Chapter 29 - The Discussion about Real Knowledge

247-248. Thus, in the cognition of shell and silver there is no effort on the part of the cognizer to proceed further with that knowledge and hence it is bhramā which is caused by some external factor.^[1] As there is no ‘ayatārtha vastu’ in the knowledge, the definitions of naiyāyikas—‘yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā’ and ‘ayatharthānubhavaḥ bhrama’ is not accepted. The statement that ‘yathārthānubhavatvam pramā lakṣaṇam’ is not correct.

249. In the cognition shell as silver there is really a negligible amount of silver is present. It is because of this silver element the shell shines as silver. Hence, it cannot be said that there is no silver in it and as such the definition of the naiyāyikas—‘tadvati tatprakaraka anubhavaḥ’ alone is that even in this erroneous knowledge and not ‘tadabhāvavati tatprakarako anubhavaḥ’. This point is explained through an analogy. In the Soma Sacrifice another creeper namely, pūtīka is prescribed in the place of soma when there is the scarcity of soma creeper. It is because the pūtīka creeper has some elements and characteristics of soma creeper.

250. (If it is doubted that ‘when the silver parts are found in a shell can we call it as silver? It is not called so, in our practical usage. How can we accept this? Then; the thing in which the shell parts (śuktyaṃśa) are found predominantly is called as shell (śukti).

251-252.—the thing in which the silver parts (rajatāṃśa) are found is known as silver (rajata). This has been clearly explained by the Sūtrakāra as “vaiśeṣyāttutadvādastadvādaḥ”.^[2] The shell is found as it is for those whose eye sights are without any defects. But for the faulty eye sights it will be cognized as silver only though the majority of shell parts are present in it. This partial knowledge of silver is not practically useful in making bracelet (kaṭakā) etc.

253-254. Therefore, the definition for the śakti and rajata namely—‘viphalapravṛtti janakatva’ is well- suited. In the same way, even in the knowledge of mirage (marīcikā) the presence of water should be understood. It has been well known through the scriptural statement, which states the presence of the five elements with one another through pañcīkaraṇa (quintuplication). The water part (jalāṃśa) is there in mirage and as such it is also considered as true knowledge. Thus on the authority of scriptures and reasoning it is accepted that all knowledge is real.

255. But according to some (mīmāṃsakas), there is the twin cognition in the case of shell-silver knowledge. In the instance erroneous knowledge of shell as silver "this is silver", what is given to the viewer is that this element (idam) is pratyakṣa while there is also the remembrance or recollection of silver that is available in the market. Thus, there are two types of knowledge in a single cognition. This is because the mīmāṃsakas do not admit the process of pañcīkaraṇa.

256-257. The reason for one who engages himself in collecting the shell or restraining himself from collecting it is this; In the first case it is the ‘iṣṭābhedagraha abhāva’ that is “there is the cognition of the absence of the śuktitva” that is the counter of rajata. In the second instance there is the ‘aniṣṭa bheda graha abhāva’ that is “there is the cognition of the absence of the rajatatva” that is the counter of śukti. Nivṛtti or refrainment is also a kind of activity and can be included in pravṛtti itself, as both are mental activities. In the case of ‘abhedagraha jñāna’ that is not possible. That is, in both pravṛtti and nivṛtti two reasons are to be adduced which is a case of prolixity or gaurava. This has been explained in nyāya pariśuddhi. That which is beyond sense perception is termed as parokṣa.

258. The absence of the parokṣa is termed as aparokṣa, which is not different from pratyakṣatva. This classification is made by the pūrvācāryas. The knowledge is acquired through reasoning or inferential cognition or through verbal testimony is termed as parokṣa and the knowledge which is acquired through the sense organs is known as aparokṣa.

259-260. The knowledge that is originated by knowing or with a clear knowledge of the instruments of that knowledge is termed as parokṣa. Thus, inference and verbal testimony becoming the object of knowledge initially and later becomes the instrument of the knowledge. But, in the case of aparokṣa the sense organs which are the means is not known or understood as the means of valid knowledge and still gives rise to knowledge.

261-262. According to some, pratyakṣa is nothing but a specific kind of vivid knowledge (vaiśadya), as in the instance of ‘I see this pot (ghaṭam paśyāmyaham)’. But it cannot be so because even in inferential cognition there arise the vaiśadya jñāna because the knowledge and the substratum namely, ‘I’ cognition, is common in both pratyakṣa and anumāna. Therefore, the classification of parokṣatva and aparokṣatva on the basis of vaiśadya jñāna cannot hold good. Therefore, the parokṣatva abhāva alone is pratyakṣa.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ibid.

[2]:

[II-iv-19]?—Śrī Bhāṣya, Vol-II, pp.404-405.