Mandukya Karika, verse 4.23-24

Sanskrit text, IAST transliteration and English translation

हेतुर्न जायतेऽनादेः फलं चापि स्वभावतः ।
आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य ह्यादिर्न विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

heturna jāyate'nādeḥ phalaṃ cāpi svabhāvataḥ |
ādirna vidyate yasya tasya hyādirna vidyate || 23 ||

23. The cause cannot be produced froth an effect which is without beginning, nor is the effect born of its-own nature (itself). That which is Without beginning is necessarily free from birth.

Shankara Bhashya (commentary)

In accepting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect you are forced to admit the absence of birth regarding them. How is it so? The¹ cause cannot be produced from an effect, which is without beginning. In other words, you do not certainly mean that the cause-is produced from an effect which is, itself, without beginning and free from birth. Nor do you² admit that the effect, by following its own inherent nature, (i.e., without any extraneous cause) is produced from a cause which is unborn and without beginning. Therefore² by admitting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect, you, verily, accept the fact of their being never produced. It is because we know from common experience that what is without beginning is also free from birth which means a beginning. Beginning is admitted of a thing, which has birth, and not of a thing which has none.

Anandagiri Tika (glossary)

¹ The cause, etc.—The beginningless effect cannot produce a cause. For, otherwise it cannot be itself an effect. An effect, signifying birth, must have a beginning. Again, if the cause be produced from an effect, then the cause, itself, cannot be without beginning

² You, etc.—It is because if the effect be produced from a cause, it cannot be beginningless.

³ Therefore, etc.—If the cause and the effect, on account of their being never born, be ever free from birth, they cannot be cause and effect. For, the words are always associated with birth. Hence the opponent by admitting the beginninglessness of cause and effect accepts, as a matter of fact, the theory of Ajāti or he stultifies himself.

Verse 4.24

Sanskrit text, IAST transliteration and English translation

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशतः ।
संक्लेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥ २४ ॥

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvamanyathā dvayanāśataḥ |
saṃkleśasyopalabdheśca paratantrāstitā matā || 24 ||

24. Subjective knowledge must have an objective cause; otherwise both must be non-existent. For this reason as well as that of the experience of pain, the existence of external objects, accepted by other thinkers, should be admitted.

Shankara Bhashya (commentary)

An objection is raised in order to strengthen the meaning already stated. The word Prajñapti in the text signifies “knowledge”, i.e., the experience of such notions as that of sound, etc. This (subjective) knowledge has a cause, i.e., an (external) agent or object corresponding to it. In other words, we premise that knowledge is not merely subjective but has an object outside the perceiving subject. Cognition of sound, etc., is not possible without objects. For, such experience is always produced by a cause. In¹ the absence of such (external) object, the variety and multiplicity of experiences such as sound, touch, colour, viz., blue, yellow, red, etc., would not have existed. But the varieties are not non-existent, for these are directly perceived by all. Hence, because: the variety of manifold experiences exist, it is necessary to admit the existence—as supported by the system of the opposite school—of external objects which are outside the ideas of the perceiving subject. The subjective knowledge has one characteristic alone, i.e., it is of the very nature of illumination. It does not admit of any variety within itself. The variety of experiences of colour, such as blueness, yellowness, etc., cannot possibly be explained, by merely imagining a variety in the subjective knowledge, without admitting variety of external objects which are the substratum of these multiple colours. In other words, no variety of colour is possible in a (white) crystal without its coming-in contact with such adjuncts as the external objects which possess such colours as blueness, etc. For this additional reason also one is forced to admit the existence of external object,—supported by the Scripture of the opposite school,—an object which is external to the knowledge (of the perceiving subject): Misery² caused by burns, etc., is experienced by all. Such pain as is caused by burns, etc., would not have been felt in the absence of the fire, etc., which is the cause of the burns and which exists independent of the knowledge (of the perceiving subject). But such pain is experienced by all. Hence,³ we think that external objects do exist. It is not reasonable to conclude that such pain is caused by mere subjective knowledge. For,⁴ such misery is not found elsewhere.

Anandagiri Tika (glossary)

This Kārikā gives the views of the dualists who believe in the reality of external objects. They argue thus:—Knowledge is not possible without the contact with an external object. Mental impressions are always created by our coming into contact with objects that lie outside of us. Besides, no variety is possible in the knowledge of the perceiving subject without a corresponding variety existing outside of it. From the experience of such knowledge as that of colour, form, etc., one must admit the existence of objects outside the perceiving mind corresponding to the subjective impressions. Again, different experiences give rise to different feelings, such as pleasant or otherwise, which also are impossible in the absence of external objects, All these arguments compel one to believe in the reality of external objects.

¹ In, etc.—Otherwise there would be no idea of variety and objects corresponding to such ideas.

² Misery, etc.—A man may create ideas, but he cannot create pain. Therefore, the pain must have an external cause.

³ Hence, etc.—The contention ' of the opponent is that there must exist causal relation between objects and our knowledge of them.

⁴ For—That is to say, that the pain of burn is experienced only when the limb comes in contact with fire and not when it is besmeared with sandal-paste, etc. Therefore, misery, pain, etc., are not possible in the absence of a cause.