Brahma Sutras (Nimbarka commentary)

by Roma Bose | 1940 | 290,526 words

English translation of the Brahma-sutra 1.1.6, including the commentary of Nimbarka and sub-commentary of Srinivasa known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and Vedanta-kaustubha resepctively. Also included are the comparative views of important philosophies, viz., from Shankara, Ramanuja, Shrikantha, Bhaskara and Baladeva.

Brahma-Sūtra 1.1.6

English of translation of Brahmasutra 1.1.6 by Roma Bose:

“If it be said that (the word ‘seeing’ in the above Chāndogya-text) is secondary, (then we reply) no, because of the term ‘self’ (being applied to the cause of the world).”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

It is not reasonable to say that the ‘seeing’ is (only) “secondary”. Why? “On account of the term ‘self’.”

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

Anticipating the objection, viz.—

As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling, e.g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: ‘The bank is about to fall’,[1] or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said: ‘Tilling is awaiting rain’; and as we read in Scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages: ‘That fight perceived’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.3), ‘Those waters perceived’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes of it here.

If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna is “secondary”, (we reply:) “No.” Why? “On account of the term ‘self’”, i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term ‘self’ which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna. Thus, if by taking the term ‘existence’ to mean the non-sentient pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in the texts: ‘All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.7.8; 6.9.4; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), the term‘self’ must refer to the non-sentient substance, which is the meaning of the terms ‘existent’ and ‘perceiver’, mentioned before in the texts: ‘“The existent, alone, my dear!”’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.1), ‘He perceived’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.3). That is, on, the view, viz. ‘He alone is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna’,—the identity between the terms ‘existent’ and the rest denoting the non-sentient and bearing a different sense and the term ‘self’ denoting the Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction, it being impossible for the term ‘self’ denotative of the Supreme Lord, to refer to pradhāna. Hence, to say that the perception is even metaphorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity (into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not metaphorical[2]—this is the sum and substance.

Comparative views of Baladeva:

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—‘If it be said (that the creator of the world is) the gauṇa (or the Saguṇa Brahman, connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term “self”’. That is, the term ‘self’ has been used in Scripture in connection with the creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.[3]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Here the desiderative suffix does not imply ‘wish’ but ‘imminent danger’ (āśaṃkā), in accordance with Kātyāyana-vārtika-sūtra 1707 quoted in Siddhānta-kaumudī 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

[2]:

That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: ‘That Divinity thought:— “Come, let me enter these three divinities” (i.e, fire, water and food)’ and so on. (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.3.2.)

[3]:

Govinda-bhāṣya 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.).

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