Manusmriti with the Commentary of Medhatithi

by Ganganatha Jha | 1920 | 1,381,940 words | ISBN-10: 8120811550 | ISBN-13: 9788120811553

This is the English translation of the Manusmriti, which is a collection of Sanskrit verses dealing with ‘Dharma’, a collective name for human purpose, their duties and the law. Various topics will be dealt with, but this volume of the series includes 12 discourses (adhyaya). The commentary on this text by Medhatithi elaborately explains various t...

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

पाषण्डमाश्रितानां च चरन्तीनां च कामतः ।
गर्भभर्तृद्रुहां चैव सुरापीनां च योषिताम् ॥ ८९ ॥

pāṣaṇḍamāśritānāṃ ca carantīnāṃ ca kāmataḥ |
garbhabhartṛdruhāṃ caiva surāpīnāṃ ca yoṣitām || 89 ||

Also from women, who have joined a heretic, who behave too freely, who have injured a child in their womb or their husband, and those who drink wine—(89).

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

One who has renounced the scriptures and has taken to wearing such things as the human skull, red garments and so forth, on the bans of heterodox theories of life and morals, is a ‘heretic.’ Those women who have ‘joined’, Such a person,—i.e. who have adopted his distinguishing murks and are under his control.

Those who behave too freely.’—When a woman renounces the customs and usages of her family, and ullowing free scope to her desires, has recourse to one as well as several men,—her behaviour is called ‘free.’

The ‘injury’ to the husband consists in giving him poison etc.; and that to the child in the womb consists in abortion.

Those who drink wine;’—i.e. those who drink what is prohibited.

On this subject some one makes the following observations:—

“The prohibition of wine-drinking is found in the words ‘brāhmaṇo na pibet surām’, (‘the Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine’); and though the words apply to all members of the caste, yet the particular gender used is indicative of the fact that the prohibition applies to males only, and not to females. Though both the male and the female belong to the same caste, yet there is a distinct difference between the masculine and feminine genders. So that when the text uses the masculine form ‘brāhmaṇaḥ’, what possibility is there of the prohibition applying to the female, who is not mentioned at all? For instance, when it is said that ‘for the sake of a son one should make the Brāhmaṇī drink’ a certain substance, it is not understood to mean that the male Brāhmaṇa should be made to drink it. In the same manner when a text makes use of the masculine form, what it asserts cannot be predicated of females. It is true that in some cases, significance is not meant to be attached to the particular gender used;—e.g., in the text ‘the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’, where the prohibition is understood to apply to the killing of the female Brāhmaṇa also. But what happens in this latter case is that the direct signification of the Accusative case-ending marks out the ‘Brāhmaṇa’ to be the predominant factor by reason of his being what is most intended to be ‘got at’ by the preadicate; and as a rule in the case of the predominant factor no significance is attached to the gender, or the number or any other factor, except what is expressed by the basic noun itself. E.g. the injunction ‘wash the cup’ is not taken to mean the washing of only one cup. In the case under discussion, however, the prohibitive text is in the form ‘Brāhmaṇena surā nu peyā’ (‘wine shall not be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa’,) where the ‘Brāhmaṇa appears as the Nominative, and as such, an accessory in the fulfilment of the act denoted; so that in the case of the prohibition in the form—‘The Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine’—also, the nominative being denoted by the verb (with its conjugational ending), is expressed by the basic noun (‘brāhmaṇa’) and comes to be taken as something conducive to the fulfilment of the act denoted by the verb; so that the nominative ending in this text is to be construed on the same lines as the Instrumental in the preceding text; and it has to be taken as a subordinate factor. And in connection with a subordinate factor, all that is expressed by the word has to be taken as significant; for instance, in the case of the text ‘paśunā yajeta’, (‘sacrifice with an animal’), it is the male animal that is always sacrificed (and this on account of the Instrumental ending marking out the animal as the subordinate factor).”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—In such cases as the one under consideration whether a certain thing form the predominant or the subordinate factor is not determined by the Accusative or Instrumental case-ending, but upon its being or not being already known. That is to say, what is not already known, that alone can form the subject of the Injunction, and this is to which due significance is meant to be attached; and this for the simple reason that it is denoted by a word which can have no other denotation; while what is already known from other sources, and is mentioned for the sake of the In junction, has to be taken as subserving the purposes of the Injunction in exactly the same form in which it has been denoted by the previous word. In the sentence ‘the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’, all that the Injunction directly signifies is the prohibition of the act of killing, and everything else (mentioned in the sentence) is such as is already known from other sources. Even so however, due significance has to be attached to what is expressed by the basic nouns (in the sentence), as otherwise, their very use would come to be meaningless. But the gender, the number and other elements, which are denoted by the case-endings,—it is just possible that these are used simply because they are invariable concomitants of basic nouns (which cannot be used by themselves without a case-ending); and hence sometimes these latter are meant to be significant, sometimes not. As regards the killing of the Brāhmaṇa, no man requires to be urged to do it by an Injunction; as he is urged to it by his own hatred of the man he kills; and all men are, by their very nature, prone to do this act But as regards the prohibition of it, unless it were directly enjoined, it could not be got at by any means; specially as it could not be obtained from any other source. So that, since it is not in any way conducive to the fulfilment of an act, nor is it the qualification of anything so conducive, hence, even though it were to be included under the nature of man, it could not be connected with the context. Consequently, for the purpose of connecting it with the context it is necessary to attribute to it the character of the topic; and when the prohibition in question has been made the topic of the Injunction, it is no longer necessary to make the denotation of the verb the topic. Thus then, the topical character having been wrested by the Prohibition, what is denoted by the verb naturally loses that character. The performance of the act (denoted by the verb) is such that its performance is secured through ordinary tendencies (of men); so that for its own accomplishment it does not stand in need of being embraced by any Injunction; and all that it needs is the capacity (and desire) of the man to do the act; and this, act of killing, being got at by other means of knowledge, establishes the man’s capacity for doing the act; so that it is through a qualification of the man that it becomes correlated with the sentence. Thus it is quite in keeping with the theory of words denoting only correlated entities. The act, along with its qualification, thus not forming the topic of this Injunction, man’s tendency to it has to be explained as being due to ordinary wordly causes. As a matter of fact, in the case of killing, such tendency and motive power is present, in the form of the man’s passion; and certainly no restrictions of gender or number pertain to passion; or the activity might be due to the man’s hatred.

From all this it follows that the word, whose denotation does not form the topic of the Injunction, on the ground that it is already known, renounces its denotative power and indicates a sense that is determined by other means of knowledge. And in as much as gender and number are not, even by import, signified by the word, how can any significance be attached to them? It being necessary to speak of what is denoted by the basic noun, it has to be spoken of with the help of some number and it cannot be used entirely by itself; and it is for this reason that gender and number are added.

On the point at issue thus the conclusion is as follows:

The man, who has determined to take upon himself the character of the agent of the act of killing, is urged (by the prohibition) to what is signified by the negative word. So that in a prohibitive sentence, no significance need attach to the use of the Accusative ending, which therefore may be ignored. Even sentences where we find the Instrumental Ending, or even the Nominative—e.g., ‘wine shall not be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa’, or ‘the Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine’,—what is denoted by them being already got at from other sources, they do not form topics of the Injunction; and hence they are taken as spoken of only by way of reference. In the case where the Accusative comes in as a qualification of the motive, the Nominative and the Instrumental endings are always taken along with the Accusative. Even when the Accusative is directly used, that which is not already known from other sources forms part of the enjoined (predicate), and, as such, is regarded as duly significant; for example in the case of such texts, as ‘bhāryām upagacchet’ (‘one should have recourse to his wife’), ‘apatayam utpādayet’ (‘one should beget a child’) [where due significance attaches to the singular number in ‘wife’ and ‘child’]. The ‘wife’ is not a a thing acquired in the ordinary worldly manner; as she can be acquired only by means of the marriage-rites. Nor is it a thing that has been definitively described in an Injunction, which would strictly restrict it to what is enjoined therein; as there is in the case of such texts as —‘āśvinam grahṇāti’ (‘holds the cup dedicated to the Aśvins’), ‘maitrāvaruṇam grāhṇāti (‘holds the cup dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa’), and ‘daśaitānadhvaryurgṛhṇāti’ (‘the Adhvaryu holds these then’) [where the exact character of the cups has been prescribed by the texts laying down the dedication], and the cups taken up are of the precise number mentioned in the texts; consequently, their number being known, they become connected with the in junction of the washing, in sequential accordance with that number. Now in this case, there being no other sentence, and the sentence in question itself being the originative injunction, there are no grounds for rejecting the directly expressed number; so that any rejection of what is expressed by the self-sufficient denotative power of words could proceed only from the mind of man. Similarly in the case of the text ‘paśunā yajeta’ (‘one should sacrifice with an animal’), the Injunction pertains to the sacrifice, which is of the nature of something to be accomplished; so that when we proceed to seek for the means by which it could be accomplished, all that is mentioned in the injunctive text, qualification and all, comes to be regarded as the object of the Injunction; specially because the function of the Injunction cannot be regarded as having been fully fulfilled only by the laying down of what is signified by the root ‘yaji’, ‘to sacrifice’; why, then, should not the words be taken in the sense that is indicated by their own denotation as helped by the denotation of other words connected with them?

Persons versed in the science of “Pramāṇas” however regard the text as a self-sufficient Injunction; and in this they only repeat what has been said by other people. What we have said is easily understandable; and it does not demand any very keen acumen to grasp it. It is the very essence of things. The science is useful only so far as the Injunction is concerned; anything more than that is a mere show of learning, a purely exaggerated description. Such description is of use only in a case where the Injunction does not supply all the information needed; as for instance, in the case of the injunction regarding the ‘laying of pebbles’, there being several articles such as butter, oil, salt and the like, that are helpful towards wetting,—it being doubtful as to which of these is to be used in the wetting of the ‘pebbles’, it is the description (of Butter as ‘longevity itself’) which leads to the conclusion that Butter should be used. Or again, in the case of the ‘Ratri-sattra’, the performance of sacrificial rites during the night being unheard of anywhere else, the subsequent description of the ‘men obtaining honour’ helps to indicate the propriety of such performance by one who is desirous of acquiring honour or fame. In the case in question however the sentence (which in Adh. 11, verses 92 etc. prohibit wine for the Brāhmaṇa) is complete in all respects, at the mention of ‘Brāhmaṇas’; so that all needs having been fulfilled, the only purpose served by the description is ‘commendation.’ It might be argued that what is said under 11.96 is treated on the same footing as the assertion that ‘the sinful man comes by accomplished happiness’,—so that the prohibition of wine-drinking comes to have a footing, though a partial one, as referring to the male only. But there would be no force in this; because females also are entitled to partake of the butter and other substances, which have been left after the offerings to the Gods have been made; and they are permitted to recite Vedic texts also at the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa and other sacrifices; such texts, for instance, as ‘videyakarmāsi, &c., &c.’ Even such Injunctions as ‘one should make the performer of Śrāddhas drink wine’ indicate that wine is permitted for women.

Nor is any such distinction (between male and female) made in the case of ‘Brāhmaṇa-killing.’ So that upon the question here raised, the final conclusion is that the prohibition of winedrinking pertains to the whole caste—(89).

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha

(Verse 90 of others.)

This verse is quoted in Hāralatā, which has the following notes:—‘Pāṣaṇḍamāśṛtāḥ’ applies to both men and women Kāmataścarantyaḥ’ are those who have had intercourse with numberless men,—for all those there are no after-death offerings;—and in Śuddhikaumudī (p. 80).

 

Comparative notes by various authors

(verses 5.88-89)

See Comparative notes for Verse 5.88.

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