III, 4, 2

2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supplementary relation (to action), (the statements as to the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are arthavādas, as in other cases, thus Jaimini opines.

As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the Self also is connected with action through the mediation of its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the rice-grains with water; hence as the purpose of the knowledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere arthavādas. Such is the opinion of the teacher Jaimini^[1]. The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, saṃskāras and works; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavādas. Cp. the passage, 'He whose sacrificial ladle is made of parṇa-wood hears no evil sound;' 'By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy;' 'By making the prayāja and anuyāja-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he overcomes his enemies^[2].'--But how can it be supposed that the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of the means of proof--general subject-matter and so on--which determine such subordinate relation?--The pūrvapakṣin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, on the ground of the means of proof called vākya (sentence; syntactical unity)^[3]. But this we deny because in the present case 'sentence' has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacrifices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of 'sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application^[4]; but the agent is an intermediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on. the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice.--Your objection is not valid, the pūrvapakṣin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there.--But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to the Self, such as 'free from sin,' and the like, it appears that the doctrine of the Upaniṣads refers to that Self which stands outside the saṃsāra and cannot therefore be subordinate to activity.--This objection too is without force; for what the Upaniṣads teach as the object of cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly referred to in such terms as 'dear' (Bṛ. Up. II, 4, 5). Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand, may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of that Self.--But in more than one place Brahman, the cause of the world, which is additional to the transmigrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration has been established, and the Upaniṣads teach that this very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the transmigrating Self!--True, that has been established; but in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their refutation are again set forth with reference to the question as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self).