Sutra 3.3.2

2. If it be said (that the vidyās are not one) on account of difference, we deny this, since even in one (vidyā there may be repetition).

If it be said that there is no oneness of vidyā, because the fact of the same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we reply that even in one and the same vidyā some matter may be repeated without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if, namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and hence separation of the two vidyās. But where the cognising persons are different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different śākhās), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does not imply difference of matter enjoined.—The next Sūtra refutes the argument founded on a rite enjoined in the Muṇḍaka.