Samanya and Vishesha in Vaisheshika and in Ayurveda

[Full tittle: Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) in Vaisesika and in Ayurveda / by Antonella Comba ]

The problem of universals has been debated for a long time both in Western and in Eastern thought. Essentially, it is the problem, even nowadays very much discussed, of the relationship between sense objects, thought, and language. Even if it is true that every attempt at reducing logic to semantics, or vice versa, is doomed to failure,¹ it can nevertheless not be denied that thought and language work closely together in building up sense perceptions; these, though presenting themselves fragmentarily, are grouped together and structured according to a form which makes them intelligible. It is precisely this form which makes possible the recognition and identification of an object with something already perceived or thought of before, the distinction between different objects, or the cognition of a 'thing' as such, and therefore it is this very form which makes knowledge possible. But how does this organization and structuring of perceptions into forms take place, and what are its causes? A very famous passage of the Isagoge of Porphyrius lists various solutions to the problem of the universals and at the same time points out the difficulty of choosing one of them, even only for a correct interpretation of the Categories of Aristotle: 'Now, with reference to genera and species, I shall refrain from saying whether they really exist or are only conceptions in the mind, and if existing, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separate or exist in sense-objects and are dependent upon them, because such a problem requires an investigation different and of wider scope'.² In the history of Indian thought we find all these various positions represented, obviously with nuances different from those of the corresponding Western positions. Not only has the problem of the universals given place in India, just as in Western scholastic philosophy, to endless discussions, with a sharp contraposition especially between Buddhist 'nominalism' and the 'extreme realism' of the Vaisesika school, but, as we shall see, this debate has filtered into the literature of ancient Indian science and especially into that of Ayurvedic medicine, which has manifold points of contact with Indian I wish to thank Dr. Arion Rosu for his valuable suggestions and unfailing encouragement. 1 Cf. A. Nocentini, Presentazione, in: J.H. Greenberg, Universali del linguaggio, Firenze 1975 (1 st ed.1966), pp.V-VI. 2 Porphyrii Isagoge sive quinque voces, ed. A. Busse, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV,1, Berlin 1887, pp.1;10-14, quoted in Bruno Maioli, Gli universali. Alle origini del problema, Roma 1973, p.13. 3 See R.R. Dravid, The problem of universals in Indian philosophy, Delhi 1972, passim. On this school of thought and its texts, see the bibliography in K.H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol.I, Bibliography, 2 nd revised edition, Delhi 1983, pp.677-688, and the works cited in this article; see also E.P. Ostrovskaja, 'Ob istolkovaniji terminov samanya i visesa v "Tarkasangrahe" Annambhatty', in Literatura i kul'tura drevnej i srednevekovoj indiji, Moskva 1987, pp. 163-173, H. Nakamura, 'Vaisesika tetsugaku ni okeru fuhen to tokushuna', in Katsumata Shunkyo hakushi koki kinen ronshu. Daijo Bukkyo kara mikkyo e, Tokyo 1981, pp.509-530 (I wish to thank Kimiaki Tanaka for having kindly sent me this article).

philosophy. Just as Ayurvedic ideas and terminology have travelled with Buddhist pilgrims from India to Tibet, and then on to China, sometimes losing along the way part of their meaning and congruence, so the philosophical doctrines of certain Indian schools too have migrated into Ayurvedic medicine, i.e. into a conceptual framework quite different from that in which they were originally conceived. When they could not be made use of as they were, they have been adjusted and fitted to the special needs of physicians, or otherwise kept in the texts as something important more because of its presence than because of its practical usefulness. The opinions of scholars regarding the concepts of samanya and visesa in Vaisesika and in Ayurveda, and those on their passage from Vaisesika to Ayurveda, vary considerably. In the first place, while most scholars recognize the extreme realism of Vai- sesika, there are some who deny it, especially as regards Kanada, mythical founder of the school and author of its most basic text, the Vaisesikasutra; then there are those who think that it is not medical texts which have borrowed something from Vaisesika, but the latter from the former; finally, there are some who maintain that in Ayurveda the universals have functions altogether different from those which they originally had in Vaisesika. Another problem in comparing the meaning which the concepts of samanya and visesa have in Vaisesika and in Ayurveda is represented by the range of texts to examine: in principle, it would be better to compare texts belonging to the same period, but the difficulty of dating them makes adopting such a criterion highly problematic. Therefore we shall consider only the texts universally considered as the oldest and the most important, and their commentaries, when essential for a correct understanding of the text: for AyurOn Ayurvedic thought, see S.N. Dasgupta, A history of Indian philosophy, (1 st edition Cambridge 1922), Delhi 1975, vol.1, pp.212 ff.;280 ff.; vol.II, pp.273-436, K. Krishnamoorthy, 'The conception of personality in the Carakasamhita and the concept of prajnaparadha', in The Poona Orientalist, XV,1-4.1950, pp.65-89; C.G. Kashikar and S.G. Vartak, Ayurvediya-Padarthavijnana, Bombay 1953; W. Ruben, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Berlin 1954, pp.212-223; V.M. Bedekar, 'Studies in Samkhya: Pancasikha and Caraka', in Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 38.1958, pp.233-244; K.B. Ramakrishna Rao, 'The Samkhya philosophy in the Carakasamhita', in The Adyar Library Bulletin, XXVI,3-4.1962, pp. 193-205; J. Filliozat, 'L'esprit de la science indienne. La logique theorique des medecins', in Annuaire du College de France, 67.1967- 1968, pp.391-393; J. Filliozat, 'L'esprit de la science indienne. Le raisonnement et la discussion en medecine', in Annuaire du College de France, 68.1968-1969, pp.439-444; A. Wezler, 'Die "dreifache" Schlussfolgerung im Nyayasutra 1.1.5', in Indo-Iranian Journal, 11.1969, pp.190-211; H. Narain, Evolution of Nyaya-Vaisesika categoriology. I: Early Nyaya-Vaisesesika categoriology, Varanasi 1976; A. Rosu, Les conceptions psychologiques dans les textes medicaux indiens, Paris 1978; S. Srivastavya, Carak Samhita ki darsanik prsthabhumi, Allahabad 1983; M.G. Weiss, 'Caraka Samhita on the doctrine of karma', in Karma and rebirth in the Indian classical tradition, ed. by W.D. O'Flaherty, Berkeley 1980, pp.90-115; A. Comba, 'Carakasamhita, Sarirasthana I and Vaisesika philosophy', in Studies on Indian medical history, ed. by G.J. Meulenbeld and D. Wujastyk, Groningen 1987, pp.43-61; G. Lietard et P. Cordier, Travaux sur l'histoire de la medecine indienne, documents reunis et presentes par A. Rosu, Paris 1989. 5 Cf. infra, note 27. 6 Cf. D. Chattopadhyaya, Science and society in ancient India, (1 st edition 1977), Calcutta 1979, p.142 and passim. I have made a first series of objections to this thesis at the First Biannual Meeting of the European Chapter of the IASTAM, held in Monaco from the 27 th to the 29 th October 1989; a summary of my paper is forthcoming in the IASTAM Newsletter edited in Paris by Francis Zimmermann. 7 Cf. infra, and note 77.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) ... 9 veda, the Carakasamhita by Agnivesa-Caraka, the Susrutasamhita by Susruta, the Astangahrdaya and the Astangasangraha by (the two?) Vagbhata(s); for Vaisesika, the Vaisesikasutra by Kanada and the Prasastapadabhasya by Prasastapada. Another text important for Vaisesika is also the Dasapadarthasastra by Candramati or Maticandra, of which only the Chinese version is available, the original Sanskrit work being lost. 8 Among medical texts, the Carakasamhita and its commentary, the Ayurvedadipika, have special relevance, as they contain quotations from the Vaisesikasutra, thus revealing a direct relationship to this text.' But why has the author or have the authors of medical works such as the Carakasamhita given such prominence to Vaisesika philosophical theories? Certainly Vaisesika is not the only school of thought to provide material for Ayurvedic speculation: Samkhya too is important, and to a lesser degree the teachings of Nyaya and Vedanta are also made use of. The fundamental part played by Vaisesika is however brought out by the place its theories have been assigned for their exposition within the work of Agnivesa-Caraka: the beginning of the first chapter. This means that Vaisesika thought is considered to be especially useful for medicine, and the reason for this usefulness will most probably have to be sought in its gnoseology and metaphysics. Vaisesika tries to account, with economy, thoroughness and cogency, for phenomena as they appear to us. Every 'cognition' (buddhi) we have can be explained by some principle; if the principles already defined cannot account for a certain cognition, we must infer the existence of another principle. But which are the basic principles and how are they defined? The basic principles, promptly called 'categories' by Western indologists, though Prasastapada calls them padarthas, 'objects of names', 10 are three: substance, quality and motion. The definitions given to them by Kanada are already the result of a sophisticated elaboration, even though Vaisesika is considered by its followers as the 'viewpoint of the common man': for example, substance is defined as 'that in which are 8 There is an English translation of this text in H. Ui, The Vaisesika philosophy according to the Dasapadarthasastra, Varanasi 1962, 2 nd ed. (1 st ed. 1917), pp.3-119. 9 For the sutras quoted in the first adhyaya of the Sarirasthana of the CS, cf. A. Comba, op. cit., pp.47 ff.; for the sutras quoted by the commentator Cakrapanidatta (henceforth: Cakra), cf. e.g. Cakra ad CS, Sutra I,1,1. Cakra also quotes other Vaisesika texts, e.g. the Prasastapadabhasya (cf. Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44; PPB p.49). 10 Cf. PPB p.15. 'Objects of names' (or 'objects of words') is admittedly not a perfect translation of padartha, as among the dravyas we find the atman, which is the subject and not an 'object'. But a perusal of Prasastapada and Sridhara makes one realise that different translations create difficulties, as expressions such as e.g. 'word-meaning' can also refer to impossible, absolutely non-existent things like a hare's horn, whereas the term padartha always refers to things which have an ontological reality, such as substances etc. 11 In the Vaisesika context the word karman, though often translated as 'action', is better translated as 'motion'; an atom does not 'act', it moves. Of course one could opine that a motion is itself an action, but there is a difference in this sort of action and 'action' in other contexts such as e.g. Ayurveda: while Vaisesika speaks chiefly of causal substances, Ayurveda is concerned mainly with effect-substances (karyadravya), that is, man, who performs actions. Thus I have translated karman with 'motion' when dealing with Vaisesika theories (also in Ayurvedic passages), but when Cakra speaks of the karman of patients (such as gymnastics etc.) (see infra), then I feel compelled to translate karman with 'action', which of course can subsume a motion too.

motions, that in which are qualities, that which is an inherential cause'. 12 One of the nine substances inferred by Kanada is earth.13 But it would be a mistake to think of this as brown lumps of dirt; earth is, by definition, the only substance which has smell, but it can assume every possible colour. 14 It is impossible to explain here all the implications of such a definition, or to examine the way Kanada has reached it: for the time being suffice it to say that all the definitions of this system are connected to each other by a thick web of relationships and underlying argumentations, so that no definition can be fully understood unless it is considered together with all the others, as is the case for the rules in the Sanskrit grammar of Panini. It is in this context that the deduction of the padarthas (which, for convenience and following established practice, we shall translate as 'categories', though see supra) samanya and visesa takes place. The first universal (samanya) to be deduced is 'being' (bhava, satta). We cognize substances, qualities and motions; but we also have the cognition that they 'exist'.15 What produces this cognition? Not a substance (dravya), because, by definition, there are only two types of substances: those which have as substrate two or more other substances (anekadravyavat), like for example a vessel which has as substrate many atoms of earth, and those which do not have any other substance as substrate (adravyavat), like an atom or time.16 But the 'being' which we cognize is an undivided whole inherent in each single substance, something which, according to Vaisesika terminology, 'has a single substance as substrate' (ekadravyavat). Therefore 'being' cannot be a substance. Nor can 'being' be a quality (guna), because by definition a quality cannot inhere in another quality, but only in a substance; if 'being' were a quality, then, saying that, for example, the red colour 'is', we would be making a quality inhere in another quality, and this is not possible. We encounter the same difficulty if we take 'being' as a motion (karman), because the latter, too, can inhere only in substances.17 So 'being' is something different from substance, quality and motion: it is a 'universal' (samanya). The mark (linga) by which its existence is inferred is the cognition that a thing 'is'; now, as this cognition does not vary according to the occurrences or the substrates of this 'being', and as 'being' is not signalled or marked by different lingas, Kanada comes to the conclusion that 'being' is one and the same everywhere.18 So the universal is, paradoxically, one and the same in different individuals, in each of which it inheres entirely, without fragmenting itself: we do not perceive in each thing a fraction of 'being', but 'being' is wholly in every 12 VS (Candra) I,1,14. An inherential cause is that in which the effect inheres: e.g. atoms of earth are the inherential cause of a vessel, because a vessel is made up of atoms of earth, in which it inheres. 13 VS (Candra) I,1,4. 14 Cf. VS (Candra) II,1,1-2 and the commentary by Candrananda. Therefore, every time we perceive a smell, we can be sure that atoms of earth are present. 15 VS (Candra) 1,2,7. 16 Candrananda ad VS (Candra) I,2,9. 17 VS (Candra) 1,2,8-10 and the commentary by Candrananda. 18 VS (Candra) 1,2,18.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa)... 11 existing substance, quality and motion. We shall see later how the commentators have tried to solve the problem of the being of 'being', without falling into an infinite regress. But 'being' is not the only existing universal: Kanada in a similar way also deduces the existence of substance-hood (dravyatva), of quality-hood (gunatva) and of motion-hood (karmatva), which inhere respectively in substances, qualities and motions. There is however an important difference between these universals and 'being': while 'being' is but a universal, 19 because it inheres in all that 'is' substances, qualities and motions - substance-hood and the other universals are at the same time also particulars (visesa).20 What is a particular? -In the Vaisesikasutra the term is used with two different meanings: in the first place, it refers to the universal itself, when it produces a diversifying cognition.21 For example, 'substance-hood' functions as a universal when it makes us recognize a substance, but functions as a particular when it makes it possible for us to distinguish between a substance and a quality.22 As 'being' is the only universal which does not function as a particular, Prasastapada later calls it 'superior' (para), as opposed to all the others, which he calls 'inferior' (apara). Kanada normally refers to the latter with the compound samanyavisesa 'universal-particular',23 though this is not always the case: according to the commentator Candrananda, there is a sutra in which samanya stands for the universal 'being', while visesa stands for substance-hood and the other inferior universals.24 In the second place, the term visesa is used by Kanada, in combination with the adjective antya (last', 'ultimate'), to refer to what are 'particulars' in the proper sense of the word, and which constitute another padartha; of these 'ultimate particulars', Kanada says only that they are different from the universal-particulars.25 We shall see later which considerations Prasastapada makes on this subject. But let us return once again to the universal-particulars, because they are at the center of the debate between those scholars who maintain that Kanada was a conceptualist and those who believe him to have been a realist. The former base their thesis on the sutra in which the universal-particulars are mentioned for the first time. The sutra says: "Universal", "particular", depend upon cognition'.26 In this sutra Kanada is, according to them, denying the independent and extra-mental reality of universals; Prasastapada 19 VS (Candra) I,2,4. 20 VS (Candra) 1,2,5. 21 VS (Candra) 1,2,3. 22 Cf. VS (Candra) 1,2,5; PPB p.746 and NK on it. 23 Cf. e.g. VS (Candra) 1,2.11. 24 Cf. VS (Candra) VIII,6 and the commentary by Candrananda. Cf. also VS (Candra) VIII,5, where, according to Candrananda, samanya stands for all the universals, and visesa for the 'ultimate particulars' (see infra). 25 VS (Candra) 1,2,6. 26 VS (Candra) 1,2,3: samanyam visesa iti buddhyapeksam.

and his successors would then have adopted a 'realist' position, twisting the words of Kanada. This interpretation, however, produces serious inconsistencies in the system, even leaving aside the commentators and keeping to what the sutras themselves say. For example, the universals cannot possibly depend upon a buddhi or cognition in the sense of being caused by this, because a buddhi is a quality, 28 and a quality can cause only substances, qualities and motions, 29 and the universals are neither substances, nor qualities, nor motions.30 Secondly, if the universals were dependent on cognition in the sense of being produced by these, they would not any more be permanent and uncaused. It is true that there is no sutra which speaks of the permanence, or rather, of the eternity 31 of the universals, nor of the ultimate particulars, nor of inherence. Nevertheless Kanada says that 'substances, qualities and motions do not differ from each other in being, in being not eternal, in having substances [as inherential causes], in being effects and causes and in having universal-particulars [inhering in them]'.32 From this it can easily be concluded that all these characteristics possessed by substances, qualities and motions do not belong to the other entities of Kanada (that is, universals, particulars and inherence). This is actually the conclusion drawn by all the commentators. 33 Obviously there are exceptions to what the sutra affirms: on the one hand, not all substances have causes (for example, atoms are eternal), 34 while on the other hand universals, just like substances and the other categories, can be causes, because they cause the cognitions which reveal them. 27 Cf. the remarks of Y.V. Athalye in Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha, ed. with critical and explanatory notes by Y.V. Athalye together with introd. and English translation by M.R. Bodas, Bombay 1963, 2 nd rev. ed. (1 st ed. 1897), pp.90 f.; B. Faddegon, The Vaisesika-system, Wiesbaden 1969 (Neudruck der Ausgabe von 1918), p.146 and p.289; A.B. Keith, Indian logic and atomism, New Delhi, 1977 (1 st ed. 1921), p.37; S.N. Dasgupta, op. cit. vol.I, p.281, vol.II, p.371; S.S. Barlingay, 'The theory of samanya or jati', in Shakti, II,7.1965, p.21; W. Halbfass, 'Remarks on the Vaisesika concept of samanya', in Anjali. Papers on Indology and Buddhism. A Felicitation Volume presented to Oliver Hector de Alwis Wijesekera, ed. by J. Tilakasiri, Peradeniya 1970, pp.144 f.; H. Narain, op. cit., pp.207 ff. 28 VS (Candra) I,1,5. Kanada does not say explicitly that buddhi is a quality of the conscious principle or atman, but it cannot be otherwise, as the very existence of the atman is inferred from the perceptions, the volitions and from everything that can be attributed to a subject which does cognitive acts (cf. VS (Candra) 11,2,4). 29 VS (Candra) I,1,17-18. 30 VS (Candra) 1,2,8-17. 31 The term nitya does not correspond exactly to 'permanent', nor to 'eternal', because it refers to what can be an object of cognition without limits of time: e.g. 'being' is nitya because the awareness that things 'are' is not limited in time, unlike the cognition of a vessel. But as all that is nitya is without cause (VS (Candra) IV,1,1), we translate this word as 'eternal', following an established practice. 32 VS (Candra) I,1,7: sad anityam dravyavat karyam karanam samanyavisesavad iti dravyagunakarmanam avisesah. 33 Cf. e.g. PPB p.49 and the commentary of Sridhara on it. 34 Cf. Candrananda ad VS (Candra) I,1,7.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) ... 13 But let us now examine the role which according to Kanada is played by the universals in the process of knowing. Kanada says: 'From the whiteness which inheres [in the white colour], from the cognition of the whiteness comes the cognition of white; these have with each other the relation of effect and cause'. 35 This sutra has often been translated introducing the conjunction 'and' between the whiteness and the cognition of whiteness; but the conjunction is absent from the text, and not without a reason. To introduce a conjunction would mean to put the two ablatives on the same level, to present them as two concomitant causes in the cognition of white; in this way there would be two causes and one effect, and one would naturally want to know to which of the two causes the final part of the sutra refers to. But such an interpretation is altogether wrong, as becomes clear when we sum things up: there is a substance in which the white colour, a quality, inheres; in this colour inheres the universal 'whiteness'; this universal is known before the colour; the cognition of the universal produces the cognition of the colour, the recognition of the colour as 'white'. From this series of passages two conclusions can be drawn: in the first place the ablative svaityat implies that the universal 'whiteness' is already present in the white colour before it is known, and it can certainly not be said that this is a conceptualist position; secondly, the universal indirectly becomes the cause of the cognition of the object itself (the commentators will say that it is an efficient cause or nimittakarana of the cognition) - the universal cannot however be at the same time the cause and the effect of a cognition! It is clear then that, in saying that 'universal' and 'particular' depend upon cognition, 36 what Kanada really wanted to convey was that the same entity, the so called universal-particular, is called 'universal' or 'particular' according to the cognition it produces. This becomes evident especially if one keeps in mind the relationships between this sutra and those which follow.37 The word iti, which in this case indicates the two possible ways of considering the same entity with respect to its functions, occurs also in another sutra of Kanada to express the relativity of the notions of 'small' and 'big': the same thing can be small with respect to a bigger thing, or big with respect to a smaller thing.3 38 35 VS (Candra) VIII,9: samavayinah svaityac chvaityabuddheh svete buddhis te karyakaranabhute. 36 VS (Candra) 1,2,3. 37 Cf. in particular VS (Candra) I, 2, 3-5. For the correct interpretation of this sutra, and a discussion of the problem, see H. Ui, op. cit., pp.173 ff.; H.N. Randle, Indian logic in the early schools, New Delhi 1976 (1 st ed. 1930), pp.133 ff.; S. Bhaduri, Studies in Nyaya-Vaisesika metaphysics, Poona 1975 (1 st ed. 1947), pp.19 f.; J. Filliozat, L'Inde classique... cit., pp.68 ff.; E. Frauwallner, History of Indian philosophy, Delhi 1973 (orig. ed. Salzburg 1953-56), vol.II, pp.101 ff.; G. Patti, Der Samavaya im Nyaya-Vaisesika system, Roma 1955, pp. 125-128; M. Biardeau, Theorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique, Paris-La Haye 1964, p.174, n.1; R.R. Dravid, op. cit., pp.34 f.; K.H. Potter, Encyclopedia... cit., vol.II, pp.133 ff.; B.N. Singh, Indian logic, Varanasi 1982, pp.108 ff. 38 VS (Candra) VII, 1,18. H. Narain (op. cit., pp.209-210) rightly compares this relativity of notions to the father/son example of Patanjali (Mahabhasya 1,1,66; vol.I, p.172 1.6 ff. Kielhorn); much less appropriate is the example, from the same source, of the cow-samanya and of the black-visesa. But Narain is wrong in concluding that 'samanya and visesa are relative notions and represent notional or logical categories rather than ontological ones' (p.211).

Even if from these considerations it emerges that the doctrine of the universals and of the particulars formulated by Kanada has its own consistency, there are many questions left open: first of all that of the possible infinite regresses into which we fall if we admit that the universals can be inhered in by other universals (for example, by 'being-ness', or by 'universal-ness'). If a list of categories is made and to them is attributed some kind of 'being', we must specify which kind of 'being' is to be understood here. Then it is necessary to define better the nature of the 'ultimate' particular: what is its use? Why does it differ from the universal-particular? And can a particular be inhered in by a particular without an infinite regress? Lastly, we must examine the question of how the universal can be present in things, the relation between the one and the many, between eternity and temporality. One who does not follow to the letter the teachings of Kanada, according to whom the universal 'existence', the 'universal-particulars' and the 'ultimate particulars' cannot themselves be inhered in by universals and particulars, 39 could posit a 'great universal' which inheres in all categories, or a special 'being' which makes it possible to say that the categories 'exist'. During the so-called 'Dark Period' of the Vaisesika school, which goes from Kanada to Candramati and Prasastapada, 40 these questions were debated by authors belonging to other, principally Jaina and Buddhist schools. 41 The Jaina teacher Saduluka Rohagupta (about 18 a.C.),42 who played a very important part in the sixth Jaina schism, introduced in his work some Vaisesika theories, among these two classifications of the universals and of the particulars: the first distinguishes between a 'great universal' (mahasamanna), a universal 'being' (sattasamanna), a universal called 'universal-particular' (samannavisesasamanna), and only one type of particulars. The second divides the universals into superior (para) and inferior (apara), and envisages also two types of particulars, called antaviseso and anantaviseso, 'ultimate particulars' and 'non-ultimate particulars'. In the opinion of the commentator Jinabhadra, the first classification of the universals can be interpreted in two different ways: according to the first interpretation, the 'great universal' produces the cognition of the 'category-hood' of the six categories, the universal 'being' causes the cognition of the being of the categories which 'are' (substance, quality and motion), and the universal-particular is e.g. substance-hood. According to the second, the 'great universal' produces the cognition that the first three categories 'exist', the universal 'being' is e.g. 'substance-hood' and the universal-particular 43 39 40 Cf. VS (Candra) I,1,7; 1,2,11; 1,2,13; 1,2,15; 1,2,17; VIII,5. For a definition and an account of the 'Dark Period' see B.K. Matilal, Nyaya-Vaisesika, vol.VI(2) of A History of Indian Literature, ed. by J. Gonda, Wiesbaden 1977, pp.59 ff. 41 Cf. ibid.; H. Ui, op. cit., pp.1 ff. 42 On the date of Rohagupta, see E. Leumann, 'Die alten Berichte von den Schismen der Jaina', in Indische Studien, 17.1895, pp.116 ff. 43 Cf. E. Leumann, op. cit., p.122. Further classifications are provided by certain Jaina commentaries to the work of this author, quoted by A. Thakur (op. cit., pp.6-9): they are the Avasyakasutravrtti by Haribhadrasuri (fl. 750 a.C. according to K.H. Potter, Encyclopedia... cit., vol.I, p.183), the Visesavasyakabhasyavrtti by Maladhari Hemacandrasuri (fl. 1180 a.C. according to Potter, l.c., p.257), and the Uttaradhyayanasutrabrhadvrtti by Santisuri (fl. 1240 a.C., cf. Potter, l.c., p.266).

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) ... 15 is e.g. 'earth-ness' (that is, a universal inferior to substance-hood).44 This last interpretation is less plausible than the first, but it is interesting to see how, with different classifications of the universals and the particulars, an attempt is made to solve the problems raised by their theorization.45 49 Another attempt in this direction was made by Candramati in his Dasapadarthasastra, which has come to us only in a Chinese translation dated 648 a.C.46 Candramati lists ten categories: 'substance, attribute, action, universality, particularity, inherence, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and non-existence'.47 Universality is the 'existence' inherent in substances, qualities and motions, is perceived by all sense-organs and is the cause of the recognition of the 'existence' of the first three categories. It is a non-product and is eternal, without qualities and motions, one and without parts.48 Particularity exists only in each eternal substance, and produces 'the intellection of excluding others and determining the one'. It too, just like the universal, is eternal, not produced, without qualities and motions, and without parts; however, unlike 'existence', it is manifold.49 The ninth category, translated by Ui with the term 'commonness', includes all the universal-particulars like substance-hood etc.; they have the same characteristics of eternity etc., of 'existence', but are different amongst themselves. Not every 'commonness' is perceptible in the same way: while substance-hood and motion-hood are perceived by the organs of sight and touch, quality-hood is perceived by all sense-organs. So Candramati calls only 'existence' a 'universal', and, unlike Prasastapada, puts all the universal-particulars together in another category. Remarkable is in any case the admission of the direct perceptibility of the universal, a theory already maintained by Kanada.51 At first sight one would say that this classification does not include a 'great universal' inherent in all the categories. But actually for Candramati it does not constitute a special category, nor a kind of universal: he confines himself to the general acknowledgement, made at the end of the work, that all the categories are knowable and at the same time the causes of their recognitions. 44 Cf. E. Leumann, op. cit., p.122. 45 50 The threefold partition of the universals has no parallel in other texts, not even in Chinese texts: cf. H. Ui, op. cit., p.36. 46 Cf. H. Ui, op. cit., p.1. For the date of Candramati or Maticandra, cf. H. Ui, op. cit., pp.9 f.; E. Frauwallner, 'Candramati und sein Dasapadarthasastram. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Vaisesika', in Studia Indologica. Festschrift fur Willibald Kirfel, Bonn 1955, p.84; B.K. Matilal, op. cit., pp.62-64. 47 H. Ui, op. cit., p.93. 48 Ibidem, pp.99-100;116;173-175;219. 49 Ibidem, pp.100;102;117;175;219. 50 Ibidem, pp.100;118;180-183;221-222. 51 Cf. VS (Candra) IV,1,14. 52 Cf. Ui, op. cit., p.119 and footnote, p.224: according to Ui, the term 'knowable' represents the jneyatva of Prasastapada, and 'causes of their recognitions' includes his astitva and abhidheyatva. M. Hattori translates this passage differently: 'All the 10 categories are cognizable (jneya) and nameable (abhidheya)' (cf. K.H.

53 55 Perhaps as a reaction to the operation attempted by Candramati and with the aim of bringing Vaisesika back into the fold of orthodoxy, or simply with the aim of giving to the school a more solid doctrinal basis, Prasastapada made with his Bhasya an impressive effort at a systematization of Vaisesika. For centuries his work was better known than the Vaisesikasutra itself, and was the subject of a much greater number of commentaries. The reason for this success is probably to be sought in the rational order in which he arranged the doctrines of the school, an order different from that adopted by Kanada; this does not however mean that he is not extremely faithful to the sutras. How does Prasastapada solve the problems raised by the theory of the universals and of the particulars? First of all by positing (if this has not been already done by Kanada in the famous sutra now considered spurious), 54 that the categories are six, and only six: substance, quality, motion, universal, particular and inherence; all these categories have 'is-ness' (astitva), nameability (abhidheyatva) and knowability (jneyatva).5 Nevertheless, this 'is-ness' is not a 'great universal', which would produce an infinite regress, but a character (dharma).57 The fact that astitva, jneyatva and abhidheyatva, notwithstanding their suffix -tva, are not universals, and that they, though not distinct from the categories themselves, belong exclusively to the six categories and not to imaginary objects, solves some of the problems raised in this connection by K. H. Potter.58 In the text of Prasastapada jneyatva and abhidheyatva are not, as Potter here seems to believe, predicates of astitva.59 However, to fully understand the statement 'astitvam jneyatvam abhidheyatvam' it is not only necessary to understand as implied the words 'all the categories have...', but it is also necessary to grasp the polemical value which this statement has with regard to Buddhists and Vedantins, who deny that 'being' coincides with all that is knowable and nameable.60 56 As 'is-ness' is defined as dharma or character, and not as a universal, it is necessary to explain the exact meaning of this term. According to the commentator Sridhara, characters are not distinct from categories (otherwise there would exist something outside the categories), but the categories themselves become, one with respect to another, character (dharma) or thing characterized (dharmin). The characters are the 'own forms' Potter, Encyclopedia... cit., vol.II, p.281). 53 Cf. E. Frauwallner, 'Candramati...' cit., pp.82 f. 54 VS (Sankara) I,1,4. 55 PPB p.15. 56 57 PPB p.41. NK p.41. Note that 'character' here is used in the meaning 'trait, characteristic; essential peculiarity, nature'. 58 Cf. 'Astitva jneyatva abhidheyatva', in Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens und Archiv fur indische Philosophie, XII-XIII.1968-69, pp.275-280. 59 Potter has later rectified his position in Encyclopedia... cit., p.141. 60 Cf. R. R. Dravid, op. cit., p.7;265.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa)... 17 61 (svarupa) of the objects, that is to say, their individuality, their special way of being. This unique and unrepeatable way of being which is the thing itself can on the one hand not produce the cognition that an object 'is', and so does not make useless the universal 'being', on the other hand it makes it possible for the universal 'being' to inhere in the object, because a universal cannot inhere in something which is absolutely not existing. A similar explanation is given to account for the fact that we cognize the universals and the particulars as entities which somehow 'exist'. As there can be no universal 'being' inherent in them,62 but we nevertheless know them as 'existing', we must admit that their being is their own form, or that they 'exist in themselves';63 again, the cognitions we have of their 'being' are due to the fact that we fictitiously superimpose on them the universal 'being' which does not actually inhere in them.64 In his classification of the universals, Prasastapada, as we have already seen, distinguishes the universal 'being', as superior (para), from all the other universals, which are called inferior (apara), but keeps all the universals in one and the same category or padartha. This classification is based on two criteria: the first is the extension of the 'field', 'sphere' or 'range' (visaya) of the universal, the second the type of cognitions which the universals produce. Visaya is a term difficult to translate in all its shades of meaning: in this case it indicates the whole of all the objects in which the universal is cognized, and therefore the objects in which it inheres.65 The universal 'being' has the largest possible field, because it inheres in all substances, qualities and motions. The inferior universals have instead a smaller range, as they inhere only in a part of the field of 'being': e.g. substance-hood inheres only in substances, and not in qualities or in motions. Every universal is everywhere (sarvagata) in its field, a fact which however raises problems when one must explain how a universal enters into something which is newly born and did not exist before, if by definition it is without motion. 66 67 61 Cf. NK p.42. 62 63 Cf. NK p.49. Cf. NK p.49: svatmaiva sattvam svarupam yat samanyamadinam tad eva tesam sattvam. Cf. also NK p.31: tesam api svarupasattasambuddhisamvedyatvat. Cf. Vy. p.142: svatmana sadharanadharmenopacaranimittena sattvam - sat sad iti pratyayajanakatvam, mukhye hy anavasthadibadhakopapatteh. 64 Cf. NK p.49-50: kutas tarhi samanyadisu sat sad ity anugamah? svarupasattvasadharmyena sattadhyaropat/tarhi mithyapratyayo'yam? ko namaha neti/bhinnasvabhavesv ekanugamo mithyaiva, svarupagrahanan tu na mrsa, svaripasya yatharthatvat. 65 Cf. NK p.741: yat samanyam yatra pinde pratiyate sa tasya svo visayah. The term visaya appears only in the sutrapatha commented upon by Sankaramisra and not in the other two versions: cf. VS (Sankara) III,2,17; IV,2,1. 66 Cf. PPB and NK pp.29-30. Playing on the different meanings of the term visaya, which also designates the kingdom or the lands of a monarch, Vyomasiva explains that as a king is said to be superior (para) to another because he has a larger visaya, so 'being', having a larger visaya, is called 'superior', while the other universals, which have smaller visayas, are called 'inferior universals' (cf. Vy. p.55). 67 Cf. PPB and NK pp.741-742; PPB p.43. A universal cannot move: only the substance in which it inheres can move, hence the objection of the Buddhists: tatha pinde vrajati na samanyasya gamanam asti niskriyatvat napy avasthanam pindasya tacchunyataprasangat / na bhagena gamanam avasthanam ca

68 71 69 The type of cognitions produced by 'being' also distinguishes it from the other universals: it only produces the cognition called anuvrtti, or anuvrttipratyaya," or anugamapratyaya,70 and not the cognition called vyavrttipratyaya." The anuvrttipratyaya is an 'inclusive' cognition or a cognition of 'identity', while the vyavrttipratyaya is an 'exclusive' cognition or a cognition of difference. The inferior universals, on the contrary, cause both types of cognitions: e.g., 'substance-hood' produces both the cognition of the identity of substances and the cognition of the diversity of the substances from qualities and motions.73 72 According to Prasastapada, the word 'particular', when referring to these inferior universals, is used only metaphorically (bhaktya), and this use is due to the fact that they differentiate the things they inhere in from other things; in reality they belong to the category of the universals, and the primary and technical meaning of the term 'particular' is quite different. 74 But if the cognition that, for example, a substance is different from a quality (that A is different from B) is produced by the universal 'substance-hood' functioning as a 'particular', what are the 'ultimate particulars', and what is their use? Prasastapada says that the 'ultimate particulars' are entities present in 'ultimate' or eternal substances, namely in atoms, in the phonic space (akasa), in time, in space (dis), in atmans and in minds (manas). In each of these substances inheres an 'ultimate particular' which causes the cognition of their absolute distinction from everything else (atyantavyavrtti). Every atom is altogether identical to the others as regards form (akrti), qualities and motions, and the 'ultimate particular' is that by which they differ from each niramsatvat/napi pascad agatyabhisambadhyate purvam tacchunyasyanupalabdheh (Vy. p.682). 68 This word occurs only in VS (Sankara) 1,2,4, but not in the other two sutrapathas. 69 PPB p.743. 70 PPB p.742. 71 PPB p.746. 72 These cognitions are the proof that universals exist (PPB p.49: samanyadinam trayanam [...] buddhilaksanatvam...). Vyomasiva interprets this statement of Prasastapada in the sense that the three categories of universal, particular and inherence are characterized by different cognitions: the universal is marked by a cognition of identity, the particular by a cognition of diversity, and inherence by the cognition 'here' (= this inheres in that). These three categories have however in common the fact of thier being marked by a certain cognition. So the word laksana has the meaning of common 'characteristic' (cf. Vy. p.143: buddhir laksanam yesam buddhya va laksyanta iti buddhilaksanas tesam bhavo buddhilaksanatvam). For Sridhara, on the contrary, in this passage of Prasastapada laksana has the meaning of proof, of means for ascertaining the existence of something (pramana): Prasastapada, Sridhara says, wants to emphasize the fact that, while the reality of substances, qualities and motions is ascertained also by other means of proof, i.e. by their effects, the reality of universals, particulars and inherence can be proved only from the cognitions they produce. Sridhara then mentions the opinion of Vyomasiva and rejects it, saying that if the cognition were only a characteristic and not a proof, this would not differentiate the last three categories from the first three, because substances, qualities and motions too have cognitions peculiar to them (cf. NK p.50). 73 Cf. PPB p.746. 74 Cf. PPB p.747.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa).. 19 other. 'Ultimate particulars' are also by what, for example, liberated atmans and minds remain distinct from each other." But no eternal substance is directly perceptible: each is inferred by its effects, just as the prakrti of the Samkhya school. Who then will be able to perceive the absolute difference existing, for example, between two earth atoms? According to Prasastapada such a knowledge belongs exclusively to the yogins. Nevertheless, he confesses that he is not himself a yogin, and therefore, implicitly, that he has no empirical knowledge of the particulars. 76 How is this Vaisesika theory of the universals and particulars made use of by the authors of medical texts? The Carakasamhita and its commentary Ayurvedadipika by Cakra have often been interpreted in the light of what S.N. Dasgupta wrote on them. According to this scholar, in the Carakasamhita samanya and visesa 'have a significance quite different from what they have in the Vaisesikasutras': in Vaisesika the 'word samanya means a class concept', while in Caraka it means 'the concrete things which have similar constituents or characteristics', and the visesas, which for Vaisesika are the 'ultimate specific properties differentiating one atom from another', in Caraka come to mean 'concrete things which have dissimilar and opposite constituents or characteristics'. What in Vaisesika had only a conceptual value, in Caraka comes to have an extremely important practical function: 'Substances having similar constituents or characteristics will increase each other, and those having dissimilar constituents or characteristics will decrease each other'.77 Now, it is true that Caraka introduces certain adjustments in the Vaisesika theory of the universals and of the particulars, but these are not exactly the ones pointed out by Dasgupta. Again, a correct approach to the problem is impossible if we do not exclude right from the beginning the conceptualistic interpretation of Kanada.78 In the first place, it is necessary to carefully ascertain if the terms samanya and visesa are used in the Carakasamhita with a technical meaning or with their literal meaning: if they are used with a technical meaning, they would correspond respectively to the fourth and fifth category of Prasastapada; if, on the contrary, they are employed with their literal meaning, the word samanya would mean a similarity (samanatva) and visesa a difference. There is, however, an easy way to distinguish a 'similarity' from a 'universal', and a 'difference' from an 'ultimate particular': while a 'universal' is present only in objects belonging to one and the same category, for example in two substances or in two qualities, a 'similarity' exists also in objects belonging to different categories, such as a substance and a quality; and while a 'particular', the antyavisesa of Prasastapada, is present only in eternal substances, a 'difference' exists also in other types of objects. 75 Cf. PPB pp.766-768. PPB pp.767-769. 77 S.N. Dasgupta, op. cit., vol.II, p.371; cf. also H. Narain, op. cit., p.110. 78 Cf. supra. 79 For this distinction, see S. Bhattacharya, 'The Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of qualities', in Philosophy East and West, 11.1961, p.145, n. 9.

A Secondly, if the term visesa does not simply convey a difference between two objects, we must establish if it is used in the sense which Prasastapada calls metaphorical, i.e. to designate the 'universal-particulars', such as 'substance-hood', or in its primary sense, to denote the 'ultimate particulars'. In any case it must be pointed out that the use of the words samanya and visesa in their literal meaning is amply attested already in the Vaisesikasutras, so it is not something foreign to the tradition of Vaisesika. 80 81 The most important passages of the Carakasamhita discussing the universals and the particulars are three: in the first the six categories of Vaisesika are listed, in the second universals and particulars are described according to their causality, and in the third they are defined through characteristics useful in medicine.31 Now in the first of the passages under consideration the terms samanya and visesa are undeniably used in their technical meanings, and not in the sense of 'similarities' and 'differences', because we find them in the list of the six Vaisesika categories; it is however odd that these categories should have been listed in an order which is different from the 'classical' one: universals come first, followed by particulars, qualities, substances, motion or action, and finally inherence.2 Universals and particulars should have occupied the fourth and the fifth place in the list, but Caraka puts them in the first and in the second place. 82 83 Cakra does not explain this passage immediately, but says he will do it later while commenting on the stanzas containing the definition of each category. In fact, when Cakra does introduce the first of these stanzas, he tries to justify the fact that Caraka describes the universal before the other categories, saying that this is due to the fact that it has been mentioned first in the list of all the categories, and that etiology, symptomatology and therapeutics, the knowledge of which must be acquired through Ayurveda, all have as their basis the knowledge of the universals.84 80 Cf., for samanya, VS (Candra) I,1,17; 1,1,22; 1,1,24; I,1,29; II,1,6-7 etc.; for visesa, VS (Candra) I,2,17; II,1,30; II,2,13 etc. Narain has used some of these passages and also others to maintain that in the Vaisesikasutra the word samanya does not have the fixed technical meaning of universal (op. cit., p.179); however it often happens in philosophical texts that the same word is used sometimes in a technical sense, and sometimes in a literal sense (e.g. the terms artha, rupa, etc. in the sutras), so this does not necessarily indicate a primitive and ambiguous stage of the doctrine. 81 Cf. CS Sutra 1,28; CS Sutra 1,44; CS Sutra 1,45. 82 Cf. CS Sutra 1,28 b-29 a: samanyam ca visesam ca gunan dravyani karma ca // samavayam ca...; PPB p.15. Even if we reject as spurious the sutra containing the list of the categories (VS (Sankara) I,1,4), it is remarkable that in the sutras the single categories are discussed according to the order followed by Prasastapada in his list (cf. VS (Candra) I,1,4 ff.). 83 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,27-29. 84 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44; cf. CS Sutra 1,24. In this passage of his commentary Cakra mentions only the universal and not the particular, because, as the latter is nothing else but the universal-particular, it is included in the universals (cf. infra).

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) ... 21 Caraka then describes universals and particulars as follows: 'The universal is always a cause of increase for all things, and the particular is a cause of decrease; but the function is of both'. 85 Commenting on this passage, Cakra observes that with 'things', substances, qualities and motions are meant. Then he rectifies and rejects some possible interpretations of this sentence of Caraka. According to the first interpretation, it is the universal itself, as such, which, in the form of jati, 'genus', increases things. Now the actual definition of the universal is not the phrase 'cause of increase', but, as Caraka will say in the next passage, 'that which produces unity (ekatva)'. The universal is called 'cause of increase' because it is that which serves as a signal, indicator or mark (laksana) of the actual cause of increase, which can be a substance, a quality or a motion. 86 Cakra also says that, as a point of fact, if a universal were always as such a cause of increase, we would have the absurd consequence that all the things in which that universal inheres would increase automatically; e.g., if the universal 'flesh-ness/meat-ness' (mamsatva) always caused an increase, as it resides both in the meat we eat (which is the cause of increase) and in the flesh which is an element of the body (which is that which is increased), we would always have an increase also in those who do not eat meat, because the universal 'flesh-ness/meat-ness' inheres in their own flesh too (and Caraka says that the universal is always a cause of increase for all things). But we observe that this is not the case; therefore the samanya is said to be 'cause of increase' in the sense that it is an indicator or mark of such a cause. To confirm his reasoning Cakra quotes a sentence from Prasastapada, which says that the three categories of the universals, of the particulars and of inherence can be neither effects nor causes. 87 Cakra then takes for examination the point of view of those who maintain that in this passage the term samanya has the meaning of the adjective 'similar' (samana): according to them it does not mean a universal, but an object (substance, quality, motion) similar to another object.88 This is the interpretation of Dasgupta himself, and it is interesting to see how it was already foreseen and rejected by Cakra. For those who adopt this point of view must reckon with the list of categories mentioned by Caraka, in which the word samanya is undeniably used with a technical meaning: from this follows the necessity of admitting also, absurdly, that the universal is mentioned only in Sutra I, 28 and nowhere else in the treatise.89 Cakra rejects this thesis with two arguments: the first is based on the fact that the logical connection between the different subjects expounded (sambandhartha) is a 85 sarvada sarvabhavanam samanyam vrddhikaranam / hrasahetur visesas ca, pravrttir ubhayasya tu // (CS Sutra 1,44). 86 87 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. Cf. ibidem and PPB p.49. The example of meat/flesh has been chosen by Cakra because it appears also elsewhere in the text (CS Sarira VI,10), and because meat is considered by Ayurvedic physicians to be the most nourishing kind of food (cf. CS Sutra XXVI,87; F. Zimmermann, La jungle et le fumet des viandes, Paris 1982, passim). 88 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 89 Ibidem.

90 requisite essential to every treatise worth being read and studied. If we admit that Caraka has used the term samanya in different places with different meanings, we can no more believe in the logical consistency of the author. It follows that we must always give to samanya the same technical meaning, and consequently interpret the expression 'cause of increase' as a character (dharma: another occurrence of Vaisesika terminology) useful as a description of the universal in a medical context; the actual definition of the universal will, in fact, be given in the stanza immediately following, i.e. in Sutra 1,45.91 The second argument is based on the correspondence existing between the way in which universals and particulars are dealt with, and the way in which the other categories are dealt with. After having listed the six categories, Caraka, even though not always in the same order in which he mentioned them for the first time, explains and defines all six of them. For example, substance, after having been mentioned as fourth in Sutra 1,28, is described after the universals and the particulars in Sutra 1,48, and defined in Sutra 1,51; the same procedure is followed for the other categories. Consequently, it cannot possibly be thought that the term samanya is not used by Caraka in a technical sense. Someone however could object that the interpretation of Cakra is not compelling because the universal does not always mark a cause of increase: there are cases in which two substances have the same quality, and still the quality of the first does not increase that of the second. To avoid this difficulty, Cakra explains that the universal is not always a 'cause' of increase in the sense indicated above: it is a 'cause' only when there is no antagonistic cause; e.g., the acidity of the amalaka" does not increase the acidity of the pitta because of its 'specific power' (prabhava) 4 antagonistic to coldness.95 92 Another objector could say that not only is the universal not always a 'cause' of increase, but there are also other causes of increase besides the universal. But Caraka, says Cakra, is in no way maintaining that only the samanya is a 'cause' of increase; a thing can also increase another thing with which it has nothing in common by its prabhava: for example, ghee (ghrta) increases the intellectual power (medha) and the fire of the organism to which it has no similarity at all, and too much thinking about something (cinta) increases the vata.⁹ Having shown that the samanya is not the only cause of increase, Cakra introduces the Ayurvedic concept of visesa by pointing out that when Caraka says that 'the universal is 90 Cf. e.g. AS Sutra 1,20. 91 Cf. Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 92 Ibidem. 93 Emblica officinalis Gaertn., syn. Phyllantus emblica Linn. (cf. R. N. Chopra [et al.], Glossary of Indian medicinal plants, New Delhi 1986, reprint, vol.I, p.106). 94 For an explanation of the concept of prabhava, cf. P.V. Sharma, Introduction to dravyaguna, Varanasi 1976, pp.53-55; Id., Dalhana and his comments on drugs, New Delhi 1982, pp.98-100; G.J. Meulenbeld, 'Reflections on the basic concepts of Indian pharmacology', in Studies in Indian medical history, ed. by G.J. Meulenbeld and D. Wujastyk, Groningen 1987, pp.1-17. 95 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 96 Ibidem.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) ... 23 always a cause of increase for all things', one should understand as implied the word samanasya, meaning that something increases something else only if they are 'similar', samana, to each other, i.e. only if they have the same samanya; if they have different samanyas, the samanya does not function any more as a 'universal', but as a 'particular', as a visesa. With respect to blood, for example, 'meat-ness' is not a 'universal', but a 'particular'. We shall see later that the fact that meat increases the amount of blood is not due to the samanya inhering in the substance 'meat', but rather to the samanya inhering in their respective qualities. But then what about the 'ultimate particulars' of Vaisesika? According to Cakra the antyavisesas are perfectly useless, so when Caraka talks of 'particulars', he is actually referring only to the 'universal-particulars' when they produce distinctions; for example, 'gavedhuka-ness' (gavedhukatva) is a universal; but the very same gavedhukatva is a particular with respect to meat and to all the objects different from the plants of gavedhuka. By its universal-particular gavedhukatva, the same plant of gavedhuka will be 'similar' (samana) to other plants of gavedhuka, and will be different from meat, as in meat there is no universal gavedhukatva." The particulars 'cause' a decrease in the same sense in which universals 'cause' an increase: they 'mark' the substance, the quality or the motion which causes the decrease, and, just like the universals, they carry out their function only in the absence of an antagonistic cause: for example, the mandaka,100 the nikuca, 101 and other substances which are unctuous, etc., even though they are antagonists of vata and of other pathogenic elements, do not alleviate them, because of the noxious prabhava of these substances, 102 It could be objected to Cakra that the particular does not always mark the cause of a decrease: if, for example, we take two different diuretics, one will not necessarily be antagonistic to the other, even though a visesa will make it possible to distinguish them; so diversity is not always synonymous with opposition, and, as such, 'cause' with decrease. The explanation Cakra gives of the particular is especially aimed at making this point clear. In the Ayurvedic context visesa means an 'antagonistic particular' (viruddhavisesa) because the texts mention only this particular as the 'cause' of decrease: (the two?) Vagbhata(s), Caraka himself and Jatukarna speak of contraries, or of 'opposed qualities and substances', as 'causes' of decrease. 103 So, according to what Cakra himself says, 97 Ibidem. 98 Coix lachryma-jobi Linn. (R. Chopra [et al.], op. cit., p.73). 99 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 100 A kind of yoghurt (dadhi) not completely mature and noxious to the dosas, obtained by a slow process of curdling (cf. CS Sutra XXVII,228; Cikitsa XXI,18). 101 Artocarpus lakoocha Roxb. (cf. T.B. Singh and K.C. Chunekar, Glossary of vegetable drugs in Brhattrayi, Varanasi 1972, pp.224;346;351). 102 103 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. Ibidem. Cf. AS Sutra 1,32; AH Sutra 1,13; CS Sutra 1,59 and 62; Jatukarna, cit. by Cakra ad CS Sutra I,44.

the non-antagonistic particular (aviruddhavisesa) is a 'cause' neither of decrease nor of increase. However, there are cases in which the simple use of a certain substance dissimilar from another, even though it is not antagonistic, indirectly causes a decrease of the second substance, if the latter in the meanwhile wears out and is not reintegrated, just as building a dam causes a diminution in the water flowing below. Caraka, saying in a general way that a particular is a cause of decrease, means to include also the decrease which takes place using a non-antagonistic visesa. 104 Someone may ask, however, if universals and particulars are 'causes' of increase and decrease also when taken by themselves, independently of their relation to other things, or not. According to Cakra, the answer of the Carakasamhita is negative, and is expressed by the words 'but the function (pravrtti) is of both'. 105 These words, according to the commentator, can be interpreted in two ways: either by supplying the word 'cause', or by supplying the word 'effect'. In the first case, the pravrtti of the universals and of the particulars is their connection (abhisambandha) with the body: 'Such pravrtti of the universals and of the particulars of bodily constituents is the cause of increase and of decrease'.1 The word 'but' indicates that this last statement has the sense of a limitation: the universals and the particulars which have no relation to the body do not 'produce' their effects, obviously from a medical point of view. 107 106 In the second case, on the contrary, pravrtti means the balance of the bodily constituents (dhatusamya): this balance is an 'effect' both of the universals and of the particulars. Taking in exclusively substances of a certain kind brings about an abnormal increase of the bodily constituents similar to them, and so an imbalance of the dhatus; the contrary happens through taking in only substances dissimilar. Balance is achieved by taking in at the same time substances which are similar and dissimilar to one's bodily constituents. 108 Finally, Caraka gives the definition of universals and particulars with these words: 'The universal produces unity, while the particular produces separation; the fact of having the same artha is the universal, while the particular is the opposite'." 109 Commenting upon the first half of this stanza, Cakra remarks that the universal produces unity in the sense that it produces the cognition (buddhi) of unity. When different individuals of the same kind, e.g. cows, are perceived at different times and places, one thinks: 'This is a cow; but that is also a cow'; and this knowledge, which, though referring to different individuals, is uniform (ekakara buddhi), has for its cause 104 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 105 Sutra 1,44. 106 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 107 Ibidem. 108 Ibidem. 109 samanyam ekatvakaram visesas tu prthaktvakrt | tulyarthata hi samanyam visesas tu viparyayah || (CS Sutra 1,45).

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa)... 25 the universal. If one and the same universal did not exist in different individuals, we could not have a correct uniform knowledge of these.110 Even the recognition of several people as cooking, or of several things as white, is due to the universals inherent in the actions (or motions) of cooking and in the qualities (white colour) of the substances. The actions performed by different people while cooking cannot be exactly the same, nevertheless they are recognized as being 'of the same kind' because the universal which inheres in them is the same. It is the universal which inheres in the different actions which causes the cognition of their unity." 111 The particular is defined, on the contrary, as that 'which produces separation', which causes the cognition that a thing is different from another. As he has already pointed out while discussing gavedhukatva, Cakra remarks that one and the same universal can be viewed either as a universal or as a particular, depending upon the cognitions it produces: cow-ness will be a universal relative to cows, but a particular with respect to horses, because it is that which causes the cognition of the difference of cows from horses and other animals, 112 How does this theory work in Ayurveda? 'Meat-ness' will be a 'cause' of increase with respect to flesh, because meat (mamsa) is 'similar' to flesh (mamsa), while it will be a 'cause' of decrease - when functioning as a particular with respect to the vata; but it will not be a 'cause' of decrease with respect to blood and other substances, because it is not an antagonistic visesa; it will rather work as a factor of increase of blood, through the universal which inheres both in its qualities and in those of blood. 113 This means that a diet based on meat will increase fleshy tissues and the amount of blood of the patient respectively by the universals of the substance and of the qualities; but it will decrease the vata by the visesa 'meat-ness' which is antagonistic to the vata. In the interpretation of Cakra, the second half of the stanza of Caraka already quoted (note 109) is meant to explain how the universal invariably produces, with reference to several objects, the same cognition, or, if functioning as a 'particular', the cognition of their difference. The fact of having one and the same cognition (ekabuddhi) of several objects is accounted for by their having the same artha, or universal, while the cognition of difference is accounted for by the fact that the objects have disparate universals, in which case the universals function as 'particulars'. 114 The stanzas of Caraka on universals and particulars have also been interpreted in other ways: Cakra quotes and refutes several other authors. One of them says that there are three types of universals and particulars: those which have as their sphere (gocara) substances, those inherent in qualities and those inherent in motions. According to this threefold partition, the 44 th stanza of this chapter of the Carakasamhita refers to the universals of substances, 45 ab refers to the universals of qualities and 45 cd to the universals of motions. This classification is rejected by Bhattaraharicandra, for whom all the three 110 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,45. 111 Ibidem. 112 Ibidem. 113 Ibidem. 114 Ibidem.

types of samanya are mentioned only in stanza 44 (but if this were the case, Cakra remarks, the second stanza would become useless). According to a third point of view, 44 is about the absolute samanya (atyantasamanya), the first half of stanza 45 is on the middle samanya (madhyasamanya), and the second half of stanza 45 is about the particular (ekadesasamanya); but this classification, says Cakra, is not very useful and is hardly consistent. Finally, there are some who believe in the existence of two kinds of universal: one 'existing in both [objects]' (ubhayavrtti) and one 'existing in only one [object]' (ekavrtti). A universal 'existing in both [objects]' is e.g., 'meat-ness', because it inheres both in that which nourishes (meat) and in that which is nourished (flesh); the universal 'existing in only one [object]' is meant to explain how certain substances, as for example ghee, have the power to increase a dissimilar bodily element, such as organic fire, or how running can increase the vata, or again how sleeping can increase the kapha. In all these cases, that which increases is not similar to that which is increased, but works by its 'specific power'. This power is nothing but a universal 'existing in only one [object]', such as 'ghee-ness', 'running-ness' etc.; so it can be said that the universal is the 'cause' of increase even when it increases dissimilar things. Cakra however rejects this thesis, pointing out that a universal which does not inhere in both objects should properly be called a particular; if we were to admit the existence of a universal 'existing in only one [object]', both similar and dissimilar things would be causes of increase, and so there would be no point in speaking of universals. But according to the Carakasamhita, the universal is definitely a 'cause' of increase, and this is the reason why this peculiarity is used to describe it; however the universal is not said to be the only cause of every increase, so there is nothing wrong in maintaining that an increase can be produced also by dissimilar things. 115 The difference between the position of the opponent and that of Cakra is rather subtle: Cakra considers the 'causality' of universals to be a general rule which is not without exceptions, while the reasoning of the opponent, who does not accept these exceptions, ends up by abolishing all distinction between similar and dissimilar objects, thereby making useless the theory of the universals and the statements of Caraka meaningless. Other opponents quoted by Cakra point out some difficulties one meets if one makes use of the universals in medicine: it is easy to speak of universals inherent in substances and qualities, but it is much harder to explain how the universal of an action can 'cause' the increase of an element of the body. It is an established fact in Ayurveda that running, and generally all kinds of physical exercise, increase the vata; but what have running and vata in common? Evidently it is not by chance that Caraka himself has mentioned the universal of substances 116 and of qualities, 117 but not that of motions; it is true, Caraka has said that motion is a cause of increase, but he has added nothing relating to universals. 118 To this objection Cakra answers by stating that in the passage on motions there is no mention of universals because most kinds of motion produce an increase by their 'specific 115 Ibidem. 116 CS Sarira VI,10. 117 CS Sarira VI,11. 118 CS Sarira VI,11; Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,45.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa)... 27 power'. This does not mean that the universal of motions does not exist; in fact vata, which is provided of motion, is increased by a body which does some motion, some exercise, and is on the contrary decreased by motionlessness. As regards sleep, even if in the treatise of Caraka it is not defined as an 'action',119 it is called an action conventionally. In reality sleep is not the immediate cause of an increase of kapha, but it is considered to have this effect because it stops the motions of the body which would produce a decrease of kapha. However, remarks Cakra, when no other cause can be thought of, one must resort to the 'specific power' or prabhava.120 Another objection points out a logical inconsistency in the theory of the universals: to one and the same entity, the universal-particular, are attributed at the same time opposite effects. Meat for example by its universal 'meat-ness' increases the flesh, and by its particular (the same 'meat-ness') decreases the vata. But this is impossible: the same individual cannot at the same time be the subject of two actions which are incompatible with each other; Devadatta cannot be making an arrow at the same time that he is making a pot!121 Cakra answers that this applies only to things which are kriyavat (i.e. when the effects are caused by actions or motions), not to things which are akriyavat: e.g., a sound produces at the same time many other sounds (in all directions), and fire produces at the same time light and heat; this thesis is confirmed, moreover, by Caraka himself, according to whom one and the same medicine, taken properly, brings into balance the bodily constituents which are lacking or in excess. 122 Finally, the last objector doubts that the rules stated by Caraka are always valid: there are cases in which the universal is not a 'cause' of increase. Let us take the case of an old man, whose bodily constituents are wearing out, or of a very sick man: even if they nourish themselves on foods which have the same qualities as their bodies, that nourishment will not make them any fatter. Another exception to the rule can occur because of seasonal factors: in summer honey and other substances do not cause an increase of kapha even if they are 'similar' to it.12 To answer this objection, Cakra returns to what he has already stated previously: in certain circumstances the universal is not the 'cause' of increase because there are obstacles which prevent it (old age, a serious illness, summer heat etc.). So the final thesis is the following one: in the absence of antagonistic factors, the universal is the 'cause' of increase. 124 119 On 'action' and 'motion' cf. note 11. 120 Ibidem. The statement of this general rule makes clear the function of prabhava in Ayurveda: it is a kind of deus ex machina which is made to intervene every time the theoretical framework appears unable to provide an adequate explanation of reality. In Vaisesika physics the function is played by the adrsta, which explains magnetism and other singular phenomena (cf. VS (Candra) V,1,15). 121 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,45. 122 Cf. ibidem and CS Sarira VI,6. 123 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,45. 124 Ibidem.

Sometimes, using this theory in Ayurveda, it happens that one speaks incorrectly of substances which increase the qualities of the body, or of qualities which increase substances, such as the bodily constituents. For example, we could say that drinking milk increases the coldness of the body, or that the lightness of a drug increases the vata. If this language were not improper, it would be meaningless to speak of universal-particulars, because these are confined in their workings to each category (substances, qualities and motions). To avoid this difficulty, Cakra says that 'the universal of substances it is which 'increases' the bodily constituents, which are substances, not the universal of qualities, because qualities cannot produce substances'. 125 If we have a certain dry (ruksa) plant called citraka 126 which, e.g., increases the pathogenic element vata, we cannot say that its dryness (which by definition is a quality of the vata) 127 has increased the vata: we must infer from the dryness of the citraka the presence in it of vata, and conclude, through the universal 'vata-ness', that the substance vata has increased the vata in the body.128 It is somewhat complicated, but it is the only way to apply to all cases the theory of the universals. Notwithstanding his evident effort for accuracy, Cakra says that for fear of being prolix he has discussed the problem of universals and particulars taking into consideration only their use in medicine, and refers to the Vaisesika literature for a fuller treatment of the subject. 129 From an examination of the texts of the Carakasamhita and its commentary Ayurvedadipika, compared with the oldest Vaisesika literature, we can draw certain conclusions, which in part contradict and in part confirm what Dasgupta says. 130 First of all, in the Carakasamhita the terms samanya and visesa have a technical meaning and do not convey simply the ideas of similarity and difference. Now, whilst the Ayurvedic samanya is no doubt the universal of Vaisesika, and therefore the fourth category in the list of Prasastapada, the visesa is not the 'ultimate particular', which represents the fifth category of Prasastapada, but is rather the universal-particular in its differentiating aspect. The term visesa occurs frequently with this shade of meaning already in the Vaisesikasutras, 131 while, as we have seen, Prasastapada attaches great importance to pointing out that the universal-particulars are called visesas only metaphorically, so as to avoid that the universal-particulars should form a category by themselves, 125 126 Ibidem and VS (Candra) I,1,8; I,1,9; 1,1,15. Plumbago zeylanica Linn., or Plumbago rosea Linn. (cf. T.B. Singh and K.C. Chunekar, op. cit., pp.156-157). 127 CS Sutra 1,59. 128 129 Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,45. Ibidem. 130 C Cf. supra. 131 Cf. e.g. VS (Candra) 1,2,3.

Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa)... 29 as in Candramati's work 132 On the other hand, as remarked by Cakra, the 'ultimate particulars' have no practical use in medicine, and this is the reason why the term visesa in the Carakasamhita means only the universal-particular.133 It is true that the Carakasamhita formulates the definition of the universals and of the particulars in a way which differs from that of the Vaisesikasutras: by means of metonymies and ellipses it points out the gnoseological function, at once unifying and differentiating, of the universal-particulars, rather than deducing their existence. This leads us to think that the Carakasamhita takes for granted the demonstration of the universals made by Kanada, and that one should not speak of dependence of the latter on medical texts, contrary to what D. Chattopadhyaya says. 134 Nor is it possible to say that the categories have arisen in a medical milieu because they are 'absolutely essential for the theoretical basis of Ayurveda': 135 in the other fundamental medical texts the theory of the universals and of the particulars is not used at all. The Susrutasamhita mentions neither universals and particulars, nor similarities and differences, in the first chapter of the Sutrasthana, the place where one normally expects to find the most important principles of the work. This absence is rather meaningful; clearly for Susruta, a surgeon, the principle explaining the effects of medicines has less importance than for the physician Caraka. Nonetheless, even from a surgeon one would expect at least some hint on the fact that similar substances increase similar substances, but at the beginning of his work Susruta does not dwell upon philosophical considerations: he defines substances as the substrates of tastes, and as drugs. 136 Even a term like samavaya, which in Vaisesika means inherence, is used by him in a generic way to indicate the union of the elements which make up the human body. Elsewhere Susruta says that the remedy to a pathological decrease of pathogenic elements (dosa), of bodily constituents (dhatu) and of impurities (mala) consists in that which has the same cause (svayoni) of the element which is wanting and increases it (vardhana). 139 Cakra explains that the word vardhana has been added to svayoni in the first place to exclude those things which, though having the same cause as the lacking element, do not increase it, and secondly to include all the things which increase it by 138 137 132 133 Cf. supra. Cakra ad CS Sutra 1,44. 134 Cf. D. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p.142 and passim. 135 Ibidem, pp.25;140. 136 36 SS Sutra 1,28. 137 SS Sutra 1,22. 138 = and Cakra svayoon For 'cause' as a rendering of yoni, cf. e.g. Taranatha Tarkavacaspati, Vacaspatyam, Varanasi 1969- 1970 (1 st ed. 1873-1884), vol. VI, p.4782: yoni karana, the commentaries of Dalhana nivardhananiti svayonir atmahetuh; tatra vayor vayur eva hetuh etc. see note 140 SS Sutra XV,8, and of Dalhana on SS Sutra XLII,6: svayonivardhana iti yebhyah karanebhyo madhuradayo rasa utpadyante tani vardhayantity arthah. 139 SS Sutra XV,8.

their prabhava, and not because they have the same cause. 140 Tastes increase their own cause and make a different cause decrease: for example, the cause of kapha is water, but sweet taste too has water as its cause; therefore, if an ill man shows the symptoms of an abnormal diminution of kapha, such as burning sensations, thirst, insomnia, etc., he will have to eat sweets, i.e. foods whose taste has the same cause as the element which is wanting. But he will have to take care and be sure that those foods are natural 'increasers' of kapha, because they could also decrease it or leave it as it is, because of their prabhava. 141 In other places Susruta uses the terms 'antagonistic' (viruddha) and 'similar' (samana: compounded with yoni it becomes a synonym of svayoni), 142 but it is clear that they do not receive the same marked technical connotation which samanya and visesa have in Caraka's work. The 'similar' reappears in the Astangahrdaya and in the Astangasamgraha, two works which attempt a reconciliation between the doctrines of their predecessors and a reorganization of Ayurvedic knowledge. 143 The place where the subject of 'increase' is expounded is the same as in Caraka, i.e. the first chapter of the Sutra; this means that great importance is attached to it. But here the place of the universal is taken by the 'similar', and that of the particular by the 'contrary [of the similar]', i.e. by the dissimilar. The stanza is the same in both Vagbhata-texts: 'The increase of all [things is produced] by the similar, the contrary by the opposite'. 144 Furthermore, the list of the categories of Vaisesika, which, according to Caraka, had been 'seen with the eye of knowledge' by the great rsis thanks to the teachings of Bharadvaja, is completely absent: all that the sages learn from the god Indra is the Ayurveda in eight parts." 145 On the reasons which have led the Astangasangraha and Astangahrdaya to leave out universals and particulars from their expositions we can only offer a hypothesis: perhaps the main reason was a certain detachment from Vaisesika metaphysics caused by a desire for a more empirical perspective, nearer to common sense and to the practical necessities of physicians and patients.146 From this point of view it becomes easier to understand why the Vaisesika terms and concepts of substance, quality and action are still employed, even if with a less philosophical connotation than in Caraka, while univerSS p.68, note 6. 141 Cf. SS Sutra XLII,6; SS Sutra XV,7-8 and the commentary of Dalhana; SS Sutra XLII,3 ff. 142 Cf. SS Sutra XV,17; XLII,8,(1)-(3). 143 144 Cf. AS Sutra 1,18 and 20. Cf. AH Sutra I,14 a and AS Sutra 1,32 a: vrddhih samanaih sarvesam viparitair viparyayah. The AS has already mentioned the increase and decrease in the first stanza devoted to the exposition of the Ayurvedic doctrine (Sutra 1,21 b), while this hemistich is wanting in the AH, which speaks of decrease for the first time in Sutra I,12. 145 Cf. CS Sutra 1,27-29; AH Sutra 1,3; AS Sutra 1,5-10. 146 Cf. Indu ad AS Sutra 1,32 a.

31 Antonella Comba, Universal (samanya) and Particular (visesa) ... sals, particulars and inherence are overlooked. 147 It is clearly the intention to highlight and to define right from the beginning the concepts which are specifically medical, such as virya, vipaka, etc., which in the works of previous authors were not explained at the beginning of their treatises. 148 The two main commentators of the Vagbhata-texts offer different justifications for the passage in which the 'similar' substitutes the universal. According to Indu, the problem is not so much that Vagbhata speaks of things similar instead of universals, because from the Ayurvedic point of view 'there is no difference between similar and universal, as without a single form even similarity is impossible': 149 the real difficulties appear when one realizes that the major universals, such as substance-hood or 'being', cannot explain increases and decreases, and so one can resort only to the universal-particulars, such as cow-ness, or when one wants to explain how one and the same cause can produce two opposite effects at the same time, at the same time increasing and decreasing something. But this last problem can not be solved definitely without resorting to the 'own nature' of the thing itself. 150 Arunadatta, on the contrary, is not concerned with the relationship between the similar and the universal; he explains the text in a very plain way, and then gives a great number of examples. According to him, there are three ways to increase or decrease something by means of the universals and the particulars, and these three ways correspond to the three categories of substances, actions, and qualities. An instance of the first way is represented by the blood which increases the blood because both are made of the same substance, water. He exemplifies the second way by means of the drug called coca, 151 which, even though it is earthy, increases the kapha because it has the same qualities as this (unctuousness, heaviness, etc.). Finally, actions increase the vata because both have in common the universal of motion-hood. 152 This explanation makes use of the universal-particulars of Caraka in its first part, and of the svayonivardhana of Susruta in its second part. Although in the interpretations of the commentators of the Vagbhata-texts there is the general tendency to use less and less of a technical philosophical terminology, some traces of the original conceptual framework still remain, so that even here it is necessary to know Indian philosophy in order to understand some of the basic concepts of Ayurveda. 147 Actually this already happens in the SS, but is more noticeable in the AH and in the AS which follow closely the order of the exposition of Caraka (cf. AH Sutra 1,15 a;16 b-17;18;19; AS Sutra 1,31;33 b;35;36 b- 37 a;40; etc.). 148 For virya, cf. AH Sutra 1,17 a; AS Sutra 1,35 b; CS Sutra XXVI,62-65; SS Sutra XL,5; for vipaka, cf. AH Sutra 1,17 b; AS Sutra 1,36 a; CS Sutra XXVI,57 b-58; SS Sutra XL,10-12. 149 Cf. Indu ad AS Sutra 1,32 b: sadrsyasamanyayos catra na kascid visesah. ekena rupena vina sadrsyam api na sambhavati. 150 Cf. ibid.: na hi svabhavah paryanuyoktavyah. 151 Cinnamomum Zeylanicum Nees or one of the other drugs listed in G.J. Meulenbeld, The Madhavanidana and its Chief Commentary. Chapters 1-10. Introduction, Translation and Notes, Leiden 1974, pp.554 and 561; T.B. Singh and K.C. Chunekar, op. cit., p.161. 152 Cf. Arunadatta ad AH Sutra I,14 a.

In this paper we have tried to examine the way in which Ayurveda has made use of the universal-particulars of Vaisesika; but this is only one of the many debts which Ayurveda has contracted from Indian philosophical doctrines. ABBREVIATIONS AH AS Cakra Cikitsa CS NK PPB Sarira SS Sutra Vy. VS (Candra) VS (Sankara) Astangahrdaya... with the commentaries Sarvangasundara of Arunadatta and Ayurvedarasayana of Hemadri... ed. by H. Paradkar, Varanasi 1982 (Krishnadas Ayurveda Series 4). Astangasamgrahah induvyakhyasahitah, ed. by A.D. Athavale, Poona 1980. Cakrapanidatta in his Ayurvedadipika, see CS. Cikitsasthana. The Carakasamhita of Agnivesa, revised by Caraka and Drdhabala, with the Ayurvedadipika commentary of Cakrapanidatta, ed. by Jadavji Trikamji Acarya, Bombay 1981, 4 th ed. (1 st ed. 1941). Nyayakandali, see PPB. Prasastapadabhasya (Padarthadharmasangraha) with commentary Nyayakandali by Sridhara Bhatta, along with Hindi translation ed. by D. Jha, Varanasi 1977 (Ganganathajha-granthamala 1). Sarirasthana. Susrutasamhita of Susruta, with the Nibandhasangraha Commentary of Sri Dalhanacarya and the Nyayacandrikapanjika of Sri Gayadasacarya on Nidanasthana, ed. by Jadavji Trikamji Acarya and by Narayan Ram Acarya 'Kavyatirtha', Varanasi/Delhi 1980, 4 th ed. (Jaikrishnadas Ayurveda Series 34). Sutrasthana. Vyomavati, in: Prasastapadabhasyam of Prasasta Devacarya with... Vyomavati of Vyomasivacarya, ed. by Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj sastri, Varanasi 1983, 2 nd ed. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 61). Vaisesikasutra of Kanada, with the commentary of Candrananda, critically ed. by Muni Sri Jambuvijayaji, Baroda 1982 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136). Vaisesikadarsane maharsipravaraprasastadevacaryaviracitam prasastapadabhasyam sankaramisravinirmitah upaskaras ca, ed. by D. Sastri, Kasi 1923 (Kasi Sanskrit Series 3).