Manusmriti with the Commentary of Medhatithi

by Ganganatha Jha | 1920 | 1,381,940 words | ISBN-10: 8120811550 | ISBN-13: 9788120811553

This is the English translation of the Manusmriti, which is a collection of Sanskrit verses dealing with ‘Dharma’, a collective name for human purpose, their duties and the law. Various topics will be dealt with, but this volume of the series includes 12 discourses (adhyaya). The commentary on this text by Medhatithi elaborately explains various t...

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तैजसानां मणीनां च सर्वस्याश्ममयस्य च ।
भस्मनाऽद्भिर्मृदा चैव शुद्धिरुक्ता मनीषिभिः ॥ ११० ॥

taijasānāṃ maṇīnāṃ ca sarvasyāśmamayasya ca |
bhasmanā'dbhirmṛdā caiva śuddhiruktā manīṣibhiḥ || 110 ||

Of igneous substances, of gems and of everything made of stone,—the purification has been ordained to be accomplished by means of ash, by water and by clay.—(110)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The name ‘Igneous substances’ is applied to all those substances that melt at the contact of fire; e.g. silver, gold, copper, iron, lead, zinc and so forth.

Gems’—things of the nature of the rock-crystal. ‘Ashma’ is stone; and what is made of it is called ‘ashmamaya’.

Sarvasya,’ ‘of everything’—This has been added for filling up the metre; the justification for it being found in there being two kinds of stone—that quarried from mountains and that obtained from river-beds.

By ash’;—since both ash and clay serve the same purpose, they are to be regarded as optional alternatives; while ‘water’ is meant to be used along with each of these two.

“What is the use of these?”

The removing of stains and smells. It has been declared that—‘the purification of the unclean thing consists in the removal of its stains and smell’;—and again‘so long as from the object besmeared with an unclean substance, the odour and stain do not pass off &c. &c.’

Both ash and clay are, by their very nature, non-greasy; hence purification is brought about by these in the case of oily effects.

The ‘purification’ of the ‘impure’ thing consists in making it fit for use by removing its defects.

“If this is so, then it should be necessary to describe in detail the impurity attaching to things—in some such form as ‘such and such a substance becomes impure when in contact with such and such a substance’.—‘But these are worldly things; and all this would be known from ordinary usage.’—Not so; because from ordinary usage, the thing is known only in a vague general form. Further in ordinary usage what is called ‘impure’ is only what has become disgusting by being contaminated by urine, ordure and blood; while what is meant by ‘impure’ in the present context is that which is unfit for touching &c.; and it is only from the scriptures that it could be learnt whence this unfitness arises. Then again, a man is called pure when he does not fall into a mistake in regard to what belongs to others. From all this it is clear that no useful purpose can be served from what is thus known, from ordinary usage, regarding the signification of the term in question. Though it is generally known that what has been contaminated is impure, yet it cannot be known by what particular thing a certain thing becomes contaminated.—‘But how can the exact signification of a term be ascertained from scriptures, when, ‘as a matter of fact, what the scriptures provide is the knowledge of what should be done, and not the meaning of a certain word, which latter is what is done by the work of Pāṇini; that this is so follows from the fact that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda (which deals only with the Duties of Man)’.—Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case in question, we do infer an injunction in the form—‘one should not make use of a substance that has become contaminated by such and such a substance’; and there would be nothing incongruous in the notion that the substance by whose contact the thing becomes unfit for use is the cause of contamination. Similarly as regards purification also, we can recognise its basis in some such injunction as—when a thing has become contaminated, it may be used after it has gone through the prescribed process of washing &c.’; and yet such an injunction would not mean that ‘purification should be done’. For if it did this, then, he who would not do it would incur sin. What happens is that in the case of ordinary secular acts, it being possible for the man in need to make use of any kind of vessels, pure or otherwise,—the Scripture lays down the restriction that ‘if need arises, one should make use of such vessels, and not of others If it is to be treated as a restriction, then it would be incumbent upon only one who seeks prosperity; and every other man would be free to do as he chose; just as in connection with the question of the correct forms of words, though the correct and incorrect forms are both equally expressive, yet there is the restriction which indicates that the use of the correct form brings merit, while that of the incorrect form is sinful [and this means that only people seeking merit need use the correct form].’—This would be true only if there were no text prohibiting the use of unclean vessels. But when there is such a prohibition, how could anyone make use of the vessel that has not been purified? As for the rules regarding purification, these only represent exceptions (to the prohibition of unclean vessels, the meaning being, that if the unclean vessel has been purified, it may be used). How then could there be any prosperity arising from what is a mere exception? Since all that it means is that if one acts according to the exception, he does not incur the sin of transgressing the prohibition.

“Or again, the Smṛti may be taken as dealing with the explanation of the meanings of words,—resembling the Smṛti that deals with the correct and incorrect forms of words. As for the notion that ‘the works of Manu and others have their basis in such Vedic texts as deal with the subject of what ought to be done’, we ask—who has said that this is so? As a matter of fact, our presumption of the basis for the assertions of Manu and others depends upon the merit of each individual case. For instance, in the case of the Aṣṭakā, which is of the nature of a rite, we presume its basis in the form of a Vedic text enjoining what ought to be done; but in a case where the assertion deals with things as they really exist, the corresponding basic text, also must be of the same kind, dealing with an accomplished entity. As regards the subject of the exact meanings of words, the idea regarding the priority of a particular denotation may always be derived from usage; as in this matter there is no question of anything to be done. In the case in question however (where there is a question of something to be done), it is not possible to derive any knowledge from mere usage. Specially because purification being something that can he brought about only by means of Vedic texts, how could it ever be made dependent upon usage? If it were, then all injunctions on the subject would be absolutely futile.—‘But we have such in junctions as that of Pāṇini, to the effect that one should make use of correct, and not incorrect, forms of words’ (where also there is no act to be done, nothing to be brought into existence).’—This is not Pāṇini’s injunction at all; all that his rule says is ‘this is correct, not that’; though it is true there is a rule like what has been quoted in the works of the authors of the Dharmasūtras all this may be learnt in detail from the Abhidhānāsara ).—‘In this Smṛti itself we find such injunctions as that—(1) claimants to property shall divide it in such and such a manner, or that (2) the eldest brother shall take four shares (9.153), or that (3) the eldest brother shall take &c. &c. (9.105). The proper denotation of the injunction has been declared to extend to directing and other factors also.

In fact the denotations of the words are in the form of injunctions and direction, and other factors are only supplementary to the injunctions; for in all these cases the notion derived from the words is in the form of urging to activity (towards a certain end).’—But what sort of urging could there be in the case (1) of causes and effects, or (2) of the pronouncing of blessings, or (3) of opportunity (all which are sometimes expressed by the injunctive affix)? Nor could the taking (of the four shares, mentioned in the texts just quoted) form the object of an injunction; since it is what is liable to be done by reason of the eldest brother being desirous of taking all he can.—‘But the desire, of the eldest brother would lead him to take his own as well as the other brothers’ shares, and hence the said injunction serves to restrict what should be taken by each.’—As a matter of fact however, there being no possibility perceptible of any one demanding more than his prescribed share, there is no room for any restrictive injunction.—‘Well, on account of the prohibition, the text may be taken as a preclusive injunction.—This would be all right; but in that case, if at the time of division itself, any of the brothers were to take something in excess of his prescribed share, with the acquiescence of his brothers, he would be incurring sin, even though the permission of the brothers would be there. Nor could the text be taken as indicating the man’s ownership over a certain share of the thing concerned; because the coming into existence of ownership has been already mentioned in the injunction of receiving one’s share; and what the prohibition does is to point out that over everything else, apart from the prescribed share, the man has no rights of ownership. But even so, if one were to transgress this prohibition and take possession of an excessive share, his ownership would certainly come into existence. It is for these same reasons that ownership has been held to be produced even by stealing and such acts. And for the time, apart from possession, no such idea is entertained as that this man has no ownership over the thing.

“Thus then, it being found that the text in question cannot be taken either as an Injunction, or a Restriction, or a Preclusion, all that the dividing means is the apportionment of the shares—‘so much is the share of this person und so much of that.’ Consequently the injunctive in ‘vibhajeran’, ‘should divide’, must indicate opportunity; and that the term ‘should take’ only refers to what actually happens in ordinary worldly practice; just as in the injunction ‘the hungry man should eat’, or ‘for the sake of the acquisition and safeguarding of his property one shall seek the help of the king.’ Gautama has distinctly enumerated (in 10.39) the sources, of ownership as—‘Inheritance, purchase, &c., &c.’

“Thus then, since we have such direct Smṛti-injunctions as those of the Aṣṭakā and the like (which are something to be done and hence fit subjects for injunction), what is said in them regarding Impurity and Purity can only be taken as laying down something that is entirely of a sanctificatory character; and since this also has its basis in a (Vedic) Injunction, it may be regarded as prescribed by that injunction itself. So that it is only from the scriptures that it can be determined what is impurity and what is purity. For this reason it is necessary that the nature of impurity also should be fully explained.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—This has been explained under 135 below, where ‘fat, semen, &c.,’ of men have been mentioned as constituting ‘impurities’; and the specifying of ‘men’ is only illustrative, as is clear from other Smṛti -texts, of all such animals as the dog, the cat, the ass, the camel, the monkey, the crow, the village-hog,the village-cock, the rat, the jackal and other carnivorous animals and birds, also nailed animals and the mungoose; and ‘fat’ and the other things include also the flesh and the hair.

What is meant by the declaration of ‘purification’ (in the present verse) is that whenever the substances mentioned become contaminated by urine and such things they have to be sanctified in the manner laid down; and this need not be done when they are to be used in their natural condition. Because gold and other things are not impure by their nature,—when alone they could need purification whenever they would be used.

Or, the verse may be taken as laying down the purification in connection with a visible act, but with a view to an invisible (trancendental) result: just like the laying down of the rule that ‘one should eat facing the East’

In this latter case however, the mention of ‘purification’ would be incongruous.

As for the ordinary clearing and washing of vessels before eating those are done on account of usage, and not by virtue of the Smṛti-rule regarding purification (which pertains to only such articles as have become defiled by the touch of the unclean thing).

As regards the other things that are ‘untouchable’ by man—such, for instance, as the Cāṇḍāla and the like—or garlic, onion, wine, meat and so forth,—these also are sources of defilement of substances.

What particular form of purification shall be used in the case of the contamination by what unclean thing,—for this it is necessary to look out for usage and other Smṛti-texts. Details on this point have been.‘supplied by Hārīta, Āpastamba, Parāśara and other sages; but all these passages we have not quoted here, for fear of having to write too much, in the manner of the philosophical writer Chandragomin.—(110).

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

(Verse 111 of others.)

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 255), which explains ‘taijasāni’ as ‘gold and the rest;’—in Mitākṣarā (on 1.183), which remarks that this pertains to vessels that are soiled;—that there is to be option between ‘ash’ and ‘clay,’ but either of these has to be combined with ‘water,’—in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Śrāddha, p. 15b);—in Hemādri (Śrāddha, p. 805);—and in Śuddhikaumudī (p. 305).

It is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Prāyaścitta, p. 134), which remarks that this pertains to soiled vessels;—in Smṛtitattva (p. 432) to the effect that eating out of a stone dish is permitted;—and in Nityācārapradīpa (p. 96).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

Gautama (1.29-31).—‘As regards the purification of things, objects made of metal must be scoured, those of clay should be thoroughly heated by fire, those of wood must be planed and those of yarns should be washed.—Objects made of stone, jewels, shells or mother-o’pearl must be treated like metallic objects.’

Baudhāyana (1.8.32, 46, 47).—‘Defiled objects made of metal must be scoured with cow-dung, earth and ashes, or with one of these:—conch-shells, horn, pearl-shells, and ivory with a paste of yellow mustard; or they may be cleaned with milk.’

Bo. (1.14.45).—‘Vessels made of metal must be washed, after having been scrubbed; the materials to be used for scrubbing arc cow-dung, earth, ashes and the like.’

Āpastamba (1.17.11).—‘A vessel made of metal becomes pure by being scoured with ashes and the like.’

Vaśiṣṭha (3.49-51).—‘Objects made of metal must be scoured with ashes; those made of clay should be thoroughly heated by fire; those of wood should be planed, and those of yarns should be washed. Stones and gems should be treated like objects made of metal; conch-shells and pearl-shells like gems.’

Yājñavalkya (1.182, 183).—‘Of vessels and cups made of gold, silver, conch-shell, of stones, vegetables, ropes, roots, fruits, cloth, bamboo, and leather—as also of other vessels of wood, etc.,—purification is accomplished by means of water.’

Devala (Aparārka, p. 254).—‘Vessels not touched by liquids are purified by water; those touched by liquids are regarded as purified only when they are free from fatty stains and odour.’

Hārīta (Aparārka, p. 254).—‘Gold, silver, conch-shells and pearl-shells are purified by water; if these are defiled to the extent of being discoloured and losing their properties, then they should be cleaned with the flour of barley, wheat, beans, lentils and cow-dung; copper-vessels are cleansed by acids and salts; vessels of Kāṃsya by ashes; iron-vessels by being scrubbed with stone, oil and sand; vessels made of gems are cleansed by scrubbing with stone and washing.’

Āpastamba (Do.).—‘Vessels of kāṃsya are cleansed by the ten alkalies.’

Śaṅkha (Do.).—‘A kāṃsya -vessel should not be heated; it becomes purified by being washed twenty-one times. Vessels of Kāṃsya, lead and zinc are purified by hot water. Kāṃsya and iron are cleansed by alkalies; iron-vessels are purified by heating, also by ashes and cow-dung. Vessels made of stone are cleansed by heating, scrubbing and also by water; those of wood, by planing; also by earth, cow-dung and water.’

Uśanas (Do., p. 255).—‘Vessels of gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc and kāṃsya are cleansed by water mixed with ashes; those of metals in general, if defiled, are cleansed by washing with ashes three times. Gold, gems, silver, conch-shells, pearl-shells and stones, as also diamonds, bamboo, ropes and leather, are purified by water. Vessels of clay and weapons are heated for purification.’

Kāśyapa (Do.).—‘Ivory, horn, conch-shell, pearl-shell and gems are cleansed by sand.’

Yama (Do.).—‘Silver, gold, copper, lead, iron, Kāṃsya and zinc are purified by ashes.’

Ṛṣyaśṛṅga (Do.).—‘Pearls and corals are purified by washing; also vessels made of conch and other shells, and also of all kinds of stone.’

Viṣṇu (Do.).—‘Things made of copper, lead or zinc are purified by acid and water;—all things made of metal are cleansed by being washed with ashes and water twenty-one times.’

Smṛtyantara (Aparārka, p. 255).—‘Vessels of kāṃsya are cleansed by ashes, if they have not been touched with wine; if so touched, they can be cleansed only by heating and scrubbing; copper is cleansed by acids if it has not been touched with flesh; if so touched, it can he cleansed only by being heated over again.’

Ādipurāṇa (Do., p. 256).—‘Things made of gold, silver, conch-shells, shells and gems,—also those made of kāṃsya, iron, copper, lead and zinc,—if they are not smeared,—become cleansed with simple water.’

Śātātapa (Do.)—‘Gold, silver, copper, lead, iron and zinc are cleansed by being scrubbed with stone,’

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