Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Purana teach Nescience

Neither Scripture nor Smṛti and Purāṇa teach Nescience.

The assertion that Nescience—to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not—rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word 'untrue' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is different from 'ṛta,' and this latter word—as we see from the passage 'enjoying the ṛta' (Ka. Up. 1,3, 1)—denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anṛta' therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement with the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by anṛta' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). Again, in the text 'Then there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ṛ. Saṃh. X, 129, 1), the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term 'darkness' (Ri. Saṃh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms 'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode; of being at different times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural passage, viz, 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable (akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest divinity.' True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle condition of primeval matter (prakṛti), which forms the totality of non-intelligent things; but this very Prakṛti is called Māyā—in the text 'Know Prakṛti to be Māyā,' and this proves it be something 'undefinable': Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word 'Māyā' denotes that which is undefinable. But the word 'Māyā' is synonymous with 'mithyā,' i.e. falsehood, and hence denotes the Undefinable also. This, too, we cannot admit; for the word 'Māyā' does not in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such things as the weapons of Asuras and Rākshasas, which are not 'false' but real. 'Māyā,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Prakṛti is called Māyā. This appears from the passage (Śvet. Up. IV, 9) 'From that the "māyin" creates all this, and in that the other one is bound up by māyā.' For this text declares that Prakṛti—there called Māyā—produces manifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called 'māyin' because he possesses that power of māyā; not on account of any ignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text expressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual soul is bound up by māyā; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless Māyā awakes' (Gauḍ. Kā.). Again, in the text 'Indra goes multiform through the Māyās' (Ṛ. Saṃh. VI, 47, 18), the manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as Tvashṭṛ': for an unreal being does not shine. And where the text says 'my Māyā is hard to overcome' (Bha. Gī. VII, 14), the qualification given there to Māyā, viz. 'consisting of the guṇas,' shows that what is meant is Prakṛti consisting of the three guṇas.—All this shows that Scripture does not teach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined either as that which is or that which is not.'

Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning. For if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the individual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason, founded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word 'that'—which is all-knowing, etc.—Nescience, which is contradictory to Brahman’s nature.—Itihāsa and Purāṇa also do not anywhere teach that to Brahman there belongs Nescience.

But, an objection is raised, the Vishṇu Purāṇa, in the śloka, 'The stars are Vishṇu,' etc. (II, 12, 38), first refers to Brahman as one only, and comprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next śloka that this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, etc., is sprung out of the 'ajñāna' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 'jñāna,' i.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung from ajñāna by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its own nature, is free from all difference (śl. 40); proves in the next two ślokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of this world; sums up, in the following śloka, the unreality of all that is different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of that ajñāna which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold; thereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman’s nature to be free from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches (45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-called reality of the world is merely conventional.—This is not, we reply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at the outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the world given before, there will now be given a succinct account of another aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be understood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-intelligent beings, the intelligent part—which is not to be reached by mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only, and, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the differences due to Prakṛti—is, owing to its imperishable nature, denoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material; part which, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes manifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is not. Both parts, however, form the body of Vāsudeva, i.e. Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From the waters which form the body of Vishṇu was produced the lotus-shaped earth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire Brahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which Vishṇu is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of the statements of co-ordination made in the next śloka (38), 'The stars are Vishṇu,' etc.; the same relation had been already declared in numerous previous passages of the Purāṇa ('all this is the body of Hari,' etc.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are Vishṇu’s body, and he is their soul. Of the next śloka, 'Because the Lord has knowledge for his essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of the Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential nature is knowledge only—while bodies divine, human, etc., have no part in it—, therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine, hills, oceans, etc., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in the actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, etc., in whose various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the actions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the souls are 'being.'—This the next śloka further explains 'when knowledge is pure,' etc. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the distinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies, human or divine, hills, oceans, etc.—all which are objects of fruition for the different individual souls—pass away.' Non-intelligent matter, as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called 'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent knowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next śloka insists (41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform nature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence; while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly passes over into different states, each later state being out of connexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next śloka, 'Earth is made into a jar,' etc. And for this reason, the subsequent śloka goes on to say that there is nothing but knowledge. This fundamental knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold individual forms of being due to karman, and hence the text adds: 'The one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds differ, owing to the difference of their own acts' (śl 43, second half). Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, etc., which constitutes the intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter—these two together constitute the world, and the world is the body of Vāsudeva; such is the purport of śloka 44.—The next śloka sums up the whole doctrine; the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding verses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'; the second half of the śloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.

Now all these ślokas do not contain a single word supporting the doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference; of a principle called Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined, owing to Nescience. The expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is not' (śl 35), and 'satya' (true) and 'asatya' (untrue; śl 45), can in no way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By 'that which is not' or 'which is untrue,' we have to understand not what is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in śl 42: the jar is something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true knowledge. 'Non-being' we may call it, in so far as while it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at different times; and hence there is no reason to call it something futile (tukhkha) or false (mithyā), etc.