Part 37.1 - Later Critics of Bhedabheda—Introduction

It has been remarked above that the system of Sripati has been styled by him as Bhedabhedatmaka Viseshadvaita.916 The criticism of Bhedabheda, as propounded 015 The Yathornananabhis srijyate grihyatecha is usually a text cited in support of the Bheda view. Munda. Upa., I. 1. 7. 916 The terms Visesha and Visishta may be fully distinguished here. Visishta in Visishtadvaita means advaita with a distinction ; or a kind of advaita that is distinguished (in a particular manner); a particular, special or distinctive kind of advaita. An advaita characterized by a distinction. It may also mean a superior kind of advaita as visishta means superior or best of all or excellent. As applied to

by Vachaspati Misra in his Bhamati, has been briefly referred to above. 917 As Vachaspati Misra lived about the 9 th century A.D., he may be said to represent the Advaita view of his time on this doctrine. Other Advaita and Visishtadvaita criticism of it will be considered below. As the doctrine has also been examined by the Dvaitins as well and as Sripati criticizes certain aspects of both dvaita and advaita, it seems necessary to set out briefly here the dvaita viewpoint taken in regard to this particular doctrine and then advert to other criticism. Ramanuja's doctrine, it might be taken to signify the particular or peculiar distinction that Ramanuji makes as distinguished from Sankara, that Brahman and Prakriti are identical and real entities. As visishta in Sanskrit is a name of Vishnu, it might, in addition, be taken to stress Ramanuja's particular regard to this deity, whom he holds in his Bhashya as the one God, as the highest Self or Brahman, as the Creator, as the promulgator of the Pancharatra and as pervading the whole world (I. 1. 13 ; I. 1. 21 ; I. 4. 4; II. 1. 15 ; II. 1. 23; II. 1. 24; II. 2. 35; II. 2. 3). Visesha in Viseshadvaita means species, kind or variety; an advaita of a special kind or variety; in other words, a sort or species of advaita which is different from Sankara's or Ramanuja's. As visesha also means individuality or particularity, the term viseshadvaita may be translated as an advaita doctrine which has an individuality of its own. Not only does Sripati assert the reality of Brahman and Prakriti but also that the Brahman is possessed of visesha, i.e., attributes. Sripati calls his system Bhedabhedatmaka viseshadvaita. In this sense, the word visesha may be taken to distinctly limit or qualify the sense of the word (advaita) following it. In other words, we would have to describe it as an advaita with a qualification, while Ramanuja's Visishtadvaita would be rightly called an advaita characterized by a distinction. Sripati's name for his system Bhedabhedatmaka viseshadvaita would thus mean a variety of advaita which embodies in itself the bheda and abheda views. Visesha as used here appears to signify nothing more than peculiar ", special", "distinctive","discriminating" or "variety". Visesha is used to indicate variety," when it is used at the end of a compound, i.e., Bhuta viseshah,-Uttararamacharita, 4; Parimala viseshan,-Panchatantra, 1; Kadali viseshah,-Kumarasambhava, I. 36. Srikantha describes his system as Saiva Visishtadvaita. 66 " " 917 See supra. Also the Bhamati Chatussutri by S. S. Suryanara-` yana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, page 175; Introduction, p. XIX.

The Bhedabheda doctrine has been dealt with at some length by Anandatirtha in his Tatvodyota.918 The relevant passage may be quoted here:-Sarva vailakshanyangikarat durghatamapi Brahmapramanat angikriyata eva jagato bhinnam abhinnam uta bhinnabhinnam iti vikalpah tatrapi yujyate | Bhinnam chet bhedadi visishtat suddham bhinnam abhinnam vetyadi anavasta Abhinnam chet mithyarupena jagata brahmapi mithyaiva syat Bhinnabhinnam chet doshadvayamapi ubhaya vilakshanam chet anirvachaniyatvam Brahmana eva patitam Yad evamapi na anirvachanyatvam Brahmanah tarhi jagatopi nasyat Visvam satyam ityadi srutervachanam atrapi yuktam Nasattan nasaduchchate \ While you accept that Brahman is one having contradictory characteristics, though such a conclusion is impossible to arrive at, the existence of Brahman is accepted through evidence. If this be so, these doubts arise:-Is Brahman separate (bhinna) from the world (jagat), or is he one with it (abhinna), or is he both separate and non-separate (bhinnabhinna)? If jagat is held to be different (bhinna) from Brahman, then he must be held to be absolutely different and no occasion for a doubt can arise as to whether he is divided, undivided and both divided and undivided. If jagat is held to be undivided from Brahman, then if jagat is said to be mithya (unreal), then Brahman also becomes unreal. If it is said that the jagat is both divided and undivided from Brahman, then there arises a double discrepancy (dosha dvayam). And both the discrepancies then become so inexplicable that Brahman himself cannot be explained. If Brahman becomes so difficult of explanation, then jagat itself is reduced to nothingness (nasyat). 919 But the Sruti texts declare Visvam satyam, etc. 920 (i.e., The 918 See T. R. Krishnachar's (Kumbakonam) Edition, p. 241, lines 1-2. 919 That is, jagat is not merely mithya, but something worse, it is not at all existent. 920 The full text of Rig-Veda, II. 24. 12, runs as follows :Visvam satyam maghavanayuvorida paschana praminanti vratam vam Praghanvasya mahato mahani satya'satyasya karanani vocham ||

jagat exists) and Nasattan nasaduchchate, etc. (The world is true and eternal). In the Karmanirnaya 21 Anandatirtha touches on this question once again. Discussing the nirvisesha theory, he asks whether the vailakshanya of Brahman exists in being Bheda, Abheda or Bhedabheda-in difference, in non-difference or in both difference and non-difference. As regards Bheda, it has never been accepted by you (the Advaitin); but vyavaharika is accepted in the light of anirvahatva (i.e., inexplicability). Therefore there is really no such thing as vyavaharika; for if all vyavahara is dispensed with, there is no proof (of anything existing thereafter). In vyavahura, the unreal (mithya) and the real (tathya), when put to common test, will prove indistinguishable like vapour (from the air) and vapour from the tears (dhumabashpayordhumatvavat). Therefore Abheda cannot be accepted. Consequently there remains only Bhedabheda. This too cannot be accepted. In Abheda, Brahman is inexplicable (anirvachya)-Brahmanostatsabdayoh paryayatva. You want to make Brahman and tatsabda synonymous with each other. This synonymity cannot be accepted because you have discarded viseshana and argue nirviseshatva. While you don't accept viseshatva, you still discuss Brahman, assuming tatsabda as synonymous with him, which is an attribute. This contradicts your own statement and thus cannot be accepted. You also say that a Brahmagnani should not use any other term as synonymous with Brahman, if he wishes to attain Brahmatva but still you employ the term tat, which is an attributive term and not Brahman. Thus your argument ends in contradiction. And therefore you have not proved your doctrine-mithya viseshya chasiddhirukta. Therefore, the argument for Bhedabheda which relies on the mutual dependence or support (anyonyasraya), on unsettledness (anavasta) and on a fraudulent device (chakrakam va) becomes contradictory A work on the Rigreda Brahmana, 1 to 5 khandas-mo.e properly called Karma mirnaya mulabhuta Rigveda bhavah. (See Krishnachar's Edition, p. 247.) 921 38 F

and has to be rejected even on your own footing. Nor can Brahman be explained to be anything else which can appeal to knowledge. Therefore, the suggestion of bhedabheda becomes contradictory. So, that form of bhedabheda consisting of vilakshana (contradictory) characteristics becomes destroyed (i.e., refuted). f In his Vishnutattva-Nirnaya 22 also, Anandatirtha discusses the doctrine of Bhedabheda. He says:-Abhinnascha mabhedascha yatha bhedavivarjitam vyavaharyam pruthaktvam syat yevameva gunohareh Abheda bhinnayorbhedo yadiva bhedabhinnayoh Anavasthiti revasya naviseshanatamatih mulasambandhamagnatva tasmadekam anamtata vyavaharyam viseshena dustarah balatohareh | Viseshopi svarupam sa svanirvahakatasyacha iti Brahmatarke The Brahma Tarka says:-The expression Abheda denotes undividedness (abhinnatvam), as if it were impossible of being divided. (i.e., incapable of being divided). And the expression vyavahara denotes absolute difference. So the characteristics of Hari (i.e., Brahman) are absolutely different from those of others. If Abheda should mean difference among the divided things (bhinnayorbhedah), or if Abheda is understood to mean difference existing between two different things, then, in either case, there arises unsettlement. And there can be no correct understanding arrived at (in either case). Without understanding correctly the relationship of the original (i.e., Brahman), if we begin to argue, then the argument ends in false reasoning in understanding about Hari (i.e., Brahman). Because all attributes use the natural forms of Brahman. And all attributes are possessed of Hari (i.e., Brahman). The Sruti texts Ekamevadvitivam tannehananasti kinchana ;923 Mrityossamrityumapnoti ya iha nanevapasyati ;³ .924 Yathodakam durge vrishtam parvateshu vidhavati evam dharman 922 T. R. Krishnamachar's Edition, page 274. 923 Chchandogya-upanishad , IV. 2. 1. 924 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , IV. 4. 19. (In the text iha has been interpreted by Anandatirtha thus: iheti Paramesvara rupeshu avayaveshu dharmeshucha kinchana nana nastityantah [|)

pruthakpasyan tanevanuvidhavati; 925 etc., declare that there is only one Being and no others and that great Being is capable of becoming the God of Death, just as a big fall of showers on the tops of the mountain makes the water roll in torrents and fully reach the sea, all characteristics denote that great Being to whom alone those attributes apply. Therefore that great Being is the possessor of all the infinite gunas (qualities) and to him alone they apply in the main. And those who thus understand Vishnu in the fulness of his character will free themselves from the bondage of samsara and enjoy everlasting ananda in his presence (tatsamipe samodate). To muktas, Vishnu is an object of shelter (asrayabhuta); and under him all those muktas serve and Isvara is the Overlord of all. This is the declaration of Parama Sruti. The Sruti texts Amrutasyaisha setuh, So'snute sarvan kaman saha Brahmana vipaschita, 928 etc., clearly state that the Lord Vishnu is the great bridge for the muktas to pass over free from bondage to the everlasting enjoyment of ananda and he that thus passes over the bridge enjoys eternal happiness as the result of realizing of what all he desired to enjoy by the side of Brahman (Sarvan kaman saha Brahmana). The Padma Purana states that all the Srutis exult in glorifying the innumerable and infinite qualities of the great Overlord (Vishnu) and therefore Narayana is the only faultless and all-bliss. This is the final conclusion. In his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad also, Anandatirtha refers to the Bhedabhe la doctrine.927 In order to declare that there is no bhedabheda, the word iha is used in Sruti texts Ekamevadvitiyam tanneka nanasti kinchana;28 928 Mrityossamrityumapnoti iha naneva pasyati. In the forms as well as characteristics of Paramesvara, there is no distinction or difference; nor is there anything that can be considered higher or equal to him. This means that there is nothing equal to or higher than 925 Katha-upanishad , IV. 14. gia 928 Tailt. Upa., II. 1. 929 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , IV. 4. 19. 927 T. R. Krishnamachar's Edition, Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , pp. 492-493. 928 Chchandogya-upanishad , IV, 2, 1.

Isvara, or one who can be said to excel him in any respect. And therefore Parabrahman is the highest of all (beings). And the bhedabheda view is thus refuted because the term bhedabheda itself is of contradictory import (viruddhobhaya samyoga iva sabdah). (It is just like a clubbing together of two contradictory thoughts in a single expression.) And the Sruti does not imply such a contradiction, because the illustration given in it explains that there is no bhedabheda. The illustration in the Sruti text is :-Yathodakam durge vrishtam parvateshu vidhavati Evam dharman pruthak As the rain which falls pasyan tan evanuvidhavati etc. on the top of a mountain naturally flows down as a stream to find its own destination, similarly all different characteristics found in various things go to Him, the great Overlord. This clearly shows that He is quite different from other things. Hence there cannot be any bhedabheda, for he is quite out and out different from all others. Bhedena darsanadvapi bhedabhedena darsanat | Vishnor gunanam rupanam tadamganam mukhadinam | Tatha darsana kalattu kshiprameva tamo vrajet, etc., as declared in the Brahmanda Purana. The Srutis and the Sastras generally denote distinctly bheda only and not bhedabheda. The characteristics of Vishnu as well as his various features, although equal in Himself, yet are absolutely different from those other beings in the world. The Sruti texts Jyushtam yada pasyatyanyamisam asya mahimanamiti vitasokah Dvasuparnau sayujau sakhayau | Yo veda nihitam guhayam parame vyoman | So'snute sarvan kaman saha Brahmana vipaschita itiº30 Etamanandamayam atmanam upasankramya ya iman lokan kamanni kamarupyanusancharanº31 and the text beginning with Athatanandasya mimamsa bhavati and ending with Manushyadi brahmantanam muktanam anande sataguna viseshaschochyate sate Muktanamcha ayam viseshah Srotriyasyacha akamahatasyeti viseshanat Nahi Brahmadinam anadhigatah srutyarthah keshamchidasti Na cha Brahmana eva kechana kamahatah kechana akamahatah ityatra pramanamasti Tasmat srotriya iti 930 Taittiriya-upanishad , II. 1. 931 Chchandogya-upanishad , VIII. 8. I

Akamahatatvancha prapta sruti phalatvan muktyuchchyate mukhyam muktasyaiva clearly declare that a mukta, by virtue of his realization, has finally attained what he desired-mukti or Brahmapada. The Sruti texts nowhere accord sanction that a realized person (mukta) will have anything more to aspire for. The expression Athatanandasya mimamsa bhavati 32 declares that begin- ¿932 ning from the state of "man" to the state of "Brahman" all enjoy ananda from one to hundred parts according to their merits as muktas. This itself is the chief characteristic of muktas. The attributes srotriyasyacha and akamahatasyacha also do not in any way allow the muktas a position any whit higher than (adhigatah) the Brahman stage. Therefore the expression srotriya (one who obtained the result declared in the Srutis) clearly means that the mukta has realized what he ought to obtain as the result,-i.e., the highest state, the state of a mukta Brahman. He has no desire beyond mukti. Hence akamahatah. Therefore srotriyas are declared to be those who have obtained fully their desires. "3 These are therefore declared in the Bharata as aptakamah, i.e., those who have realized their desires, i.e., those who have nothing else to desire, mukti being the final stage and there being nothing beyond it. When Bheda has once been proved all round, we cannot revert to a discussion of Abheda or of Bhedabheda, as both of these are proved to be non-existent. For it has been proved that there is no such thing as bhedabheda in Vishnu considered as Parabrahman. If Bhedabheda cannot be maintained, then either Bheda or Abheda will have to go. Sripati's position is that either extreme is impossible in view of the two different types of texts we have to deal with in the Srutis. As against Advaita, he thinks that neither an attributeless Brahman nor an illusory world can be successfully maintained. As against Dvaita, Sripati's contention is that stressing only 932 Chchandogya-upanishad , III. 13. 7. 933 Cf. Anandatirtha in Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , III. 4. 14:-Prapta Sruii phalatvattu srotriyah prapta mokshinah ■ (See Krishnachar's Edn., p. 493).

one set of Sruti texts defining the Dvaita viewpoint as against the weight of the other set expounding the Advaita position, would be tantamount to rejecting the authority of the latter. Sripati's cardinal point is that Bhedavadins fail to recognize the Abheda Sutras. They differ, in his opinion, from Bauddhas only to a small extent: while Bauddhas reject all Srutis; Bhedavadins reject only a part of them. The difference is thus one of quantity and no more. 934 But Bhedins may urge-as they have-that there may be what seem like contradictions between Sruti texts. It will not do to say that there are such contradictions. It is your duty not to treat them as contradictory, for have you exhausted all the Srutis to say conclusively that they are contradictions? It is difficult to prove such a contradiction. It only shows that you are not able to harmonise all the Sruti texts into a consistent whole. A Sruti text says:-Guna srutah saviruddhascha deve santayassruta api naivatra sanka Chintya chintyascha tathaiva doshah srutascha nagnaivihi tatha pratitah (Sauparna Sruti). The qualities described in the Srutis are, though appearing apparently contradictory, really not so; because God is faultless, and nothing could be doubted of Him which is of contradictory import. In view of the fact that His nature could not be fully understood, the alleged contradictions cannot either be proved or harmonised by us within our limited range (of knowledge). And thus they go for mere observations without any proof. God is faultless; nor are the Srutis contradictory in this regard. So runs the Sauparna Sruti, quoted by Anandatirtha in his commentary on the Sutra, Sarvadharmopa pattescha (II. 1. 38).93 934 A similar criticism is offered by Anandatirtha in regard to the lack of difference between those who hold the Bauddha and the Sunyavada doctrines. (See Anandatirtha's Anuvyakhyana, II. 1. 29-33.) 985 Anandatirtha's Brahma-Sutra Bhashya, II. 1. 38. The Jaina doctrine is rejected by the Sutrakara, according to Anandatirtha, because on account of the impossibility of contradictory attributes

Another point urged by Sripati against Dvaitavadins is their extreme insistence on the difference between ghata and pata (ghatapatayor atyanta bhedavadinah). As to this point it may be pointed out that some Bhedavadins have anticipated this point and answered it at some length. Among these, Jayatirtha stands easily first. Commenting on the Sutra, Asaditi chenna pratishedha matratvat (II. 1. 8), Jayatirtha in his Nyaya Sudha sets out the truth underlying the criticism that Bhedavadins attach undue importance to the ghatapatta vada. In its ultimate analysis, this criticism reduces itself to a denial of kartrutva to Brahman. What is behind and beyond ghata and pata? There is the kartru, whose existence cannot be denied. If his existence is denied, then not only the bheda between ghata and pata is denied, but also the existence of the creator of this distinction, i.e., the kartru. If ghata and pata are not in existence, there is no kartrutva behind them. If there is no kartrutva, then there is no topic to start with. Then, there will be, in consequence, no discussion. If we have to accept the existence of ghata and pata, then we have to accept the existence of kartrulva. Without kartrutva, ghata and pata could not have come into existence. In the Sutra, the term pratishedha matra declares kartrutva to Isvara, because his kartrutva is beyond denial. The lordship of Isvara is of an all-pervasive nature and it is his special characteristic and there it is beyond the control of another. Much less is it capable of interruption (or prohibition). The indeclinable term matra (in this Sutra) indicates his pervasive character in its entirety. The words pratishedha matra accordingly imply that injunctions cannot predominate over him (pratishedha matra sabdo vidherapradhanyam lakshayati). Therefore karya and karana would have become inoperative without a kartru, for example ghata and pata. being represented as being in one and the same thing. (See Ibid., II. 2. 32-34.) The same reasoning would apply to the co-existence of Bhedabheda. (See also Anandatirtha's Anuvyakhyana, II. 2. 29-34.)

Ghata and pata depend purely for their coming into existence in their particular forms upon a kartru. Obviously ghata could not have had any existence as such before it was made, though the material out of which it was made was in existence. If there is no kartru, in spite of the materials available in the forms of karya and karana, nothing could be brought into definite form. The kartru being undeniable (anishedhataya para pratikshepena pratiyate) he avails himself of the karya and karana and brings into manifestation (srishti) as the potter having under his control the material earth and the wheel brings into existence several forms of ghata. Thus it is proved that the kartru uncontradictingly possesses in himself by his inherent powers both the powers of (Devasyesha svabhavoyam) karya and karana. Just as if we deny the existence of the potter, we cannot predicate the making of the pot, in the same way, if we deny the kartru, we are reduced to denying the utility of the truth of the illustrative example, viz., the existence of the ghata, for we should in such circumstances have not realized its existence, but only ended in arriving at its non-existence. If we attempt to predicate that there is such a thing as a non-existent ghata, the very idea itself cannot be supported in any form, because its very existence is a nullity (abhavat). If we want to prove nullity (abhava) through an illustration, the question of bhava and its character must first be illustrated and understood. What is bhava and what is abhava and what are their respective characteristics? It is possible to describe bhava svarupa from example, but it is not possible to do so in the case of abhava svarupa. Where we deny bhava svarupa, there we have to infer the existence of abhava svarupa. That is why the word matra is used in this Sutra. It comes to this: By merely denying the bhava rupa which can be attained, we will be imagining a non-existent state. This is not what is intended by the Sutra. It does not attempt to describe anything beyond bhava dharma. It is because it seeks to establish the bhava svarupa that the illustrative example

of ghata has been sought (by Dvaitavadins). Therefore it is that the bhava and abhava of ghata svarupa cannot be dispensed with by their mere denial so long as kartrutva remains in the kulala, whose dharma is clearly to be understood. The non-mention of kulala cannot remove him from existence. How then How then can his existence be established? It is said that the term matra in this Sutra indicates the absolute independence of the potter in regard to his discretion as to the forms the pots should take (matru sabdohi sakalye vartate). Nobody can hinder his independence (in this regard). The thought of denial of kartrutva was only adduced by the upholders of the opposite doctrine (parenaiyoktatvat). The phrase pratishedha matra interferes with the independence of the kartru against this injunction. Thus, if it is stated that he partook of only food, it is understood that he left other things alone and partook of food only. Therefore, the mind of the partaker of food is signified-his kartrutva is signified in regard to the kind of food he has chosen to take, i.e., that he has taken only food and not anything else. This peculiar turn of mind indicates only a mind which predicates one that is thinking of a bhava svarupa and not abhava svarupa. Therefore, the use of the phrase pratishedha matra indicates that the mind is fixed on bhava svarupa and not on abhava svarupa. The topic to be proved is of two kinds: svatantram and paratantram (independent and dependent). Paratantra is further divided into bhava and abhava. Bhava is in turn sub-divided into chetana and achetana. While abhava does not come under the headings of chetana and achetana, what is the utility of considering abhava as belonging to one of these two categories? However, we cannot even assume, for example, that there is in existence some one, a very intelligent man, but who never had actually his existence. What then is the use of saying, in such a case, that such a person (an intelligent person) never actually existed and that such a person has never been found? A discussion which leaves away the actual connected argument and premises a point of no consequence whatever,

is impertinence (atiprasangat). Of course, the Sruti text Tan mano kurute does not concede this impertinence. Otherwise, the correct conclusion cannot be arrived at. If the term pratishedha matra had a meaning contradictory to the Srutis, then, the Srutis cannot be harmonised. The term asat in the Sutra only shows Brahman and denotes solely bheda, difference. And this meaning the opponent has to contradict because Brahman becomes a term of plurality. There cannot be There cannot be many Brahmans independent of each other. Therefore Brahman is defined here by the term asat. Truly, the phrase pratishedha matra used in the Sutra is intended only to indicate the insistence to be laid on the right use of one's intellect for interpreting in a feasible manner the Srutis in an harmonious way, avoiding thereby all contradictions. Many commentators, while accepting the unusual matter contained in this Sutra, and conceding the dharma of bhava, have doubted the existence of abhava but left it however in a state of doubt. We cannot fit in bhava with abhava dharma and abhava with bhava dharma. Because there is demonstrably no proof available to fit in the characteristics of bhava and abhava with the characteristics of their abhava and bhava dharmas; because they are decidedly of an opposite nature. Between two white cloths, a comparison may be easily effected, but not between two unconnected things. like meru and mandira (i.e., a mountain and a house). Moreover, there is no connection whatever between bhava and abhava and it is never possible to effect a comparison between the two because of their contradictory character. A reasonable comparison between two things is possible only when both possess the identical qualities and not otherwise. Take, for instance, a buffalo and a horse. They cannot be compared, because of the inimical and opposite characters they are naturally endowed with. Such is the nature of bhava and abhava. Their very natures make them the opposite of each other and exclude the one from the other. A ghata can never assume by itself that form (i.e., the form of a ghata). The dharma of one particular

thing cannot be made by itself, so that dharma and dharmi cannot be one and the same, unless the dharmi is acted upon by the dharma. It, therefore, comes to this: dharma is the property of a particular thing, which can be clearly seen in the dharmi as its property. That which is made known by its peculiar qualities, i.e., its distinguishing property, that is called its dharmi (the possessor of a dharma is dharmi). Dharmi is the possessor of the dharma, i.e., the characteristic property. It is not possible to describe these two-dharma and dharmi-in any other mode. Bhava and abhava, therefore, cannot be established by any other means beyond their actual essential properties. Otherwise, the discussion regarding ghata and pata will be evidently out of the way if the characteristics not existing in one are assumed to be as if they were existent. This leads to a result undesirable. How can it be said that bhava and abhava do not possess the dharmi bhava? Why not abhava be considered to be absence of dharma of the bhava? Two dissimilar objects which are possessed of different properties compared with two white cloths possessing the same comparable characters are instances for comparison between bhava and abhava. As an illustration, two white cloths may be compared in regard to their respective characteristics for obtaining a knowledge of them. Similarly, as an illustration of abhava, may be mentioned meru and mandira, the characteristics of which are dissimilar. The characteristics found in meru are not found in mandira. In this way, abhavarupa is illustrated. In the same manner, the characteristics of ghata being absent in pata, any comparison between the two (objects) cannot hold good, for in the ghata is involved the earth for its original property, while that is not found in the pata. In this way, all objects of a contradictory character-which are different from each other ar stated to be possessed of opposing properties. Hence the idea of bhavabhava being considered as abhavabhava and associated with such dharma is repudiated. As to things which last eternally and those which are liable to eventual destruction, even though they do possess certain

contradictory properties, their qualities have still to be considered in describing them. The same cannot be said of two similar things like sukla pata-two white pieces of cloth. Because the two white cloths are similar to each other in their qualities. The same should hold good in the case of all objects of comparison. The opponent has always agreed that two dissimilar things do not agree in their properties. And it is not possible to discover any points of similarity in two things of dissimilar nature. If, in this manner, we proceed to compare two dissimilar objects, which from their very nature are patently different from each other and begin to describe the qualities of each for purposes of comparison, we will only end our argument in incoherent talk. If we still insist on so comparing existing things with things non-existing (i.e., bhavabhava) with their respective opposing properties (abhavabhava), then it results in the inconsistency that the properties and the things possessed of the properties (dharmadharmi) cannot be differentiated. Then, there can be no restriction of thought in understanding things existing with their properties and things non-existing and their properties (bhavatvena abhavasya cha abhavasya bhavatvena) so that things existing may be described as nonexisting--as argued in the Nyaya Mimamsa under the heads. of Pragabhava, Pradhvamsabhava and Atyantabhava. And then finally a comparison will prevail in knowing which things existed and which non-existed. Such must not be the way employed for knowing the correct properties of things to arrive at a correct conclusion. The whole world will not consider such conclusions as deserving of any value. Therefore, the terms bhava and rupa are terms indicating properties of particular things. And hence we have to understand things existent and things non-existent as we come into contact with such of them according to the context in which they are referred to. This is the proper way of interpreting. Should a reader be taught to lay down a rule for himself as to how to understand the usage (of bhava and abhava) in the context in which they are referred to ? The latter part of the question suggests the answer for the

former. (He must discover the proof and draw the inferences.) However, certain things-either existent or non-existentsuch as ghata, etc., really never existed before. In order to illustrate how a thing which never existed before could be brought into existence, i.e., to give an instance of pragabhava-reference may be made to the utility of things such as the earth, which when made into a rounded ball-like thing, can be converted into a ghata of any form that one likes. This shows how a thing (padartha) could be used and what its properties are. Out of the material earth, a form has been brought into existence which did not exist before. The inference is that a form not existent before (pragabhava) has come into existence. According to the abheda theory, the dharma-dharmi bhava is not considered as an attribute of quality (visesha saktya samgachchata iti). This may be right for that theory. But as regards the second (abhava) it is, as in the case of the first, unyielding and the properties of abhava are likewise neglected. Whoever accepts the fact that ghata can be made from a rounded ball of earth, admits also the existence of bhava; whoever admits that a thing existent is liable to destruction, he should be held to admit both pragabhava and pradhvamsabhava. Whence ghata is brought into its form, it cannot be compared with a non-existing thing like pata. Nor can it be interpreted in terms of the non-existing thing pata. Accordingly the states of pragabhava and pradhvamsabhava may be described as subjects for comparison to convince one of how a non-existent thing came into existence and also how it can undergo destruction. This is the only way to arrive at the right conclusion by interpreting the terms used in a particular context. In order to indicate that many things could in this way be compared in order to arrive at the correct conclusion, the plural indeclinable hi is used by the Acharya (Anandatirtha) in the text (Prathamehi, II. 20. 14, in his Anuvyakhyana). The topic and the matter relating to the topic are related in the same way as the supporter and the supported. In order to illustrate this view, the Acharya uses the locative case. In all such

illustrations, one has to bear in mind the chief topic and how the matters relating to it should be viewed and compared, so that the primary and secondary thoughts may not be mixed up (gauna mukhyatva vivakshabhavasya sthitatvat iti). Thus it has been clearly proved how bhava and abhava are so intermixed in discussion by argumentators, thus proving the contradictory conclusion they arrive at, which bears. testimony in itself to be against the teaching of Sruti texts. Now, the Sutrakara, having proved that there is no contradiction between Sruti texts, explains how the term Asat should be understood in the correct manner, so that such explanation might be in harmony with all Sruti texts and at the same time disallow all other methods of argumentation that might be in contradiction with it, and proceeds to lay down the next Sutra: Api tau tadvat prasangadasamanjasam (II. 1.9). If we discussed the term asat in this manner, contradictory to the Sruti texts, then our discussion will end in disagreement with them (asamanjasam). And thus this expression asamanjasam would lead us to assume that the Visva (universe) has come into existence without a maker (kartru). How is this? If we are to accept the theory that Jagatkartrutva should be assigned to abhava, then we would have to say that there exists nothing else than abhava. Then Isvara and all others would have had to come into existence out of abhava. But it is not so. For if Isvara is ignored and denied to be the maker of the jagat, then we will have none else to hold responsible for creation, etc. And therefore obviously this is not the meaning of the Sruti text and therefore it should not be said that in Pralaya nothing existed including Isvara and all other minute forms of embryonic matter capable of bringing about creation again. it is therefore to prove clearly, by way of illustration, that there were at Pralaya all forms of matter in their undestroyable condition that ghata was chosen to exemplify how non-existent things can be brought into creation by the maker-the kartru-by means of different kinds of matter existing in embryo. The Sutrakara thus formulated the last Sutra, only to declare that everything-i.e., all matter-

was existent in its embryonic form at Pralaya (asat) and not that nothing was existent at Pralaya. To accept the latter proposition would be wrong. Because, the illustration of the ghata has been brought in only to drive home this point. The all-pervasive character of Paramatman is amply proved by evidences, which are not liable to destruction. These evidences are clear proofs to illustrate the minute embryonic existence of everything during Pralaya under the all-pervasive control of Paramesvara. Where are these proofs available and what Srutis establish this position? The Bhashyakara (in his Anuvyakhyana) establishes it in connection with the expression Sarva naseshvapi iti, etc., occurring in II. 1. 15.930 There the word 15." Sarva not only includes those existing at present but also all those that have been existing for all time. In order to remove the apparent inconsistency involved in this statement, he points out that from the given premises the conclusion follows that the Paramatman's all-pervasiveness is at the root (of the position) (Purushasya vyapti mulam anumanamuchchyate). The illustration itself amply proves the statement without contradiction. Therefore it follows clearly as an inference that in Pralaya, Paramesvara and everything else (favouring srishti) did actually exist (sat bhava) in an embryonic form. If it is suggested by the opponent that the jagat originated from abhava kartrutva, even that is destroyed by his own argument. Because if the Pralaya was such as to leave no vestige of a Purusha, if abhava Visva kartrutva is to occur, even the very occasion for such a kalpana (assumption) disappears. Because such an assumption evidently has to fall back for its support on the kartrutva of the Purusha, which was ex hypothesi, destroyed at the Pralaya. Verily in this world, if the kulala did not exist before the ghata came into existence, no one could have had the idea of its maker (Nahi loke sage 936 See Anuvyakhyana, II. 1. 15, where the full text of the pasoccurs: Sarvanaseshvapi sada sishtatvat yasya kasyanuh | Nasoyam vimatopi syannasatvat kartru seshavan Dharma'dharma- srayatvena svikaryopi niralaye || Anaditvat iti

pragutpatteh kulalabhavayoh satorabhavo ghatasya karta drishtah). They would have necessarily asked who is this kulala? Naturally one who had not seen the maker, would at once reply, "He is the maker of a pot " and thus free himself of the confusion. Again, when in the struggle that ensued between Sunda and Upasunda, 937 when countless numbers fell down, there still remained one who was the chief cause of their struggle. Thus, there has been never an instance where everything went to destruction along with the kartru as it is opposed to the principle of kartrutva for a kartru cannot destroy himself (Natu nasa kartuh Purushasya avisishtata). Nor while destroying what existed till then, can one prevent from coming into existence what is going to come into existence in the future. Since he cannot foresee what is going to come into existence in the future, much less is it within his power to prevent it from coming into existence. It really comes to this: leaving the kartrutva quite free for what is to come into existence in the future in due course, he must say that only what has been existent in the present-has been destroyed. If not, the premises assumed will be overruled and contradicted. It cannot be granted for a moment that destruction is possible for all three periods of time-past, present and futurefor no one has any control over what is going to befall at the next moment. Nor can it be proved. But if it is to be assumed that the destruction of what is going to happen is also possible, then it has to be described as an anomaly 938 (tatra vyabhicharasyat). 937 See the Mahabharata for the story of Sunda and Upasunda. These were two brothers, the sons of Nikumbha. They secured a boon from the Creator that they would not die until they should kill themselves. On the strength of this boon, they grew very oppressive and Indra had at last to send down a lovely nymph named Tilottama, and while quarrelling for her, they killed each other-leaving Tilottama alone. 938 Vyabhicharah is going away from; deviation; or leaving the right course. Hence an irregularity, anomaly or exception to a rule. In Logic, a fallacious hetu, the presence of the hetu without the sadhya.

Pralaya is the complete destruction of everything 2939 that has, during the course of ages, been brought into existence. Thus, Pralaya is the destruction of existing things. There is, however, no reason to co-relate Isvara abhavatva with Pralaya. Therefore, there is no reason to predicate that Pralaya indicates such a a destruction as to include the destruction of Isvara, etc. It is thus clear that to assume that nothing existed at the time of Pralaya and that everything had been destroyed is a a clear contradiction. Both the Sutrakara and the Bhashyakara accordingly left this point for inference on the part of their disciples without dwelling at length on it. However, this was hinted at by the Sutrakara in the first words of the Sutra beginning with Api tau, etc. The Bhashyakara asks: What is the profit to be derived from a proof which establishes such a Pralaya (as evidences the destruction of everything including the kartru)? Therefore laya evidently means the destruction of everything else existing except jiva and Isvara which are indestructible. And this is the ordinary inference to be drawn. Now, we have to prove whether in Pralaya, the jiva and Isvara did actually exist. To meet this point, the following inferential proofs are available At destruction, the dharma (matter) and dharmi (properties of matter) were never interfered with. In order to drive home this fact, the term api in the Sutra is used. The dual term tau indicates that jivatma and Isvara did exist. During Pralaya, dharma and dharmi (matter and its properties) did continue. Dharma also includes the opposite adharma. 939 Pralaya: Pra+laya: a condition in which the exhausted state is allowed to lie in an inactive condition, only to be rejuvenated and allowed to gain power and start and grow again afresh, as if quite new. In other words, Pralaya is a dormant condition of inactive existence. In the compound word Pralaya, laya means lurking or hiding. How modern science is approaching this ancient doctrine of Pralaya is thus expressed by a scientific writer in closing a series of papers in The New World Picture" The idea of the eternal dissolution of matter into waves and the materialization of waves back into matter, has now some experimental foundation." 11 - 39 F

Dharma and adharma, which are always associated with the jivatma, can never undergo destruction. Therefore, even in Pralaya, though the form of nara°40 (human form) underwent change, dharma or adharma still remained with the bhava. But if it is objected that this is only an arbitrary proof intended to gain ground for alleging that Isvara and his kartrutva existed even during Pralaya, the reply is that the word asraya used in the Sruti text (Pralaya kalavarti dharmah sasrayah) clearly proves that Pralaya also sought the asylum of Isvara. It sought refuge in Isvara saying, "Now, I have done my portion of the dharma as per your will" (Dharmatvat idanimtana dharmavat). Even dharma is represented as having subjected itself to the kartrutva of Isvara in its work of destruction. Evidently the seeking of this kind of refuge which results in subjecting Pralaya dharma itself to the karlrutva of Isvara makes it nothing more than perform the function of a jiva. The fact is that in Isvara alone the karana chetanatva exists. It is not possible to eradicate this kartrutva from Isvara, who is the sole repository of all causes. It is not within the physical power of any one force beyond Isvara to remove from Isvara his kartrutva and karanatva and place it in another (Nachatindriyayoh dharmadharmayoh adhishthatritvam isvaradanyasya upapadyate). Therefore it should be imperatively agreed to that in Pralaya the controlling power over dharma-dharmi and the jivatma does exist along with Paramapurusha. Verily, if it is to be agreed that bhava only existed in Pralaya, then it is not necessary for us to admit that dharma-dharmi existed separately seeking asylum in Isvara. This point must be made clear-whether bhava is separate from dharma-dharmi or included in it. Do you mean to say that the characteristics of dharma-dharmi exist in the cause or in the effect or in both during Pralaya? Or, if it is granted that Sat signifies akaranatva, 940 Nara means dosha sahita jivatma, i.e., the jiva taken with his taint,

then the reply is that we have to accept for granted that nothing existed. The contradiction thus arises that those things that existed from eternity did exist in Pralaya. In certain places, it is also said that everything existed during creation. However, nothing came into existence during creation which never existed before or during Pralaya. If it were otherwise, karya which existed from beginningless eternity would have gone without a karana. Because from Asat, there can be no cause for action. (That is, from non-existence, there can be no existence.) All causes leading to creation will have to be considered as having ceased to exist. If it is agreed that from a certain cause not foreseen, srishti came into existence in the beginning, then Pralaya also should be agreed to have come into existence from some unforeseen cause. It, therefore, naturally follows that there was in existence something unforeseen from beginningless time. This, therefore, has to be assumed. Such a thing did exist in Pralaya. Even the present Let it be so. existing thing came out of that unforeseen cause which was existing from beginningless time, wherefrom our present premises came into discussion. As we agree to this, the other also will have to be agreed to in the same way. It cannot be asked whether there existed no cause in the beginning of time. In the same way, Pralaya shows plainly that there was enough cause for it, Pralaya being the proof for it. How? In Pralaya itself, sufficient illustration of what previously existed from beginningless time, the cause of which could not be ascertained, is fully proved. Else, there would not have been sufficient cause for Pralaya. Pralaya did not destroy beginningless time. If not, how could effect come into play without any cause? Therefore, we have rightly to infer that cause and effect did exist in the interval of time between the beginning of creation and its end (i.e., Pralaya); just because there existed things unforeseen in Pralaya, therefore we have to infer that cause for it did exist in Pralaya.

To understand even adikala, we have to infer the unforeseen causes which existed before in beginningless time and thereby seek to establish the causes which brought about mahadadi karana.⁹11 This must be clearly said. In adikala, nothing could be foreseen. Later on, out of the unforeseen causes that existed previously, things came into existence, and helped to give rise to adyam. That which previously did not exist later came into existence. This is the general saying. This removes the doubt. If so, we ask that which did not exist previously, how did it come into existence later? However that may be, it is not questioned how that which was not in existence even before the time of Pralaya came into existence later. We explain We explain usually that which was not in existence previously came into existence later. This explanation is objectionable because how could it be possible that what never existed before should have subsequently come into existence? That could not possibly be. If there was nothing that could as efficient cause (nimitta karana) give rise to the existence of everything, though not seen by us, creation would not have been possible in the beginning of time. We never said for a moment that what we never saw did never exist. Then, how is it possible to say that whatever came into existence in the beginning of time (Adikala) such as mahadadi, came out of nothing as its cause? If creation came into existence in the beginning, we cannot say, however, it came out of nothing as such an assumption would be a clear contradiction, because all unforeseen things cannot come within our observation, even if we desired. Then, why should we not assume that mahadadi came into existence during creation out of some unforeseen causes which are not known to us? As the unforeseen causes cannot be closely examined by us, even 941 Mahat is the second of the twenty-five elements or tattvas recognized by the Sankhyas. In Sankhya philosophy, Mahat stands for the great principle, the intellect (distinguished from Manas), the second of the twenty-five elements above referred to,

if we desired, as it is beyond our reach, we have simply to grant the existence of the unforeseen causes, in order to bring into existence the mahadadi srishti. Then, let it be granted that from unforeseen causes only things came into existence. We cannot, however, deny that there was nothing unseen before, for it is not possible to prove such a statement. In order to gain a correct understanding we have to lean upon a particular conclusion, which is indisputable in order to establish what we seek to prove. If you cannot grant that there existed what was beyond your perception, then there would be no cause whatever for anything to come into existence. In that case, where is any Pralaya at all and where, the proof for it? Pralaya also, in such a case, would be rendered apramanika and would be impossible of belief. Because you did not see it Isvara and others, whether with your own eyes. Even so, they existed or not in Pralaya, cannot be perceived by you and even a statement about Pralaya would not stand as proved. And so the opponent will have his statement disproved. This is what we have to understand. Necessarily in Pralaya, we have to assume that certain things should have existed which were capable of bringing into existence creation in the beginning of time. It is thus: The creation of the Universe is a series of creations in one continuous flow (Visvasantanoyam drisya santana sunyaih santanabhirarabdhah santanatvat araniya santanavat) which cannot be understood by those who are devoid of a continuous flow of perception, and it cannot be realized by them how this series of creations came into existence ever since the beginning of time; just as the trees in the forest (araniya santanavat)942 form a continuous flow (one succeeding the other), so is the universe which forms a continuous flow of creations, one following the other. Therefore, even the present creation of Brahmanda came out from the 942 It may also be explained in another manner, Arani being interpreted as "relating to Arani". Arani is a piece of wood of the Sami tree used for kindling the sacred fire by attrition; the fireproducing wooden stick (Aranih agniyonih).

embryonic state that existed in Pralaya, out of which it came into existence in its present form. Even though it existed for ever, it is said to have existed from the beginning. In other words, that which is like a small light has become a big glowing torch. In the same way, all these series of generations cannot be rooted out, because they still remain in their embryonic state just as a small light keeps constantly burning. It is never possible to eradicate these little paramanu wholesale at any time, because they are capable of coming to life again. If it is assumed that they were so eradicated, then, we have to assume again that they resumed their existence by the air beginning to blow. Even the series of terrestrial globes (bhugola) cannot be thought of as having been rooted out at any time, because of their endless series in existence like particles of glowing fire. This phenomenon (kriya) is at all times under the control of the Supreme Kartru. If so, then, it must be agreed to that all dharma and adharma and all causes are brought to effect by the Supreme Kartru, just as the happiness or sorrow that attend on the body of Devadatta are born of Devadatta's own peculiar characteristics and his own personal endeavours. What all peculiar things Devadatta does, owe their origin to his peculiar personal characteristics, born of the smell of his previous birth (Sragadivadityadi anumanena vichitra karyanyathanu papatya). According to the Sruti text Jyotishtomena svargakamo yajeta,*³ Yo Brahmanayava guret tam satameva yatayet, iti,944 it has to be understood that Devadatta, by reason of his own peculiar qualities, offers the Jyotishtoma and other sacrifices and attains svarga, etc. This is the right way to understand. Now, if you think that it is not so-that it is not by his labour that Devadatta attains svarga and that he is ignorant of the future, then, you will have to answer whether it was possible for Devadatta to earn his happiness or sorrow by his own special qualities or as the fruit of the series of actions inherited by him (Devadatta Sarirader Devadatta visesha guna 943 Chchandogya-upanishad , VIII. 12. 944 Ibid., VII. 24. 1.

It is janyatvam kim sakshat sadhyamuta paramparayava). not, however, the first; because you have not agreed to accept that dharma and adharma which existed previously were the ones which impelled Devadatta. And it is also not true that the bodily happiness or otherwise of Devadatta was not the result of Devadatta's own labour, just as it was seen in Yagnadatta's instance. It evidently proves itself that the results came only out of the labour in previous births as the result of the worship offered to deities then. It cannot be said that Isvara is responsible for any part of the fruits of the actions born of the peculiar characteristics of Devadatta. From what is now happening before us we are helped to think of what might have been their cause. Even the beginning of creation is evidently the result of causes unforeseen and antecedent to it and yet we are led to think that what did not exist has suddenly come into existence. If that is the idea we maintain, there will be neither an end to the means to be adopted for sacrificial functions such as Jyotishtoma, etc., performed in order to win svarga nor an attainment of the objects to be achieved by their performance. Having adopted an uncertain procedure probably an unintended end will be reached; for generally if the deity that is to be invoked in a particular sacrifice is unknown, the result is that svarga and the rest (of the salvation) sought for will remain unattained. Therefore to attain a correct result, he (the sacrificer) should find out all advantageous means by which the attainment of svarga, etc., might be enabled to be accomplished. If so, then, even to obtain a knowledge of Pralaya, we have to seek such correct sources of information as will help us to secure its correct meaning without any of the existing facts being contradicted. It is thus: we cannot say that time was not existing even before Pralaya and that the expression "in the beginning does not suggest that time was not in existence previously. It is not right to premise that before Brahman came into existence there was absolutely nothing like Brahmanatva and even if we did so assume, we will have drawn an "

inference which is liable to doubt. Therefore, it is not enough to take into account only the time at which Pralaya occurs, because we will not then have taken into consideration all the factors then prevailing (i.e., at the time of Pralaya). If we do not so take into consideration all the then existing factors at Pralaya, then we cannot be expected to arrive at a correct conclusion. In this way, if you say that it would be an error if we assumed that there was before Pralaya a Brahman who had neither a beginning nor an end, the reply is it is not so. Because, in all Vedantic argument, we have to draw an inference. Thus, (to understand the position), in the example Parvato agniman ityadau, to determine the question whether there is fire (agni) on the mountain or not, we lean on smoke (dhuma) and are thus led to draw the inference that there is fire on the mountain. This is the only correct manner of determining the truth; else our inference would be thrown away. If it is said that there are other ways of determining the existence of fire on the mountain, then, if that be so, how can contradiction find place in the argument? If the correct method of reasoning correlating the different limbs of the argument is employed, having regard to the particularity of time, the very face of the contradiction will cease to exist. Putting aside the point whether an entity like Brahman (Brahmana vyakte) came into existence anew (adyatva), whether it did exist without beginning (anadyatva), to prove merely, for the time being, the existence of Hiranyagarbha and then to say that Hiranyagarbha disappeared in Pralaya cannot help the opponent to succeed. By first assuming the existence of Brahman, do you also assume that visva existed with all Brahmanda or that it only came into existence as the result of a new creation ? Not the first; because it does not answer your purpose. Evidently, it is the second; because you have agreed that at Pralaya, everything including Brahmanda went into destruction.

If Brahmanda did not exist at first, there can be no Pralaya which could come off at the end. If you say that things came into existence in the same way that flies come into existence in the fruit of audumbara and fire from the internal part of the audumbara, 043 then there would be no cause that would give rise to further results and it would be just like the sprouting of a cotton plant from a pot in which no cotton seed had been planted. Then Time, Fire, Rudra, etc.-none of these-should have existed. As for the second alternative, there would be no cause for Pralaya at all. And the happening of Pralaya itself would be impossible of proof. Then, we will have nothing whatever to assume, and no kind of existence whatever, such as fire, wind, and the series of things, gradually ending with darkness and neither tree, mountain nor other object left to us, and no Pralaya whatever-thus landing us in a vacuum of nothingness (avayavasunya samayasiddheh). If you assume any one of these-of this series of fire, wind and the series gradually ending with darkness-you will have assumed either all of them to be existing or none at all. Fifthly, if the terrestrial globe is assumed to be in existence always in a successive series (santana sabdennochante), will we be making an unwarranted stretch in our assumption? In the first place, there is a way for establishing the truth. But then the minute embryonic particles forming the ingredients, as it were, for the scattering of the seeds and bringing into existence the next creation, will have to be assumed to have existed without destruction. Secondly, if not, there is nothing else left to lean upon. Seeing these contradictory fallacies, we have to ignore all arguments. Therefore, in order to save this position, the granting of such an assumption would prove ineffectual, inasmuch as the cause which made such an assumption possible would be subject to destruction and nothing could possibly come into existence anew. Thirdly, it would end in a false conclusion (apasiddhanta). 945 Arani, churning wood used in the production of sacrificial fire. See footnote on page 613.

Gradually, there would be an eradication of all argument. Fourthly, it is just like assuming the existence of the threads of a cloth when the whole cloth has been destroyed, which is an evident wrong deviation (from the truth). If the minute particles (paramanu) from which the existence of the world was assumed to have come into existence and developed by multiplication, even such an assumption would be rendered false and go without proof. To assume only one of them would be a wrong deviation (vyabhicharah). A cause for a beginning means assuming the existence of a cause for a series of all things existing-fire, wind and the rest of the series. ending with Pralaya. If we assume that one particle came into existence and then multiplied itself into two, and then into three and thus in a series of multiples, creation came into existence, there will be an occasion for a serious objection. Therefore we have to discard even the second inference as well. Brarence did exist originally and did not come into are otheanew (at Pralaya). If we agreed to assume itne mountain, source from which it was brought in find place in thould be subject to destruction in Pralaf reasoning corre, construct our arguments in such a way nt is employed Pralaya from proofs obtained from the Agame, the verer to arrive at such a conclusion, the chief thi Paquered is to put together proofs (from the Sastras) whit ( do not contradict each other. If we did so, one would not be enabled to say that some of the proofs adduced are unimportant or uncommon. If important links are thus sought to be omitted on the plea that they are unimportant then, there will occur a renunciation of the support sought from the Agamas. This being so, how can it be said that you seek your support from the Agamas only? Thus, it is clear that every link of proof afforded by the Agamas should be accepted and closely followed. In this manner, it having been established with the aid of proofs drawn from the Agamas that jiva and Isvara uncommon, or

did exist in Pralaya, it follows as equally established that the properties of all things in their embryonic form did exist in Pralaya (dharmadi satvamapi sadhitam). Else, there will be a clear contradiction if we concluded that in Pralaya there was only abhava in the form of asat. Having thus far maintained one side of the argument, and a cause being established, the fact that Prakriti and the rest existed is also established (Evamadi karyam pakshikritya sopadanatva sadhane prakrityadi siddhirapi drashtavyeti). In the very first Sutra, in order to remove this contradiction of abhava kartrutva and to repudiate it, the anumana has been clearly placed (for correct inference being drawn according to the Agamas). The Sutra (propounded by Badarayana) Drish- tantabhavatº¹ clearly lays down the principle that the creation of the universe was not the result of abhava kartrutva, for Isvara, the Karta, did exist in Pralaya. Pralaya is the result of the will of the Karta. Out of his free will, Pralaya took shape, just as we assume that a piece of cloth or some such thing (patadau) had a maker. In all places wherever ellipses are to be filled in, the filling in should be done in such a way as to remove contradiction. If we assume that abhava existed in Pralaya and then proceed by admitting mahadadi came into existence, this very assumption would be a clear contradiction of the actual existence of matter in embryonic form, which will have to be doubted. In order to completely expel such a doubt, the expression sarvatra is used. . . . By the word karta we have to understand that he is a Buddhiman, i.e., the knower of all things. If you assume otherwise, one who begins to argue, leaning on abhava kartrutva, will surely fall into contradiction and fail to arrive at a sound conclusion (Abhavakartrutvavadinam pratisiddha sadhanataprasangat). There will be no use arguing with such a person. Where is the objection (to the above statement)? There is no 946 The reference is to I. 1. 1. The discussion referred to in it is one relating to Brahman and not abhava. The Sutras propound a jijnasa about Brahman and not about abhava. The word Brahman includes Brahmasvarupa (Karta), Agamas, Vedas, etc.

ground whatever to infer kartrutva in abhava. The Sutra Drishtantabhavat 17 clearly meets the opponent's doubt. And this again is amply proved in the Sutra, Svapaksha doshachcha.948 In fact, this Sutra becomes the commentary for the previous Sutra. This lays down the procedural order to be followed. We should never be at variance with the truth of the statement in the Sastras which says. karyatvat ghatavat, i.e., chetana kartrutva exists always as is seen in ghata. The destruction of chetana should be understood in the same way as a ghata should be when it is destroyed. We should not doubt the fact that without chetana kartrutva, it is possible to create as is seen in the bringing into existence of a pata (patotpattivat). If we agreed to the proposition that the ghata is destroyed, it should not be assumed that we have agreed to the (other) proposition that the maker of the ghata is (also) destroyed. There is no reason whatever to think of the destruction of chetana kartrutva in our argument. It is our duty now to discuss and prove whether the chetana kartrutva existed quite intact or not in Pralaya. It is generally seen that even though all the plants die out in the dry season, soon after a time we notice sprouts coming up, thereby proving that there were the seeds that had not been perceived. From this phenomenon, we cannot assume and premise that at the destruction of the threads of the cloth the cloth could come into existence again (of their own accord). When the world comes to perish at the occurrence of Pralaya, it cannot be assumed that the Great Maker as well as his kartrutva have also perished. He had still his kartrutva existing in himself. We cannot say for a moment that the Maker and his kartrutva originated afresh. Such an assumption would be wrong. In order to refute such 947 II. 1. 9. The text of the Sutra is :-Natu drishtantabhavat (Not so; as there are parallel instances). 948 II. 1. 10. This Sutra may be thus rendered: "And on account of the objections to his view". It immediately follows. Natu drishtantabhavat, and is referred to below as explanatory of the latter.

an idea, and to establish that even in Pralaya the Maker and his kartrutva did exist and there was no annihilation of the Maker and his kartrutva, the expression asat (a+sat) 049 in the Sutras, Asaditichenna pratishedha matratvat (II. 1. 7) and nine other Sutras in the Asadadhikaranam has been used. It is very easily inferred that such a state of annihilation could not have been possible. It is for this reason that the next Sutra Drishtantabhavat was enunciated by the Sutrakara, to drive home the fact that kartrutva did exist in Pralaya. Nor could it be a fact. If annihilation had been agreed to by the Sutrakara, it would not have been possible for him to prove the kartrutva of Isvara (Isvarasya jagatkartrutvam) from the annihilated stage and it would also go against his own utterance (ukta viruddham). The Sutra Sastrayonitvat (I. 1. 3) also strongly refutes the existence of such an annihilated state and argues strongly against such an idea. Inferential premises must be supported by correct proofs so as to lead to the existence of the Maker and his kartrutva. The existence of the Maker at all times was never for a moment doubted by the Sutrakara nor has he doubted the existence of his kartrutva at all times. What is the purpose of our going in quest of the proofs provided by the Agamas by inferential premises? It is only to establish the existence of Isvara-and his kartrutva at all times-that we seek for aid in the Agamas. If it were not so, there would be no necessity to begin such a discussion, if the proofs in the Veda would not establish the existence of Isvara and his kartrutva at all times. Such a jijnasa would be fruitless and it were well it had not been begun (at all). Then, what should we do? The only answer is that Agamas alone should help to clear our doubt and on the clear proofs afforded by them we have to lean and agree to. If we, after discussion, understand correctly the meaning of the Sruti text Yatova imani bhutani jayante iti,ª50 etc., and agree to its conclusion, then there would be no further cause for us to doubt 949 The word Asat denotes the great Avyakta as Brahman, Taittiriya-upanishad III, 1, 950

the existence of Isvara and his kartrutva at all times and there would be no cause for any contradiction to arise. Thus, from correct inferential premises, we have proved beyond all doubt that the creation of visva never came out of abhava kartrutva. Having assumed the doubtful argument that the visva was created from abhava kartrutva, we have arrived at the correct proof that the creation of visva is only possible with Isvara kartrutva and his existence at all times (Isvara kartrukatvam samarthitam). From the same conclusion is met the opponent's argument and the objection against it in the next Sutra, Tarkapratisthanadapi anyathanumeyamiti chedevamapyanirmoksha prasangah (II. 1. 12). Because discussion of one kind has not proved profitable, if another indefinite kind of inference is had recourse to, away from the provision of the Agamas, the argument will be driven away from the one position that would lead to salvation (anirmoksha prasangah). This is the explanation for the objection. The Sutra states that when a start (in discussion) is made on the basis of a certain inference, in keeping with the Agamas, if one happens to arrive at a difficulty (in the purvapaksha), he should not at jump into several other kinds of inferences, exceeding the provisions of the Agama, for fear the purvapaksha discussion will not lead us into a correct siddhanta, and thus fail in helping to attain at our object. Generally, the purvapaksha starts on account of certain doubts that could not be cleared from the proofs (pramana) put forward by us; we have to arrive at the siddhanta by closely examining such proofs which could be harmonised and which could help us to arrive at a correct conclusion. Inferences themselves cannot be final proofs. Why? Because, if one inference fails, we should not think we can at once start off with another inference. What is an inference and what are its limits? We should not premise things that are unnecessary, untrue or ungranted by the Agamas, for we cannot get acceptable proofs from the Agamas for them nor can we agree to them. Nowhere is it found justified that when an argument that has been

started, on certain premises, is found to be inconvenient, that we should issue forth with another mode of argument, contrary to the original one (na tarkonumanat bhidyata, iti). You should not say that the new method of argument is more profitable and that it is possible to gain proof for it. Why? Because logic did not establish the original argument (tarkapratishthanat). And so, we have had to seek some (other) kind of solution. Nobody has prevented us from seeking out the solution at hand. It is said that through discussion and inferences, you have to prove and arrive at the conclusion, removing the doubt. Therefore this mode of endeavouring to subsist in different receptacles of argument (vyadhikarana) by changing from inference to inference, one contrary to the other, is not seen in the Agama. Just because the first method of argument proved a failure, that we should start off a contrary one is not permissible. It is to remind one of this provision that the Sutrakara sets down this Sutra. Discussion (tarka), according to the Agama, should never change from one mode of argument to another. Or, if one inference does not help to put forth a correct argument to establish the truth, the most suitable thing to do is to find out proofs which will best harmonise with the Agama. (That is, the inference should not question the Agama, which has for its sheet-anchor the pervasion of the Brahman; an argument that controverts Paramesvara vyapti ends as apratishthita tarka.).951 How could an argument become untrustworthy (apramana)? By its inability to arrive at a correct conclusion and by its being obliged to draw inferences to the contrary. This is how it should be understood the apratishtha character of the argument. It is to clear up this doubt that the Sutrakara has laid down this Sutra, so that no one may fall into this blunder and invariably to find out such proofs which would satisfy the Agamic standpoint. Therefore, the searching of proofs for an argument means the comprehension of the Agama (standpoint). Therefore, the latter part of the Sutra 951 Unstable logic or reasoning; hence unprofitable, useless,

624 952 INTRODUCTION (anyathanumeyamitichet, etc.) lays down clearly that such a constant change of arguments from one to another leads to fruitless discussion and ends in the putting off of the attainment of moksha. Agama is fixed as the only means of obtaining correct pramana. In order to lay full stress on accepting Agamic proofs as the sole truth, the commentator (Anandatirtha) uses the expression akshajagama mulasya in the later half of the verse (in his Anuvyakhyana), thereby meaning that just as the axle of a wheel is to the wheel itself as a pivot, so the Agama is the chief pivot on which all arguments by the aid of tarka, should be made to turn by the drawing of inferences. If Agama is thus accepted, there will be encountered no contradiction and the truth will be established. The chief point in view is that all inferences to be drawn should be authoritative and agreeable to the Agama."5 What the Sutrakara means is this:-Whatever was drawn as inference with the given data, must be proved by the Agamic proofs, so as to harmonise the argument with paksha linga vyaptimatva. In this lies the skill of the argumentator as to how he searches into the Sastras to establish the irrefutable truth of the inference. If not, his tarka, being away from the Agamic proofs, can never establish the truth (of the inference). Therefore, it is only through the Agamic pramana that we can establish the truth of the inference. 953 What is the purpose of our making an inference? It is only to seek the truth by the help of Agamic proofs. First, in order to find it out, we start by making an inference from the given data. With the help of it, how can we arrive at a correct result, if we do not closely follow the Agama and select proofs that will help to harmonise with the inference? No fawn (harinasava) ever tries to go against its will into the gaping mouths of a wolf, if it wants to get 952 See Anuvyakhyana (T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, page 177): Agamanugrahabhave natarkasyat pratishthitah | Akshajagama mulakyhasyadevasya pratishthitah || 958 All discussion is subject to the cardinal doctrine Paksha linga vyapti.

away from it. The very fact that it cannot thus save itself is evidence enough for the opposite view. Secondly, even if we assume the contrary as a fact and proceed to argue, saying that the first inference was a wrong one, then what follows? In such a case, both the inferences will be rendered wholly groundless. Thus arise a series of contradictions between one set of proofs and another and the doubts relating to the proofs themselves become obstructed, the one to the other, and go uncleared. It is not infrequently so. Therefore the first aim of the argumentator should be to determine the meaning of the Agama, in order to obtain a path with its aid. The second point one has to keep in view is whether a statement is in accordance with Agamic proof or if not, how could such a proof be available in the Agama and how is it to be made available. This should be the aim of the argumentator. At all times, he will necessarily find the proof fully supported by the Agama, because Agama stands for the Sastra just as the axle-wheel stands to the wheel itself. The established truth will be such a one that it could withstand any kind of refutation and the opponent will be successfully beaten down. There cannot be two opposing proofs for arriving at one established truth, for that would result in inconsistency. If every kind of inference can help us to arrive at a final conclusion, whether with or without the aid of the Agama, then every one will think that all the inferences thus drawn are unfounded. In order to save us from this position, the Sutrakara has definitely laid down in the Sutra that this is the only way to draw an inference. Else the arguments by which such contradictory conclusions are reached will result in the failure to realize moksha (Evam anirmoksha prasangah). And this is clearly pointed out in the Sutra. Therefore, we should understand that all inferences drawn should be authoritative and subject to proof from the Agama. The inference drawn should be such a one that no opponent could oppose it from the Agamic standpoint and it should be free from flaws, judged from the position taken by the Agama. 40 F

If one step of the proof fails to harmonise with the Agama, then the whole of the proof will, from the point of view of Agama, fail to be authoritative. Also, it will be subject to Agamic refutation. If one correct method is not properly followed throughout, then the inference drawn will not only have failed to establish the truth but also it will have repulsed itself. Some commentators have coupled this Sutra with Sutras like Navilakshanatvat (II. 1. 4), etc., and have thus tried to establish that the world is a material cause for Brahman for purposes of creation. If this is conceded, Prakrityadhikarana becomes superrogatory. For which reason, they split the Sutra into two parts and treat the first part Tarkapratishthanat as describing the conclusion (siddhantataya varnayanti). The commentator (Anandatirtha) opposes this view. Because the questions. arise (1) whether the argument has failed and further argument is impossible of being adduced; or (2) whether the argument cannot find sufficient Agamic proof to support it; or (3) whether it indicates the inadequacy of search into the Agama for the requisite proof. The answer to the first question is hidden in the question itself. This is in fact so (i.e., implicit in it). Because one who attaches himself to Sankhya philosophy does not admit that he has failed in his argument, even though he fails to secure Agamic support and does not mind it. In his own opinion, he does not desire to retrace his steps to obtain a connection for fear his opinion may prove redundant. In his opinion, he thinks that the Sutra Sistrayonitvat (I. 1. 3) is explained clearly by the subsequent Sutras, Ikshiternasabdam (I. 1. 5), etc. and Anumanikama pyekeshamiti (I. 4. 1), etc. The second standpoint is also objected to on the ground that Agama being like an axle-pole (akshaja) for all its proofs, in order to get at it, we have to search how far the kartrutva of Parabrahman is proved and select such proofs in support of the inference drawn. There must not be the slightest room for the opponent to refute. This the Sutrakara points out and indicates how to draw the inference and how to select Agamic proofs free from flaws. When the Sutrakara

has himself thus shown the method of selecting the Agamic proofs according to the Brahma Mimamsa Sastra, how can one say that the Sutrakara has not himself established the truth by the method of discussion (tarka) employed by him and how can it be open to objection? Of course one set of commentators do blame another set of commentators. Notwithstanding their objections, an argument correctly put forward, and directly in search of the truth according to the Agama, cannot be said to have gone off unestablished from the right path. Such an argument cannot be easily discarded. Accordingly, the Sutra briefly means: no tarka can be easily discarded which supports an inference established by Agamic proofs intended to postulate the all-pervasive kartrutva of Parabrahman (Vyaptyadimatvena pramanyapramanya karana). Proceeding, he comments on the next Sutra, Etena sishta parigraha api vyakhyatah (II. 1. 12). In order to prove conclusively that the truth underlying Sruti texts should be admitted in their entirety, Sruti texts do not as between themselves contradict each other. They cannot each of them be refuted with the aid of others. But all of them should be interpreted harmoniously as a whole for arriving at the truth. Tarka should be so used that a harmonious interpretation is arrived at and that in a manner not inimical to the Agama. This is the gist of the Sutra, Etena sishtaparigraha api vyakhyatah (II. 1. 12). From the above (Sutra), the remaining (Sruti texts) which had proved unacceptable to certain wise commentators, have also been commented upon (here). In this Sutra (II. 1. 12), the Sutrakara says that he has taken into consideration what has been left out by wise commentators and has commented without reserve on the true import of all Sruti texts, including those which have proved unacceptable to them. Some commentators comment like this: By the expression Etena in the Sutra they refer back to the Sutras, Navilakshanatvat (II. 1. 4), etc., which are not to the point. Thus, they accept to a certain extent the meaning of the Upanishadic

texts, so far as it helps to put forth their argument and leave away the rest, for fear of meeting with contradiction. They also have been considered as useful to the argument and commented upon in this Sutra, as it is adduced to be important by such writers as Manu, Vyasa and other commentators. These latter eminent men have taken the Sruti texts as a whole in supporting the anvadi karana vada by the Vaiseshikas. That has here been contradicted. Let us first consider their doubts and their reasoning. The seeking of a solution for this is by means of application by analogy (atidesa). 954 There are, it is said, two sets of argumentators-the Sankhyas who hold to the doctrine Nirisvaratva and the Vaiseshikas who hold to the Sesvaratva. It is fitting that both these contrarieties should be considered. Some hold a view opposed to the granting of jagatkaranatva to Brahman. But the Sankhyas refuse to concede the very existence of a Brahman. The one question that has led to differences of opinion among Vedantins as between themselves is the themselves is the granting of jagatkaranatva to Brahman. Even the views of those opposing the granting of jagatkaranatva to Brahman have been taken into consideration. Vaiseshikas, though they grant the existence of Brahman and concede that the jagat is the nimitta karana, do not agree to the jagat being upadana karana. There is thus a little difference of opinion here. Hence the use of the word sishtaa part of the Sruti remaining unaccepted by the Vaiseshikas. Satkaryavadins, who accept the Srutis in their totality, need not be considered here, as they do not fall under the category of sishta parigrahas. If they are also to be included in this connection, the argument will become too elaborate and become rambling (viparivartasyat). In such a case, we would have to consider the performance of sacrifices and the pain 954 Atidesa is of five kinds: Sastratidesa, Karyatidesa, Nimittatidesa, Vyapadesatudesa and Rupatidesa. Atidesa is usually expressed. by words showing likeness or resemblances, such as iva, vat, sadrusa, etc.

inflicted on animals thereat. This is held over only to save a lengthy argument in which the Veda could be shown to support the position that no pain is inflicted on the animals offered as sacrifices. Multiplying arguments on this scale is not our purpose. Principles and rules are numerous. How can this Sutra be limited in its application? The Sutra aims only at disowning the attitude of the two sets of argumentators to a certain extent, by agreeing to the principle half way, as convenient to them, and disagreeing from the remainder. With a view to reject the wrong comment and impress on the mind the correct interpretation, this Sutra has been enunciated. Chief among those who have departed from the correct interpretation, in our opinion, are those who have assigned kartrutva to abhava and to jagat the kartrutva of jiva and the rest. The latter point is also in the remaining part of their argument. By using the expression api vyakhyata, it is indicated that all such arguments as these, which have been left out of account by them, though they are part of the Veda, have been considered by the Sutrakara. Though rejected by them, they are still part of the Veda and so have had to be considered, as they cannot disappear from the Veda because they have been rejected by one set of commentators. The Veda admits jiva, pradhana, satkala and svabhava and the arguments which support them, and these we have acknowledged according to this Sutra. The expression sishta in the Sutra also includes the argument about Brahma-karana-vada. This, some argumentators have not acknowledged. In leaving aside this part of the argument, they still hold on to the abhava kartruvada. This, again, is explained by means of application by analogy (atidesa) and proved. The word sishta has, therefore, been used in the Sutra. In order to set out clearly the doubts of those commentators which made them disagree to that portion of the tattva, the expression siskta has been used in the Sutra, thus helping to prove by referring to the contrary views held by them. It is not to help their disagreement but to

the clearly explain the real meaning of the Vedic expression and to establish the bhava kartruvada. Some of the commentators referred to support the argument jiva pradhana vada and try to establish asat kartrukatva. It is not right. It has been clearly proved in the foregoing Sutra and rejected. It is unnecessary to refer to it here to avoid repetition. The Sruti texts Tan mano kurute, etc., are strong proofs that manas (mind) is only one of the seats in bringing about an action into existence and therefore manas cannot be called as asat or abhava. We must understand it in the manner we have explained in the previous Sutra, Asaditichenna pratishedha matratvat. From the expression pratishedhamatra used in the Sutra, it is to be clearly understood that asat cannot be the agent nor can kartrutva be ascribed to it.955-56 In order to instruct clearly that asal which ends in sunyat cannot possess any agency, expressions pratishedhamatra, etc., were used in the Sutra. Also, the Sruti texts Akasmadidam aavirasit iti, etc.957 [This (universe) came into being accidentally] declare that without mind (manovina), asat would be merely sunya and nothing could have come into existence. So that it comes to mean this in the foregoing argument, it was proved that abhava could not have been the cause for the universe coming into existence; now, it is proved that sunya is not capable of bringing anything into existence. Abhava is thus synonymous with sunya. What was said before is that nothing could come into existence without kartrutva-and now it is affirmed that a kartru is of the utmost necessity. Asat has no kartrutva assigned to it (i.e., to create the world, etc.). The statement that asat has no kartrutva assigned to it is not one made by the commentator. This 1 has been said above. Yet there is no punarukti dosha here. Because it is made by the commentator with the object of anticipating the objection of the opponent and 955.56 The word Asat should be understood as avyakta as in the words of the Sruti text: Asabda asparsa arupa avyaya agandha (Katha-upanishad , III. 15). 937 Rig-Veda, 1. 1. 1.

answering it in advance and for laying bare the proofs that could be adduced from the Agamas. It is only to prove these aspects of the matter, viz., asat (abhava) kartruvada; bhavasya kartrutvam and kartrutvam vina na karyasya utpattih, that the discussion of the matter has been brought up and the doubts cleared. 960 attriTherefore never think of abhava as possessing kartrutva -abhava kartrutva; nor of creation of the universe by jiva. Of course, Sruti texts like, Jivat bhavanti bhutani, 958 Pradhanadidam utpannam, 95º Akasmadidam avirasit iti, etc., support only bhava kartrutva and not abhava kartrutva, just as for example, ghata dadhi, kantaka taikshnya, etc. These examples are illustrative of the truth of the Sruti texts. Jivas and others cannot counteract the innate qualities of things-the piercing quality of the thorn, etc., or the agency required for placing the curds in a ghata. If we say that jivas and others can counteract the innate qualities of things, our words will prove untrue. The abovequoted examples are intended to illustrate the characteristics of asatva and achetanatva. Do you then say that asat karanatva cannot be attributed to asat or is it that you bute to asat akartrutva also? It is not the first; because the examples above quoted contradict it (such a position). Nor is it the second; because we do not attribute kartrutva to abhava. The expression kartrutva should everywhere be understood as carrying with it the sense of (i.e., as implying) karanatva also. From this it should not, however, be understood that Isvara, by reason of his possessing karanatva, would create jivas afresh at creation, because they have existed at all times. By a fresh creation of visva, there is no contradiction of the previous conclusion (ie., that Pralaya does not mean complete annihilation of karya and karana, but it is only development into srishti of what existed in the embryonic form at Pralaya). The jivas themselves do not know what all have been existing which 958 Rig-Veda, IX. 96. 5. 960 Rig Veda, I. 1. 1. 959 Bhagavata, VI. 9. 11.

causes them to come into existence as helps at creation. This aspect of the matter has already beeen agreed to (by us). The jivas cannot avail themselves of opportunities of knowing all those materials that cause the bringing about of their creation, as they are unable to know them. The kartru himself knows the causes of srishti as evidenced by the Agamas. The Srutis refute uncontradictingly the pradhana-karana-vada and subsequently establish Sesvara Sankhya doctrine. And therefore there is no contradiction meant here. Whatever it may be, the right of prohibition is not in Pradhana and the rest of them, because they are achetana. If we still hold and argue that they have such a power, then it results in uncertainty (anekantika vada).961 And further it ends in yukti virodha, i.e., becomes opposed in reasoning to the purvapaksha; and this has been pointed out briefly in the words. pratishedhamataratvat and drishtantabhavat. Further, from the Sutras, Svapaksha doshachcha and drishtantabhavat, the argument becomes unsupported by authority (apramanikatva), and therefore your doubts are cleared from your own words. It makes no difference to us-your raising this point. It is the same as before, i.e., as if you had not put it forward (Aviseshitassamanah). And this is how we have proved by analogy (atidesa). (Karanatva to Brahman has not been assigned groundlessly.) Further, verily you ask again how it could be contradictory if we argued that the jiva possesses the kartrutva and how it could be yukti viruddha, our reply is that the very fact that there was causation for every thing, leaves no room for anything to be made afresh by the jiva, for it is said akrutam iti, nothing is made newly that did not exist previously. And Uncertainty; being not to the point. Anekantika is the name given to one of the five main divisions of hetvabhasa (fallacies) otherwise called savyabhichara. It is of three kinds :(i) Sadharana where the helu is found both in the sapaksha and vipaksha, the argument, therefore, being too general; (ii) Asadharana, where the hetu is in the paksha alone, the argument being not general enough; (iii) Anupasamhari, which embraces every known thing in the paksha, the argument being non-conclusive. if 061

therefore the panchami (vibhakti) is used to denote that nothing was created afresh (achetanadakrutamcha drishtva). The eva sabda denotes that there could be no doubt whatever (asandigdha) as to the existence of the jiva at the time of Pralaya. If any doubt had been entertained, the panchami would not have been used. The jivas also were never made (akrutatva) but they existed. They existed with the mahat (the great principle), etc. Hence it is that panchami has been used. The mahat includes all jivas; therefore it is that mahat's function is the causing of creation. Mahadadi also have to be actually taken to be like jivas. But mahadadi are not achetana. It would be wrong to suppose that pradhana is capable of action-because it is only an achetana vastu. In the same way it is wrong to suppose that asat is capable of actionthough it is a vastu, it is only like a pot, an achetana vastu. However, it has already been agreed to that srishti comes into being only for the sake of jivas and pradhana also is brought into creation as upadana karana in order to help the jivas. In order to denote that these jivas are devoid of independence, and are always subject to Parabrahman, this Sutra has been enunciated. Therefore, the argument is not unwarranted. Verily if it is said that jivas also were made by Isvara just as any other vastu, we have to say "It is not so," for it is not right to apply such an argument in the case of Isvara. Because Sruti texts like Sa idam sarvamasrujata iti, etc., clearly declare that Isvara being above all did create mahat, etc., under his supreme control. But to interpret Sruti texts like these in any other manner without understanding them correctly, would land us in an unwarranted stretch of the argument, would affect the inferential premise as to kartrutva and karanatva of Brahman, and would render us unauthoritative. Thus, this matter has, in the light of your objections, been discussed without varying the meaning of the Sruti texts and displaying any bias, and brought to a conclusion. Sruti texts like Jivat bhavanti bhutani iti, 903 etc., 962 Chchandogya-upanishad , VII. 1. 26. 96 963 Rig-Veda, IX. 96. 5.

clearly denote the superiority of Parabrahman in his bhavapradhana in respect of all kartrutva, he being the Supreme. And the term "jiva" wherever used in Sruti texts like those referred to above, should be understood to mean Parabrahman; any other interpretation will end in contradicting other Sruti texts like Namani sarvani yamavisanti ili, 964 etc. Verily if it is assumed that ordinary jivas are capable of creating, then, such a view would go against the example quoted in Sruti texts that earth by itself cannot become ghata (without a kartru) and thus such a view becomes contradicted. Sruti texts like Nanyato'sti karta iti,ºº5 etc., clearly prove that the Supreme Brahman is the only kartru and independent and above all. This has been sufficiently proved by the examples set out above and this is the only way to arrive at a reasonable and satisfactory conclusion. By this argument we have rejected every kind of trick (upadhi) that has been directed against it. Generally jivas are devoid of svatantra, just as the earth is incapable of becoming a ghata by itself; and therefore the svatantra of Parabrahman is rendered manifest and placed beyond all attack. Thus everything has been rendered clear. Commenting later, on the Sutra, Amsonanavyapadesadanyathachapi dasakitavaditvamadhiyatyeke (II. 3. 40), Jayatirtha directly meets by anticipation the criticism (adverted to by Sripati) that the Bhedins are atyantayor ghatapatavadinah. In doing so, he begins by stating that some (commentators) amplify this Sutra by suggesting that jiva is an amsa of Paramatman. This amsa is indeed beginningless. Paramatman is also beginningless. These are (individually) not capable of being divided. The Sruti terms them achchedyatvat. Both cannot be localized in a particular spot. Just like ghata, the jiva is subject to anityatva, i.e., to changes in form. What then is the significance of the terms Abhinnatva and Bhinnatva? In this 904 965 966 906 Bhallaveya Sruti, as quoted by Anandatirtha. Agnivesma Sruti, as quoted by Anandatirtha. So also in the Smritis. Cf. Bhagavad-Gita, II. 24, Achchedyoyam adahyoyam akledyo asoshya eva cha, etc.

connection, it has to be remarked Bheda is only conditionalºº7 (aupadhika) while Abheda is natural (svabhavika). This upadhi (this conditional existence), which, some say, is avidya, is without beginning (anadya) and is indescribable (anirvachya), while others opine that it is real and due to internal attachment (Satyamevantahkaranadikam iti). Why is this difference in opinion? Because there are Sruti texts like Dva suparnau iti,⁹s Nityo nityanam iti,969 etc., signifying Bheda; and there are other Sruti texts like Tattvamasi iti,970 Aham Brahmasmi iti, 971 etc., which signify Abheda. It cannot be said in regard to one single jiva by itself (Ekasya jivasya Brahmanah iti) that it bears, in regard to Brahman, the relationship of Bheda and Abheda. Such a statement should be applicable to all (jivas). For which reason, certain commentators postulated that jivas that attain to Brahmatva, some can be Brahmadasa and some others Brahmakitava. This does not seem to be right. If it were so, what is the kind of Abheda that they postulate in regard to Brahmadasas? Is it of a primary or of a secondary nature, implying, by way of illustration, only a similarity etc., between the two-jiva and Brahman (sadrusyadilakshanah)? If it is alleged to be the first (i.e., primary), it has to be discarded; because the expression api in the Sutra postulates that much of relationship between the jiva and the Brahman and no more. That is, in its essence abheda is meant only to stress bheda (Tatpaksho mukhyabheda pakshah). Jiva, on account of upadhi, is, even in moksha, different from Brahman (Jivasya aupadhika eva paramatmano bhedah). Those who argue abheda as svabhavika in mukti argue out in effect only bheda and not abheda (Abhedastu svabhavika iti vadata muktau bhedabhavo 967 That is, pertaining to attributes or properties; an effect produced. 968 Mundaka-upanishad , III. 1. 1. 969 Katha-upanishad , V. 13. 970 Chchandogya-upanishad , VI. 8. 9. 971 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , I. 4. 10.

636 72 INTRODUCTION ' vachyah). To suggest that in mukti the jiva is possessed of avidya but free from antahkarana, is contrary to the previously quoted Sruti texts, because these plainly enunciate that even in mukti, jiva and Brahman are different. Accordingly as it is against the pramanas, it is fit to abandon this standpoint (that the bheda postulated is of the primary kind). If it is alleged to be the second (or secondary kind), it also deserves to be rejected, because the jiva being achetana, Abheda indicates only the mukta's distinctive feature of similarity with Brahman (sadrusyam iti upalakshanam) 12 as compared with those who have not attained that state. It is clear from this that the superiority of Brahman stands out of itself unaffected (Tat pradhanakatvadyapiti drashtavyam). If Abheda is agreed to, how is it possible, then, to accept the opposite of it (viz., Bheda)? Accordingly it is meet to repudiate it. If it is said that Abheda prevails only in cases of certain people who attain to mukti from samsara, even this is opposed utterly to reason. Moreover, the acceptance of the theory that Bheda and Abheda prevail as between jiva and Brahman, would also be opposed to Sruti texts. Because Bhedabheda means Bhedenasahito bheda, i.e., Abheda that exists along with Bheda (Bhedenasahito Bhedo Bhedabhedah.) Nowhere could such a relationship (Bhedabheda) be said to exist. Without such a joint existence (of Bhedabheda), it is improper to enumerate the second (Abheda) with the first (i.e., Bheda) (na upasankhyatavya). While there is no such real collective existence (of (Bheda and Abheda), there can be no such thing in existence as Bhedabheda (samudayamrute nakechit bhedabhedo nasti). Therefore, there being no existence without its natural 972 Upalakshanam: A mark, characteristic or distinctive feature. Implying something that has not been actually expressed; implication of something in addition or any similar object where only one is mentioned. The idea seems to be that Abheda indicates only a partial or one-sided similarity and in that respect is only a distinctive mark of a jiva in mukti. Hence the word sadrusya is used to indicate "likeness," resemblance," or similarity". 16 41

characteristics, there can be no such thing as Abheda (svagunadin vina abhedo nasti). Accordingly, the characteristics of jiva and Brahman are natural to each of the two and cannot be harmonised (Etena jiva Brahmano bhedabhedau dvavapi svabhavikau). Bheda is not a thing that has been fettered by the upadhi termed avidya and the like (natu bhedo'vidyadyu padhi nibandhanah). And therefore even in moksha, Bheda prevails, and we reject Abheda in mukti, as propounded by the Yadava Prakasa, because it is clearly contrary to Bheda vachanas (found in the Srutis) (Ato muktavapi Bhedasadbhavat nasmakam muktabheda vachana virodha iti vadan yadava prakasopi nirastah). 975 The expressions kvachit and kenachit "** occur here and there (in arguments of this nature) but they are opposed to a large number of Sruti texts (visesha Sruti virodhat). While there is nothing like Bhedabheda existing between jiva and Brahman, how then could the Bhedabheda Sruti texts been brought out by way of illustration to explain the Sutra? The answer is that Badarayana has explained the Sruti texts (referred to) from his own point of view in this Sutra. Sruti texts declare only Bheda and describe the distinctive features of Bheda and Abheda that are generally found in jiva and Brahman (Upalakshanametat Bheda srutayascha ityapi drashtavyam). Because each of these belongs to his own (respective) amsa. This is how the Sutra has 973 Yadava Prakasa:-The work of Yadava Prakasa is referred to by Ramanuja in his Sri Bhashya. He is taken as typical of those who propound the view that "the general cause, i.e., Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities." See Sri Bhashya, commentary on II. 1. 15 (Tadananyatvam arambhanasabdadibhyah). This theory is severely criticised by Ramanuja as opposed to all Scripture, Smriti, Itihasa, Purana and Reasoning (Ibid.). Tradition says that Yadava Prakasa was the teacher of Ramanuja. 974 Kvachit-Met with occasionally; rare; unusual. Kenachit-By some persons, in the indefinite sense indicating the unimportance of the person or persons referred to.

to be understood. The statement that the jiva is a part (i.e., an amsa) of Paramatman, is a solemn declaration (pratignajata arthah). The words ninavyapadesat in the Sutra show that the jivas are relatively different from each other just like son, brother, etc. The words anyathachapi denote that though they (son, brother, etc.) are different from each other, yet their relationships exist in this manner (as sons, brothers, etc). In the same way Sruti texts also indicate Bheda and Abheda between jiva and Brahman. These Sruti texts also broadly declare that the jiva is only an amsa of Brahman and nothing more. If perchance jiva is utterly different (bhinna) from Brahman, just as what ghata is to pata, i.e., extremely different, then all the Abheda Sruti texts would have been obstructed. Similarly, if perchance jiva is utterly abhinna from Brahman, then, all the Bheda Sruti texts would be invalidated. We should not, because there are Sruti texts supporting both Bheda and Abheda, endeavour to club them, the two sets of Bheda and Abheda (Sruti texts), into one harmonious whole (Yadi jivo Brahmano ghata iva patadatyantabhinnassyattada bheda srutayah uparuddhyeran Yadiva Brahmabhinnah syattarhi bheda srutayo badhayeran Nacha bhedabheda- srayanena srutidvaya samanjasyam vachyam). It is nowhere exemplified that if this is not done, the Sruti texts would be contradicted (Na kenachidityudahruta sruti virodhat). From the mere fact that there are Bheda and Abheda Sruti texts, we cannot combine what are opposite Sruti texts and say as a demonstrated conclusion that jiva is an amsa of Brahman (Ato hedasheda srutyan yadhanu pa pattya jivo Brahmanomsa angikarya ityeva sutrartha iti). It is neither right that we should use the expression Bhedabheda as one expression by itself nor as conveying this meaning (i.e., as conveying a consistent meaning of the Sruti texts). For it is said, Yato bhedenatasyayamabhedenacha giyate Ataschamsatva muddishtam bhadabhedau na mukhyata iti 1975 Those Sruti texts 975 The authority is not quoted. srutyanyadhanu

which declare for Bheda cannot be held to declare for Abheda. As those Srutis have declared amsatva to be their primary object, the idea of Bhedabheda is not the important matter (i.e., amsatva and not Bhedabheda is the important point). When we admit that we have correctly understood the Paramatma amsatva, then we should not agree also to the Bhedabheda theory. Because the characteristics of amsatva cannot be properly determined. To this, the reply is that we have already admitted that there is no difference as between the Matsya and other avataras as all the amsas are admitted to be one without difference (Matsyadishu paramesvara ameshu abhedasya angikritatvat). But as regards the jivas, the expression Paramesvara amsa is used simply in order to show that there is such a similarity as between them (as there is between the different avataaras of Vishnu). This similarity as between the jivas shows their constant subordination to Parabrahman in their existence. By this, it is declared that the characteristics of virility (pumstva) etc., possessed by Parabrahman in his amsatva, are denied to the jiva. Thus what seems to be suggested in regard to the jiva in the very name of the Adhikarana is rejected. It is not possible to interpret the amsatva (of the jiva) even by any hidden mode (prakarantarena). The expression cha in the Sutra (Amso nanavya padesat) warrants the restriction of the meaning of the term amsa in this way that the jiva is subordinate to Brahman (Tadadhinasattadimatvam chetyarthah). Really, the term amsa has been used in the Sutra to denote that there is absolutely no difference between the avataras, Matsya and the rest. Nevertheless, the term amsa when used in connection with 1 iva is merely intended to denote a proportionate similarity in its characteristics when compared with the entire amsatva as seen in the different avataras of Parabrahman. And therefore the term amsa, when applied to the jiva, has only a secondary significance (Tathapi mukhyamsa sadrusyam tatsattaiva sattavatva lakshanam eva jivasya amsatvam gaunoyam amsasabda iti). The term amsa

is possessed of several meanings, among which the most primary one is seen in the Matsya and other avataras (of Vishnu), in which each avatara consists of the svarupamsa in its entirety. But when the term amsa is used in respect of the jiva, it is not so. For, the amsatva of the jiva is possessed of varying characteristics. Hence it bears a secondary significance, as declared by the Agamas (agama vakyam pathati). The Agamas declare clearly that the jiva bears only a small amount of similarity (kinchit sadrusya matram) to Brahman. The expression "amsatviti" used by the Acharya (Anandatirtha) should be construed as covering both these two aspects of its significance, viz., the first lakshana indicating the capacity to create, etc., the svarupa indicating purnanandikam (entire bliss) and the sthiti indicating the measure of his all-pervading omnipresence (sarvagatatvadi parimanam). These are the chief characteristics of the first aspect of amsatva. These are to be understood as indicating the never-changing svarupamsa of Brahman. As regards the jivamsa, it is otherwise. This also, the Sutra illustrates from the examples of dasakitavaditvam. This explains further the import of the subsequent Sutra, Prakasadivattu naivamparah. The jivas in their amsatva can never bear the same likeness (samya) to Paramesvara in the same manner as the avataras, etc., do in their different manifestations. Because Matsya and other avataras bear the likeness of Svarupamsa while the jivas bear a divided likeness (vibhinnamsa eva). In order to break down the misconception of similarity as between the two, the subsequent Sutra, Prakasadivattu naivamparah (II. 3. 47) was propounded by the Sutrakara to illustrate his position. These illustrations sufficiently show that it would not be meet to take the word in one and the same significance.070 In order to remove the doubt whether it should be understood as applicable both to Bheda and Abheda in their tive applications (ubhayatra bhedabheda sadbhavadityasanka respec- 970., The word has a double significance and must be understood in one way when applied to Brahman and in another when applied to jiva,

nirasayabhashyam), this interpretation has been offered. In fact, the existence of self-conceit in jivas is pointed to in the term amsa in its significance. In order to bring out the force of pride (egotism) existing in jivas, the term amsa is further explained in the subsequent Sutras by clear illus. trations and this makes the position very explicit. Commenting on the Sutra, Prakasadivattu naivamparah (II. 3. 46), the Acharya (Anandatirtha) says that the sun is within his own disc, his own measurer and his own sharer. The rays of light that proudly proceed from the sun and the sun in the Suryamandala are both the same (amsa and amsi are both the same). In this way (i.e., this idea of oneness) we have to carry everywhere. The word atha (used by Anandatirtha) is used in a collective sense. Because the sun overspreading the seven oceans with his lordly rays (his amsa) and himself (amsi) are one. The prithvi which extends to an area measuring panchasatkoti is, as amsa, the same as the mountain Meru, its amsi (Amsibhuta dharadevi meruvaderabhimanini devatapi amsarupa eka eva). Meru and the Himavat are termed males in the Puranas because they are famed for their hardness. Some Sruti texts declare that the earth is very hard; this is only to represent that, in certain places, the earth is also hard. Here, the characteristic of the earth (svarupamsa) is explained in its variety only. In the same way, Bhagavan Vishnu (Parabrahman), who is amsi, is one and the same in his many different avataras and absolutely without difference in his amsa. This is how we have to understand. Parabrahman is immutable (avyaya), and always full of good qualities (sada purnagunah), both in amsa and in amsi. This is the idea that is propounded in the succeeding Sutras for demonstrating the abheda point of view as between the svarupamsa of Parabrahman and avataramsas. The different amsas (vibhinnamsa) of the jiva are next expounded by way of illustration. Next Next to Parabrahman are the devatas who have fallen away (sada apabhrashta namaka devatamsa), who are also of the amsarupa, such as Surya, Varuna, Prithvi, etc., who are quite different from each 41 F

other and are in their inverted order from Parabrahman. In this Sutra, Badarayana has established that the jivas in their amsas are thus severally different from each other in the inverted order when compared with Paramesvara's svarupamsas which are absolutely one and the same. With great skill, in the next Sutra, Anugnapariharau dehasambandhajjyotiradivat, this difference between Paramesvara as amsa and amsi-is demonstrated. In this Sutra and in those succeeding it, the commentator further illustrates. how the jiva is of vibhinnamsa on account of the egotistic feeling (abhimana) in him. And on this abhimana of the jiva, the commentator proceeds to say that the jiva is always embodied in a body, which even divine beings, though they may possess the capacity to be invisible (to us), cannot avoid. Hence the cha sabda-which occurs in the Asantateschavyatikarah (II. 3. 49)-is intended to denote the collective sense. Surya and the rest are subordinate in srishti and sthiti to Parabrahman (prasadayatta), that is both for coming into srishti (pratibandha) and for absolution. (nivrittitvat). By the word anugrahya, we have to understand that they possess bodies which have been polluted by the taint of abhimanadosha (attachment). Suffice it to say that jivas as amsas are different from Paramesvara (Paramesvaradbhedam); that the bheda is of varying kinds and that it is never one like the svarupamsa of Parabrahman as manifested in his many avaturas. The very word anugrahya denotes "subject to grace". This in itself plainly denotes that jivamsa is different from svarupamsa. Sruti texts like Neshyate, naivale, jayante iti, etc., strongly support this view of subordination (of juvamsa). The Sutra, Asantateschavatikarah (II. 3. 49) strongly supports this view in that the jivamsas are held to be absolutely different from Paramesvaramsa (tat jivamsanam paramesvaradbhedameva sadhayat pratiyate) and not identical with Matsya and other avataramsas (Na tu matsyadinam abhedam). Matsya and other avataramsas are in the possession of the attributes of perfect ananda and other good qualities. The Sutra, jivamsa).

on the Anugnapariharau, etc., (II. 3. 47) indicates, other hand, that the jivamsa is subordinate to Parabrahmamsa. It must never be understood that jivamsa is equivalent to the svarupamsa of the Matsya and other avataras. Thus, it has been established by proofs that jivamsa is absolutely different from Isvaramsa. And thus it is established by many proofs that the iiva is different from Isvara (evam amsasyapi jivasya Isvaradbhedah pramanaih samarthitah). Yet, if any one still tries to prove that jivamsa sabda is intended to be identical with Parabrahmamsa and tries to find out proofs for it, he will fall into confusion of the kind noted above. And in his attempt to establish a contradiction, he will arrive at a result which is expounded in the next Sutra, Abhasa eva cha (II. 3. 50). According to this Sutra, the jivas bear a semblance to the Parabrahmamsa. This is the import of the Sruti text, Tathaitasmin Purushottame etat jivajatam atatam etadevasya tadamsatvam iti, etc. (That is, though born as an amsa of Paramatma, Paramatma is complete, in his amsatva, whereas he-the jiva-is different from Paramatma and calls himself an amsa.) This text by itself does not establish the Parabrahma amsatva of the jiva. Because there is this text contrary to it (in the mantra of the Rig-Veda): Pado'sya visva bhutani tripadasya amritam divi iti.977 (In a small fourth part of Parabrahman is the whole universe; the remaining three parts are unseen in the world of immortality). 978 The dyu sabda (akasa) covers up the entire worlds Anantasana, Svetadvipa and Vaikuntha which are implied by the term pada. This word pada also means amsa. Merely because the jiva is referred to as amsa, it is not permissible to claim identity with amsatva or padatva of Parabrahman. And therefore we cannot invent a place for the jiva which is identical with Parabrahman. Next, the term natviti is used by the Acharya. How can the jiva as amsa claim identity with Parabrahman, while Parabrahman's every amsa is entire in itself as described in the Sruti text, Pumpadavat purushasya amritapadatrayam? 977 Rig. Taitt. Aranyaka, III. 12. 978 Ibid.

If it is asked (kutah) how can every amsa of Parabrahman be entire in itself, the answer is Narayanam pradurbhavarupam (jivamsebhyah param vilakshanam)-the avatara rupas of Narayana, etc., are manifested forms among Parabrahman's infinite and unimaginable forms. The amsa of jiva when compared with Parabrahman is quite separate and quite the reverse in its character. Hence different. The Sruti says Jagada, etc.-that Parabrahman in his svarupa has adhidaivadi svarupa (adhidaiva, adhyatma and adhibhautika) which is determined in every part of it (pada) and srishti begins in the amsa itself. In order to explain the adhidaivadi svarupa etc., this section was begun so as to enable one to understand this state of difference existing between the amsa of Parabrahman and the amsa of the jiva; and to give a firm impression of it, the Acharya summarises and states it in the further sloka, Akshaya iti-Parabrahman in his svarupa is akshaya, i.e., he has no sarira which he is to assume and to lose, while the jiva in his amsa necessarily assumes one and casts it off. Therefore it is that in Pralaya also He undergoes no change (because he has no sarira). This is at length described in the Sutras, Asambhavastu satonu papatteh and Na'tma sruter nityatvachchatabhyah." The Acharya says Lakshmyavasa iti. Parabrahman always exists with Lakshmi and Lakshmi is ever at His will. Even in Pralaya, Parabrahman, while in His entire svarupa, keeps Lakshmi also in Her entire svarupamsa. This is at length explained in the Viyadadhikarana (II. 3. 1)-that Lakshmi with the will of Parabrahman starts the creation by bringing into manifestation Brahma and others with their abhimana³8 ending ultimately in their respective bodily forms only during srishti (utpatti) and none during mukti. In thus treating of the order of creation and destruction, srishti and pralaya, it is intended to show the relative importance of jivas in their respective amsas (taratamya). This is treated of at length in the Adhikarana, 980 979 II. 3. 9 and II. 3. 17. 979 980 Pride (in a good sense) ; i.e., sarira in which it ultimately ends.

Viparyayena tu kramota sampadyate, etc. 981 The gist of Viyadadhikarana is further elaborated in the Sutras following it, wherein it is said that Prakriti appears as Lakshmi. Then Sankarshana assumes the form of Prana. Then, again, Prakriti assumes the form of Saraswati and Bharati. These two latter are also the original forms of Prakriti. Thus with the united kartrutva of Prakriti and Purusha, Brahma is made to manifest himself in mahattattvarupa. Then he develops into ahamkaratattva; then, again, appears as Indra, Skanda and other tattvabhimanis (i.e., primary agencies of creation). In order to reject the misconception that they are superior to the amsa of Parabrahman, these symbolic names indicate their grades in subordination to Parabrahman. This is explained in the Sutras, Tathapranah etc.982 Thus srishti and pralaya are the order in which Parabrahman manifests his kartrutva. And the Sutras, Tejotastathahyaha and Tadabhidhyanadevatu tallingatsah (II. 3. 15 and 16), indicate that the spirit (tejas) of each belongs to himself. The Panchami (vibhakti) used clearly shows the meaning of the Sutra, Parat tu tat sruteh. (Both in srishti and pralaya all jivas are, in the order of gradation, subordinate to Parabrahman.) 983 The liberation. from janma and laya is what is called moksha. Liberated from both these-janma and laya-to be eternal (nitya), is mukti. In mukti also, though there is no janma again, the fact of affectionately praising the Parabrahman, is in itself being subordinate to Parabrahman. This is established at length in the Sutra, Tadadhinatvat arthavat. 984 Thus, this subject of gradation of Brahman and other jivas in their amsas has been discussed and determined throughout this pada (i.e., II. 3.) It will thus be seen that the criticism of the Dvaita view that undue stress is laid on Bheda by the upholders of that theory has been met, in anticipation, as it were, by Jayatirtha. It will also be conceded that the position of Sripati in regard to Abheda in the moksha stage is widely different from that of the Advaita 981 982 II. 3. 14. II. 4. 1. 933 II. 3. 38. 984 I. 4. 3.

school of thought. That is the very reason why he designates his system as Viseshadvaita and not merely Advaita. His conception His conception of Advaita may perhaps be described as Advaita with a difference and embodying the Bheda and Abheda views combined in a harmonious manner. It is interesting to note in this connection that Jayatirtha in his Nyaya Sudha 985 (I. 1. 1.) lays down the principles of Brahma Tarka which should guide discussions relating to the Brahman and the value to be attached to opposing Sruti texts. His argument is that Sruti texts are, broadly speaking, of two kinds : Savakasa, those which leave room for discussion; and Niravakasa, those which leave no room for discussion. He thus enunciates these two principles: - (1) Ato nanu adhikabala virodhe na hinabala pramanam bhavati. Where there is a stronger opposing argument, there the weaker proof cannot prevail. (2) Savakasa niravakasayoh niravakasam balavat. Between the savakasa and the niravakasa arguments, only the niravakasa argument will prevail. (3) Savakasacha advaita srutih. The Advaita Sruti texts quoted in support of Brahmaikya belong to the savakasa order as they leave much room for discussion and contradiction. (4) Bheda srutistu niravakasah. The Bheda Sruti texts, i.e., those that declare the Bheda doctrine, belong to the niravakasa group. (5) Ato niravakasataya balavatya bhedasrutya savaka- sataya durbalayah advaitasruteh badho yukta iti. Therefore it is but right that those Niravakasa Sruti texts which hold, without giving room for discussion, the Bheda doctrine prevail over those Savakasa Advaita Sruti texts, which are weak in their argument and leave scope for discussion. They are weak and rightly sublated. These principles, as will be seen, differ from those formulated by the Advaita school of thought. Ramanuja in setting out the Mahapurvapaksha argument, which 985 T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 66.

is said to embody the Advaitic view, 996 thus summarizes them: There being a conflict between the two sets of passages (those which describe Brahman as possessed of qualities and those which describe Brahman as devoid of qualities), we (i.e., the upholders of the Advaitic view) -according to the Mimamsa principle referred to above 987 -decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities."988 Commenting in his Anuvyakhyana 989 on II. 3. 29 Tadguna saratvat taduyapadesah prognaval, Anandatirtha definitely rejects Bhedabheda. He says:Sadrusyachcha pradhanatvat svatantryadapi chabhidam Ahurisena jivasya na svarupabhidam kvachit Sthanaikyamaikamatyancha muktasya tu visishyate Sadrusyancha viseshena jadanam dvayameva tu " Bhavet sudrusyamatyalpam tritiyam paramatmana Isarupakriyanam cha gunanamapi sarvasah" Tathaivavayavanam tat svarupaikyam tu mukhyatah || Yathodakam durge vrishtam parvateshu vid havati Evam dharman pruthak pasyan tanevanuvidhavati || Iti sruter nobhayancha bhedabhedakhyamishyate || Ekamevadvitiyam tanneha nanasti kinchana Mrityossa mrityumapnoti ya ika nanevapasyati || Iti srutavivetyasmat bhedabheda nirakritih Ivobhaye cha sadrusyam iti vaksabdanirnaye{} 986 In the text Brahmavidbrahmaiva bhavati, sadrusya and svatantrya are promised by Isvara to the jiva. Never It has been suggested that this Mahapurvapaksha view enunciated by Ramanuja represents the Advaitic view developed by Vimuktatman in his work Ishta-Siddhi, which has been set down to the middle of the 11 th century A.D.-See M. Hiriyanna, Ishta-Siddhi, Introd. xi-xiii. 987 Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini, VI. 5. 54, where Kachchavimochana in the Jyotishthoma sacrifice is explained. 988 Sri Bhashya, I. 1. 1. See Thibaut's Vedanta-Sutras with Ramanuja's Commentary, pp. 25-27. 989 T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 193.

was Isvara's undifferenced svarupa granted to the jiva. Sthanaikya is all that has been provided for the mukta. This sadrusya (between Isa and jiva) differs as much as the sadrusya of the muktas does from that of the jadas (such as pearls, rubies, etc.). The sadrusya of the jiva is of the third order and utterly small. In quality it differs from Isvara in its lordship (Isatva), form (rupa) and in action (kriya). In every other quality the jiva is in the third order. 990 Similarly in bodily form, it differs. In fact, nothing beyond svarupaikyaa is promised to the mukta. Just as the showers pouring on the summit of a mountain flow towards the sloping ground, thereby finally reaching the ocean, similarly all dharmas find their own avenues and flow till they reach their final end. Thus the Sruti does not accord sanction to the double system known as Bhedabheda position. And the Sruti text Ekameva, etc., declares that Parabrahman is only one and in Him there are no divisions and he who contemplates on Him in the idea that he differs from himself (in his forms) will meet with the death of deaths. Thus, by the help of the Sruti texts themselves, the theory of Bhedabheda is rejected. The indeclinable adverb iva in the Sruti text denotes mere sadrusya (likeness) between the two as declared in the Sabdanirnaya. The same idea is suggested but not developed by Anandatirtha in his Brahma-Sutra Bhashya in the commentary on the same Sutra (II. 3. 29). Only because the jiva possesses for his essence qualities similar to those of Brahman, he is spoken of, says Anandatirtha, as in the case of the all-wise Brahman. As the essence of the jiva consists of only wisdom, bliss and other Brahman-like qualities, the statement is made that the jiva is one like Brahman; as in the Sruti text Sarvam khalvidam Brahma tajjalaniti santa upasita, 991 etc., Brahman is spoken of as 090 Trividha jivasanghastu Deva Manusha Danavah I Tatra deva mukti yogya manusheshu uttamastatha || Tattvasankhyana, T. R. Krishnachar's Edn., p. 237. 9900 Svarupa+aikya. Aikya means only similarity, i.e., what the jiva deserves. Eke mukhyanya kevalah. (Nighantu). 991 Chchandogya-upanishad , III. 14. 1.

identical with all the world, on account of Brahman possessing all the qualities which are predicated of the whole world. But he quotes the following from the Bhavishyatpurana to indicate the limit of the likeness between the jiva and Brahman : "The souls are separate; the perfect Lord is separate; still owing to the similarity of intelligent nature, they are spoken of as Brahman in different Scriptural disquisitions."992 In commenting on II. 2. 33 (Naikasminnasambhavat), though he does not refer to the Bhedabheda theory, Anandatirtha states that the Sutrakara rejects the Jaina theory because of the impossibility of the existence of contradictory attributes being in one and the same thing at the same time. He suggests that the Saptabhangi nyaya, according to which seven different moods are said to be in the same thing at the same time, is not maintainable as they are contradictory of each other, and so cannot be admitted to be in the same thing. These seven moods are: "Somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable." "It might be being; it might be non-being; it might be being as well as non-being; it might be different from what is being as well as non-being, etc." These contradictory attributes cannot be admitted to be existent in one and the same thing from their very nature, i.e., such an admission would be, he says, against all reason and proof, while the authorities to prove it are wholly absent. Ramanuja urges, while commenting on this very Sutra, as will be shown below, that what applies by way of objection to the Bhedabheda theory, applies to this Jaina doctrine of Saptabhangi nyaya also. Ramanuja and Anandatirtha treat both the theories as a species of paralogism which cannot be maintained as contradictory attributes cannot be held to co-exist in the same thing at the same time. 002 Anandatirtha, Brahma-Sutra Bhashya, II. 3. 29.

Anandatirtha, in interpreting Sutras I. 4. 24 to 29 (from Prakritischa pratigna drishtantanu parodhat to Etena sarve vyakhyatah vyakhyatah), states that Brahman is also called Prakriti, agreeably to the argument and illustrative instances. He quotes the text "This verily is the Person whom all the names declare; just as all the rivers going to the sea, flow towards and enter it, so do all names enter and declare the Perfect Being." Prakriti is Brahman only because of his divine will being called Prakriti. Anandatirtha quotes the Sruti text "Let him know the Lord's Will to be Prakriti and the Supreme Lord to be the master of the Will."993 According to this text, Prakriti is only the Will of the Lord. The Sruti text is quoted: "He is Will; He is the guiding thought; He is wisdom; He is bliss." This is so, because he is both Prakriti and Purusha. In support, is quoted the text of the Paingins' Sruti which directly describes the Brahman as both Prakriti and Purusha : "He is woman; He is man; He is Prakriti; He is the Purusha; He is Brahman; He is the support; He is the light; Who is the Lord Hari, the cause of all; Himself without a beginning or end, but the end of all; the highest of the high; the original present in all." Prakriti is Brahman only for the reason He moulds forms out of Prakriti (i.e., Prakriti the material cause), in which He also exhibits Himself in various ways and makes everything. That Brahman is Prakriti is seen from the etymology of the word Prakriti: "he works eminently". Brahman enters into Prakriti, the material cause, shapes it differently and in the different shapes He dwells as a ruling principle for which purpose He assumes numerous forms. The Bhallaveya Sruti is quoted to this effect: "Now indeed the Lord enters with Prakriti, makes himself many; hence He is Prakriti, hence He is Prakriti, they say." Next the Naradiya Purana is cited: "The Supreme Lord Govinda, though He undergoes no change, 993 Rig-Veda, IV. 10.

only having entered into Prakriti the changeable, is spoken of as Prakriti." The suggestive remark is added: "No other interpretation is to be put upon it, for that would be against the authority of Scripture." In conformity with this view, that Brahman while He enters Prakriti and makes Himself, Himself undergoes no change, is further strengthened in the Anuvyakhyana, in the comments on the corresponding Sutras (I. 4. 24 to 29). This exposition is taken up by Jayatirtha and expanded at length into an argument which shows how these Sutras are an exposition of Badarayana's views against the Bhedabheda theory. Anandatirtha in his Anuvyakhyana, 991 commenting on I. 4. 24 (Prakritischa pratigna drishtan tanu parodhat) says:-Na cha prakriti sabdena Brahmopadanamuchchyate Avikarassada suddho nitya atma sada Harih | Sadaika rupa vijnana bala ananda rupakah Nirvikaroksharah suddho niratanko'jaro'marah Avisvo visvakarta' jo yah parah so'bhidhiyate Nirvikaramanaupamyam sadaikarasa makshayam Brahmeti Paramatmeti yamvidur vaidika janah Iti Sruti puranoktya na vikari janardanah Paradhina viseshaptiranivartyonyatha bhavah | Kshiradivad vikarassyat naiva sa syat hareh kvachit A padanatvamevasya yadyu padanateshyate || The use of the Prakriti does not mean that Brahman is liable to undergo vikara. The Sruti declares Avikarah sada suddhah, i.e., that Brahman is Avikara and ever suddha, nitya (eternal) and is called Atma and ever removes one's sin. Brahman always has eka rupa and is always all-knowing, all-potent and all bliss. Such a one, who never undergoes any change (nirvikara), is called aksharah, suddhah, niratankah, ajarah, amarah, avisvah, visvakarta and ajah. He alone is declared as parah i.e., Mahesvara. Such a one who undergoes no vikara cannot bear comparison as there is none other to compare with him. Therefore he is termed Brahman and Paramatman by great sages who are well versed in the Veda. 994 T. R. Krishnachar's Edition, p. 172.

Similarly do the Srutis and Puranas declare Janardana to be nirvikarin. But here and there, it is seen as if Brahman is subjected to others' control (paradhina). This is either a seeming misconception or a misjudgment. Curd is a state of vikara from milk, but the change of curd into milk is unheard of. Parabrahman never undergoes such a state of vikara, which disables him from going to his original state. Mere mention that he is the karana (apadana) and also the kartru (upadana) does not make him lose the state of nirvikaratva. This has been accepted by all-that Parabrahman is like a father (pitru) and is also creator of the visva. But it is also agreed that he was not born out of the visva. Just as the spider throws out the thread of its web, without itself showing any vikara in the act, Parabrahman, out of his entire karanatva and agency, creates visva as a result of action (karyarupataya). Furthermore, he is the great cause, being the visva kartru, he creates out of his mere will as declared by the Sruti text Ichchamatrat Prabhoh srishtih avikarasya sarvada | Svabhavo'yamanantasya rajoyenabhavaj jagat. So declares the Bhallaveya Sruti which says that out of His (Parabrahman's) mere Will, visva srishti came into existence. Commenting on this passage, Jayatirtha says:Neti | Yasya kshirasya vikaro yaddadhi tasmat kshira. danyatha tasya dadhnah kenapi kvapi na drisyata ityarthah Evamanyatha darsanasya siddhavikara vikari bhavadvyavrittih Tatah kim ityata aha || tato Sarvagnat iti Hi sabdo yasmadityarthe tasmannatayo vikari vikara bhava iti seshah || Ayamatra prayogah | Jagat brahma vikaro na bhavati Tato anyatve nopalabhyamanatvat Yo pato anyatvenopalabhyate sa na tadvikaro yathaghatah patasya Yascha yadvikaro nasau | 'nyatvenopalabhyate Yatha dadhikshiraditi Yadva jagad brahmani nanyonya vikara vikarini Anyonyamanyatvenopalabhyamanatvat Ghatapatavaditi prayogah | Nachayamasiddho hetuh Yassarvagna iti brahmanah sarvagnatva sravanat | jnana karyasya sarvathapyanu palambhena jagato

jnanabhavanu manat Viruddha dharmadhikaranayoschanyonya manyatvopalambha niyamat iti bhavenoktam | Sarvagnaditi Nanu vikara vikarinor bhedabhedabhyupagamat kathamayam heturitichenna Bhedenaiva upalambhasya hetutvat Tarhi drishtantassadhana vikalah | Sarvatra maya Bhedabhedabhyam sankarasyabhyupagamat Tat kim tvadabhyu pagama matrena ghata patayorabheda utopalambhat Nadyah Madabhyupagamena suddha bhedasyaiva grahyatvat | Nadvitiyah Asiddheh | Abhedanu palambhova hetutvena vivakshitah Nanvayam asiddho hetuh Jagadbrahmana abhinnam satvadbrahmavadityanumanena bhedopalambhaditi chenna Kharvam svarnenabhinnam satvat svarnavadityabhasa samana yoga kshematvadityaha | Abheda iti Yadi jagadbrahmanoh sadhyeta tarhiti seshah Kharvamayah kharparamva | Nanvidam ishtameva | Kharvasvarnayorabhedasya mayangikritatvat itichenna Abheda sabdena bhedabhavasya vivakshitatvat Atra pramana virodha iti chet Jagat brahmano'atyantam bhidyate tatsvarupanugati- sunyatvaditi tvadanumanasyapi pramana virodha iti samam samadhanam Atyanta bhedo mama na kvapityaprasiddha viseshanateti chenna Mokshabhava prasangat | Tathahi | Gnanena nivritta karmanacha mokshobhyu peyate | Tachcha jnanam ajnanamapi bhavati Nivriltam karma pravrittamapi bhavatiti katham mokshasadhanam syat | jnanatvadina tadbhave ajnanaderapi tadbhavasyat | jnanadikam jnanadi svarupena atyanta bhinnam ajnanadi svarupena tu bhinnabhinnamato na karya sankara iti chet | Tathapi ajnanadyabhedena svakaryasya kartavyatvat Evam mokshopi samsara bhinna ityamokshasyat | Mokshatma (ta)na sadbhavena mokshatve samsaropi tatha syat Yadi chayamabhedo'nu palabhyamano arthakriyasu nopayujyate Tada vyasanitayaivabhyu pagantavyah syaditi Brahma svarupanugati sunyatvat na tat parinamoyam prapancha ityuktam Tatra kim sarvasvarupanugati sunyata abhipreta Utakinchit anugama sunyata Nadyah Sarvanugama bhavepi ghatadinam mridadi vikaratva darsanat Na dvitiyah Satvanugamena vikara vikari bhavopapatterityata aha | Abheda iti Abhedo vikari vikara bhavah| i

Nanu na suvarnasatvam kharvenugatam Tat kathamayam prasangah Tat kim brahma satvameva viyadadinam Adhyetichenna Pramana bhavat Pranavai satyam, teshamesha satyam ityadi Sruteh prana satyatvasya brahmadhinatarthatvopapatteh Brahmana eva samanya satta viyadadavanugateti chet tarhi katham na svarnasatta kharve nugata Atha manyase karanameva karyatmana bhavatiti parinamavadinam matam Tatascha karanam yatsvabhava vyabhicharitadanugamah karye' vasyabhyupagantavyah Anyatha karanameva karyatmana bhavatiti riktam vachassyat Avyabhicharita svabhavanu game karanasyaivananugama prapteh Nacha sanmatra Svabhavam suvarnam Ena kharvam tadvikarassyat Kintu tadavyabhichari suvarnatvadyanugame satiti Evam tarhi jagadapi katham brahma parinamassyat Nahi sanmatra svabhavam brahma Kintu vijnanamanandam brahmetyadi srutya vijnanadinamapi tadavyabhichari svabhavatvavagamat Nacha vijnanadyanugamah prapanche'stiti samam Nanu kshiravyabhichari svabhava madhuryanugati vidhuram dadhi, tadvikaro drishtamiti chenna Satkaryavada bhanga prasangat Kshirakaryam dadhiti nischayena madhuryam kshirasvabhava iti kalpyate Madhuryasya kshira svabhavata nischaye va Kshiravinase tatkaranasya dadhyu padanatvam kalpayala iti na doshah nirvikaratve A pichagamairanumanaischa brahmano siddeh satyaprachyuta (svarupa) svabhavasyaiva brahmano jagadu padanatvam yomanyate tam pratyetau prasanga viparyayavuktaviti ko virodhah Etena pradhanasya jagadu padanatve pyayam samano dosha ili nirastam | Atha matam | Dvirupam brahmapyupagamyate Anantananda chidatmakam sadatmakamcheti Tatradyena rupena nimittam Dvitiyenopadanam Ato na kaschidukto doshah Tathahi | Yattavaduktam nirvikaratvam tachchichakti vishayatva chchrutyaderadushanam Nimittakaranena chichchaktikena prakriti pradhanadyabhidhanam sachchaktikam brahma parinamatityangikare na yukti virodhopi Sadatmakasya jagadu padanatvachchaitanya dyananu gamopi na doshah Sadanugamasya vidyamanatvat! Anyatva darsanamcha

| 655 | navirudhyate Yato yasmadanyatva mupalabhyate sarvagnat 1 Tannimittameva nopadanam Yachchopadanam sadrupam na tasmad bhede nopalabhyata ityasankyaha | Bhageneti Yadi brahmanah sadbhagena parinamah chidbhagena nirvikaratvamangikriyate Tada vaktavyam | Tayorbhagayorabhedo bhedabhedau va Na tavadabhedah | Dvayorapi parinamitvadi praptyabhagadvaya kalpana vaiyyarthyat Napi bhedabhedau abhedena sankara prasangat | Bhedabheda karyam nirunaddhitichet Kim tarhyaprayojakenabhedena Tasmad bhagayoratyanta bhedevangikaraniyah Tatah kimityata aha Yo bhaga iti | Parasparamatyanta bhinne dve vastuni | Tatraikam nirvikaram jagannimittameva | Aparantu parinami jagadu padana mevetyangikarenesvarasya kevala nimittatva vadina masmakam kaschidvivadah Nirvikarasya jagannimittasyasmabhirisvaratvena parina. mino jagadu padanasya pradhanatvena svikritatvat | Vivadabhavachcha prakritischetyadi sutranam anarambha yeveti | Atra yo bhaga iti parabhyupagamenoktam Svamatena tu yadvastviti gnatavyam Nahi bhaginam vina bhagassambhavati Napi vikaryavikarinoh kaschit bhagi vidyate Nanvasti vivada vishayah Nimittopadana bhedavadina nimittasyaiva brahmatvamabhyupagamyate Mayatu sadanantananda chitam samudayasyeti tadarthamadhikaranarambha iti chet | Kimidam brahmatvam (Kim) Brahma namavatvam uta jagatkaranatvadi lakshanarthavatvam Adyam dushayati Bhinnanam iti Tadbhavedityabhyupagamamaha | Tataschayamarthah Yaddyarthena vivado'sti tada narambhaniyamevadhikaranam Sabdamatre parena vivada karanat | KarnepyaSabda sastratvaditi Dvitiyepi vivektavyam Kim parasparam bhinna ssatchidanandadyah pratyekam brahmani | Uta te na brahmani Kintu tatsamudaya eveti Nadyah ekamevadvitiyam ityadi srutivirodhat Dvitiyepi tatsamudayonama kim tadu padanakam dravyantaram sankhya va samyogo va Sarvatrapi doshamaha | Brahmeti | Tadeti manasi sthitanam pakshanam vikalpitanam vangikare | Kvachit pakshe hi sabdenanu pa patteh prasiddhatamaha Atra hi brahmopadanasya va tadgunino va jagadupadanatvam praptamiti visvasya brahmopadanakata nasyat Nahyu padanagunigatah saktayah

karyadravye guneva sambhavanti Tadupadanatvaderasambhavat Athava brahmanah karyatvat gunatvachcha na visvopadanatvam sambhavatiti vyakhyeyam Atra brahmopadanatetyu palakshanam | Brahma nimittakata cha na yuktetyapi drashtavyam || Jayatirtha's position may be briefly set down. The milk is seen to undergo a change resulting in curd; but the curd does not admit of undergoing the process of reversion to its former condition of milk. Such is not the change that Brahman is expected to undergo in the creation of the world (Srishti). Out of his mere will, Srishti becomes manifest, himself undergoing no change whatever. The changes seen in Srishti are only changes in Pradhana by the power of his (Brahman's) will. The term hi clearly indicates that Brahman undergoes no change whatever during this transformation of Pradhana in Sritshi. Accordingly jagat cannot become a transformed condition of Brahman. Brahman is quite independent from what is manifested out of his will. For the very reason that ghata and pata being made out of earth and cotton materials are subject to the agency of the potter and the weaver, similarly jagat is the manifested result of the will of Parabrahman without absolutely any change in himself. For, no such change is ever observed in Parabrahman; what all is otherwise seen in the manifested jagat itself is as the curd transformed from milk. Nor can it be said that jagat is capable of showing any vikara in Brahman during the series of changes it undergoes. In order to illustrate this truth the examples of ghata and pata have been brought in. These two illustrations were not brought in for any other ineffectual purpose. Brahman is declared Sarvagna and in all his manifestations the greatest output of knowledge is exhibited by him and his master workmanship leaves nothing to be questioned. In every particle of work in Srishti, no contradiction could ever be pointed out either in character or in the result, for the very reason that he is Sarvagna. Nor can it be doubted that during the transformation of Pradhana carried out at his will no

contradictory aspect of Bheda and Abheda can be pointed to throughout his manifestation. In every particle of transformation, he proves himself quite out of touch with the Pradhana and its varied changes. Else, the illustrations would prove against his Sarvagnatva. If it is asked that in certain places Bheda is indicated and in certain others. Abheda is perceived, and the question raised why should not Bheda and Abheda be conjointly considered, the answer is that the illustrations above quoted, ghata and pata, do not allow of such a fused consideration. These illustrations show fully that the agents-the potter and the weaverare absolutely different from the things made by them. In no way can they be proved to be a part of the changes that ghata and pata have undergone. Similarly, jagat in its manifested form is absolutely free from Brahman at whose will it became manifest. And it cannot be said that Brahman himself underwent any change at all by reason of his manifestation. A gold A gold bangle is in a form assumed by gold different from gold itself; though gold is made to appear in the form of a bangle, yet, the gold is there, the change of form is also there and the agency through whom the change was made is also clearly seen. In this illustration, the gold and the bangle are one and the same, while the agent that brought the gold into this different form is absolutely different and underwent no change whatever. The illustration amply proves that in the very same way jagat and Brahman are absolutely different from each other as gold and the maker of change in its form. It also proves beyond all doubt that gold in its svarupa underwent no change whatever in transforming itself into a bangle. If it is asked "where lies this atyanta bheda, and that it is not quite clear on account of its mere attributive character," then the reply is there is no Moksha, because of the very same reason, Moksha being subject to His Grace. It is therefore said that Moksha is the result of nivritti korma (action done without desire). And this can be attained both from jnana and ignorance, for sometimes nivritti karma assumes the form of pravritti 42 F

658 karma. INTRODUCTION In such a case, how can Moksha be expected? If jnana and ajnana cannot be distinguished, the result also cannot be distinguished. Thus what one thinks that he is doing out of his wisdom, he may be actually doing as the result of his ignorance. Unless one distinguishes that jnana is absolutely different (atyanta bhinna) from ajnana, he will have no room to commingle guana and ajnana in the form of Bhinnatva and Abhinnatva. Therefore every one, in order to obtain Moksha, should work out of mere wisdom. Therefore it is held that Moksha is absolutely different from and free from the bondage of Samsara. Unless one holds such a decisive opinion, he cannot free himself from the bondage of Samsara. Nor will his actions be productive of any good result to make him realize Moksha. Thus his actions will all be reduced to a sorrowful end. It must not be thought that Brahmasvarupa is realized from the mere assertion of the non-existence of jagat. Because if it is held that there existed nothing and everything but Brahman was sunya, then there is nothing to assume whereby ghata and pata could have been put forth as examples out of Pradhana, which was subject to vikara. It was proved that Brahman himself would not undergo vikara, because he is always avikara. Then, what is Abheda? It is vikarivikara bhava. Evidently it should signify something which undergoes change because it is liable to change -a natural state subject to change. It cannot be said that gold is such a thing. Then, what is the proof? Can it be said that Brahman, in his sat, is identical with Akasa and the rest of them? If it is so affirmed, it should be said that it is not so; for there is no proof that it is so. For the Sruti texts, Prana vai satyam teshamesha satyam iti, etc., prove that Prana is real; and that this Prana is subordinate to Brahman and that Brahman alone is generally ruling over all and not merely as gold in relation to gold bangle. Those who maintain the Parinama vada hold that cause ends in the result, Karanameva karyatmana bhavati iti. Thereafter, the cause which is the root always exhibits itself

necessarily through the result. Karana is thus reduced to mere void (riktam vachassyat). But as In instances where the truth is unopposed, the causes leading to the truth alike are unopposed and open to no contradiction. For example, gold is not only naturally of a pure quality but also all articles made of it, of different sorts, are also of the same pure quality. And there is no reason to dispute its quality. When that is so, how can jagat be said to be a thing transformed out of Brahman (through vikara)? Similarly Brahman cannot be said to be of the same svabhava as gold illustrated above. the Sruti declares Vijnanam anandam Brahma iti, etc., Brahman is all-knowledge and bliss in form and cannot to any extent separate himself on account of his sat nature from knowledge and bliss. Else the satsvabhava of Brahman would be put into opposition to the Srutis. It is certain that curd is an altered state from that of milk; for this is the only state into which milk can naturally and ultimately turn into. Of course sweetness is naturally one of the qualities of milk and at one time this quality is liable to destruction, at which stage it results in exhibiting itself as curd. And we cannot say that this kind of conversion is a fault. Moreover, all agamas and anumanas assure and assert that Brahman is absolutely nirvikara. If one says that creation (srishti) by Brahman is but his natural tendency, there is nothing to contradict such a statement; no one can dispute it. And in so far as Pradhana is considered a mere subordinate cause, subject to Brahman's will in the matter of srishti, it is equally open to no contradiction. Accordingly the opponent's objection is discarded. The fact is Brahman has two forms; one is anantananda chidatmaka form and the other sadatmaka form. Out of the first, all causes are stored (apadana); from the second (form), all causes play upon the upadana karana in bringing into manifestation Pradhana. And there is absolutely no contradiction in this statement. What was said previously, viz., Brahman undergoes no vikara, is again reaffirmed that it is so, because of

his faultless chitsakti and this does not contradict the Srutis. The question arises whether from the satsakti form of Brahman comes the nimittakarana (apadana karana), thereby ending in the name of Prakriti-Pradhana (upadana karana). If this view is accepted, would there be any contradiction with the Srutis, in employing such an argument? There would be no contradiction. For Brahman being sadatma, the manifestation of jagat is his mere nature and hence there is no contradiction. His sadatmaka form is above all charge of vikara. His manifestation of Pradhana does not in any way affect him during the transformation of Pradhana into jagat. And therefore it has been declared that Parabrahman, who is Sarvagna, is beyond all vikara. By his mere will, the cause comes into play. If it is doubted whether sadrupa consists of his upadana and whether it is completely different from the jagat, the reply is Bhageneti, i.e., it is by mere difference. If Brahman through his sat ultimately puts the chit into manifestation through his nirvikaratva, then, he is called avyakta. If it is asked whether the two parts, the manifested and the unmanifested, are Bheda or Abheda or Bhedabheda, the reply is it is not Abheda, because both the parts have the will of Parabrahman in their parinama and therefore it cannot be said to consist of Bhedabheda for Abheda in this combination simply expresses no commingling. Thus Bhedabheda becomes confused and contradicted. Then, in such a state, Abheda becomes a mere rhetorical expression. Therefore the two parts being absolutely different from each other, we have to accept only Bheda as true. Then, what is the result? When the two parts are utterly different from each other, of which one, the Brahman, is nirvikara, jagat becomes only a nimitta karana. And subject to his will, jagat undergoes various vikaras at the mere will of Parabrahman. And this proves that we have no dispute whatever. So, it is declared that Parabrahman being absolutely nirvikara, jagat is subject only to his natural will in all his lordship (over it) and undergoes changes under

the name of Pradhana. 661 In order to remove this dispute, the Sutra, Prakritescha pratignadrishtantanuparodhat was laid down by the Sutrakara. Else there would have been no necessity for this Sutra. It has been stated above that the two parts (forms of Brahman) are absolutely different from each other. In your view, it is not granted that Brahman has two different forms. Without a thing to be divided, there can be no division. Unless there is a thing ready to be divided, there can be no division. Nor can there be vikara unless there is a thing ready to undergo vikara. Let this be the matter for discussion. The Bhedavadin says that the nimitta karana of Parabrahman is purely a source of cause and nothing more in Brahman. We therefore say that the sadananda form of Brahman always rules over the chitsamudaya. In order to prove this, the adhikarana is begun. If so, then, what is this Brahmatva in Parabrahman? Is this Brahmatva in Brahman merely a name or is it something in him for manifesting the jagat in its varied form? The first view is contradicted because of its divided character. This means that where we do not agree and where we always differ, there we should not begin the adhikarana. For the agreement merely ends in argument. Only when one is ready to stand to the literal meaning of the expressions an argument should be advanced. If it is asked whether in Parabrahman sat, chit, ananda, etc., are different from each other or one in combination, the reply is "It is not the first". For, the Sruti text Ekamevadvitiyam is contradicted. As regards the other view, the combination consists of both the nirvikara and vikara forms under the name of upadana karana and other combinations. There is fault attaching to all these views. For Brahman, when it is once determined in mind and accepted, there can be no cause for disagreement. The expression hi proves without a doubt the declared meaning of the upadana karana of Parabrahman, which is his natural characteristic in bringing Pradhana into Srishti in its varied aspects. Else Brahman's lordship over upadana karana would not have existed. Brahman's lordship

is amply shown in Srishti in various transformations by his mere will in which lies his Brahmatva. Else, it (Brahmatva) would not have existed in him. It cannot be said that Parabrahman's upadana karana and the various manifestations of Pradhana in bringing the universe into existence, cannot be said to be interdependent on each other. Hence in Brahman's chief nimitta karanatva lies his Brahmatva. Hence also he is the overlord of all manifested vikara forms of jagat under his will and control. This is no mere subtle argument but proved from an examination of all Srutis and agamas.