Brahma Sutras (Nimbarka commentary)

by Roma Bose | 1940 | 290,526 words

English translation of the Brahma-sutra 2.1.22 (correct conclusion end), including the commentary of Nimbarka and sub-commentary of Srinivasa known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and Vedanta-kaustubha resepctively. Also included are the comparative views of important philosophies, viz., from Shankara, Ramanuja, Shrikantha, Bhaskara and Baladeva.

Brahma-Sūtra 2.1.22 (correct conclusion end)

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.1.22 by Roma Bose:

“And (the individual souls are) like stones and the best, there is impossibility of that.”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

Like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are the modifications of the earth, the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it does, some peculiar qualities of its own. Hence, the allegation by the opponent is an “impossible” one.

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the stones like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are modifications of the earth, though non-different from the earth as consisting in earth,, are yet different from the earth, possessing, as they do, their peculiar natures,—so is the case here. By the term “and the rest” the modifications of the tree, such as the leaf and so on, are to be understood. That is, just as the leaf, though non-different from the tree, is yet not the tree, so is the case here. Or else, by the term “and the rest”, the ray of the diamond and the rest is understood, for the ray, though non-different from the diamond, etc., is yet found to be different. Hence, just as the ray, though non-different from its substratum, is yet different from it, so it is appropriate to hold that the embodied soul is by nature different from Brahman, though it is at the same time non-different from Him as having Him for its soul. Hence, the respective difference between what is subject to transmigratory existence (viz. the individual soul) and what is not, (viz. Brahman) being thus established, there is no inconsistency here. Hence “there is impossibility of that”, i.e. there is no possibility of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, as alleged by the opponent. Thus, it is established that there no contradiction is involved in our view.

Hence ends the section entitled “The designation of another” (7).

Comparative views of Rāmānuja:

This is sūtra 23 in Rāmānuja’s commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “Just (as it is impossible for non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest (to be identical with Brahman, so) there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an identity between the individual soul and Brahman)”.[1]

Comparative views of Śrīkaṇṭha:

This is sūtra 23 in Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary too. “(Since the individual soul, possessed of little knowledge, is declared to be belonging to an absolutely different category from Brahman, the omniscient), just as (non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an absolute identity between the individual soul and Brahman).”[2]

Comparative views of Baladeva:

This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. “(Since the individual soul, though sentient, is dependent) like (non-sentient objects like) stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of the individual souls being the creator of the world).”[3]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Śrī-bhāṣya (Madras edition) 2.1.23, p. 53, Part 2.

[2]:

Brahma-sūtras (Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary) 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

[3]:

Govinda-bhāṣya 2.1.23, p. 56, Chap. 2.

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