Mandukya Karika, verse 3.5

Sanskrit text, IAST transliteration and English translation

यथैकस्मिन्घाटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ।
न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥ ५ ॥

yathaikasmiṅghāṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhiryute |
na sarve saṃprayujyante tadvajjīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ || 5 ||

5. As any portion of Ākāśa enclosed in a pot being soiled by dust, smoke, etc., all such other portions of Ākāśa enclosed in other pots are not soiled, so is the happiness, etc., of the Jīvas, i.e., the happiness, misery, etc., of one Jīva do not affect other Jīvas.

Shankara Bhashya (commentary)

The dualists contend that if one Ātman exists in all bodies then the birth, death, happiness, etc., of one Ātman (as Jīva) must affect all and, further, there¹ must follow a confusion regarding the results of the action (done by individuals). This contention is,thus refuted:—As² the Ākāśa enclosed within one jar being soiled by dust, smoke, etc., does not make the Ākāśa enclosed in other jars soiled with the dust and the¹ smoke, so all created beings are not affected by the happiness, etc. (of one Jīva).

(Objection)³—Is it not your contention that there is only one Ātman?

(Reply)—Yes, we admit it. Have you not heard that there is only one Ātman like the all-pervading space, in all bodies?

(Objection)—If⁴ there be only one Ātman then it must always and everywhere feel misery and happiness.

(Reply)—This objection cannot be raised by the Sāṃkhyas. For,⁵ the Sāṃkhyas do not admit that misery, happiness, etc., ever cling to the Ātman; for they assert that happiness, misery, etc., belong inseparably to Buddhi.⁶ Further, there is no evidence for imagining multiplicity of Ātman which is of the very nature of knowledge.

(Objection)—In the absence of the multiplicity of Ātman the theory that the Pradhāna or Prakṛti acts for the sake of others⁷ does not hold good.

(Reply)—No, this argument is not valid; for whatever the Pradhāna or Prakṛti may be supposed to accomplish by itself for another cannot inseparably inhere in Ātman. If bondage⁸ and liberation accomplished by the Pradhāna inseparably inhered in the multiple Puruṣas, then the theory that the Pradhāna (Prakṛti) always acts for the sake of others would not be consistent with the unity of Ātman existing everywhere. And the theory of the Sāṃkhyas regarding the multiplicity of Ātman would be reasonable. But the Sāṃkhyas do not admit that the purpose of bondage or liberation can ever be inseparably associated with the Puruṣa. For, they admit that the Puruṣas are attributeless and are centres of Pure Consciousness. Therefore,⁹ the very existence of the Puruṣa is their support for the theory that the action of Pradhāna is directed to serve the purpose of others (the Puruṣas). But the supposition of the multiplicity of Puruṣas need not be made for this purpose. Therefore the theory of the Pradhāna seeking to serve the purpose of others cannot be an argument for the supposition of the multiplicity of Ātman. The Sāṃkhyas have no other argument in support of their supposition regarding the multiplicity of Ātman. The Pradhāna takes upon itself bondage and liberation only through the instrumentality¹⁰ of the existence of the other (the Puruṣa). The Puruṣa which is of the very nature of knowledge, is the cause of the activity of the Pradhāna by the fact of its very existence and not on account of its any specific¹¹ qualities. So it is through ignorance alone that people imagine the Puruṣa (Ātman) to be many and also thereby give up the real¹² import of the Vedas.

The Vaiśeṣikas ¹³ and others assert that attributes such as desire, etc., are inseparably related to Ātman. This¹⁴ view is also not correct. For, the Samskāras (the impressions) which are the cause of memory cannot have any inseparable relation with Ātman which has no¹⁵ parts. Further, if¹⁶ it be contended that the origin of memory lies in the contact of Ātman with the mind, we say that this contention is not valid; for, in that case there will be no principle regarding memory. Memory of all things will come simultaneously. Besides¹⁷ mind can never be related to the Ātman which is devoid of all sensations such as touch, etc., and which belongs to a class other than that of the mind. Further the Vaiśeṣikas do not admit that the attributes (Guṇa) such as forms, etc. (Rūpas), action (Karma), generality (Sāmānya), particularity (Viśeṣa) and inherence (Samavāya), can exist independently of the substance (Dravya). If these are totally independent of one another, the contact between the Ātman and desire, etc., and also between the attributes (Guṇa) and the substance (Dravya) will be an absurdity.

(Objection)—The contact characterised by an inseparable inherence is possible in the case of entities where such relation is proved to be innate.

(Reply)—This¹⁸ objection is not valid; for such innate relationship cannot be reasonable, as the Ātman, the ever permanent, is antecedent to the desires, etc., which are transitory. And if desires, etc., be admitted to have inseparable innate relationship with Ātman, then¹⁹ the former would be as permanent as such innate attributes of Ātman as greatness, etc. That is not desirable, for then there would be no room for liberation of the Ātman. Further, if inseparable relationship (Samavāya) were something separate from the substance, then another factor must be stated which can bring about the relationship between Samavāya and the substance,—as in the case of the substance and the attributes. Nor can it be stated that Samavāya is a constant inseparable relationship with Ātman; for, in that case, the Ātman and Samavāya on account of their constant and inseparable relationship can never be different from one another. If, on the other hand, the relationship of Samavāya be totally different from the Ātman, and the attributes also be different from the substance, then the possessive case cannot be used to indicate their mutual relation which is possible only when the two terms connected by the possessive are not totally different. If Ātman be inseparably connected with such categories as desires, etc., which have both “beginning” and “end,” then it would itself be impermanent. If Ātman be considered to have parts and undergo changes, like the body, etc., then, these two defects always associated with the body, etc., would be inevitable in the case of the Ātman. (Therefore the conclusion is that) as the Ākāśa (ether), on account of the superimposition of ignorance (Avidyā), is regarded as soiled by dust and smoke, in like manner, the Ātman also, on account of the limiting condition of the mind caused by the erroneous attribution of Avidyā, appears to be associated with the contamination of misery, happiness, etc. And such being the case, the idea of bondage and liberation, being empirical in nature, does not contradict (the permanent nature of Ātman from the standpoint of Truth). For, all the disputants admit the relative experience to be caused by Avidyā and deny its existence from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality. Hence it follows that the supposition of the multiplicity of Ātman made by the logicians is without basis and superfluous.

Anandagiri Tika (glossary)

¹ There—In the case of the unity of Ātman, the action of one individual must affect others who are not responsible for the action. Then there cannot be any possible relation between action and the results of actions. The law of causality becomes futile.

² As— The reply is that birth, death, misery, happiness, etc., are admitted to be facts experienced in the practical world. There the multiplicity of Ātman is also admitted. But this multiplicity of Ātman is due to the limitations of the (upādhi) of the mind caused by Avidyā (ignorance), which does not exist in the Supreme Reality.

³ Objection—This objection is supposed to be raised by the adherents of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

⁴ If etc.—The contention of the Sāmkhva philosopher is that in case the unity of Ātman is upheld, one must always feel miserable or happy as the result of the good and the bad actions of others must affect him.

⁵ For, etc.— According to the Sāṃkhya theory, the Ātman or the Puruṣa is without parts and attributes and is of the very nature of consciousness. Prakṛti or Pradhāna is insentient, dull, and endowed with the qualities of misery, happiness, etc. All the activities of Prakṛti are directed to serve the purpose of the conscious Puruṣa. Prakṛti, being insentient, cannot enjoy the result of her own work. According to the Sāṃkhya theory, Prakṛti is one, but the Puruṣas are as numerous as there are bodies. Each Puruṣa by coming in contact with Prakṛti catches the reflection of misery or happiness, which are the characteristics of the latter (Prakṛti) arid thinks itself as happy or miserable.

⁶ Buddhi— According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy there are twenty-five categories. Buddhi is first evolved as the result of the contact of Prakṛti with Puruṣa. The three qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which give rise to misery, happiness, etc., lie in an undifferentiated state in Prakṛti. But when Prakṛti evolves into Buddhi, these qualities become differentiated. Hence, misery, happiness, etc., have been stated as inseparably related to Buddhi.

⁷ Others—i.e., the Puruṣas. See note Ante 5.

⁸ Bondage, etc.—According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy the contact of Prakṛti with Puruṣa causes the latter to fall into bondage. But as soon as Puruṣa realises his independence, he is liberated. Therefore according to the Sāṃkhyas, Prakṛti is the cause of bondage and liberation and the Puruṣa, in itself, is of the very nature of knowledge. All the activities of Prakṛti, which are otherwise meaningless, are directed to make the Puruṣa realise his real nature.

⁹ Therefore, etc.—According to Vedānta, the ideas of both bondage and liberation belong to the world of relativity. It is due to ignorance. From the standpoint of Truth, there is neither bondage nor liberation; for the Ātman is always free.

¹⁰ instrumentality, etc.—Vedānta does not disagree with this position. According to it, the fact of the multiplicity of relative phenomena is explained by the presence of the non-dual Ātman. Every illusion has its substratum.

¹¹ Specific qualities—This is the view of Patañjali. According to his system, known as the philosophy of Yoga, there is an Īśvara or Personal God, possessed of attributes, who is the cause of the created universe.

¹² Real import, etc.—i.e., the non-dual Ātman is the only Reality.

¹³ Vaiśeṣikas.—The followers of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy hold that there are six categories, viz., Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karma (activity), Sāmānya (generality), Viśeṣa (particularity), and Samavāya (inherence). All these categories exist independently of one another. The Dravya or substance (Ātman) has nine special attributes, viz., Buddhi (intellect), Sukha (happiness), Duhkha (misery), Ichha (desire), Dveṣa (aversion), Prayatna (effort), Dharma (merit), Adharma (demerit) and Samskāra (impression).

¹⁴ This, etc.—If desire, etc., are inseparably connected with Ātman, then desire, misery, happiness, etc., of one being would imply those of another.

¹⁵ No parts—If it be contended that desire, etc., inhere in one part of the Ātman then the reply is that Ātman unlike the pot, etc., has no parts.

¹⁶ If etc.—The opponent contends that the origin of memory is to be found in the contact of the ìpind with Ātman. But this argument is not valid. For, Ātman is ever present. In that case the mere effort of the mind to remember anything should bring its memory. But this does not happen. In spite of all our efforts we often fail to bring back the memory of many past events. Further, Ātman is indivisible and without parts. Therefore any impression that arises in the Ātman cannot be confined to any particular part of the Ātman. If such be the case, then all beings should remember a thing at the same time. Still another difficulty of this theory is that, Ātman being without parts, one should remember all things at one and the same time. Hence no rule exists regarding memory.

¹⁷ Besides, etc.—Contact is possible between two things of the same species.

¹⁸ This objection, etc.—Śaṅkara criticises this view of the relation between substance and quality. If the two are inseparably related, the inseparability must refer to space, time or nature. The two are not inseparable in space, since we see the redness of a red lotus disappearing. If inseparability in time is the essence of the Samavāya relation, then the right and the left horns of a cow would be related in that way. If it be inseparability in nature or character, then it would be impossible to make any further distinction between substance and quality, since the two are one.

¹⁹ Then, etc.—But we know that desires, etc., are impermanent.