Verse 12.1 [Question]

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

चातुर्वर्ण्यस्य कृत्स्नोऽयमुक्तो धर्मस्त्वयाऽनघः ।
कर्मणां फलनिर्वृत्तिं शंस नस्तत्त्वतः पराम् ॥ १ ॥

cāturvarṇyasya kṛtsno'yamukto dharmastvayā'naghaḥ |
karmaṇāṃ phalanirvṛttiṃ śaṃsa nastattvataḥ parām || 1 ||

‘O sinless one, the whole law for the four castes has been expounded by you; instruct us now in regard to the actual fruition of actions.’—(1)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The first half of the verse indicating the end of the subject-matter of the ordinances, serves the purpose of shutting out any further desire on the part of the listeners.

‘Whole’— This epithet is meant to be commendatory; the sense being that ‘these ordinances have set forth all the Smārta duties along with the esoteric explanations.’

The fact of the Teacher having completed his task is described through the mouth of the pupil; but no stress is meant to be laid upon it.

In reality however the assertions set forth here do not emanate from the Teacher and Pupil at all; the author of the book himself has divided these into two parts (of question and answer).

The term ‘Dharma’ denoting what ought to be done, here stands for the whole compilation of Injunctions and Prohibitions. And it is through this that the connection between actions and their results, even though not referred to before, is now set forth.

The assertion—‘The whole law has been expounded by you’—becomes explicable only when taken as referring to Injunctions and Prohibitions.

“The result of what action is asked about—when it is said—‘Instruct us now in regard to the function of actions’? For those actions that are compulsory are done simply because they have been enjoined by the Scriptures, and the agent does not have any reward in view at all; those that are not compulsory, in connection with nearly every one of them distinct rewards have been spoken of;—e.g., in such declarations as ‘one who makes a gift of water obtains satisfaction, as also heaven and longevity’;—and even those in connection with which it might be thought that no rewards have been spoken of,—there also it has been proved that Heaven is their reward;—as regards the Gestatory and other Sacramental Rites, these have their reward in the peculiar character that they bestow upon the persons for whom they are performed; and as such do not stand in need of any transcendental results;—the Occasional Acts, such as the purifying of substances and the like, or the bathing on touching a Caṇḍāla and so forth,—these also lead to results that are quite perceptible; they are done for the purpose of purifying things, because the use of impure things has been forbidden;—lastly, as regards Expiatory Rites the purpose served by them has been just described. Thus we fail to see those actions whose results are -sought to be known.”

The result sought to be known is that of those that are forbidden; as it is those that are spoken of below, as ‘the sinfulness of acts committed through the body, etc., etc.’ (Verse 9). And in a way the obeying of prohibitions also is something enjoined by the scriptures.

“If those acts also were laid down for the purpose of rewards, they would not be incumbent on all men; as they would be performed by only such men as happen to have a desire for the particular reward.”

Our answer to this is as follows:—Here no such results are going to be described as are desired by men; as what are set forth here are the undesirable results; and certainly these are not desired; no man ever wishes to obtain what is undesirable; and it is in this manner that the results mentioned come to bear upon all men.

What we have said regarding the obeying of prohibitions being an act done in accordance with scriptural injunctions, does not go far enough; the fact of the matter is that everything is done in accordance with scriptural injunctions.

“But the acts that the scriptural injunctions set forth are done for the sake of men desiring the results of those acts;—or in some cases, the acts are occasional ones, laid down without reference to any results in the case in question (of prohibitions) however, inasmuch as we do not find any expressions indicative of the fact that they shall he obeyed ‘throughout life,’ wherefore would the forbidden act not he done?”

It is found that if one ignores the prohibitions he incurs sin. For instance, it has been declared that ‘by entertaining a desire to kill a Brāhmaṇa, one goes to hell.’

“The act that is forbidden,—such as the killing of a Brāhmaṇa and the like,—is certainly not one that is enjoined by the scripture. It is only an act enjoined by the scripture that can have any connection with results mentioned in the scriptures; as we find in the case of such declarations as—‘one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices’; where the fact that sacrifices should be performed is one that can he got at only from the scriptures, and not from any other source. In the ease in question on the other hand, men are prompted to do the prohibited acts by hatred and such other worldly unscriptural motives; and what is itself unscriptural cannot have any connection with a result that is scriptural. It has been asserted that texts have indicated that the ignoring of prohibitions is conducive to sin. But what would be the need for such an indication?

Since all that we learn from the scriptural prohibition is that it says to the man moved by hatred to do some forbidden act (like the killing, for instance)—‘this should not be done’; and there the comprehension of the sentence is complete; what word is left there uncomprehended which would need the said indication?”

If we were to pursue this enquiry further, it would prolong our work unduly. The fact of the matter in brief is this:—what the prohibitive injunction ‘one shall not kill’ signifies is a prohibition. Now there does arise in the mind of the person to whom this injunction is addressed a desire to know what it all means; and the idea that he derives from it is—‘such and such a course of action shall not be adopted by me’; and it is not the object (act) that is urged by the Injunction; since by their very nature injunctions are meant to urge agents, and the agent in the case in question would be indicated by the presence of the worldly motive of hatred, which is what would be in keeping with the nature of the act of killing. The man who undertakes to kill by his own will would not stand in need of being urged by an injunction; and it is such a person to whom the prohibitive injunction is addressed. In a case where the action is indicated by other sources, any injunction that bears upon it may be taken as indicating the agent concerned; and in cases where no desire for any result is concerned, the person who is urged by the injunction does not comprehend the fact of bis being the person urged, until he understands that what is prohibited leads to an undesirable result: In fact such is the way in which ordinary men understand things. When a certain act is found to be forbidden by the Veda, if a man does it, it is understood that it would lead to undesirable results. And in matters like the present nothing can be put forward except what happens in the course of ordinary worldly experience. And even if the fact of a certain act leading to undesirable results, is not directly mentioned, it will be only right to assume this fact, on the basis of the very nature of prohibitions; to say nothing of cases where the said fact is directly mentioned? For there can be no justification of rejecting what, is directly mentioned. The mention of such results as ‘hell’ and the like cannot be regarded as purely declamatory, so long as it is capable of being taken as setting forth the results of acts spoken of. Further, declamatory assertions also are only complements to injunction. In the case in question, however, there is no injunction mentioned either directly or indirectly; because the fact principally sought to be set forth is the connection between the act and the result. In the present discourse no acts are enjoined; all that is propounded is the relation of certain acts to certain results; and the hundreds of assertions contained here cannot be meaningless. If they were really meaningless, we would have admitted it to be so; but such is not the way of writers on Smṛtis. Nor can the passages in question be explained in any other way save in the one indicated above; specially as there is no injunction to which they could be complements (and hence be taken as Declamatory Declarations).

It might be argued that such figurative explanation would be wrong, even on the part of writers on scriptures.

But it is not so; those who talk thus show utter disregard for the Great Sages.

‘Agha’ is sin; ‘anagha,’ ‘sinless one,’ is in the Case of Address; denoting freedom from sin, which is meant to be a praise of the teacher.

‘Instruct’ denotes speaking.—(l)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

(verses 12.1-4)

These verses are quoted in Madanapārijāta (p. 692), which adds the following notes:—‘Trividhasya’, the three kinds, highest, middling, and lowest,—‘tryadhiṣṭhānasya’ which has three substrata, in the shape of mind, speech and body,—‘daśalakṣaṇayuktasya’, the ten distinguishing features of ‘paradravyābhidhyāna’ and the rest going to be described below (verses 5-7);—of this ‘dehin’ know the mind to be the ‘instigator’;—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Prāyaścittā 41a);—and verse (3) only in Prāyaścittaviveka (p. 12).