Brahma-Sūtra 2.2.22

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.2.22 by Roma Bose:

“(there is) the non-establishment of the conscious and unconscious destruction^[1] on account of the non-interruption (of the stream of cognitions).”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,^[2] because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series.

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents, has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted by them, is being disposed of.

The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is “conscious destruction”; destruction not so preceded is “unconscious destruction”. These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them. Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruction of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is the “non-establishment”, i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members of the series. Why? “On account of the non-interruption of the series.” First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus, it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being-possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times—this is the sense.

Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the perception of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar to it. by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar existences.

A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then the disappearance of the entire universe will result.

In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects, since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized.^[3]

Comparative views of Bhāskara:

Reading different, viz. “asambhavaḥ” in place of “avicchedāt”.^[4]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Prati-saṃkhyā and aprati-saṃkhyā.

[2]:

For explanation, see below Vedānta-kaustubha

[3]:

I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material, viz. clay, which continues to exist.

[4]:

Brahma-sūtras (Bhāskara’s Commentary) 2.2.22, p. 120.