Text 161

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 161:

ननु यद्येकः समवायो द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादिविशेषणैः सह सम्बन्धैकत्वात् पदार्थसङ्करप्रसङ्ग इति न आधाराधेयनियमात् । यद्यप्येकः समवायः सर्वत्र स्वतन्त्रः तथाप्याधाराधेयनियमोऽस्ति । कथं द्रव्येष्वेव द्रव्यत्वं गुणेष्वेव गुणत्वं कर्मस्वेव कर्मत्वम् इति । एवम् आदि कस्माद् अन्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् । इहेतिसमवायनिमित्तस्य ज्ञानस्यान्वयदर्शनात् सर्वत्रैकः समवाय इति गम्यते । द्रव्यत्वादिनिमित्तानां व्यतिरेकदर्शनात् प्रतिनियमो ज्ञायते । यथा कुण्डदध्नोः सम्योगैकत्वे भवत्याश्रयाश्रयिभावनियमः । तथा द्रव्यत्वादीनाम् अपि समवायैकत्वेऽपि व्यङ्ग्यव्यंजकशक्तिभेदाद् आधाराधेयनियम इति ॥ सम्बन्धनित्यत्वेऽपि न सम्योगवद् अनित्यत्वं भाववद् अकारणत्वात् । यथा प्रमाणतः कारणानुपलब्धेर्नित्यो भाव इत्युक्तं तथा समवायोऽपीति । न ह्यस्य किञ्चित् कारणं प्रमाणत उपलभ्यते इति । कया पुनर्वृत्त्या द्रव्यादिषु समवायो वर्तते । न सम्योगः सम्भवति तस्य गुणत्वेन द्रव्याश्रितत्वात् । नापि समवायस्तस्यैकत्वात् न चान्या वृत्तिरस्तीति । न । तादात्म्यात् । यथा द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां सदात्मकस्य भावस्य नान्यः सत्तायोगोऽस्ति । एवम् अविभागिनो वृत्त्यात्मकस्य समवायस्य नान्या वृत्तिरस्ति तस्मात् स्वात्मवृत्तिः । अत एवातीन्द्रियः सत्तादीनाम् इव प्रत्यक्षेषु वृत्त्यभावात् स्वात्मगतसंवेदनाभावाच्च । तस्माद् इहबुद्ध्यनुमेयः समवाय इति ॥ १६० ॥

इति प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये समवायपदार्थः समाप्तः ॥
योगाचारविभूत्या यस्तोषयित्वा महेश्वरम् । चक्रे वैशेषिकं शास्त्रं तस्मै कणभुजे नमः ॥
इति प्रशस्तपादविरचितं द्रव्यादिषट्पदार्थभाष्यं समाप्तम् ॥

nanu yadyekaḥ samavāyo dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādiviśeṣaṇaiḥ saha sambandhaikatvāt padārthasaṅkaraprasaṅga iti na ādhārādheyaniyamāt | yadyapyekaḥ samavāyaḥ sarvatra svatantraḥ tathāpyādhārādheyaniyamo'sti | kathaṃ dravyeṣveva dravyatvaṃ guṇeṣveva guṇatvaṃ karmasveva karmatvam iti | evam ādi kasmād anvayavyatirekadarśanāt | ihetisamavāyanimittasya jñānasyānvayadarśanāt sarvatraikaḥ samavāya iti gamyate | dravyatvādinimittānāṃ vyatirekadarśanāt pratiniyamo jñāyate | yathā kuṇḍadadhnoḥ samyogaikatve bhavatyāśrayāśrayibhāvaniyamaḥ | tathā dravyatvādīnām api samavāyaikatve'pi vyaṅgyavyaṃjakaśaktibhedād ādhārādheyaniyama iti || sambandhanityatve'pi na samyogavad anityatvaṃ bhāvavad akāraṇatvāt | yathā pramāṇataḥ kāraṇānupalabdhernityo bhāva ityuktaṃ tathā samavāyo'pīti | na hyasya kiñcit kāraṇaṃ pramāṇata upalabhyate iti | kayā punarvṛttyā dravyādiṣu samavāyo vartate | na samyogaḥ sambhavati tasya guṇatvena dravyāśritatvāt | nāpi samavāyastasyaikatvāt na cānyā vṛttirastīti | na | tādātmyāt | yathā dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sadātmakasya bhāvasya nānyaḥ sattāyogo'sti | evam avibhāgino vṛttyātmakasya samavāyasya nānyā vṛttirasti tasmāt svātmavṛttiḥ | ata evātīndriyaḥ sattādīnām iva pratyakṣeṣu vṛttyabhāvāt svātmagatasaṃvedanābhāvācca | tasmād ihabuddhyanumeyaḥ samavāya iti || 161 ||

iti praśastapādabhāṣye samavāyapadārthaḥ samāptaḥ ||
yogācāravibhūtyā yastoṣayitvā maheśvaram | cakre vaiśeṣikaṃ śāstraṃ tasmai kaṇabhuje namaḥ ||
iti praśastapādaviracitaṃ dravyādiṣaṭpadārthabhāṣyaṃ samāptam ||

Text (161):—Even though the members related are transient, the Inherence is not transient, like Conjunction; because like Being, it is not brought about by any cause. That is to say, in the case of Being we have found that it is eternal, because we cannot cognise any cause for it, by any of the valid means of knowledge; and the same may be said to be the case with Inherence also; as by none of the valid means of knowledge can we find any cause for it.

Objection:—“By what relation does Inherence subsist in substance &c.? This relation can not be that of conjunction; as conjunction being a quality can reside in substances only (and Inherence is not a substance); nor can the relation be that of inherence; as the latter is one only; and there is no third relation by which it can subsist.”

Reply:—Not so; as it is itself of the nature of relation or subsistence. In the case of ‘Being’ with regard to substances, qualities and actions, we have seen that it has no connection with any other ‘being’; and in the same manner, Inherency being inseparable (from its substrate) and of the very nature of a subsisting relation, could have no other relation; and hence it is regarded as self-sufficient. For this reason it has been regarded as imperceptible by the sense-organs; specially as it is not found to have an existence in the perceptible substances in the same manner that ‘being’ &c, have; and as it is not perceptible by itself, we conclude that it is only inferable, from the notion that ‘this is in that.’

All reverence to that Kaṇāda who, having pleased Maheśvara by the superb character of his meditation and austerities, propounded the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣika system!

Thus ends the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Praśastapāda.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

A question having been raised as to whether Inherence is eternal or transient, the author says—Even though, the members &c., &c. In the case of conjunction we find that the members in contact being transient, the conjunction also is ‘transient’; but not so in the case of Inherence; as in the case of conjunction it is only natural that the destruction of the members should bring about the destruction of the conjunction as the members form the material cause of the conjunction; the case of Inherence however is different; the members are mere related members, and not its cause; as we have shown above; hence Inherence is not destroyed on the destruction of the members; as we recognise it as present in other substances; just as is the case with ‘being’ (which also is eternal).

Objection:—“Does Inherence correlate the members through some relation, or without any relation? Nothing could correlate things without being related itself; if it were not so, then we would have most absurd relationships. Then, as for being related, it could not bear the relation of conjunction &c.........and as we cannot find any relation by which Inherence can subsist in substances, we conclude that it does not subsist in them at all.”

Reply: It cannot be rightly held that because it has no relationship, therefore it does not exist. Because it is itself of the nature of relation or subsistence. As for conjunction, it is caused; and hence though a relation, it subsits by another relation; the very presence of a cause constituting the nature of an effect; and as for Inherence, it does not stand in need of any other relation; it subsists by itself.

For this same reason it is imperceptible by the sense-organs etc., etc. ‘ Being’ etc., are found to subsist in perceptible things; and hence they are regarded as perceptible by the sense, by reason of the organs coming in contact with the things in which ‘Being’ etc., inhere. Inherence however cannot subsit in the same manner, and hence it is regarded as imperceptible; as the organs of sense are found to have the power of perceiving only such things as are in direct contact with them, or those that inhere in such things.

Objection: “If there is a sensuous cognition of Inherence, then it is a mere absurdity to declare that it has no relation; and if there is no such cognition, then that must be stated clearly”.

In view of this objection, the author adds—It is not perceptible by itself. That is to say, we have not the same cognition of Inherence that we have of conjunction; as the members related by inherence are found to constitute a single mass.

Thus then, Inherence should be regarded as that whereby is brought about the coherence of distinct substances, and which serves to set aside independence.

This commentary, the Nyāyakaṇḍalī consisting of a combination of excellent letters and surpassing all others, is like the range of the peaks of the mount Meru (which is composed of a mass of gold, and which lies to the north of all things).

This Nyāyakandalī, while putting forward the good points of its own unmolested system, refutes the view of the opponents.

Located in the southern part of the Rāḍhā (a district in Bengal-Behar) is the village of Bhūrisṛṣṭi belonging to the Brāhmaṇas that performed many sacrifices, and inhabitted by many wealthy men.

From out of this village was born, like he moon from the Ocean, the Brahmana who was a moon on the earth, by reason of his being a source of happiness to the people,—he who was respected of all people, like Bṛhaspati himself.

From him was born Baladeva, the great ocean of the gems of good qualities, the sustaining tree of the creepers of learning, of purest intentions, the great propeller of the river of manifold celebrity.

Abhokā, born of a pure family, having many good qualities, was the wife of him, who was famous and possessed of excellent qualities.

From her was born Śrīdhara, the fulfiller of the wish of all needy men—affording excellent protection (good shade), making excellent presents (producing good fruits), having many children (branches), the refuge of Brahmanas (birds).

This person gave birth to the beautiful Nyāyakandalī [Nyāyakaṇḍalī?] which is fit to be listened to by the most clever among the learned, and serves to explain the six categories.

The Nyāyakandalī was composed in the year 913 of the Śāka era.

Thus ends the Nyāyakandalī, treating of the categories, composed by Bhaṭṭa Śrīdhara, at the request of Śrī Pandūdāsa [Śrī Paṇḍudāsa/Pandudāsa?].