Chapter 25 - Validity of Knowledge

219. This is declared by wisemen: ‘when there is the contact of the object with sense organs’, knowledge has something for its content and this is known as flawless knowledge (avigītā). Thus, the saṃyoga or conjunction between the external objects and the knowledge is explained.

220. But, if the question arises about the relation between the internal objects such as Ātmā and pratyaktva, then we provide the following answer.

221. Here, the relationship between the internal objects such as jñāna and ātmā is apṛtaksiddhi (inseparable) and both these inseparable things are substances; they are called as nitya saṃyoga (eternal-relation).

222. According to our system the nitya saṃyoga between the two substances is accepted. The relationship, namely saṃyuktāśrayaṇa for pratyaktva etc., is also accepted. Thus, the saṃyuktāśrayaṇa is present in both dharmabhūtajñāna and the pratyaktva of the ātman like the relation between the external objects and the dharmabhūtajñāna.

223. Here, a question arises that though there is the relation between the dharmabhūtajñāna and pratyaktva always exists, the knowledge of the deep sleep state is realized only after waking up. So it is only āgantuka or temporary. How is it possible? It is replied that though the relationship is always present in them (nitya saṃyoga), the quality namely viṣayitva (the knowledge about the objects) is seen or understood only in the awakening state and there is no fallacy in this.

224. The viṣayitā (understanding the objects) not only means viṣaya sambanda (relationship of the objects) but also viṣaya prakāśa (the knowledge about the objects). As the second one, viṣaya prakāśa is understood only in the awakening state, there is no impediment because of āgantu and it is accepted.

225. The authority for the knowledge being self-luminous in revealing the objects (viṣayaspūrti) is evident from the following Śrī Bhāṣya text “viṣaya prakāśana velāyam jñātuḥ ātmanaḥ tathaiva”. And it is clearly stated that the viṣayaspūrti for a person will arise only by the statement (‘pratyaṅaham vijānāmi ghaṭādīn iti’).^[1]

226. It may be doubted that in the statement ‘jānāmi’ (I know) when there arises the knowledge, there is no viṣayitva for the knowledge as it is saṃyoga rūpa and as there is non-difference with one’s own self.

227. It is replied that the ‘vyavahārānuguṇya (practical adaptability) itself is the viṣayitva of dharmabhūtajñāna. Therefore, the viṣayitva of the dharmabhūtajñāna is nothing but the viṣaya saṃyoga (the contact with the object). So there is no fallacy of ativyāpti or avyāpti (partial inapplicability) in the definition of dharmabhūtajñāna.

228-229. Therefore, like the self (knower) the attributive consciousness is also eternal, and it is known from the scriptural passage “na vijñātuḥ vijñāteḥ viparilopo vidyate”.^[2] It is subject to contraction (saṅkocā) and expansion (vikāsa) like the effulgence of the light. So the dharmabhūtajñāna is possessed of parts (as it is associated with an activity namely contraction and expansion). This is clearly stated in Nyāya Siddhāñjana.

230. The statement in the Tattvamuktākalāpa is that There is no content in knowledge' is stated not with the view that knowledge has no parts (niraṃśa) but it is only the statement of the prima-facie view.^[3]

231. In the view that knowledge is not a substance the viṣayitva of the knowledge can hold good, the niraṃśatva of the viṣayitā is only possible when there is no saṃyoga or conjunction in it. But when there is a saṃyoga in the viṣayitā definitely needs the aṃśatva.

232. Though the nature of the substance is eternal yet, in practical usages the pot is destroyed (ghaṭaḥ naṣṭaḥ), the pot is produced (ghaṭaḥ utpadyate) etc., means that there is the change in the state (avastha) namely, ‘potness’ only. All these have been already stated.

233. As both the knowledge and the self are eternal entities, there must be the luminosity of the knowledge at all states. As such, there should be no sleeping state at all. But in practical life we see person sleeping. That is the state of absence of knowledge. How is it possible? Though both are eternal, yet, the luminosity will be there only when there is the conjunction of the objects with knowledge. Therefore, the absence of the movement namely, relation is technically termed as sleep and not the total loss of knowledge.

234. Therefore, deep sleep state is possible eventhough the knowledge is present. There is no doubt in the eternity of the knowledge. Though there is no luminosity of the knowledge in the deep sleep state yet it always has the capability of revealing the object like the eternity of the substance.

235. The above view is clearly understood by the statement ‘ghaṭam aham jānāmi’ where the initial experience (prathamānubhuva) is achieved through the capability of revealing of the knowledge (prakāśanaśakti). Here the naiyāyikas view is not accepted.

236. Through the statement ‘ghaṭam aham jānāmi’ the knowledge is manifested by itself with its viṣaya (object) and āśraya (substratum) without seeking any other external aid like the knowledge of the Supreme Self.

237. If the self-luminosity of the knowledge is not accepted and is explained as in need of some external factors, then the fallacy called ‘asarvajñā’ will arise for the Supreme Self. The vastu viṣayaka jñāna (knowledge by seeing the objects) of the Īśvara will arise with both viṣaya and āśraya. If it is not accepted, then īśvara will be termed as ekona sarvajña. As the above view is not accepted, it is proper to accept the knowledge as eternal.^[4]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

See Śrī Bhāṣya, I (i) 1, pp.168-169.

[2]:

See Nyāya Siddhāñjana, pp.60-61.—See also Nyāya Siddhāñjana, p.518 (Varanasi Edition)—Here the eleven questions are answered to establish the self-luminosity of knowledge.

[3]:

See Tattva Muktā Kalāpa, IV 6.

[4]:

See Nyāya Siddhāñjana, pp.68-69.