Mandukya Karika, verse 4.25

Sanskrit text, IAST transliteration and English translation

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् ।
निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्वम् इष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥ २५ ॥

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvamiṣyate yuktidarśanāt |
nimittasyānimittatvam iṣyate bhūtadarśanāt || 25 ||

25. From the point of view of logical reason a cause for the subjective impression must be assigned. But from the standpoint of the highest Reality or the true nature of things, we find that the (so-called) cause (of the subjective impression) is, after all, no cause.

Shankara Bhashya (commentary)

To¹ this objection, we reply as follows:—We admit that you posit a cause of the subjective experience on account of such arguments as the existence of the variety (in the objective world) and because of the experience of pain. Stick for a while to your argument that reason demands that an external object should exist to produce a subjective impression.

(The opponent)—Please let us know what you (Advaitin) are going to say next.

(Reply)—Yes, the² jar, etc., posited by you as the cause, that is to say, the cause of the subjective impression, are not, according to us, the external cause, the substratum (of the impression); nor are they the cause for our experiences of variety.

(Objection)—How?

(Reply)—We say so from³ the standpoint of the true nature of Reality. When the true nature of clay is known a jar does not exist apart from the clay as exists a buffalo in entire independence of a horse. Nor does cloth exist apart from the thread in it. Similarly the threads have no existence apart from the fibres. If we thus proceed to find out the true nature of the thing, by going from one cause to another, till language or the object denoted by the language fails us, we do not still find any (final) cause.

“Bhūtadarsanāt” (from the true nature of the thing) may be “Abhūtadarsartāt” (from the unreality of the experiences). According to this interpretation, the meaning of the Kārikā is that we do not admit external objects as the cause on⁴ account of the unreality of these (external) objects, which are as unreal as the snake seen instead of the rope. The (so-called) cause⁵ ceases to be the cause as the former is due to the illusory perception of the perceiver. For,⁶ it (the external world) disappears in the absence of such illusory knowledge. The man in dreamless sleep and trance (Samādhi) and he who has attained the highest knowledge do not experience any object outside their self as they are free⁷ from such illusory cognition. An object which is cognised by a lunatic is never known as such by a sane man. Thus⁸ is answered the contention regarding the causality based upon the arguments of the perception of variety and the existence of pain.

Anandagiri Tika (glossary)

Realism which is always associated with causality is now refuted by idealism.

¹ To, etc.—That is to say, that objection as set forth in the previous Kārikā.

² The jar, etc.—The external jar is not the cause of our mental impression (idea) of the jar. Nor is the external jar the substratum upon which the idea of the jar is superposed.

³ From the, etc.—It is because from the standpoint of Ultimate Truth the external jar does not, as such, exist. That which really exists is clay (without form) which, being associated with name and form, appears as the jar. Name and form, being mere ideas of the mind, are illusory. Therefore, the jar has no real existence independent of the clay. If the opponent contends that the external objects create the subjective ideas, we ask for a cause for the external objects. The opponent cannot point out such a cause. Hence the argument of causality fails.

⁴ On account of, etc.—That is to say, no external object exists as such. What is taken as the external object is merely the idea of the perceiver. When the snake is perceived in the rope, that perception, being illusory, cannot be called the knowledge of any independent reality called snake. Similarly, the perception of the external object, being illusory, cannot point to the existence of any such object as an independent reality.

⁵ Cause, etc.—Seeking a cause for subjective ideas is due to ignorance (Avidyā).

⁶ For, etc.—When this ignorance, i.e., the belief in causalit„ disappears the external world itself disappears.

⁷ Free, etc.—That is to say, they are no longer subject to the law of causality. Hence they do not see any external world as an independent reality.

⁸ Thus, etc.—The opponent contends that external objects must exist as we are conscious of the variety of, subjective impressions. Another reason for the existence of the external object is our experience of pain. The mind may create an idea, but it will not cause pain to itself. To this contention the following reply is given:—We may have consciousness of variety or pain in the absence of external objects. One is conscious of the variety of objects in dream. He feels pain in dream. But the dream experiences are only the subjective impressions in the mind of the dreamer. No external object exists, at that time, which corresponds to the dream experiences. Therefore subjective impressions need not be necesarily produced by a really existing external object. There is no proof that external objects independently of the mind exist. The subjective impression of the snake in place of the rope is produced in the absence of an external snake. From the standpoint of reality, nothing exists but the Self or Ātman. Perception of any other existence is due to illusion. The mind, in ignorance, seeks a cause, and thereby infers an external world.