak.
यद्वै तन्न शृणोति शृण्वन्वै तन्न शृणोति, न हि श्रोतुः श्रुतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यच्छृणुयात् ॥ २७ ॥
yadvai tanna śṛṇoti śṛṇvanvai tanna śṛṇoti, na hi śrotuḥ śruterviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yacchṛṇuyāt || 27 ||
27. That it does not hear in that state is because, although hearing then, it does not hear; for the listener’s function of hearing can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can hear.
यद्वै तन्न मनुते मन्वानो वै तन्न मनुते, न हि मन्तुर्मतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यन्मन्वीत ॥ २८ ॥
yadvai tanna manute manvāno vai tanna manute, na hi manturmaterviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yanmanvīta || 28 ||
28. That it does not think in that state is because, although thinking then, it does not think; for the thinker’s function of thinking can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can think.
यद्वै तन्न स्पृशति स्पृशन्वै तन्न स्पृशति, न हि स्प्रष्टुः स्पृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्स्पृशेत् ॥ २९ ॥
yadvai tanna spṛśati spṛśanvai tanna spṛśati, na hi spraṣṭuḥ spṛṣṭerviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yatspṛśet || 29 ||
29. That it does not touch in that state is because, although touching then, it does not touch; for the toucher's function of touching can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can touch.
यद्वै तन्न विजानाति विजानन्वै तन्न विजानाति, न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्; न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्विजानीयात् ॥ ३० ॥
yadvai tanna vijānāti vijānanvai tanna vijānāti, na hi vijñāturvijñāterviparilopo vidyate'vināśitvān; na tu taddvitīyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktaṃ yadvijānīyāt || 30 ||
30. That it does not know in that state is because, although knowing then, it does not know; for the knower’s function of knowing can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can know.
The rest is to be similarly explained: That it does not smell, That it does not taste, That it does not speak, That it does not hear, That it does not think, That it does not touch, That it does not know, etc. Though thinking and knowing are aided by vision etc., yet they have activities concerning objects past, present and future that do not depend on the eyes etc. Hence they are separately mentioned.
Now the question is, are the vision and so forth attributes different from the self and from one another, like the heat, light, combustion, etc. of fire, or are they different phases of an attribute identical with the self, the difference being caused only by extraneous limiting adjuncts? On this some say: The self is an entity that by itself has both unity and difference, just as a cow is one as a substance, but its features, the dewlap etc., are different from one another. As gross substances have both unity and difference, so we can infer that formless substances without parts also have both unity and difference. Since this is observed to be the universal rule, the vision and so forth belonging to the self are different from one another, but as the self they are one. To this we reply: No, for the passage in question has a different meaning. The passage, ‘That it does not see in that state,' etc. does not mean to show that the vision and so forth are attributes different from the self, but is introduced in order to answer the following objection: If the Ātman is self-luminous intelligence, how is it that it does not know in the state of profound sleep? Surely then it must be otherwise. This is how it is being answered: Its natural self-luminous intelligence manifests itself in the waiting and dream states through many limiting adjuncts such as the eyes, and comes to be designated as vision etc. But in the state of profound sleep, owing to the cessation of the different activities of the mind and organs, these latter do not appear, and therefore the nature of the self cannot be perceivd as differentiated by them. Yet it is spoken of as being present in a way that is a mere recapitulation of normal experience. Hence the view that the passage in question presents the attributes such as vision as different from the self, is based on an ignorance of its true meaning.
Moreover, it would be in conflict with the Śruti text that speaks of the self as homogeneous Pure Intelligence, like a lump of salt, and also with texts like the following: ‘Knowledge, Bliss’ (III. ix. 28), ‘Truth, Knowledge’ (Tai. II. i. 1), and ‘Intelligence is Brahman’ (Ai. V. 3). From the common use of words also we know this. We often use such expressions as, ‘One knows colour through the eyes,’ ‘One knows sound through the ears,’ ‘One knows the taste of food through the tongue,’ etc., which show that the objects denoted by the words ‘vision’ etc. can be designated as knowledge alone. And the use of words is a means of knowledge. Examples also corroborate this view. Just as in the world a crystal is naturally transparent, and only for that reason assumes different colours by coming in contact with different limiting adjuncts such as green, blue, or red colour, and no one can imagine that crystal has any other attribute but its natural transparency, such as green, blue, or red colour, similarly the different powers of vision etc. are observed in the light called the self, which is naturally Pure Intelligence, simply owing to its contact with the limiting adjuncts such as the eyes, because Pure Intelligence, like the crystal, is naturally transparent. The self-luminosity of the Ātman is another reason. Just as the light of the sun, coming in contact with things to be illumined, appears as green, blue, yellow, red, etc., although in reality it cannot be so divided, so does the light called the self, revealing the whole universe as well as the eyes etc., assume their form. This has been stated in the passage, ‘It is through the light of the self that he sits,’ etc. (IV. iii. 6).
Besides, substances that have no parts cannot be conceived as multiple, for there is no such example. Although the ether is conceived as possessing diverse attributes such as all-pervasiveness, and atoms as possessing various qualities such as odour and savour, yet, when discriminated, these prove to be due only to extraneous limiting adjuncts. The ether, for instance, has no attribute of its own called all-pervasiveness: it is through its association with all as limiting adjuncts that it is designated as all-pervading, when as a matter of fact it is present everywhere in its natural form. The quesion of going or not going does not arise with regard to the ether in itself, for going is an action that connects something existing at a particular place with some other place, and this action is impossible in a thing that admits of no differentiation. Similarly different attributes can never be in the ether. The same is also true of atoms etc. An atom, say of earth, which consists only of odour, is the minutest particle of it, and is itself odour; one cannot conceive that it again has a property called odour. It may be urged that an atom can have savour etc. But that is due to its contact with water and so on. Therefore there is no example to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many attributes. This also refutes the view that the powers of vision and so forth of the Supreme Self can have different modifications such as the eyes and colours.
यत्र वा अन्यदिव स्यात्, तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येत्, अन्योऽन्यज्जिघ्रेत्, अन्योऽन्यद्रसयेत्, अन्योऽन्यद्वदेत्, अन्योऽन्यच्छृणुयात्, अन्योऽन्यन्मन्वीत, अन्योऽन्यत्स्पृशेत्, अन्योऽन्यद्विजानीयात् ॥ ३१ ॥
yatra vā anyadiva syāt, tatrānyo'nyatpaśyet, anyo'nyajjighret, anyo'nyadrasayet, anyo'nyadvadet, anyo'nyacchṛṇuyāt, anyo'nyanmanvīta, anyo'nyatspṛśet, anyo'nyadvijānīyāt || 31 "||
31. When there is something else, as it were, then one can see something, one can smell some-thing, one can taste something, one can speak something, one can hear something, one can think something, one can touch something, or one can know something.
It has been said that in the state of profound sleep there is not, as in the waking and dream states, that second thing differentiated from the self which it can. know ; hence it knows no particulars in profound sleep. Here it is objected: If this is its nature, why does it give up that nature and have particular knowledge? If, on the other hand, it is its nature to have this kind of knowledge, why does it not know particulars in the state of profound sleep? The answer is this: When, in the waking or dream state, there is something else besides the self, as it were, presented by ignorance, then one, thinking of oneself as different from that something—although there is nothing different from the self, nor is there any self different from it—can see something. This has been shown by a referrence to one’s experience in the dream state in the passage, ‘As if he were being killed, or overpowered’ (IV. iii. 20). Similarly one can smell, taste, speak, hear, think, touch and know something.
सलिल एको द्रष्टाद्वैतो भवति, एष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति हैनमनुशशास याज्ञवल्क्यः, एषास्य परमा गतिः, एषास्य परमा संपत्, एषोऽस्य परमो लोकः, एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः; एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति ॥ ३२ ॥
salila eko draṣṭādvaito bhavati, eṣa brahmalokaḥ samrāḍiti hainamanuśaśāsa yājñavalkyaḥ, eṣāsya paramā gatiḥ, eṣāsya paramā saṃpat, eṣo'sya paramo lokaḥ, eṣo'sya parama ānandaḥ; etasyaivānandasyānyāni bhūtāni mātrāmupajīvanti || 32 ||
32. It becomes (transparent) like water, one, the witness, and without a second. This is the world (state) of Brahman, O Emperor. Thus did Yājñavalkya instruct Janaka: This is its supreme attainment, this is its supreme glory, this is its highest world, this is its supreme bliss. On a particle of this very bliss other beings live.
When, however, that ignorance which presents things other than the self is at rest, in that state of profound sleep, there being nothing separated from the self by ignorance, what should one see, smell, or know, and through what? Therefore, being fully embraced by his own self-luminous Supreme Self, the Jīva becomes infinite, perfectly serene, with all his objects of desire attained, and the self the only object of his desire, transparent like water, one, because there is no second: It is ignorance which separates a second entity, and that is at rest in the state of profound sleep; hence ‘one.’ The mtness, because the vision that is identical with the light of the self is never lost. And without a second, for there is no second entity different from the self to be seen. This is immortal and fearless. This is the world of Brahman, the world that is Brahman: In profound sleep the self, bereft of its limiting adjuncts, the body and organs, remains in its own supreme light of the Ātman, free from all relations, O Emperor. Thus did Yājñavalkya instruct Janaka. This is spoken by the Śruti.
How did he instruct him? This is its supreme attainment, the attainment of the individual self. The other attainments, characterised by the taking of a body, from the state of Hiraṇyagarbha down to that of a clump of grass, are created by ignorance and therefore inferior to this, being within the sphere of ignorance. But this identification with all, in which one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing olse, is the highest of all attainments such‘as identity with the gods, that are achieved through meditation and rites. This too is its supreme glory, the highest of all its splendours, being natural to it; other glories are artificial. Likewise this is its highest world; the other worlds, which are the result of its past work, are inferior to it; this, however, is not attainable by any action, being natural; hence ‘this is its highest world.’ Similarly this is its supreme bliss, in comparison with the bther joys that are due to the contact of the organs with their objects, since it is eternal; for another Śruti says, ‘That which is infinite is bliss’ (Ch. VII. xxiii. 1). ‘That in which one sees something. . . . knows something, is puny,’ mortal, secondary joy. But this is the opposite of thathence ‘this is its supreme bliss.’ On a particle of this very bliss, put forward by ignorance, and perceived only during the contact of the organs with their objects, other beings live. Who are they? Those that have been separated from that bliss by ignorance, and are considered different from Brahman. Being thus different, they subsist on a fraction of that bliss which is perceived through the contact of the organs with their objects.
स यो मनूष्याणां राद्धः समृद्धो भवत्यन्येषामधिपतिः, सर्वैर्मानुष्यकैर्भोगैः सम्पन्नतमः, स मनुष्याणां परम आनन्दः; अथ ये शतं मनुष्याणामानन्दाः स एकः पितृणां जितलोकानामानन्दः; अथ ये शतं पितृणां जितलोकानामानन्दाः स एको गन्धर्वलोक आनन्दः; अथ ये शतं गन्धर्वलोक आनन्दाः स एकः कर्मदेवानामानन्दः—ये कर्मणा देवत्वमभिसम्पद्यन्ते; अथ ये शतं कर्मदेवानामानन्दाः स एक आजानदेवानामानन्दः, यश्च श्रोत्रियोऽवृजिनोऽकामहतः; अथ ये शतमाजानदेवानामानन्दाः स एकः प्रजापतिलोक आनन्दः, यश्च श्रोत्रियोऽवृजिनोऽकामहतो; अथ ये शतं प्रजापतिलोक आनन्दाः स एको ब्रह्मलोक आनन्दः, यश्च श्रोत्रियोऽवृजिनोऽकामहतः; अथैष एव परम आनन्दः, एष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः; सोऽहं भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्शायैव ब्रूहीति; अत्र ह याज्ञवल्क्यो बिभयांचकारः, मेधावी राजा सर्वेभ्यो मान्तेभ्य उदरौत्सीदिति ॥ ३३ ॥
sa yo manūṣyāṇāṃ rāddhaḥ samṛddho bhavatyanyeṣāmadhipatiḥ, sarvairmānuṣyakairbhogaiḥ sampannatamaḥ, sa manuṣyāṇāṃ parama ānandaḥ; atha ye śataṃ manuṣyāṇāmānandāḥ sa ekaḥ pitṛṇāṃ jitalokānāmānandaḥ; atha ye śataṃ pitṛṇāṃ jitalokānāmānandāḥ sa eko gandharvaloka ānandaḥ; atha ye śataṃ gandharvaloka ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ karmadevānāmānandaḥ—ye karmaṇā devatvamabhisampadyante; atha ye śataṃ karmadevānāmānandāḥ sa eka ājānadevānāmānandaḥ, yaśca śrotriyo'vṛjino'kāmahataḥ; atha ye śatamājānadevānāmānandāḥ sa ekaḥ prajāpatiloka ānandaḥ, yaśca śrotriyo'vṛjino'kāmahato; atha ye śataṃ prajāpatiloka ānandāḥ sa eko brahmaloka ānandaḥ, yaśca śrotriyo'vṛjino'kāmahataḥ; athaiṣa eva parama ānandaḥ, eṣa brahmalokaḥ samrāḍiti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ; so'haṃ bhagavate sahasraṃ dadāmi, ata ūrdhvaṃ vimokśāyaiva brūhīti; atra ha yājñavalkyo bibhayāṃcakāraḥ, medhāvī rājā sarvebhyo māntebhya udarautsīditi || 33 ||
33. He who is perfect of body and prosperous among men, the ruler of others, and most lavishly supplied with all human enjoyments, represents the greatest joy among men. This human joy multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the Manes who have won that world of theirs. The joy of these Manes who have won that world multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of the celestial minstrels. This joy in the world of the celestial minstrels multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the gods by action—those who attain their godhead by their actions. This joy of the gods by action multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the gods by birth, as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire. This joy of the gods by birth multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Prajāpati (Virāj), as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire. This joy in the world of Prajāpati multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha), as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire. This indeed is the supreme bliss. This is the state of Brahman, O Emperor, said Yājñavalkya. ‘I give you a thousand (cows), sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself.’ At this Yājñavalkya was afraid that the intelligent Emperor was constraining him to finish with all his conclusions.
(It has been said that) all beings from Hiraṇyagarbha down to men live on particles or fractions of the supreme bliss. In order to convey an idea of this bliss as a whole through its parts, as of a rock of salt through its grains, the present paragraph is introduced. He who is perfect of body, having no physical defects, and prosperous, provided with luxuries, among men; also the ruler of others, the independent lord of people of the same class, not a mere provincial ruler; and most lavishly supplied with all. human enjoyments—the adjective ‘human’ excludes the materials of heavenly enjoyment; he is the foremost among those who possess all these human luxuries—represents (lit. is) the greatest joy among men. The identity of joy and its possessor in this sentence (‘joy’ meaning ‘enjoyer’) indicates that this joy is not different from the self. For it has been said in the passage, ‘When there is something else, as it were,’ etc. (IV. iii. 31), that the lower degrees of bliss have only emanated from the supreme bliss in the dual form of subject and object; hence it is but proper to bring out this identity in the phrase ‘greatest joy.’ Kings like Yudhiṣṭhira are examples in point. The Śruti teaches us about this supreme bliss, in which differences cease, by making a start with human joy, which we all know, and multiplying it a hundred times in successive steps. Now, where this joy increasing a hundred times at each step reaches its limit, and where mathematical differences cease, there being nothing else but the self to see, hear or think, that is the supreme bliss, and in order to describe this the text proceeds:
This human joy multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the Manes. They are qualified by the clause ‘who have won that world of theirs,’ i.e. who have pleased the Manes by the performance of obsequial rites etc., and have won their way to their world. Their measure of joy is the human joy multiplied a hundred times. That again multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of the celestial minstrels. That again multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the gods by action—those who attain their godhead by their actions such as the Agnihotra enjoined by the Śrutis. Similarly one unit of joy for the gods by birth, those who are gods from their very birth, as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless, i.e. doing what is prescribed by the scriptures, and free from desire for all objects below the level of the gods by birth. That his joy equals theirs is gathered from the word ‘ca’ (and) in the text. That multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Prajāpati, i.e. in the body of Virāj, as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless and free from desire—this has already been explained—and who meditates on him. That multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of Brahman, i.e. in the body of Hiraṇyagarbha, as well as of one who, etc.—already explained. After this mathematical calculations cease.
This has been called the supreme bliss, of which the joys of the world of Hiraṇyagarbha etc. are but particles, like drops of an ocean That in which the other joys, increasing step by step in multiples of hundred, merge, and which is experienced by one versed in the Vedas, is indeed the supreme bliss called Samprasāda (that experienced in profound sleep); for in it one sees nothing else, hears nothing else (and so on). Hence it is infinite, and for that reason immortal; the other joys are the opposite of that. The Vedic erudition and sinlessness (mentioned above) are common to the other joys too. It is the difference made by the absence of desire that leads to the increase of joy a hundred times. Here it is suggested by implication that Vedic erudition, sinlessness and the absence of desire are the means of attaining the particular types of joy; as rites such as the Agnihotra are means to the attainment of godhead by the gods. Of these, the two factors, Vedic erudition and sinlessness, are common to the lower planes too; hence they are not regarded as means to the attainment of the succeeding kinds of joy. For this the absence of desire is understood to be the means, since it admits of degrees of renunciation. This supreme bliss is known to be the experience of the Vedic scholar who is free from desire. Vedavyāsa also says, ‘The sense-pleasures of this world and the great joys of heaven are not worth one-sixteenth part of the bliss that comes of the cessation of desire’ (Mbh. XII. clxxiii. 47).
This is the state of Brahman, O Emperor, said Yājñavalkya. For this instruction I give you a thousand cows, sir. Please instruct me further about liberation itself—this has been explained. At this last request Yājñavalkya was afraid—the Śruti tells us the reason of his fear: he was afraid not for his lack of ability to teach or for ignorance, but— that the intelligent Emperor was constraining him to finish with all his conclusions. ‘Whatever questions of his regarding liberation I answer, the Emperor, being intelligent, takes all to be but a part of the questions that he is at liberty to ask me, and puts me newer questions every time to answer. On the plea of asking his wished-for questions covered by the boon, he wants to possess all my knowledge’—this was the cause of Yājñavalkya’s fear.
स वा एष एतस्मिन्स्वप्नान्ते रत्वा चरित्वा, दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च, पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति बुद्धान्तायैव ॥ ३४ ॥
sa vā eṣa etasminsvapnānte ratvā caritvā, dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca, punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyonyādravati buddhāntāyaiva || 34 ||
34. After enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, and merely seeing the effects of merits and demerits, he comes back, in the inverse order, to his former condition, the waking state.
It has been shown (par. 9) that the individual self becomes itself the light in dreams. Further on it has also been shown, by a reference to its moving between the dream and waking states, that it is different from the body and organs, and by the illustration of the great fish, that it is free from desire and work, on account of its non-attachment. Again the effects of ignorance in the dream state have been shown in the passage, ‘As if he were being killed,’ etc. By implication the nature of ignorance too has been ascertained as the superimposition of attributes other than the true ones, and as not being a natural attribute of the self. Similarly the effects of knowledge too have been shown in the dream state, by a reference to one’s experience, as identity with all, in the passage, ‘When he thinks, “This (universe) is myself, who am all,” that is his highest state’ (IV. iii. 20). It has also been stated that identity with all, which is its nature—its transcendent form, in which it is free from all such relative attributes as ignorance, desire and work—is directly experienced in the state of profound sleep. The Ātman is self-luminous and is the supreme bliss; this is the subject-matter of knowledge; this is the perfectly serene state, and the culmination of happiness—all this has been explained by the foregoing passages. And they are illustrations of liberation and bondage, which are the effects of knowledge and ignorance respectively. These two have been indicated with their causes and effects. But Janaka, mistaking that all that has merely been an illustration, thinks that liberation and bondage, which are the themes they seek to illustrate, are yet to be explained together with their causes by Yājñavalkya, as coming under his wished-for questions covered by the boon. Hence his further request: ‘Please instruct me further about liberation itself.’
Now it has been said that the same self-luminous Ātman moves unattached like a great fish between the dream and waking states. As it moves like the great fish between these two states, alternately relinquishing and taking up the body and organs, which are the forms of death, so at the time of death and birth it is alternately disconnected from and connected with those very forms of death. Its journey, referred to in the passage, ‘It moves between the two worlds,’ was barely indicated as the theme that was illustrated by its moving between the dream and fwaking states. That journey with its causes has to be described at length; hence the rest of this section. In a preceding paragraph (par. 17) the self has been spoken of as going from the waking to the dream state, and thence to the state of profound sleep, which is the illustration for liberation. The present paragraph is related to that, since it seeks to show how, coming down from that state, it goes through the relative activities of the waking state. The Jīva, passing from the waking to the dream state, and thence to the state of profound sleep, stays there for a while; then he comes slightly down, and after enjoying himself and roaming in the dream state, etc.—all this has been explained—he comes back to the waking state.
तद्यथानः सुसमाहितमुत्सर्जद्यायात्, एवमेवायं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सर्जन्याति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति ॥ ३५ ॥
tadyathānaḥ susamāhitamutsarjadyāyāt, evamevāyaṃ śārīra ātmā prājñenātmanānvārūḍha utsarjanyāti, yatraitadūrdhvocchvāsī bhavati || 35 ||
35. Just as a cart, heavily loaded, goes on rumbling, so does the self that is in the body, being presided over by the Supreme Self, go making noises, when breathing becomes difficult.
From here onwards transmigration of the self is being described. To show that as the self came from the dream to the waking state, soàt will pass from this body to the next, an example is being given: Just as in life a cart, fully or heavily loaded with utensils and other household effects such as a mortar and pestle, a winnowing-fan and cooking vessels, as well as eatables, goes on rumbling under the load, driven by the carter, so does the self that is in the body, i.e. the self that has the subtle body as its limiting adjunct, which moves between this and the next world, as between the waking and dream states, through birth and death, consisting respectively in the association with and dissociation from the body and organs, called evils, and the departure of which is immediately followed by that of the vital force etc., being presided over, or revealed, by the self-luminous Supreme Self, go making noises. As has been said, ‘It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out,’ etc. (IV. iii. 6).
It should be noted here that when the subtle body, which has the vital force as its chief constituent, and is revealed by the self-luminous Ātman, goes, the self, of which it is the limiting adjunct, also seems to go. As another Śruti says, ‘On whose (departure must I depart)?’ (Pr. VI. 3), and ‘It thinks, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7). Hence the text says, ‘Presided over by the Supreme Self.’ Otherwise how can the self, being unified with the Supreme Self, go making noises like a cart? Therefore (the meaning is that) the self, with the subtle body as its limiting adjunct, goes making noises (the death rattle), afflicted by the feeling of pain as the vital parts are slashed. When does that happen? When breathing becomes difficult—when the man is gasping for breath. The word ‘etat’ is an adverb (meaning ‘thus’). Although this is an occurrence that is commonly observed, the Śruti repeats it only to create a spirit of renunciation in us. So miserable is this relative existence! Since at the time of death the vital parts are slashed, causing loss of memory and putting ā man in a helpless state of mind on account of the pangs felt, so that he cannot adopt the requisite means for his well-being, therefore, before that crisis comes, he must be alert in practising the means conducive to that end. This is what the Śruti says out of compassion.
स यत्रायमणिमानं न्येति—जरया वोपतपता वाणिमानं निगच्छति—तद्यथाम्रं वोदुम्बरं वा पिप्पलं वा बन्धनात्प्रमुच्यते, एवमेवायं पुरुष एभ्योऽङ्गेभ्यः संप्रमुच्य पुनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति प्राणायैव ॥ ३६ ॥
sa yatrāyamaṇimānaṃ nyeti—jarayā vopatapatā vāṇimānaṃ nigacchati—tadyathāmraṃ vodumbaraṃ vā pippalaṃ vā bandhanātpramucyate, evamevāyaṃ puruṣa ebhyo'ṅgebhyaḥ saṃpramucya punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyonyādravati prāṇāyaiva || 36 ||
36. When this (body) becomes thin—is emaciated through old age or disease—then, as a mango, or a fig, or a fruit of the peepul tree is detached from its stalk, so does this infinite being, completely detaching himself from the parts of the body, again go, in the same way that he came, to particular bodies, for the un-foldment of his vital force.
When, and owing to what, does that difficulty of breath take place? How does it take place, and what for? The answers to these questions are being given: When this human body that is a product of ignorance, with a head, hands, etc., becomes thin. Why? Through old age, being naturally worn out like a fruit ripened by time, or disease, literally, that which causes affliction, hence, fever etc. Afflicted with disease, the body, owing to impaired digestion, cannot digest the food that is eaten, and not being nourished by its essence, gets thin. This is what is meant by the expression ‘or through disease.’ When the body is extremely emaciated by fever and other causes, dyspnoea sets in, and at this stage the man goes making noises like the overloaded cart. Whosoever has a body must be overtaken by old age, suffer from disease etc., and have leanness; these are inevitable evils. The fact is mentioned to generate a spirit of renunciation in us.
How he leaves the body when he goes making noises is being described through an illustration: Then, as a mango, or a fig, or a fruit of the peepul tree, etc. The citing of many and dissimilar examples is for the purpose of stating that death may come from any cause, since the causes of death are indefinite and innumerable. This too is for stimulating renunciation: Since he is subject to death from so many causes, he is always in the jaws of death. Is detached from its stalk (Bandhana): The word ‘Bandhana’ may mean the sap that binds it to the stalk, or it may mean the stalk to which it is attached. As the fruit is detached from the sap or the stalk by the wind and many other causes, so does this infinite being, the self that is identified with the subtle body, i.e. has this as its limiting adjunct, completely detaching himself from the parts of the body such as the eye—not preserving the body through the vital force, as he does when he goes into the state of profound sleep, but withdrawing the organs together with the vital force—again go, etc. The word ‘again’ suggests that he has before this also gone many a time from one body to another, as he moves frequently between the dream and waking states. In the same way that he came to his present body, to particular bodies, according to his past work, knowledge, and so forth. What for? For the unfoldment of his vital force: Though literally it woùld mean ‘for the vital force,’ yet, since he goes along with it, the epithet would be meaningless. He goes from one body to another only for the unfoldment of the vital force. It is by this means, and not by the mere existence of the vital force, that he fulfils his object, viz. the enjoyment of the results of his work. Therefore in order that the vital force may be auxiliary to that, the specification ‘for the unfoldment of his vital force’ is appropriate.
Now it may be objected: When the Jīva goes leaving this body, he has no power to take up another, for he is dissociated from his body and organs. Nor are there others who, like servants, would wait for him with another body made ready, as a king's retinue waits for him with a house kept ready. How under the circumstances can he take up another body? The answer is: He has adopted the whole universe as his means to the realisation of the results of his work; and he is going from one body to another to fulfil this object. Therefore the whole universe, impelled by his work, waits for him with the requisite means for the realisation of the results of his work made ready. Witness the Śruti: ‘A man is born into the body that has been made for him’ (Ś. VI. ii. 2. 27). It is analogous to the case of a man about to return from the dream to the waking state. The process is being explained by a familiar illustration:
तद्यथा राजानमायन्तमुग्राः प्रत्येनसः सूतग्रामण्योऽन्नैः पानैरवसथैः प्रतिकल्पन्ते, अयमायाति, अयमागच्छतीति, एवं हैवंविदं सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रतिकल्पन्त, इदं ब्रह्मायाति, इदमागच्छतीति ॥ ३७ ॥
tadyathā rājānamāyantamugrāḥ pratyenasaḥ sūtagrāmaṇyo'nnaiḥ pānairavasathaiḥ pratikalpante, ayamāyāti, ayamāgacchatīti, evaṃ haivaṃvidaṃ sarvāṇi bhūtāni pratikalpanta, idaṃ brahmāyāti, idamāgacchatīti || 37 ||
37. Just as when a king is coming, the Ugras set against particular offences, the Sūtas and the leaders of the village wait for him with varieties of food and drink and mansions ready, saying, ‘Here he comes, here he comes,’ so for the person who knows about the results of his work, all the elements wait saying, ‘Here comes Brahman, here comes Brahman.’
Just as when a king, duly installed on the throne, is coming to some place within his kingdom, the Ugras, a particular caste, or so called from their fierce deeds, set against particular offences, appointed to punish thieves etc., the Sūtas, a hybrid caste, and the leaders of the village, anticipating the king's visit, wait for him with varieties of food such as those that are chewed or otherwise eaten, and drink such as wine, and mansions such as palaces ready, saying, ‘Here he comes, here he comes,’ so for; the person who knows about the results of his work, i.e. the transmigrating self—for the results of one's work are the topic under consideration, and they are referred to by the word ‘evam’ (thus)—all the elements that make up his body, together with the presiding deities, Indra and the rest, who help the organs to function, wait with the means of enjoying the fruits of his work made ready—being impelled by that work.
तद्यथा राजानं प्रयियासन्तमुग्राः प्रत्येनसः सूतग्रामण्योऽभिसमायन्ति, एवमेवेममात्मानमन्तकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति ॥ ३८ ॥
इति तृतीयं ब्राह्मणम् ॥
tadyathā rājānaṃ prayiyāsantamugrāḥ pratyenasaḥ sūtagrāmaṇyo'bhisamāyanti, evamevemamātmānamantakāle sarve prāṇā abhisamāyanti, yatraitadūrdhvocchvāsī bhavati || 38 ||
iti tṛtīyaṃ brāhmaṇam ||
38. Just as when the king wishes to depart, the Ugras set against particular offences, the Sūtas and the leaders of the village approach him, so do all the organs approach the departing man at the time of death, when breathing becomes difficult.
Who accompany him as he thus wishes to go? And do those who accompany him go prompted by an act of his, or dp they go of their own accord in conformity with his past work together with the elements that make up his new body, called the next world? Regarding this an illustration is being given: Just as when the king wishes to depart, the Ugras set against particular offences, the Sūtas and the leaders of the village approach him in a body, unbidden by the king, and simply knowing that he wishes to go, so do all the organs approach the departing man, the experiencer of the fruits of his work, at the time of death, when breathing becomes difficult. This last clause has been explained.
Footnotes and references:
Ignorance and its effects.
To show the order of gradual emancipation.
Since the Emperor chose this very boon, in preference to any other.
The ‘of’ is here appositional.
Which remains the same Under all these varying circumstances.
Which shows that the light in question was there.
For example, whatever reveals another thing is different from it.
For instance, the eye, which (according to the materialists) reveals the body, is not different from it.
One of the divisions of the earth situated round Mt. Meru.
Viz. that the light we are speaking of must be within the body and yet different from it, foe unlike the tan etc. it is invisible.
That there is no extracorporeal self acquiring in ieveíy birth merit and demerit which determine its future.
Phonetics, ritual, grammar, philology, prosody and astronomy.
The ascending node of the moon.
The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.
If the self be a modification of the intellect, liberation would be impossible.
Śaṅkara here takes the Mādhyandina reading ‘Sadhiḥ’ instead of ‘Sa hi,’ as in the text he follows.
From the objects to the self we have an ascending order of fineness, and from the self to the objects an ascending order of grossness.
The reflection of the self in the intellect constitutes this ego.
There are four schools of Buddhism, viz. the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, all maintaining that the universe consists only of ideas and is momentary—every idea lasting only for a moment and being immediately replaced by another exactly like it. The first two schools bqth believe in an objective world, of course ideal; but whereas the first holds that that world is cognisable through perception, the second maintains that it can only be inferred. The third school, also called Vijñānavādin, believes that there is no external world, and that the subjective world alone is real. The last school, called also Śūnyavādin (nihilist), denies both the worlds.
This is the view of the Yogācāra school as opposed to that of the first two.
The series called Hari, for instance, is perceived by the series called Rāma.
Buddha’s knowledge, for instance, perceives that of any ordinary mortal.
The reality of the consciousness presupposes the existence of external objects, which alone determine the form of that consciousness.
The impossibility of doing away wiṃ the distinction between knowledge and the object known.
For the same thing cannot be boṃ subject and object.
Since there is only one consciousness, and that alsb momentary.
The individual self. So also in the next few paragraphs.
Two derivations are given. In the first ‘Sarva’ (all) is joined to the verb ‘Ava,’ to protect; in the second it takes the suffix ‘vat,’ denoting possession.
In their threefold division, pertaining to the body etc.
For the creation of chariots etc. in dreams.
Śaṅkara supplies this from the preceding paragraphs.
Where the word ‘Anta’ occurs thrice, meaning not end, but state.
Referred to in II. i. 19 and IV. ii. 3.
See footnote on p: 3.
Hence grief cannot hurt it, for it is its very self.
The reference is to Bhartṛprapañca.
As standing in the way of liberation.
See footnote 2 on p. 611.
As qualities do In a substance.
Bhartṛprapañca is meant.