Section 6.2 (second khaṇḍa) (four texts)

Upaniṣad text:

In the beginning, my dear, this was Being only,—one, without a second.—Some say that, in the beginning, this was Non-being, only one, without a second. From that Non-being sprang Being.—(1)

Commentary (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya):

Being only—the term ‘Being’ stands for that entity which is mere esse,—subtile, undefinable, all pervading, one, taintless, impartite, consciousness, as understood from the Vedānta-texts. The particle ‘eva’ ‘only’, serves to emphasise the statement.

Question—“What is to be understood from this?”

Answer—What is understood is that ‘this universe which with its names, forms and activities, is perceived as a modified product,—was Being only’; such is the connection of the word ‘was’.—

Question—“When was this Being only?”

Answer—In the beginning,—i.e., prior to the birth of the universe.

Question—“Is not this Being there now, at the present time,—that it has been qualified—as Being so in the beginning?”

Answer—Not so.—“Then why the qualification (in the beginning)?”—What is meant is that even now, at the present moment, it is Being, but it is accompanied by differentiation of Name and Form,—the object of the idea of the term ‘this’, and as such it becomes this. Before birth—in the beginning,—however, it was answerable only to the idea and term ‘Being’; hence it is emphasised that ‘in the beginning this was Being only’. Before its birth, no object can be apprehended as being such and such in name, or having such and such a form; it is exactly as during the time of deep sleep. What is meant is that immediately on waking from deep sleep, all that one is conscious of is mere existence (of things), while during deep sleep, he is conscious of Being alone as the only entity; and so also in the beginning—before the birth of the universe.

It is just as all this is spoken of in the ordinary world. In the morning, one sees the potter spreading out clay for making the jar and other things,—and then having gone away to another village, and returning in the afternoon, sees in the same place, many products in the shape of jars, saucers and other articles, all of diverse kinds.—One says that ‘all this, jar, saucer and the rest, was, in the morning,

clay only’—so it is said here that ‘in the beginning this was Being only.’

One;—What is meant of the assertion that it was one only, is that even in the form of its product, it does not become something else.—Without a second;—what is denied by this negation is the likely idea that—“Just as in the making of the jar and other things, it was that, apart from the clay, there were other efficient causes,—in the form of the Potter and others,—so in the case of the Products of Being also, there would be other accessory causes, apart from the Being.”—There is no entity, second to it, hence it is without a second.

Objection:—“In the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣika also all things are co ordinated with Being, (existence)—the term ‘being’ ‘exists’ being found to be applied to substances, qualities and other things, in such expressions as ‘the existing Substance’, ‘the existing Quality’, ‘the existing Action’, and so forth”.

Answer:—True; it would be so. But before the birth of the product, it did not exist,—say the Vaiśeṣikas; as their doctrine is that ‘before its production, the product is non-existent’,—nor do they accept the view that before production there was a single entity, ‘one without a second.’—From all this it is clear that what is spoken of in the text, through the example of Clay and other things, is a cause, in the shape of ‘Being’, entirely different from the ‘Existence’ posited by the Vaiśeṣika.

In regard to this subject of determining the exact nature of the entity before its birth, the Vaiśeṣikas have asserted, when determining the nature of things, that “Before its birth, this universe was non-being,—i.e., mere negation of Being,—one, without a second. In fact, he Bauddhas hold the view that before birth, the negation of Being is the only reality; and this ‘Non-Being’ is not regarded by them as some other entity, which is contrary to ‘Being’;—as has been assumed by the Naiyāyikas according co whom, ‘Being’ is an entity which is apprehended as it exists, and that which is apprehended as contrary to this is ‘Non-Being’,—both being equally real entities (one positive and the other negative).

Objection:—“The Vaiśeṣikas also hold the view that before its birth, this univèrse was mere negation of Being.—As to the question ‘How did this exist before its birth?’—The answer provided by them is that ‘it was Non-Being, one, without a second’, where the thing spoken of is clearly related to a particular point of time (‘before birth’); and they also declare its being without a second, (and all this makes clear that this thing must be a positive entity).”

Answer:—True; but such an opinion is right for those who posit merely a negation of things (and do not admit of any positive entity). In fact, the opinion that there is ‘non existence only’ is not right; as, if that were so, then the person holding this opinion would himself have to be denied;—it might be argued that “the holder of the opinion is admitted to be an entity at the present time, not before bis birth.”—But that cannot be; there is no evidence to show that prior to birth there was negation of Being; so, that there is no reason for the assumption that “Before birth, it was only non-Being”.

Objection:—“What is denoted by the word is the Form (commonality) of things, how can there be any meaning of words or of the sentence, in the case of the assertion ‘non-Being, one, without a second’ (as none of these words is denotative of a commonality), and when no such meaning is possible, the assertion would become meaningless and (hence) wrong, invalid.”

Answer:—This does not vitiate our position; because what the sentence asserts is the cessation (negation) of the apprehension of ‘Being’. The term ‘Being’ is denotative of a positive generic entity; and the other two terms ‘one’ and ‘without a second’ are co-ordinated with (qualify) the term ‘Being’; so also the term ‘this’ and ‘was’ (in the sentence ‘this was non-being’). In this sentence expressing, the Being (positive entity), the negative ‘non’ has been introduced; and being thus introduced, it serves, on the basis of the positive sentence itself, etc. preclude, from the positive connotation of the sentence, the idea relating to that positive connotation,—in the form ‘Being’, ‘one, without a second’; just in the same way as the man on the horse, while resting on the horse itself, turns its face away from the thing standing before it. The sentence thus does not connote mere negation of Being.— Hence, we conclude that the sentence, ‘this was non-Being only etc., etc.’, has been used only for the purpose of denying a possible wrong notion that might be entertained by people. It is only after the wrong notion has been expressed that it can be denied (in the next text); in this way the sentence ‘this was non-Being’ serves a distinctly useful purpose; and hence it, becomes established that it is a Vedic assertion and fully authoritative; and there is no force in the objection that has been urged against it. From this Non-Being,—the negative of all things,—sprang Being’.—The form ‘jāyata’ (without the initial ‘a’) is a Vedic anomaly.—(1)

Upaniṣad text:

‘But how could it be so, my dear?’—said he;—‘How could Being be born from Non-Being?—in fact, this was Being only, in the beginning, one, without a second.’—(2)

Commentary (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya):

Having set forth the wrong view propounded by the Mahāvaināśika (Nihilist—Bauddha), he proceeds to reject it: But how,—with what proof,—my dear, could it be so? How could it be possible that Being should be born from Non-Being? The meaning is that there can be no proof or reason for such a view. It is true that the sprout is seen to appear only after the seed has been destroyed. But even this instance would not be compatible with the doctrine that ‘it is from Negation alone that things are produced’.—“How so?”—Asa matter of fact, the constituents of the seed, which occupy the space that had been occupied by the seed, continue to subsist in the sprout; and there is no destruction of those constituents on the birth of the sprout. As for the entity in the shape of the seed itself (which ceases to exist), the Nihilists do not admit of any such positive entity, apart from the constituents of the seed, as these would be destroyed on the birth of the sprout; if there is such a positive entity apart from the constituents,—then this goes against their doctrine (that there is no positive entity).—It might be argued that “what is destroyed, on the birth of the sprout, is the shape and form of the seed, the existence whereof is admitted (by the Nihilist), as due to Illusion”.—But what is this Illusion? Is it positive or negative? If it is negative, then there is no corroborative instance possible (in support of the view—that the positive entity is produced from a negative entity; and illusion itself being a nonentity, it cannot prove the existence of the seed—Ānandagiri).—If, on the other hand, the illusion is positive, then there is no ground for the notion that the sprout has grown out of negation; because, the sprout is actually produced out of the constituent elements of the seed (which, ex-hypothesi, is a positive entity based upon illusion, which itself is a positive entity, ex-hypothesi).

It might be argued that “the constituents also of the seed are destroyed on the birth of the sprout”.—But what has been said in regard to the seed applies, with equal force, to its constituents also. That is, just as, according to the Nihilists, there is no positive composite whole in the shape of the seed,—so also the constituents cannot be positive entities; and if these are not positive entities, then there can be no destruction of them. Thus, inasmuch as the constituents of the seed also have their own subtler constituents, and these latter again have their own, still subtler constituents, and so on, there being an infinite series of constituent elements,—there is no possibility of destruction (total annihilation) in any case, and as, all through this infinite series of constituents, there runs the notion of their being ‘Beings’ (positive entities),—there is no cessation of this ‘existence’ (character of ‘being’); so that the Theory of the Positivist Upholders of ‘positive Beings’, that ‘Being (entity) is produced from Being’, becomes established. As for the upholders of ‘Non-Beings’, there is no instance to show that Being (Entity) is produced from Non-being (Non-Entity). As for the Positivists, there is the well-known instance of the jar (an entity) being produced from the Clay (also an entity); which is clear from the fact that the jar is there when the clay is there, and it is not there when there is no clay.—If the jar were to be produced out of Negation, then it would not be necessary for the man desirous of making the jar to seek for Clay. It would be possible too, in that case, for the jar and other objects to be conceived and spoken of as negations (non-entities). But neither of these two contingencies happens. Hence, we conclude that it is not true that ‘Being is produced from Non-Being’.

Some people have held the following view:—“It is the idea of the Clay which is the cause (source) of the idea of the jar; so that it is the idea of the Clay which is the cause of the idea of the jar, and there is no such real entity as the clay or the jar.”

But even so it would be an existing (positive) idea of the clay which would be the cause of the existing (positive) idea of the jar; and so there is no production of Being from Non-Being.

Says the opponent.—“What we mean is that between the idea of the clay and the idea of the jar, which appear to stand in the relation of cause and effect, there is only immediate sequence, and not the actual relation of cause and effect.”

This also is not right. In support of this immediate sequence of ideas, the Nihilists can have no corroborative instance in the external world (as being purely internal).

It is on account of all this that the father said—“How could it be so, my dear?” That is, in what way could Being be produced from Non-Being? The meaning is that there is no instance of Being (Entity) being ever produced from Non-Being (Non-Entity).

Having thus demolished the doctrine of the Negativist (Nihilist), he sums up by saying—‘In fact, there was Being only, in the beginning’,—wherein is contained the affirmation of his own doctrine as fully established.

Says the opponent—“For the Positivist also (who holds that Being is produced out of Being), there is no corroborative instance available; because we do not see a jar being produced out of another jar.”

True, it is so; one Being or Entity is not produced from another Entity; it is the same Entity that appears and subsists in another form; as for instance, when the snake becomes coiled up, or when the clay appears in the diverse forms of dust, clod, jar, potsheds and so forth.

Says the opponent—“If that is so, and it is the one and the same Being that appears in various forms and conditions, then, how is it that it is asserted (as in the text) that ‘it existed before being born’?”

Answer:—Apparently it was not heard by you when it was pointed out by us (in the beginning of the Bhāṣya on text I above) that what is intended by the sentence ‘In the beginning this was Being only’ is the emphasising of the positive character of the product denoted by the word ‘this’ (i.e. the Universe).

“In that case, it comes to this that before it was produced, the product denoted by ‘this’ was Non-being (Nonentity), and now (after being produced) it has come into existence (on production).”

Not so, as a matter of fact it is only the Being or Entity that comes to subsist and be spoken of as ‘this’; just as it is Clay itself that comes to subsist and be spoken of as ‘clod’, ‘jar’ and so forth.

“Just as the clay is an entity, so are the clod and jar etc. etc., also; because these latter also, like the former, are cognised as ‘entity’ (Being). And yet, as the product is the object of cognition other than the cognition of its cause, the product must be an entity different from the ‘Being’ (its cause); just as the cow is different from the horse (because it is the object of a cognition different from the cognition of the horse).”

Not so; because though among the products—clod, jar and the rest,—there is mutual difference, yet the character of being ‘clay’ pervades equally over all of them. Though the jar is different (and separable) from the clod, and the clod is different (and separable) from the jar,—yet neither the clod nor the jar is different (separable) from Clay; hence both the clod and the jar are only Clay. As regards the cow and the horse however, the cow is different from the horse and the horse is different from the cow.—From all this it follows that the jar and other products (of Clay) are only clay in diverse forms.—In the same way all this universe is only Being, in diverse forms; and hence it is only right to assert that before birth, it was Being only; specially because every form of the product is only a modification based upon words.

Says the opponent—“This Being is one, indivisible, whole, without parts, inactive, calm and taintless; as declared in such Vedic texts as ‘The divine, incorporeal Puruṣa, unborn both inside and out’, (Muṇḍaka-Upa. 2.1.2.). And how can there be any modified form for the Being which is one indivisible whole?”.

This does not vitiate our position. Of the indivisible Being also, it is possible for modified forms to appear out of those (illusory) component parts of Being which are created by the imagination of man; just as the serpent appears out of those component parts of the rope which are created by the imagination (as being those of the serpent). Because after all ‘all modification is a product of words, existing in mere name, and the Clay is the only reality’; and thus really speaking Being alone is real, one, without a second,—even at the time that there is perception of ‘this’ (this perception being purely illusory).—(2)

Upaniṣad text:

It conceived—‘May I become many; may I grow forth’; and It created Fire. That Fire conceived—‘May I become many; may I grow forth’; and it created Water. Therefore whenever a man is hot and perspires, it is water produced from fire.—(3)

Commentary (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya):

It—that Being—conceived; it saw and thought.—From this it follows that the cause (origin) of the Universe is not the Primordial Matter, as posited by the

Sāṅkhya; because Primordial Matter has been regarded by them as insentient; while this Being is sentient; as only a sentient Being can conceive. It conceived—‘May I become many, may I grow forth’—may I be born well;—just as the Clay grows into the form of the jar and other things,—or the rope grows into the form of the serpent—which form, in both cases, is created by the imagination.—“In that case all that is perceived is unreal, non-existent, like the rope in the form of the serpent.”—No; what we assert is that it is Being itself which is perceived in a form other than its own, through duality and diversity; and there is no nonexistence of anything anywhere. It is the logicians who assume things other than Being, and declare that those things are non-existent, before being produced, and also afterwards, after destruction.—We however do not make any assumption of anything—name or named,—other than Being at any time or place. Whatever there is, in the form of name or named,—which is imagined to be something different—all this is Being only, just as it is the rope itself which, under the assumption of the serpent, is called ‘serpent’;—and just as the clod, jar and the rest come to be spoken of as different from the Clay—or the assumption that all that is different from Clay,—in ordinary life. For those, however, who know the real character of the Rope, the name as well as the idea of serpent’ cease,—and for those who know the real character of Clay, the name and idea of ‘jar etc.,’ cease; in the same manner, for those who know the real character of Being, the name and idea of all other products cease; as declared in such Vedic texts as—‘Wherefrom speech turns back, without getting at it, along with the mind.’ (Taitti. Upa. 2. 4. 1.), and ‘It is undes-cribable, imperishable,’ (Ibid. 2. 7. 1.) and so forth.

Having conceived thus, it created fire.

Objection:—“In another Vedic Text, it has been declared that ‘From Self was produced Ākāśa’ (Taitti. Upa. 2. 1. and ‘From Ākāśa, Air,—and then from Air, Fire’,—which thus is the third product; how then, is it mentioned in the present text as the very first product? That Fire as well as Ākāśa, both should be created from the same source is self-contradictory.”

Answer:—There is no force in this objection; it is possible to interpret the present text to mean, that It created Fire, after the creation of Ākāśa and Air (and thus all the texts become reconciled). Or, the order of sequence in the creation is not what is meant to be asserted here; all that is meant to be asserted is that ‘all this is the product of Being (entity) and hence, all is Being alone, one, without a second’. That this is so meant is clear from the example of Clay that has been cited.—Or, what is meant to be asserted is the doctrine of ‘Triplication’ (as set forth in texts 3-4, below); hence the present text speaks only of Fire, Water and Food.

‘Tejas (Fire), is well-known in the world as that which burns, cooks and illumines and is red.—When this Fire was created—that is, after the Being had taken the form of Fire, it conceived—‘may I become many and grow forth— as before. It created Water; Water is liquid, viscil, fluid, and white,—as is well-known in the world.—From Fire came Water as the product; hence it is that at whatever place and time, man becomes hot—heated—and perspires, it is water produced from fire.—(3)

Upaniṣad text:

The Water conceived—‘May I become many and may I grow forth’; it created Food. Therefore, when it rains there is profuse food produced; hence, it is from Water that eatable food is produced.—(4)

Commentary (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya):

The said Water conceived,—as before, Being in the form of Water conceived,—‘May I become many—profuse—and grow forth—become produced.’—It created Food—in ṭhe shape of Earth. Inasmuch as food, which is of the nature of earth, is the product of Water,—whenever—in whatever place—it rains, there is prefuse food produced; hence it is from water that eatable food is produced.

At first it is said that when the text spoke of Water having created ‘Food’, it was Earth that was meant to have been created; while subsequently, in the example cited the word used is ‘annādya’ where ‘anna’ stands for food and ‘ādya’ for eatable, and from this qualified term, it would appear as if Rice and Barley and other grains were meant by ‘Food’ (not the Earth). Food is well-known as heavy, firm, nourishing, things and dark in colour. There is thus no repetition.

Objection:—“It is not possible for Fire and other things to conceive, as there is no prohibition of the killing of these things (as there is prohibition of the killing of sentient beings), and also because we do not find in these things any such feelings as Fear and the like (which are concomitant with sentience);—how is it that the text speaks of Fire having conceived?”.

This does not vitiate our position. Because Fire and other things are the products evolved out of the cause (Being) which is the real conceiver; in fact, Being itself is the conceiver, who creates products in a definite order of sequence; and when Fire and the rest are spoken of as having ‘conceived what is meant is that it was as if the elemental substance conceived.

Objection:—“For the Being also, the conceiving must be only figurative (and not real).”

Not so; because ‘conceiving’ by the Being can be known only from Words (of the Veda), and hence, it is not possible to assume that it is figurative, not real.

Says the opponent—“As Being is the cause of Clay, it is possible to infer that it is insentient (like its, Product, clay): hence it can be presumed that it is the insentient Primordial Matter itself, which functioning for the sentient Being, produces the various products in general, at well-defined times; so that the ‘conceiving’ in this case must be figurative; in ordinary life we have seen that an insentient thing is spoken of and treated as sentient; for example, in such.expressions as the river bank wishes to slide down Of the same kind may be the attributing of ‘conception’ to Being (which, as Primordial Matter) is really insentient.”

Not so, we reply. Because this Being is going to be spoken of later on as the Self, in the text ‘That is the truth, that is the Self—It might be argued that ‘this speaking of it as the self also may be figurative; just as is found in such expressions ‘Bhadrasena is my very Self where the character of ‘self’ is attributed to one (Bhadrasena) who may be doing all that is food to the speaker, and yet is not his Self. But that cannot be; as it is taught that Liberation comes to one who regards himself as ‘Being’, having the firm conviction that he is real; and for such a one the delay is only ‘till then’ (which shows that the Being and the Sentient self are one and the same).—“Even this may be purely figurative. That is to say, when it is said that when one has a firm conviction regarding the Principal Self, Liberation is close to him,—this teaching regarding Liberation also may be only figurative. Just as, in the ordinary world, when one has started to go to a village, he may say ‘I have reached the village’, for the purpose of indicating quickness.”—That cannot be; because the whole treatment has started with the preface ‘By the knowledge of which all becomes known etc., etc.’ It is Being alone, by knowing which all else becomes known; for the simple reason that all things are not different from Being; and also because Being has been declared to be ‘without a second’. Nor has the Śruti directly declared anything else as ‘to be known nor can any such be inferred from any indicatives in the Veda,—on the basis of which the ‘Liberation’ spoken of could be regarded as figurative. Further, if all that is said in the whole Discourse were to be presumed to be figurative, then the labour of the presumer would be entirely futile; as for him the means of accomplishing the Purpose of man would have been known by means of Ratiocination itself. From all this we conclude that as the Veda is fully authoritative, there can be no abandoning of its direct meaning.

Thus it is established that the cause of this Universe is a Sentient (conscious) Being,—(4)

End of Section (2) of Discourse VI