Sutra 2.1.29

29. And on account of the defects of his view also.

On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the Pradhāna or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary things would attach themselves to the Pradhāna also, since it does not differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause.

The Pradhāna, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,' and so on?—But there are parts of the Pradhāna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness!—This we reply necessitates the following distinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness constitute the Pradhāna? or is the Pradhāna the effect of those three? The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according to which the Pradhāna is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three guṇas also have no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former alternative, the guṇas not being composed of parts must be held to aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot result.—The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction, and hence do not possess the power of originating effects.