Sūtra 2.2.8

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Sūtra 2.2.8:

अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च

aṅgitvānupapatteśca

aṅgitva – the relation of being the principal; anupapatteḥ – on account of the impossibility and unreasonableness; ca – and.

“It is impossible [that any one of the guṇas] may be the principal [in the state of pralaya, and hence the world would not originate.]” (8)

Sūtra pagination:
Adhyāya 2:
  No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures;
Pāda 2:
  Refutation of Opposing Views (continued);
Adhikaraṇa 1:
  Pradhāna Cannot be the Cause of the Creation.

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s commentary (Govinda-bhāṣya)

Pradhāna is defined in Sāṅkhya philosophy as the equilibrium of the three modes of material nature: sattva, rajas and tamas. In the unmanifest state of pradhāna, none of the guṇas is superior or inferior; consequently the relation of principal and subordinate could not exist then. Nor can they say that Īśvara [the Lord] or kāla [time] brings about a disturbance in the equilibrium, making one of the guṇas superior to the others, because the Sāṅkhyas hold that God does not exist, nor do they admit the separate existence of time.

Thus Sāṅkhya-sūtras [1.92-93] says:

“It is not proved that there is a God. And further it is not proved that He exists, because whatever exists must be either free or bound, and He can be neither one nor the other, because either way He would be inefficient. Since if He were free, He would have no desires which as compulsory motives would instigate Him to create; and if He were bound, He would be under delusion. He must be on either alternative unequal to the creation, etc. of the world.”

And, in Sāṅkhya-sūtras [2.12] Kapila denies the separate existence of time:

“Space and time arise from the ether [ākāśa].”

Nor can the Sāṅkhyas say that the soul is the creator, because according to their theory, the very nature of the soul is indifference to everything. The puruṣas therefore being perfectly detached, have no interest to break the equipoise of the pradhāna and make one of the guṇas superior to the others. Hence the creation is not caused by the relative superiority and inferiority of the guṇas. Even admitting that in every successive creation and in pralaya, the guṇas will always be unequal in their force, there would be nothing to bring about this inequality in the first creation. Even admitting for argument’s sake that there is inequality among the guṇas in the ordinary state of creation, and that such inequality may have come about without any reason, it would follow that in pralaya also the inequality would occur without any reason, and no pralaya will be possible, for creation would start up then also. And even if it can be established that the inequality, once established, continues without any further cause, you cannot explain how it can be brought about without any cause in the beginning.

Similarly in the modern scientific Big Bang theory, no source is given for the material elements, and no mechanism for setting off the explosion Big Bang, because both would require the existence of a potent, intelligent Creator pre-existent to the material creation. So there is nothing in either theory to explain how the inert material energy acquires the initial energy of creation.

“But,” says the Sāṅkhya, “we must infer that the guṇas are of various nature and wonderful attributes because we see their effect in this world, and therefore your objections do not apply.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra: