Verse 11.46

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अकामतः कृतं पापं वेदाभ्यासेन शुध्यति ।
कामतस्तु कृतं मोहात् प्रायश्चित्तैः पृथग्विधैः ॥ ४६ ॥

akāmataḥ kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ vedābhyāsena śudhyati |
kāmatastu kṛtaṃ mohāt prāyaścittaiḥ pṛthagvidhaiḥ || 46 ||

A sin committed unintentionally is expiated by the reciting of the Veda; while that committed intentionally, in folly, is expiated by the various forms of expiatory rites.—(46)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

Question.—“Do these Expiatory Rites end only with their performance (without bringing about any effects), just like the Twilight Prayers and other rites? Or, do they continue until definite effects are produced, in the form of the actual removal of the guilt like the act of cleansing the body (which ends only with the actual removal of the dirt)?”

In answer to this some people offer the following explanation:—As a matter of fact no action is ever lost; both merit and demerit (due to actions) end only with the bringing about of their effects; no actions ever disappear until they have brought about their effects. This is what is meant by the assertion that ‘no action is ever lost’ Hence the man who commits a transgression must experience the tortures of hell, as the result of that transgression, [so that no expiation of any transgression is possible]; and the only effect of his not performing the prescribed expiatory rite would be that he shall also transgress the law laying down such rite, and thus commit a further offence.

This, however, is not right Because, simply because the texts lay down that the rite shall be performed, such rite does not become compulsory [and it is only the omission of a compulsory act that involves sin]. All that is said is that the man becomes ‘cleansed’; from which it is clear that this cleansing is the purpose served by the expiatory rite. So that when expiatory rites are performed, one would wash off his sins; and this would he done because of the sin having been committed by the man himself.

It has been argued above that—“all that has been indicated is that sin is incurred by the man who commits an act that has been forbidden by a prohibitive text; and not that the sin becomes nullified by means of expiations.”

But this also is not right. Because what has been indicated is that the said act becomes a source of suffering; now in Expiation also there is much suffering in the form of penances and charities; and it is quite possible that the small amount of suffering undergone in the shape of these latter should prevent the onset of the greater sufferings threatening in the future. Just as a serious disease is prevented by the eating of bitter medicines and keeping on low diet; or again, when a man having committed an offence surrenders himself to the king and confesses his guilt, saying—‘I have done such and such an act,’—the punishment inflicted upon such a man is only half of what is prescribed for that offence; while if he were arrested by the king’s officers and brought to court, his punishment would be much severer.

Thus it is that the utility of the injunctions in question (of expiations) becomes established. That the rites are destructive of the effects of sins has to be admitted on the strength of the injunctions themselves. It is for this reason that these rites have been called ‘expiatory’ of sins; for the sin is said to be ‘expiated’ only when it has become deprived of its causal efficiency.

For the same reason the Expiatory Rite cannot be regarded as restoring the rights and privileges lost by. reason of the guilt; since it is only in the case of the five most heinous offences that any loss of privileges has been mentioned,—the very term ‘becoming an outcast’ meaning the loss of the privileges of the caste.

In connection with the present context it should not be understood that any such marked distinction is intended as that ‘in the case of unintentional offences the expiation consists in the reciting of the Veda, and in that of intentional offences of penances’;—because as a matter of fact both kinds of expiation have been laid down in connection with both kinds of offences; specially as every rule regarding an expiatory rite starts off with the defining of the occasion for expiation; e.g., ‘The Slayer of a Brāhmaṇa shall make a cut, etc, etc.’ (11.72)

Thus then, all that the verse means is that—‘there is heavy expiation in the case of intentional offences, and a lighter one in that of unintentional ones.’

“In fact when a man commits an act unintentionally, he is not the doer of that act; as one is called the ‘doer’of an act only when he does it intentionally; as we find people making such assertions as—‘This man is not doing such and such an act, he is being made by fate to do it’ Further, it is only as done with a distinct motive towards it that an act forms the subject of a prohibition; e.g., it is only when a man evinces a desire for drinking wine that he is told ‘not to drink the wine’; and if a man eager for a drink of water drinks wine thinking it to be water, he does not incur any guilt; and this for the simple reason that his action has not been prompted by the motive to drink wine. It might be argued that it is only an action that has formed the subject of an Injunction that cannot be forbidden. This is quite true, so far as actions without a purpose are concerned; but of actions with a purpose, a prohibition is always possible.”

In answer to this some people offer the following explanation:—What forms the subject-matter of prohibitive texts is the affirmation of an act as extending up to the sin that its commitment involves; just as it does in the case of taking poison.

For these people the objection has no force at all. As regards the taking of ‘poison,’ there can be no distinction as to its being done intentionally or unintentionally; in either case the act must lead to death.

Similarly in the case of such acts as ‘the Slaying of a Brāhmaṇa’ and the like.

According to some people an act is done because of the declaration that it shall be done, and it is not done because of the declaration that it shall not be done. And by this view also prohibitions apply to only one who is going to do some ordinary act; it is only when a man is going to do an act that he is called its ‘doer.’ But a man can be a ‘doer’ even without knowing it, as when he falls down a river-bank. It cannot be said that in such a case the man is called a ‘doer’ only in the figurative sense; because the doer (nominative) has been defined only as ‘one who is his own master regarding the act,’ and not as ‘one who does an act intentionally

Further, from the present text itself it is clear that even acts due to sheer negligence have been held to involve sin, and hence necessitate expiation. What is the need of any further assumptions?—(46)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā, (3.226), to the effect that the sin accruing from ‘non-degrading’ offences even when intentional, is wiped off by the performance of expiatory rites;—in Aparārka, (p. 1040)—in Madanapārijāta, (p. 705);—in Prāyaścittaviveka, (p. 18), which says that all that is meant by the mention of ‘Vedabhyāsa’ is that the expiation of unintentional delinquencies is lighter than that for intentional ones,—it explains ‘pṛthagvidhaiḥ’ as ‘other kinds of expiation’;—and in Smṛtisāroddhāra, (p. 354).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 11.44-47)

See Comparative notes for Verse 11.44.