Brahma Sutras (Nimbarka commentary)

by Roma Bose | 1940 | 290,526 words

English translation of the Brahma-sutra 2.2.44, including the commentary of Nimbarka and sub-commentary of Srinivasa known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and Vedanta-kaustubha resepctively. Also included are the comparative views of important philosophies, viz., from Shankara, Ramanuja, Shrikantha, Bhaskara and Baladeva.

Brahma-Sūtra 2.2.44

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.2.44 by Roma Bose:

“Or if there be the existence of intelligence and so on, there is no denial of that.”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

If there be the existence of natural intelligence and so on (on the part of Śakti), what contradiction can there be in its being the cause of the world? The doctrine of Śakti is set aside by itself through the admission of Brahman.

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

The term “or” has the meaning ‘but’. Śakti is the abode of a mass of natural attributes like knowledge, strength and the rest, independent by nature of anything else, and self-relying. “If there be the existence,” i.e. admission, “of knowledge and so on”, in this manner, on the other hand, then “there is no denial of that”, i.e. its causality is not denied. In this aphorism: “And endowed with all (attributes)” (Brahma-sūtra 2.1.29), there is designated a Deity, knowable through all the Vedāntas, and it is He that is admitted by you. He is not the power (Śakti) of any one, He is the Highest Deity, denoted by the word “Brahman’ and so on. The sense is that the doctrine of Śakti defeats itself.

Comparative views of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara:

The criticism of the Pañcarātra doctrine continued: viz. “(Even) if there be the existence of knowledge, there is no setting aside of that (viz. of the above objection)”. That is, even if be said that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest are not the individual soul and so on, but divine beings, endowed with supreme knowledge and the rest, still then the objection stated before, viz. the impossibility of origination, remains in force.[1]

Comparative views of Rāmānuja:

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. According to him this sūtra and the next set forth the correct conclusion against the above prima facie view, and defend the Pañcarātra doctrine. Thus, it means: “If (Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest be) of the nature of knowledge and so on (i.e. of the Highest Lord), there is no contradiction of that”. That is, the Pañcarātra doctrine is not that individual soul arises from the Lord, the mind from the individual soul, and so on, but simply that the Highest Lord, viz. Vāsudeva, out of kindness for people, abides in a four-fold form, so that He may be easily accessible to His devotees.[2]

Comparative views of Śrīkaṇṭha:

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary as well. He takes it to be a prima facie view, viz. “If there be the assumption of intelligence and so on (i.e. of the forms of the individual soul and so on), there is no contradiction of that”. That is, the opponents point out that they do not hold that there is the origin of the individual soul and the rest, but simply that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest assume the forms of the individual soul, etc., i.e. rule them. Hence the above objection cannot be raised.[3]

Comparative views of Baladeva:

Interpretation different: “If (the body of the Lord be of the) nature of intelligence and the rest, there is no contradiction of that”. That is, if the prima facie objector points out that although the Lord cannot have a material body, yet He may have a non-material body composed of knowledge and so on, then we reply that if the Lord of the Śāktas be possessed of such a body, then we have no objection to their view, since it becomes identical with our doctrine of Brahman.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ś.B. 2.2.44, pp. 574ff.; Brahma-sūtras (Bhāskara’s Commentary) 2.2.40 (written 2.2.44), p. 129.

[2]:

Śrī-bhāṣya (Madras edition) 2.2.41, p. 116-117, Part 2.

[3]:

Brahma-sūtras (Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary) 2.2.41, p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.

 

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