Part 26 - Prakriti and Pratyaya

If it is said that the word jijnasa does not possess the sakti of knowing Prakriti and Pratyaya (i.e., the material cause of the world and the co-operative cause of the world), then it is replied jijnasa gives a collective (samudaya) knowledge of both the topics (lakshanas) i.e., Prakriti and Pratyaya. By the use of the same pratyaya¹³0, the mode of discussion is understood to be through Jahallakshana. By the use of the word Prakriti, Sadhyajnana¹38 (knowledge to be proved) is intended to be conveyed through ajahallaskhana.1 By some the co-operative causes (pratyaya lakshana) are understood to be as siddha-jnana (perfect knowledge), though they are yet to be demonstrated (sadhya-jnana) and they hold that they come under the category of jahallakshana. It is necessary, in order to obtain a comprehensive knowledge, that the sadhana-jnana should be possessed in a determined manner. Sambhavananda and Sivananda very much take the view that both prakriti and pratyaya lakshanas must be correctly understood. Here some are of opinion that prakriti and pratyaya are one and the same (prakriti pratyaya samudaya ekaiva lakshana). In expressions (vakye), the lakshana is not invisible. In the two expressions Ardham antarvedi minoti ardham bahirvedi etc., and Visham bhunkte, the 136 in jijnasa. +37 In this kind of lakshana, a word loses its primary sense but is used in one which is in some way connected with the primary sense, as in the familiar instance gangayam ghoshah. 138 Sadhyajnana means knowledge of the major term in a syllogism; the predicate of a proposition. 130 A kind of lakshana in which the primary or original sense of a word used elliptically does not disappear as kuntaha pravisanti= kuntadharinah purushah.

actual lakshanas are clearly seen. The expressions clearly convey the meaning. Even though the collective causes (samudaya saktyabhavepi) cannot describe the co-operative causes, yet the co-operative causes (pratyaya) can be rightly comprehended. Sachajahati,-this is called ajahallakshana kind. By looking at one particular form, it should not be said it is devoid of other forms. Because it is not the truth (tasya apramanikatvat). In the expression chhatrinogachchanti, are included both those who hold the umbrella and those who are without it. It does not merely mean that they are simply going; the words convey the idea that they are going and also holding the umbrella. The speaker wishes to convey in detail the lakshana of those who are going without omitting the essential objects with which they are connected (i.e., umbrella they are carrying). Instead of omitting the details, the act of going is expressed so as to convey the full form (rupena) in which they are going, i.e., in different ways, some holding the umbrella and others without it. Again, in the expression Kakebhyo dadhi rakshyatam etc. (let the curds be protected from crows), the act of protection and the several crows approaching the curds are referred to. The meaning is not that the curds. should be lost (upaghatakatvat). Whenever a course of conduct is enunciated, the mutual ones are also implied. Courses of action which are contrary to each other are not to be understood thereby. Because the course of conduct referred to definitely describes what it is without any misconception (bhinna vrittyu pasthitatvat). When the primary meaning of a word is to be taken into account, its secondary signification ought not to be taken. Where ajahallakshana has to be considered, there both the lakshanas (i.e., jahallakshana and ajahallakshana) ought to be accepted. When only the primary meaning is required to be taken into consideration, we have to understand the chief thing, the secondary idea being neglected. In the example Gangayam ghoshamatsyau etc., as the village is seen, it is clearly understood that ghosha cannot be taken to convey the

It sound arising from the noise of the river. Because thereby the whole idea will have to be wrongly understood. is the firm idea that can (enable us) to realize the nature of an object. In fact, the word jijnasa is more instrumental (tantrenapattam) in conveying the primary idea to the mind. Whenever such reasoning is employed through ajahallakshana, the word jijnasa should be in fact understood in the collective sense. Whenever, in a discussion, we have to arrive at a firm conclusion, both the methods should be employed to know the collective idea. Knowledge is a thing that is to be obtained only after knowing the pratyaya and prakriti lakshanas, in a collective sense. In conclusion, even in places where a long discussion is involved, the primary meaning of each word is largely taken into account. In all jahallakshana, the prakriti and pratyaya are both understood in a collective sense to secure the knowledge of Brahman. Since each expression (sabda) has a particular power (sakti) supporting it, we must understand the meaning of the sabda in such a way as to have its primary and not its secondary meaning. How then can Brahman be expected to possess only one form without attribute (sakti sambandha) when all the expressions have got two-fold views? On certain occasions, the secondary meaning (lakshana) and its respective attribute ought to be considered, and in such places the primary meaning need not be thought of. In conclusion, when expressions are joined to other words to convey their secondary meaning, in those cases they should be considered as vakya lakshana. Therefore, in sastras, vyavahara is said to be the expression of a meaning of a word other than the primary one attaching to it. While prakriti is thus understood, the lakshana (or secondary) use should be taken in the collective sense. When the secondary meaning is thus taken, then Brahman can never be understood to be one without attribute. When there is difference in the collective sense, that which is connected with it should also be different. Also, it is not possible to impart

a settled conviction, through the mode of lakshana discussion. Then, any attempt to obtain a settled knowledge by both modes of discussion (jahalakshanna and ajahallakshana) is bound to prove useless (vyartha). In the example Chhatrino gachchanti, one is apt to understand that those who possess umbrellas are going even though some may be without theirs. Again, in the example Gangayam ghoshamatsyau etc., of the two ways of understanding, only one is right, viz., one indicating the existence of the village on the Ganges. It should not be taken to mean the sound of the flow of the Ganges. Here the collective (samudaya) as well as the sense conveyed by each part making the collective sense (samudayinah) ought to be considered as different in sense. Unless we know the properties of all things, it is not possible to have a comprehensive knowledge, which can only be had by the jahallakshana mode of discussion. In reality, the discussion is attended with different kinds of difficulties if we are to obtain a comprehensive view. To obtain the desired comprehensive view, a settled knowledge of each of the component parts should be secured. By the word jijnasa, it is to be understood that the sabda has got the clearly described power (sakti) of the component parts (prakriti and pralyaya) in order to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of Brahman. Though the component parts are different from each other in the properties of the different matters, yet, in the final conclusion, their relationship conveys a comprehensive knowledge of Brahman. When an expression can clearly convey to the mind the properties of matters, such an expression is called Vakya lakshana, a characteristic expression. So by the Jahallakshana mode of discussion, we should not understand merely difference (bheda) between objects. In the expression chhatrino gachchanti, the actual truth should be considered collectively. Even though among them there are people without umbrellas, in a collective sense the expression is used to denote their going with the addition of the umbrellas. Therefore, while one mode

of discussion by Jahallakshana is adopted, the Ajahallakshana knowledge also is liable to be impressed on the mind. In the Guhadhikarana, 140 Manchana Pandita 141 establishes thus the text Ritam pibamtau, etc.:-The character of drinking (pibat) and not drinking (apibat) is expressed by the Ajahallakshana mode of discussion to convey a collective idea. At any rate, in the Lingasamudayadhikarana Paramasivaradhya Bhattacharya has commented in his work named Kaivalya Prakasa that whenever several causes and effects are to be discussed in determining all the internally situated attributes of Brahman, the adoption of both vrittis (i.e., Jahat and Ajahat lakshana vrittis) is not contradictory. The object in view always possesses the two-fold qualities contained in prakriti and pratyaya lakshanas. Therefore, the ajahallakshana mode of discussion should not be disregarded in all discussions where the properties of the component parties are the chief causes to determine the collective knowledge of Brahman. Else a decided knowledge cannot be had and therefore in the expressions Chhatrino gachchanti and Gangayam ghoshamatsyau, to have a collective knowledge we must know the component parts. making up the samudaya, i.e., those possessing the umbrellas. and those not possessing them, and also the sand made by the flow of the Ganges through its banks and also the actual village Gangayam ghosha. Then only the collective knowledge can be clearly be clearly comprehended. Let it be granted. The Sabda clearly explains the characteristic attributes of a subject and thereby gives a definite knowledge of that object. This is done by the Jahat and Ajahat labshana modes of discussion, where Prakriti and Pratyaya are generally the subjects of discussion. Having so far admitted that the material cause of an object is to be understood in all its properties, we should also clearly discuss 140 Brahma-Sutras, I. 2. 11-12. 141 The expression Manchana Panditiye used in the text indicates probably a commentary by Manchana Pandita on the sutras quoted,

and understand the properties of the co-operative cause of the same object. Paramasivaradhya Swami, in his work known as Sivajnana Chandrodaya, clearly describes that only such settled knowledge should be possessed through discussion by the two different modes. It should not be admitted that in having a firm knowledge about Prakriti itself is sufficient. Else there will be a contradiction of the knowledge according to the other mode of discussion-ajahallakshana. In the expression Gangayam ghosha matsyau, if we consider only one method of discussion by jahallakshana vritti instead of both, then, a thorough knowledge cannot be had. Enough has been said of Jahat and Ajahat lakshana modes of discussion. It is sufficient if it is borne in mind that a firm knowledge should be possessed regarding prakriti and pratyaya. To possess a firm knowledge, all facts connected with the matter should be proved beyond all doubt. It is not sufficient if only certain facts are clearly understood. It must not be presumed that a firm knowledge has been obtained without fully understanding the properties of the matter. A real desire to know about a matter is not sufficient. Whenever a matter is very difficult to understand, that matter is likely to be treated with reluctance. Sometimes we much desire to understand incomprehensible things just as a bereaved widower (vidhura) expresses his love for his lost wife (i.e., yearning for a thing he cannot get). Although much desired, knowledge cannot be had of incomprehensible things. Therefore all attempts ought to be made to clear all the doubts before knowledge could be had of a particular matter. All connected knowledge about the material cause should be acquired. In no other manner can the power of understanding be developed except by discussion about the properties of sabda and by pursuing a correct mode of enquiry on the approved lines. A firm knowledge can only be said to have been arrived at when we have determinedly grasped the truths underlying each subject. Unless the

co-operative cause and the connected attributes are fully known, we cannot have an independent knowledge. In the expression Gaurnitya etc., even though a cow is dependent on its protector, yet by various proofs (lakshana) it can be admitted that it can live independently. Therefore, the material cause can be thoroughly understood only after grasping the truths connected with co-operative. causes, which are the result of the two lakshanas (jahat and ajahat lakshanas). It is not right to study at first the co-operative cause of matter to know the truth, nor collectively (samudayena) but the material cause must be studied after discussion and removal of all doubts without presuming at any step a knowledge not acquired. In determining the word of a Sruti text, even though it is inferred to be very easily understood, both the methods. of argument (jahat and ajahat) should be used for thoroughly understanding the lakshanas of prakriti and pratyaya. It is never right to try to have a collective idea by inferential deductions either of prakriti or of pratyaya or any of the attributes of either as it is likely that it would yield a contradictory meaning. 42 In In the text Saktun juhoti etc., the accusative case, the object of action (of throwing into the fire) 1+2 is implied, for obtaining the right result. Also, in the text Havishyam abhyaharayati etc., for the accusative and the instrumental cases, the objects of action and bearing are implied, which denote both the material and the co-operative causes (prakriti and pratyaya). Also, in the expression ratho gachchati etc., where the object of a vyapara (i.e., motion) is implied, the result of moving is to be understood. the expressions janati, ichchati, dveshti, yatate, etc., we have to understand each verb according to the root meaning, which is the meaning of the prakriti as well as the result (or the phala) which the words imply. In the expression nasyati etc., the agent that is capable of destroying is denoted. Therefore in knowing the meaning of the word, the object which is the agent to produce the result is to By saying Svaha and throwing the oblation into the fire, 142

305 be understood. In the commentary of Durvasa¹³ on Karakavrittilakshana, buddhi and kshetragna occurring in the text, Ritam pibantau etc., in the purvapaksha part of Guhadhikarana, are proved to be agents. In the expressions asma lutishati 14 and kulam pipatishati 15 etc., only the nature of the act that is about to happen is implied and not any agency that is impelling its happening. Then, the doubt arising as to whether an inanimate object can itself accomplish an act is to be determined according to the (Panini) Sutra Dhatoh-karmanassamana kartrukadichchayam va etc. By the use of the expression, it is not intended to show that a lifeless object can desire or has a discretion. Lifeless objects have not such desire but are subject only to external forces. It is clearly proved in Patanjali's Bhashya that whenever an expression is used ascribing agency to lifeless objects, then such expression should be understood as being dependent on external forces and not possessing by themselves any desire. According to the maxim, Gauna mukhyayoh mukhye karyasampratyayah etc., in such expressions as the above, the secondary meaning should always be understood instead of the primary, because a desire is naturally attributable to an animate and not to an inanimate agent. In Ikshatyadhikarana, Durvasa Bhagavadpadacharya also agrees with the above view in regard to (the interpretation) of kulam pipalishati. Even though the co-operative causes (pratyaya) are to be understood clearly, yet they are not primarily responsible as prakriti is the primary cause. But according to the expression lakshanaya prakrityaiva, it is only to understand prakriti (the primary cause) that we have to clearly understand pratyaya (the co-operative causes). If we ignore such co-operative causes, even though they are negligible, we cannot arrive at a correct conclusion. Causes which are 143 The text has Durvasiye, which denotes a work of which Durvasa was the author. 144 A stone is about to fall from the mountain peak. 145 The river is about to overflow cutting the banks. 20

contradictory cannot lead to a correct conclusion and should not be enquired into unnecessarily. As correct knowledge (jnana) is the chief thing sought for, all attempts ought to be made in availing (ourselves) of the co-operative causes and the materials pertaining to them. In endeavouring to arrive at a correct knowledge, the desire should be to find out the correct method and the objects which would lead us towards it. Until we are possessed of such a method, every attempt should be made to search it out. We have to aim at its realization by a strenuous search (anvishan). Realization is the chief object of correct knowledge, which ends in the attainment of salvation (moksha sadhana), failing which every endeavour at personal effort (purusha pravritti) will be fruitless (nishphala). It is to secure correct knowledge that matters are enquired into. The sole subject of such a knowledge is the realization of moksha (moksha sadhana), of Brahmajnana and the same is based on the discussion of the Sruti texts. The seed of discussion lies in the method of enquiry. When the teacher (Acharya) goes on teaching his disciple through discussion about moksha sadhana, he must clearly understand from the teacher Prakrityartha jnanam by frequently clearing himself of the doubts arising in regard to the subject-matter under discussion and of the matters which enter into it (vishaya vishayi bhavena). The nature of the enquiry on the part of the disciple should be such that all the materials. should be thoroughly sifted after grasping them and the established truths should be possessed by him. This is the chief object of jijnasa. Both prakriti and pratyaya should be thoroughly understood, not by merely touching their outer fringes but in such a way as to ward off all doubts relating to them. Without such a view in mind, discussion is undesirable. The subject sought for by discussion must be certainly realized. Therefore the view has been propounded by Paramananda Aradhya¹46 that both 146 Evidently a teacher who was considered an authority even greater than Ekorama Siddha Bhagavadpadacharya, the guru of Sripati, referred to already and in the next sentence below.

the modes of discussion-jahat and ajahat lakshana-should be employed to understand the nature of prakriti and pratyaya. This view is also admitted and agreed to by Ekorama Siddha Bhagavatpadacharya¹ and hence must be fully adopted.