Verse 1.3

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

त्वमेको ह्यस्य सर्वस्य विधानस्य स्वयम्भुवः ।
अचिन्त्यस्याप्रमेयस्य कार्यतत्त्वार्थवित् प्रभो ॥ ३ ॥

tvameko hyasya sarvasya vidhānasya svayambhuvaḥ |
acintyasyāprameyasya kāryatattvārthavit prabho || 3 ||

Thou alone, O Lord, art conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of this entire Veda—which is eternal, inconceivable and not directly cognisable.—(3)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

At this stage the following question arises—“It has been said that the term ‘Duty’ is used in the sense of only that activity which tends to accomplish a transcendental purpose; and such activity may consist in the performing of the Aṣṭakā, as also in bowing to Caityas and such other acts (prescribed in the heterodox scriptures); and what sort of Duties is going to be expounded in the present Treatise?”

In answer to this we have the third verse, which serves the purpose of pointing out what Duties are going to be expounded and also of further indicating the aptitude of Manu already mentioned.

‘Thou alone’—without any one to help you; without a second.

‘Sarvasya vidhānasya kāryatattvārthavit.’—The term ‘Vidhāna,’ meaning that by which acts are enjoined, stands for the scripture;—it is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, not a product, not the work of man; and its name is ‘Veda’;—‘entire’ i.e., including the text which is directly found in the Veda, as also that the exact words of which are only inferred; for instance, (a) in the text—‘one should perform the Agnihotra, it pertains to thousand men,—by means of this verse one should worship the Āhavanīya’—we have the Veda directly enjoining what is to be done; the term ‘by means of this,’ ending as it docs with the instrumental case-termination, serving to point out the employment of the mantra-text directly quoted;—(b) while in the case of the injunction ‘the Aṣṭakās should be performed,’ which is found in the Smṛti, we infer, on the strength of this Smṛti, the corresponding Veda text;—similarly, when we read the Mantra-text, ‘I am chopping grass, the seat of the Gods,’ we at once infer, on the basis of the indicative power of the words of that text, the Vedic injunction that ‘the said text is to be employed in the chopping of grass this Mantra is found in that section of the Veda which deals with the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa sacrifice, and the chopping of grass is laid down as to be done in course of that sacrifice; but there is no such direct injunction as that ‘the chopping should be done with such and such a Mantra and the above-mentioned Mantra-text is found to be capable, by its very form, of indicating the chopping of grass; while as regards its being connected in a general way, with the sacrifice, this follows the fact of its occurring in the same ‘context’ as the injunction of that sacrifice; and it is by virtue of its own indicative force that it comes to be employed in the chopping of grass. The idea arising in the mind of the student (on noticing the above facts) is as follows:—‘From the context it follows that the Mantra-text in question should be used in the performance of the pūrṇamāsa sacrifices;—how is this to be done?—well, the natural answer is that it is to be used in the manner in which it is capable of being used; the capacity of a thing, even though not directly mentioned, always help., in determining its use;—what then is the Mantra-text capable of doing?—it is capable of indicating the chopping of grass;—hence from the context, and from the capability of the Mantra itself, it follows that it should be employed in the chopping of grass’;—as soon as this idea has been arrived at, the corresponding words, ‘by this Mantra the chopping of grass should be done,’ present themselves to the mind; because as a matter of fact, every concrete conception is preceded by the corresponding verbal expression. The said verbal expression, thus presenting itself to the mind, is called the ‘inferred Vedic text.’ The Text thus inferred is regarded as ‘Veda,’ by virtue of the fact that it owes its existence to the force of two other Vedic texts—viz., the text laying down the Darśapūrṇamāsa and the Mantra-text referred to above. Such is the opinion of Kumārila.

Or, the term ‘vidhāna’ may be taken as equivalent to ‘vidki’, meaning actual operation, the accomplishment of purpose; this is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, i.e., handed down by beginningless tradition,—or that it is prescribed in the eternal Veda;—‘entire’—i.e., what is prescribed in the directly available verbal texts, and what is only implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the texts. The Vedic injunction is of two kinds:—(a) There is one kind of injunction which is directly expressed by the words; e.g., ‘desirous of Brahmic glory, one should offer the Saurya-Caru’; here what is expressed is that one who desires Brahmic glory is the ñt and proper person to offer the Saurya-Caru; and when one proceeds to secure Brahmic glory by means of the said offering, he learns that the procedure of the offering is analogous to the Āgneya offering (which is the archetype of all Caru-offerings). In both these cases the idea got at, being derived from the words of the texts, is regarded as ‘derived directly from words;’ though the former is derived directly from the words and the latter from what is ‘expressed by the worlds,’ yet, this difference, due to the removal of the latter by one step, does not deprive it of the character of ‘being derived from words.’ For instance, when the water in the pool is struck by the hand, and it in its turn strikes against some other place; and yet this latter place is regarded as being struck by the hand, though not directly; similarly when pieces of rubber are thrown down, they rise and fall, and all the subsequent acts of rising and falling are the indirect effects of 'the first downward impulse imparted to them. Exactly analogous is the case of the injunctions in question: Every ectypal sacrifice is related to a particular form of procedure (borrowed from its archetype). Similarly when we meet with the injunction ‘one should perform the Viśvajit sacrifice,’ we argue that no injunction is possible except in reference to a fit and proper person capable of (and having a motive for) performing it, and hence come to the conclusion that the person so capable is one who desires Heaven; this idea being thus implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the text. It is in view of this two-fold character of injunctions (and enjoined acts) that we have the term ‘entire.’ In fact the purpose of adding the epithet ‘entire’ is to indicate that Smṛtis have their source in the Veda. This we shall explain under Discourse II.

An objection is raised:—

“As a matter of fact, Vidhi is something in the form of what should be done, expressed by the injunctive and such other verbal expressions; and this, in all cases, must be directly expressed by actual words; under the circumstances, what do you mean by saying that there are two kinds of injunction,—that the term ‘one should offer’ denotes something to be done, and the procedure of the offering is indicated by implication in the manner described above?”

There is no force in this objection. As a matter of fact, in the case of the injunctive words ‘nirvapet,’ ‘should offer,’ ‘yajeta,’ ‘should sacrifice’ and the like, even though what is expressed by the verbal root itself may be comprehended, the full conception of what is to he done is not obtained until we have comprehended the other factors,—such as the character of the person fit for the performance, the procedure to be adopted, and the actual details of the act to be performed; it is only as equipped with all these factors that the Injunction becomes comprehended in its complete form. In view of this fact, there is nothing incongruous in regarding the said factors also as denoted by the Injunctive word.

This is what the text means by the epithet ‘achintya,’ ‘inconceivable’—which means ‘not directly perceptible.’ What is directly perceived is said to be ‘apprehended,’ and not ‘conceived,’ or ‘remembred’ [so that if the Veda were something directly perceived, the epithet ‘inconceivable’ would have no force; things like the Veda can only be conceived of, and the Veda isnot even that].

‘Not directly cognisable;’—i.e., that which has got to be assumed or inferred, as forming the source of several assertions made in the Smṛti;as a matter of fact, such Vedic texts are not perceived, hence it is called ‘not directly cognisable.’—Or ‘not directly cognisable’ may he taken in the sense of incapable of having its extent exactly defined, by reason of its being very extensive; the Veda being divided into several rescensions, cannot be exactly defined by all persons; and on this account also it may be called ‘inconceivable;’ even in ordinary parlance, people are found to say—‘what to say of others; this cannot be even conceived of.’ The mind can conceive of all things; but the Veda is so extensive that it cannot be conceived of even by the mind. Thus the two epithets (‘inconceivable’ and ‘not directly cognisable’) serve to indicate that the Veda is beyond the reach of the internal as well as the external organs of perception; i.e., it is very extensive; and this mention of the extensiveness of the Veda serves as an inducement to the Teacher; the meaning being—‘it is you alone who have learnt the Veda which is so extensive, hence you alone are conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of the said Veda.’

The term ‘Kārya,’ ‘what ought to be done,’ stands for the act to be performed; in reference to which the man is prompted to be the performer, (in such terms as)—‘this should be done by you,’ ‘this should not be done by you,’ ‘the Agnihotra should be performed’ ‘the eating of the flesh of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be done.’ Avoidance also is a kind of ‘acting;’ e.g., the ‘non-doing of Brāhmaṇa-murder’ constitutes the ‘performance’ or ‘acting’ of the avoidance (of Brāhmaṇa-murder). Activity is ‘acting;’ so is also ‘desisting from activity;’ and the name ‘acting’ is not restricted to only that which is accomplished by means of instruments and agents set in motion; in fact, when such ‘acting’ is possible, if one desists from it, this desisting also is ‘acting.’ For instance, when it is asserted that ‘the man who takes wholesome food lives long,’ what is meant is that the man who takes his food at the proper time, and who does not eat at the improper time; as desisting from eating is also ‘wholesome.’

Or, the word ‘Kārya’ may be taken as indicating the Injunction and the Prohibition; as these alone form the essence of the Veda; the other parts of it, which are merely descriptive of certain happenings,—such passages for instance as ‘he wept, and because he wept, he became known as Rudra,’—are not true; they are not meant to be taken in their literal sense, they are meant to be construed along with an injunctive passage and serving the purpose of commending what has been laid down in that injunctive passage. For instance, the descriptive passage just quoted—beginning with ‘he wept’ and, ending with ‘there is weeping in his house within a year’—is to be construed with the injunctive passage—‘Therefore silver should not be placed on the grass;’ and being deprecatory of the placing of silver, it serves the purpose of commending the prohibition of that placing of silver. This is what is meant by the dictum—‘the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to what has to be accomplished, and not what is already accomplished and what is mentioned in the Arthavāda or Descriptive Passages is what is already accomplished; and what is already accomplished cannot be cognised as something to be done; what however is cognised is that the description is supplementary to some injunction; if then it were taken to be true in its own literal sense, it could not be supplementary to any injunction; and this would militate against the syntactical connection between the two passages—descriptive and injunctive; and so long as two passages can be taken as syntactically connected and constituting a single compound sentence, it is not right to take them as two distinct sentences. [The reverse process of taking the injunction as supplementary to the description would not be right; for] as a matter of fact, what is yet to be accomplished could not be subservient to what is already accomplished; specially because, if this were so (and the in junction itself were not literally true), then the Veda would contain no injunction of anything at all; and it would thereby cease to be an authoritative source of knowledge. This would involve the further incongruity, that we would have to deny the well-recognised fact of the injunctive and other words denoting injunction. It is with a view to all this that the revered Manu has declared ‘something to be done’ as the ‘essence’ of the Veda. Jaimini also in the Pūrvamīmānsā-Sūtra (1.1.2)—‘Duty is that desirable tiling which is prescribed by the Vedic injunction’—has distinctly declared that the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to what is to be done.

The term of address ‘Lord’ has been used on the understanding that the personage addressed is well-known to be possessed of the capacity to expound duty,—such capacity being due to his being endowed with a high degree of knowledge of all things. The meaning thus is—‘O Lord, may you, who are fully able to expound Duty, explain the Duties to us.’

Being thus questioned by means of the first three verses, he promised, in the following verse, what he was asked to do. (3)

 

Explanatory notes

‘Vidhānasya svayambhuvaḥ’—Buhler has translated this phrase to mean ‘the ordinance of the self-existent’,—evidently taking ‘Svayambhuvaḥ’ as standing for God. This, however, is incompatible with the interpretation of all the commentators, according to whom ‘Svayambhuvaḥ’ is in apposition to ’Vidhānasya’,—the phrase meaning the ‘self-existent ordinance’, ‘the Eternal Law’ (the Veda). Burnell is more to the point when he renders it as ‘self-existent system.’ Medhātithi (p. 5) has suggested another explanation—‘activity handed down by immemorial tradition.’

‘Aprameyasya’—Though other commentatoss are satisfied with rendering this epithet as meaning ‘unfathomable,’ Medhātithi imparts to it a special significance by explaining it as ‘not directly knowable, but to be inferred, as the foundation of the Smṛti.’

‘Kāryatattvārtha’—‘the purport and nature of the soul’ (Kullū.)—‘the true purport’ (Medhātithi, Govinda and Nandana)

It is noteworthy that Medhātithi has supplied, under verse 11 below, a totally different explanation of this verse.