Chapter 6 - The Intuitionist School (ādhidaivata-pakṣa)

[Full title: The Intuitionist School and the Consideration of the Body and the Ātman—(ādhidaivata-pakṣa and kṣetrakṣetrajña-vicāra)]

satyapūtāṃ vaded vācaṃ manaḥpūtaṃ samācaret
  —Manu. (6.46).

"Speak that which has been purified (become pūta) by satyam (veracity); and behave in that way which your Mind considers as pure".

There is another method of the consideration of the- question of Action, Non-Action, and Wrong Action, besides the Positive or Material method, namely, the Intuitionist (ādhidaivata) method. Those who belong to this school say that, when a man decides as to what is Action, Non-Action, or Wrong Action, or as to the doability or non-doability of any particular Action, he never troubles to find out how pain or happiness will result from any particular Action, and whether the sum total of happiness caused by it is greater than that of unhappiness, nor does he enter into the consideration of the Ātman and the Non-Ātman; and many persons do not understand these intricate questions. Nor even- does everybody do every particular act for his own happiness. Whatever arguments may be advanced by Materialist philosophers, if one considers minutely for a moment what the state of mind of a person is in determining the righteousness or unrighteousness of any particular Action, it will be seen that inherent and noble mental impulses like pity, kindness, philanthropy etc. impel him to do any particular act on the spot. For instance, when a man sees a beggar, his mind is inspired by the feeling of pity before the thought as to what benefit will be acquired by his Self or by his giving the beggar something in charity enters it, and he gets rid of the matter by giving the beggar whatever he can; in the same way, when her child begins to cry, the mother does not stop to consider how much how many people will be benefitted by her feeding it, but she at once begins to feed it. Therefore, the true foundations of the science of Karma-Yoga are these noble mental impulses. These "mental impulses have Hot been given to us by anybody, but they are Nature-born or inherent, or, in a sense, self-created deities. When a judge is seated in his judicial chair, he is inspired by the deity of Justice when he administers justice, and if he defies this inspiration, he administers injustice. The inherent mental impulses of kindness, pity, philanthropy, gratitude, love for one's duty, courage and other virtues, are deities just like the deity of Justice. Everyone by nature knows what the true forms of these deities are. If ha defies the inspirations of these deities on account of avarice, hate or jealousy, or for some such other reason, what can these deities do?,Now, it is true that there is sometimes a conflict between these deities themselves; then, we are in doubt as to the inspiration of which deity we should consider as predominant in doing a particular Action; and then it becomes necessary for us to consider some other power besides the deities, of Justice, Kindness, etc. in order to satisfy this doubt. But even if, on these occasions, we do not enter into the intricacies of Metaphysical considerations, or of the weighing of pain or happiness, but only consult our Mental Deity (manodevatā), that is, our Conscience, that deity immediately shows us which path is the more meritorious one; and therefore, Conscience is superior to all deities. The word 'Conscience' (manodevatā) is not to be understood as meaning and including desire,anger, avarice, or the other emotions which inhabit the mind, but as meaning, in the present contest, the God-given or., inherent power which everyone possesses of choosing between good and bad. This very power has got the high-sounding name of, "Power of discriminating between the good and the bad" (sad-asad-viveka-buddhi)^[1], and if a person, on any occasion of doubt, thinks for a moment quietly and with a peaceful mind, this deity which, discriminates between the right and the wrong (sad-asadvivecana-devatā) will never fail him. Nay, on such occasions, we say to other persons: "Consult your own mind". What importance to attach to what virtue is ready listed with this sovereign deity which immediately gives you her decision on any matter in accordance with this list, as occasion arises. Suppose, there is an occasion 1 when there is a conflict between the principles of Self-protection and Harmlessness, such as a famine, when we are in doubt as to whether Or not to eat uneatable food; then, we should consult- our Conscience, and immediately it will come out with the decision: " Eat the uneatable food ". Similarly, if there is a conflict between Self-interest, and philanthropy, that situation too must he -solved by the help of this Mental Deity. One writer has after peaceful thought stumbled on 'this list of the relative values' of righteous and unrighteous actions prepared by" the deity of Conscience, and he has published it in his book.^[2] In this list, the highest place has been given to the feeling of Reverence combined with Humility; and Kindness, Gratitude, Generosity, Affection etc. are given the consecutive lower grades. This writer is of the opinion that when there is a conflict between a virtue of a lower order, and a virtue of a higher order, one must attach higher importance to the virtue oi the higher order. According to this writer, there is no other proper way of determining the doability or non-doability or the righteousness or unrighteousness of any Action; because, even if we extend our vision as fax as possible, and decide in what the 'greatest good of the greatest number' lies, yet in as much as our discriminating Reason does not possess the power or authority to order "us to dd that in which the good ' of the greatest number lies, the question whether or not one should do that which is beneficial to 'the greatest number ultimately remains unsolved, and again the whole matter remains in abeyance. The decision of the doability or non-doability of an Action arrived at after a far-sighted consideration of pain and happiness will meet the same fate as that of a decision which may have been given by a judge who has not received proper authority from the king. Mere far-sightedness cannot tell a person to do something, or that he must do some particular thing; because, far-sightedness being a human product, it cannot control human beings. On such occasions, there must be someone else having a higher authority than ourselves who gives the command; and this function can be satisfactorily discharged only by this God-given Conscience, which is superior to man, and therefore, in a position to- exercise authority over man. As this deity is self-created it is also usual, in ordinary parlance to say: "My Conscience (manodevatā) tells me a particular thing". The fact that when, a man has committed a sinful action, he is subsequently ashamed of it, and that his inner consciousness bites him, is- nothing else but the punishment of this Mental Deity; and that proves the existence of this independent Mental Deity. For otherwise, we cannot, according to this school of thought,, explain why our Conscience pricks only ourselves.

The summary given above is of the opinions of the Intuitionist School in the Western countries. In these- countries, this body of thought has been principally promulgated by Christian preachers; and in their opinion, this- God-given method is superior to, and easier to follow than the purely Materialistic methods for determining the righteousness- or unrighteousness of an Action, and is, therefore, the method which should be acted upon. Although in India there was no such independent section of the science of Kamia-Yoga in. ancient times, yet we come across similar opinions in many places in our ancient treatises. We find in many places in the Mahābhārata that the various mental impulses have been given the forms of deities. I have referred in the foregoing pages to the story of the deities of Morality (dharmam), Prosperity (śrī) etc. having left the body of Prahlāda and entered the body of Indra. This deity who discriminates between doability and: non-doability, or righteousness and unrighteousness is called: 'Dharmam', and there are stories that this deity had manifested himself in the form of a śyena bird for testing the truthfulness of the King Śibi, and first in the form of a Yakṣa and later on in the form of a dog for testing Yudhiṣṭhira. Even in the Bhagavadgītā (10.34), Fame (kīrti), Opulence (śrī), Speech (vāk), Memory (smṛti), Acumen (medhā), Perseverance (dhṛti), and Forgiveness (kṣamā) are called deities; and out of these, memory, acumen, perseverance, and forgiveness are qualities of the mind. The Mind itself is a deity, and the worship of it has been prescribed in the Upaniṣads, as being a symbol of the Parabrahman (Taī. 3.4; Chāndogyopaniṣad 3.18). When Manu says: "manaḥpūtaṃ samācaret" (6.46), i.e., "Do what the Mind believes to be pure", he may be said to have intended the Mental Deity by the word 'manas' (Mind). In ordinary affairs, we say instead: "Do as the Mental Deity (manodevatā) pleases. In the Marathi language, the word 'manaḥpūta' has acquired quite the contrary meaning; and on many occasions, when a person does whatever he likes, he is said to behave 'manaḥpūta'. But the true meaning of this phrase is that: 'One should do only that which the Mind considers as sacred or pure'.

In the fourth chapter of the Manu-Saṃhitā, Manu himself has made the meaning clearer by saying:

yat karma kurvato 'sya syāt paritoṣo 'ntarātmanaḥ |
tat prayatnena kurvīta viparītaṃ tu varjayet ||
  (ManuSaṃh. 4.161).

That is, "One should perform by efforts that Action by which one's innermost Ātman is satisfied; and one should give up whatever is disliked by it",

So also, Manu, Yājñavalkya, and the other Smṛti-writers, in mentioning the fundamental rules of practical morality such as the rules of Morality applicable to the four castes, etc. have said:–

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ |
etac caturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣād dharmasya lakṣaṇam ||
  (Manu-Smṛti 2.13).

That is, "the Vedas, the Smṛtis, good behaviour, and the satisfaction of one's Ātman, are the four fundamental elements of righteousness (dharmam)”.

The meaning of the words 'the satisfaction of the Ātman' is, 'that which one's Mind looks upon as pure'; and it is quite clear that where the righteousness or unrighteousness of any particular Action could not be decided by consulting the Śrutis, the Smṛtis, and the principles of good behaviour (sadācāra), the fourth means of deciding the matter was considered to be its 'manaḥ-pūtatā', i.e., its 'being considered as pure by the Mind'.

In the Mahābhārata, Dhṛtarāṣṭra, after relating the stories of Prahlāda and Indra mentioned in the last Chapter, has said in describing 'śīlam', that:

yad anyeṣāṃ hitaṃ na syād ātmanaḥ karma pauruṣam |
apatrapeta vā yena na tat kuryāt kathaṃcana ||
  (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 124. 66).

That is, "That Action of ours which is not beneficial to others, or of which we ourselves would feel ashamed, should not be performed in any case.”

My readers will notice that by using the expressions 'is not beneficial to others' and 'feel ashamed this verse has included in the same place both the doctrines of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' and the Mental Deity'. Even in the Manu-Smṛti, that Action for having done which or when doing which one feels ashamed, is referred to as 'tāmasa', and that Action of doing which one does not feel ashamed, and whereby our innermost self (antarātman) remains happy, is referred to as 'sāttvika' (Manu-Smṛti 12.35, 37); and these ideas are to be found also in the Buddhistic treatise Dhammapada (See Dhammapada, 67 and 68).

Kālidāsa says that when there is a doubt as to the doability or non-doability of any Action:–

satāṃ hi sandehapadeṣu vastuṣu pramāṇam antaḥkaraṇapravṛttayaḥ |
  (Śākun. 1.20).

That is, "saintly persons always consider as authoritative the dictates of their own Conscience".

Controlling the mental impulses by concentrating the mind on a single object is the province of the Pātañjala Yoga, and as this Yoga-Śāstra has been in vogue in India from very ancient times, it was at no time necessary to teach our people the method of making the mind peaceful and quiet, and doing that which the Mind considered as proper, whenever there was any doubt about any matter. It is stated in the various Smṛtis at the very commencement, that the Ṛṣis who wrote them, used always to define righteousness and unrighteousness after first completely concentrating their minds (Manu-Smṛti 11); and the method of thus consulting the dictates of Conscience on any matter also- seems at first sight extremely easy. But when one minutely considers what is meant by a ' pure mind ' from the philosophical point of view, this facility of the matter disappears; and on that account, our philosophers have not based the edifice of Karma-Yoga on it. We must now consider what this philosophical point of view is; but before I do so, I will here explain briefly how the Western Materialistic philosophers have refuted this Intuitionist theory. Because, although the reasons adduced by the Materialists and the Metaphysicians may be different, yet as the result arrived at by both is the same, I shall first deal with the arguments of the Materialists, in order that the importance and the propriety of the arguments of the Metaphysicians should be the better understood by my readers.

As the Intuitionist School has, as mentioned above, given, the highest place to Conscience Pure, it is clear that the objection against the Materialistic philosophy or morals, namely, that they do not attach any importance to the Reason of the doer, does not apply to the Intuitionist theory. But when one minutely considers what is to be called the 'Pure Conscience' in the shape of a Mental Deity which discriminates between the Right and the Wrong (sad-asad-viveka-buddhiḥ), it will he seen that other unconquerable difficulties arise with reference to this theory also. Nobody need be ^ told that whatever thing is taken considering it in all its bearings, and finding out whether or not it is performable or unperformable, doable or not-doable, or whether or not it will be advantageous or pleasant, is a thing which is not done by the nose or the eyes or any other organs, and that there is an independent organ, namely, the Mind, which serves that purpose. Therefore, doability or non-doability, righteousness or unrighteousness are things which must be determined by the Mind, whether you call it an organ or a deity. If that were all that the Intuitionist school said, nobody would find any fault with it. But, Western Intuitionists have gone far beyond that. They say that deciding whether a thing is good or bad (sat or asat), just or unjust, righteous or unrighteous, is quite different from deciding whether a particular object is heavy or light, white or black, or whether a calculation is correct or incorrect. The Mind can, by logical methods, decide matters which fall within the second category; but the Mind itself is incapable of deciding on the matters mentioned in the first category, and that is a thing which can be done only by the Mental Deity in the shape of the Power of discrimination between good and bad. They explain this by saying that in determining whether a particular calculation is correct or incorrect, we first examine the additions or multi- plications involved in it, and then arrive at a decision, that is to say, before determining this question, the Mind has to go through some other actions or activities; but the same is not the.case in the matter of the discrimination between good and bad. As soon as we hear that somebody has murdered somebody else, we immediately utter the words: "What a bad thing has been done by him", and we have not to think about the matter at all. As the decision which we arrive at without;any consideration, and the one which we arrive at after con- sideration, cannot both be said to be the functions of one and the same mental capacity, we must say that Conscience is an independent Mental Deity. As this power or deity is equally awake in the hearts of all human beings, everyone looks upon murder as a crime, and nobody has to be taught anything about the matter. This Intuitionist argument is answered by Materialistic philosophers by saying, that from the fact that we can spontaneously arrive at a decision on any matter, we cannot draw the conclusion that such matter must be different from another matter as to which we come to a decision after proper consideration. Doing a thing quickly or slowly is a matter of practice. Take the case of calculations. Merchants quote the rate for the seer immediately on being given the rate for the khandy, by mental calculation. But on that account, their deity of calculation does not become different from the same deity of the best mathematicians. By habit, something becomes so much part and parcel of oneself, that one does it easily and without the slightest consideration. An excellent marksman easily shoots and kills birds on the wing; but no one, on that account, says that there is soma independent deity of marksmanship. Not only that, but no one, on that account, considers the science of marksmanship or of calculating the speed of flying birds or other scientific calculations as unnecessary. There is a story told of Napoleon Buonaparte, that as soon as he stood on the battle-field and cast only one glance all round, he could immediately find out the weakest point of the enemy. But, on that account, nobody said that the science of warfare is an independent deity, and that it is in no way connected with other mental faculties. It may be that one man has a greater aptitude for a particular thing than another. But on that account, we do not say that the two have two different kinds of intelligence. Besides, it is not that the decision on questions of doability or nondoability, or of righteousness or unrighteousness is made instantaneously on all occasions. Because, if such were the case, there would never have been any doubt as to whether a particular thing ought to be done or ought not to be done '. Not only is such doubt occasionally experienced by everyone, but, what is more, the decisions given by different persons as to the doability or non-doability of the same Action are different. If there is only one self -created deity in the form of 'Conscience', why should there be this difference? Therefore, we have to say, that a man comes to a decision on any particular matter, according as his mind is evolved or educated. There are many aboriginal tribes who do not consider murder a crime, but even eat human flesh with pleasure! But if we for a moment leave aside the case of uncivilised human beings, yet, according to the customs of different countries, something which is considered objectionable in one country is wholly acceptable in another country. Marrying a second wife when the first one is alive, is considered a crime in England; but nobody thinks much of it in India. Indians would feel ashamed of sitting in an assembly without their turbans on; but in England people consider taking off one's hat as a sign of respect! If it were true that one feels ashamed of a wrong act as a result only of God-given or inherent Conscience, should not everyone feel equally ashamed of the same act? Even marauders consider it disgraceful to draw a sword against a, person whose food they have eaten; but, even powerful civilised nations in the West consider it a sign of patriotism to murder people who are subjects of a neighbouring nation! If there is only one deity in the shape of Conscience, why should there be this difference? And if one admits different kinds of Conscience, according to- civilization or according to the customs of countries, then the self-created immutability of Conscience itself suffers. As man leaves the uncivilised state and is gradually more and more civilised, so also are his Mind and Reason developed;, and when in this way, the Reason has developed, man becomes capable of spontaneously conceiving such ideas as he would have been incapable of conceiving in his former uncivilised condition. We may even say that the Reason being developed in this way is a sign of civilisation, just as a civilised or educated person's not asking for everything which he casts his. eyes on is a sign of the control over the organs which has become ingrained in him, so also has the mental faculty of choosing between good and evil gradually grown in mankind, and it has now become so much part of human nature that we give our decision as to the morality of a thing spontaneously and without consideration. If we have to see things which are near or which are far, we have to contract the muscles and tendons of the eyes to a greater or lesser extent, and this is done so quickly that we never realise it; but has any one, on that account, looked upon the consideration of the reasons for this process as useless? In short, the Mind or the Reason of man are the same at all times and with reference to all matters. It is not that we decide between black and white by one kind of Reason and between good and evil by another kind of Reason. The only difference is that the Reason of a particular person may be more developed, whereas the Reason of another person may be uneducated or incompletely developed. Western Materialistic philosophers have' thus drawn the conclusion that when we bear in mind this difference, and also take into account our experience that being able to do any particular thing quickly is only a matter of habit or practice, we have no reason for imagining that there is an independent and wonderful power like Conscience in addition to the natural faculties of the Mind.

The ultimate decision of our ancient philosophers on this matter is similar to that of the Western Materialistic philosophers. They admit the principle that it is necessary to consider any particular matter quietly and with a peaceful mind. But they do not accept the position that there is one kind of Reason which decides the question of righteousness and unrighteousness and another kind of Reason which decides whether a particular thing is black or white. The Mind arrives at a correct or incorrect decision according as it has been educated. They, therefore, say that everybody must make an effort to develop his Mind; and they have also given rules explaining what this development is and how it is to be made. But they do not accept the position that the power of discrimination between good and bad (sad-asad-vivecana- śakti) is some independent heavenly gift which is different from the ordinary Reason of a man. The question as to how a man acquires knowledge and how the activities of his Mind and Reason are carried on, have been very minutely examined in ancient times. This examination is technically known as "the consideration of the Body and the Ātman" (kṣetra-kṣetrajñavicāra). 'kṣetra' means the body and 'kṣetrajña' means the Ātman. This kṣetra-kṣetrajña-vicāra is the foundation of

Metaphysics; and as it is impossible to look upon the Power of discrimination between good and bad or any other Mental Deity as higher than the Ātman when once one has properly understood this science of the Body and the Ātman, it becomes perfectly clear how the Intuitionist arguments are insufficient. I shall, therefore, in this place briefly consider the science of the Body (kṣetra or Field) and the Ātman (kṣetrajña). Thereby, my readers will be able to properly understand the correct meanings of many of the doctrines of the Bhagavadgītā.

The body of man (piṇḍa, kṣetra, or śarīra) may be said to be a great factory. As in any factory raw material is first taken in from outside, and then all the material is selected or arranged, and having determined which of the material is useful for the factory and which not, the raw material taken In is manufactured into different articles and sent out, so also are there numerous activities going on, every moment in the human body. The first of the means man has for acquiring the knowledge of the various objects in the world, made up of the five primordial elements, are his organs. The, true or fundamental form of the objects in the world cannot be realised by any one by means of his organs. Materialists say that such form is the same as it appears to our organs; but if tomorrow a human being acquires another new organ, then, from his point of view the qualities of the different objects in the world will be different. Human organs are of two kinds, namely, organs of Action (karmendriya) and organs of perception (jñānendriya). The hands, the feet, the voice, the anus and the generative organs are the five organs of Action. All the Actions which we perform by means of our body are performed through these five organs. Besides these, there are the five organs of perception, namely, the nose, the eyes, the ears, the tongue and the skin. "We perceive colour by the eyes, taste by the tongue, sound by the ears, smell by the nose, and touch by the skin. All the knowledge that we acquire of any external object, is the effect of its colour, taste, sound, smell or touch, and nothing else. For instance, take a piece of gold. It looks yellow, it seems heavy to the touch, and it is elongated on being hammered. These and its other qualities which we perceive by means of our organs, is what is 'gold' in our eyes; and when these qualities are seen to recur in any particular object, then such object becomes an independent physical object named 'gold' in our opinion. Just as there are doors in a factory for taking material in from outside and for sending out the material, which is inside, so also, the organs of perception are the doors of human body for taking material inside and the organs of Action are the doors for sending that material out. When of the rays of Sun fall on any object and enter our eyes on being reflected, our Ātman perceives the colour of that object; and when the minute atoms of scent, emanating from that that object come and strike our olfactory nerves, we smell it. The functions of the other organs of perception are carried on in the same way; and when the organs perception are functioning in this way, we become aware of the external objects in the world through their medium. But the organs of perception do not themselves acquire the knowledge of the activities which they carry on; and therefore, these organs of perception are not called 'jñātā' (Knower), but they have been referred to as the portals for taking in material from outside. When external material has come inside through these doors, the dealing with it afterwards is the function of the Mind. For instance, when at noon the clock strikes twelve, it is not the ears which understand what o'clock it is. Just as each stroke falls, aerial vibrations come and strike the ears, and when each of these strokes has in the first place created a distinct effect on the mind, we mentally calculate the sum of all these phenomena and decide what o'clock it is. Even the beasts have got the organs of perception, and as each stroke of the clock falls, it causes an effect on their mind through their ears. But their mind is not sufficiently developed to be able to total up the number of strokes and to understand that it is twelve o'clock. Explaining this in technical language, it is said that although a beast is capable of perceiving individual phenomena by themselves, yet, it is not able to perceive the unity which results from that diversity. In the Bhagavadgītā, this is explained by saying: "indriyāṇi parāṇy āhuḥ indriyebhyaḥ paraṃ manaḥ", (Bhagavadgītā 3.42), i.e., "the organs are superior to the external objects, and the Mind is superior to all the organs". As has been stated above, if the Mind is not in its proper place, we do not see anything although the eyes may be open, nor do we hear anything though the ears may be open. In short, the external material comes into the factory of the Body through the organs of perception to the clerk called 'Mind', and this clerk subsequently examines that material. We will now consider how this examination is done, and how it becomes necessary to further sub-divide that which we have so far been broadly referring to as the 'Mind', or how one and the same Mind acquires different names according to difference in its functions.

All the impressions which are created on the mind through the organs of perception have first to be placed together in one place and by comparing them with each other, one has first to decide which of them are good and which bad, which acceptable- arid which objectionable, which harmful and which beneficial p and when this examination has been made, we are induced to- do that thing which is good, beneficial, proper, or doable. This- is the ordinary course. For instance, when we go into a, garden, impressions of the various trees and flowers in it are made on our minds through our organs of perception. But unless our Ātman has acquired the knowledge of which of these flowers have a good smell and which a bad one, we do not get the desire of possessing a particular flower, and consequently perform the Action of plucking it. Therefore,, all mental activity falls into the following three broad divisions, namely: (1) having acquired the knowledge of external objects by means of the organs of perception,, arranging all these impressions, or carefully classifying them for purposes of comparison, (2) after this classification has been made, critically examining the good or bad qualities of the different objects and deciding which object is acceptable and which not; and (3) when the decision has been made, feeling the desire to acquire the acceptable and reject the unacceptable, and getting ready for appropriate action. It is not that these three functions must take place immediately one after the other, and without there being any interval of time between them. We may in the present feel the desire of acquiring some object which we may have seen in the past; nevertheless we cannot, on that account, say that any one of these three functions is unnecessary. Just as though the Court of Justice is one and the same, the work in it is divided in the following way, namely, the two parties or their respective pleaders first place their respective evidence and witnesses before the Judge, and the Judge gives his decision after considering the evidence on either side, and the Sheriff ultimately carries out the decision which has been given by the Judge, so also are the activities of that clerk whom we have so far broadly referred to as the 'Mind', divided. Out of these activities, the function of considering discriminatingly all the various objects which are perceived, and deciding that a particular thing is of a particular kind (evameva) and not of another kind (nānyathā), that is to say, the function of a Judge, belongs to the organ called 'Reason' (buddhiḥ); and all the mental functions referred to above, except the functions of this faculty of discriminating between good and evil, are carried out by the organ called 'Mind' (manas), according to the terminology of both the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya philosophies (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 23 and 27). This (minor) Mind, like a pleader, places before the Reason the various ideas that a particular thing is like this (saṃkalpam) or is like that (vikalpam) etc., for decision; and therefore, it is called an organ which is 'saṃkalpavikalpātmakam', that is, which merely forms ideas without arriving at any decision. The word 'saṃkalpam' is sometimes made to include also the factor of decision (Chāndogya. 7.4.1.). But in this particular place, the word 'saṃkalpam', has been used to mean and include merely realising, or believing, or taking for granted, or understanding that a particular thing as of a particular kind, or such activities as planning some Action, desiring, thinking, or conceiving, without arriving at;any decision (niścayaḥ). But the function of the Mind is not.exhausted after placing various ideas for decision before the Reason in this way like a pleader. When the Reason has decided on the goodness or badness of any particular act, and has decided what is acceptable, the Mind has also to perform the Registrar's function of bringing about, through the organs of Action, that thing which has been found acceptable, that Is to say, of carrying into execution the decisions of Reason;.and therefore, the Mind can also be defined in another way. It is true that considering how to carry into execution the decision which has been arrived at by the Reason is in a sense saṃkalpa-vikalpātmaka; nevertheless that process has been given the independent name 'vyākaraṇam', that is, 'development', In the Sanskrit language; all the other mental activities except these are the functions of Reason. The Mind does not discriminate between the various ideas in the mind. Discriminating between them and giving to the Ātman the accurate knowledge of any particular object, or deciding that a particular thing is only of a particular kind after proper classification, or arriving at a definite inference, and deciding as to the doability or non-doability of any particular Action after inferentially determining the relation of Cause and Effect between two things, are all functions of the Reason and are known in Sanskrit as 'vyavasāyaḥ' or 'adhyavasāyaḥ'.

Therefore, these two words have been defined in the Mahābhārata in the following way in order to show the difference between the Reason and the (minor) Mind, namely:–

vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ mano vyākaraṇātmakam
  (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 251. 11).

That is, "the 'buddhiḥ' (Reason) is an organ which does the vyavasāyaḥ, that is, which discriminates and arrives at a decision, and the Mind (minor) is an organ which does the vyākaraṇam, that is, carries out the development or the further arrangements”.

In short, the Reason "is vyavasāyātmikā and the mind is vyākaraṇātmakam". Even the Bhagavadgītā contains the words "vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ" (Bhagavadgītā 2.44); and in that place, the word buddhiḥ means the organ which discriminates and decides. The buddhiḥ is like a sword. Its function is only to cut whatever comes before it or is brought before it. It has no other quality or function (Śriman Mahābhārata Vana. 181. 26). Planning, desiring, wanting, memory, perseverance, faith, enthusiasm, kindness, interestedness, affection, pity, gratitude, sexual impulses, shame, joy, fear, love, attachment, hate, avarice, arrogance, jealousy, anger etc., are all qualities or faculties of the Mind (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.5.3; Maitryupaniṣat (or Maitrāṇyupaniṣad) 6, 30), and man is prompted to perform any particular act according to the particular mental impulse which has sprung into the Mind.

However reasonable a man may be, and even if has fully understands how poor people suffer, yet, if the feeling of pity is not aroused in his heart, he will never be inspired by the desire to help the poor; or, though he might feel the desire to fight, he will not fight if he is wanting in courage. The Reason only tells us what the result will be at those things which we want to do. But as desire, courage etc., are not the faculties of the Reason, Reason by itself, that is without the help of the Mind, never inspires the organs to do anything. On the other hand, though, the Mind can inspire the organs when under the sway of Anger etc., yet an Action which may have been performed without the discrimination of the Reason and merely by. the inspiration of the mental impulses, will not necessarily be morally pure. For instance, if something is given in charity without exercising the Reason and merely under the impulse of the feeling of pity, there is a chance of its having evil effects if the charity is given to an. undeserving person. In short, the mental impulses by them- selves are blind without the help of Reason. Therefore, in order that any good Action should be performed by a man, there must be a combination of a Reason which is pure, that is to say, such as will arrive at a correct decision between good and bad, a Mind which will act according to the dictates of the Reason, and organs which are subject to the control of Mind.

Besides the words 'buddhiḥ' and 'manas' the other words 'antaḥkaraṇam' and 'cittam' are also in vogue. As the word antaḥkaraṇam out of these means the internal (i.e., antaḥ) organ (i.e., karaṇam or indriyam), it usually includes the manas (Mind), buddhiḥ (Reason), cittam (Consciousness) and ahaṃkāram (Egoism) etc.; and when the Mind first contemplates external objects, it becomes cittam, (i.e., Consciousness), (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 274.17). But, as in ordinary parlance these words are used as being synonymous, there is very often a confusion as to what meaning is intended in which place. In order that such a confusion should not arise only the two words Mind and Reason, out of the various words mentioned above, are used in scientific terminology in the specific meanings mentioned above. When in this way a differentiation has been made between the Mind and the Reason, the Reason in its capacity of a judge, necessarily becomes superior to the Mind, and the Mind becomes the clerk of the Reason. This is the purport of the following words, used in the Gītā, namely, "manasas tu parā buddhiḥ", i.e., ' the Reason is superior to or beyond the Mind" (Bhagavadgītā 3.42). Nevertheless, even this clerk has, as mentioned above, to perform two. different functions; the first of these is to properly arrange all the impressions which have come from outside, through the medium of the organs of perception, and to place those impressions before the Reason for decision; and the second one is to carry "the order Or the message of the Reason to the organs of Action after the Reason has arrived at a decision and make these organs perform those external Actions which are necessary to be performed for carrying out the decision of the Reason. Just as very often in a shop, the duty of purchasing merchandise for the shop and also the duty of sitting in the shop and selling the goods are both carried out by one and the same clerk, so also is the case with the Mind. Suppose, you see a friend of yours and being inspired with the desire of calling him, you say to him 'hullo!'; then, let us see what are the various functions which are carried out in your antaḥkaraṇam. First, your eyes, that is, the organ of perception, have sent a message to the Reason through the medium of the Mind that your friend is near you, and that knowledge is conveyed through the Reason to your Ātman. Here, the first function, namely, of the acquisition of knowledge, is over. Then the Ātman, through the medium of the Reason decides to call the friend; next, the desire to speak springs into the Mind in order to execute the decision of the Reason, and the Mind causes the word 'hullo!' to be uttered by the organ of Action.

In the Śikṣā-grantha of Pāṇinī, the function of the utterance of words has been described on that basis as follows:–

ātmā buddhyā sametyārthān mano yuṅkte vivakṣayā |
manaḥ kāyāgnim āhanti sa prerayati mārutam |
mārutas tūrasi caran mandraṃ janayati svaram ||

That is, "the Ātman in the first place grasps all things through the medium of the Reason, and creates in the Mind the desire to speak; then the Mind sets in action the bodily heat (kāyāgni) which in turn Bets the breath in motion; then this breath entering the chest, creates the lowest sound; and this sound ultimately comes out of the mouth in the shape of labial, guttural, or other sounds."

The last two lines of the above stanza are also to be found in the Maitryupaniṣad (Maitryupaniṣat (or Maitrāṇyupaniṣad) 7.11.); and from this it is clear, that this stanza must be older than Panini.^[3] 'kāyāgni' is known in present-day medical science as 'nerves'. But according to that science, the nerves which bring in the perception of external objects are different from those which carry the message of the Reason to the organs of Action through the medium of the Mind; and therefore, according to Western medical scientists, we must have two kinds of Mind. Our philosophers have not thought that there are two kinds of Mind; they have differentiated between the Reason and the Mind, and have said that the Mind is dual, that is to say, where the organs of Action are concerned it acts according to the organs of Action, and where the organs of perception are concerned, it acts according to those organs. Both these ideas are essentially the same. According to the points of view of both, the Reason is the judge who decides, and the Mind becomes saṃkalpavikalpātmakam, that is, performs the function of conceiving ideas in relation to the organs of perception, and becomes vyākaraṇātmakam. that is, executive, in relation to the organs of Action, that is to say, it becomes the actual provocator of the organs of Action. Nevertheless, in developing (i.e., making the vyākaraṇam of) anything, the Mind has very often to conceive ideas (that is, make saṃkalpam and vikalpam) in order to see in what way the dictates of the Reason can be carried out. Therefore, in defining the Mind, it is usual to say simply "saṃkalpa- vikalpātmakaṃ manaḥ"; but, it must not be forgotten, that even according to that definition, both kinds of functions of the Mind are included.

The definition of Reason given by me above, namely, that it is the organ which discerns, is intended only for the purpose of minute scientific discussions. But, these scientific meanings of words are always fixed subsequently. It is, therefore, necessary to consider here also the practical meanings which the word 'buddhiḥ' had acquired before this scientific meaning had been fixed. We cannot acquire the knowledge of anything unless it has been identified by the Pure Reason (vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ); and unless we have acquired the knowledge of that object, we do not conceive the intention or the desire of obtaining it. Therefore, just as in ordinary parlance, the word 'mango' is applied both to the mango-tree and the mangofruit, so also ordinary people very often use the single word 'buddhiḥ' (Reason) for signifying the Pure Reason (vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ), as also the fruits of that Reason in the shape of Desire etc. For instance, when we say that the buddhiḥ of a particular person is evil, we intend to say that his 'Desire' is evil. As 'Intention' or 'Desire ' are both faculties of the Mind from the scientific point of view, it is not correct to refer to them by the word 'buddhiḥ'. But, before the word 'buddhiḥ' had been scientifically analysed, the word 'buddhiḥ' had begun to be used in ordinary parlance in the two meanings of (i) the organ which discerns and (ii) the Intention or Desire which subsequently arises in the human mind as a result of the functioning of that organ. Therefore just as the additional word 'tree' or 'fruit' is used when it is: intended to show the two different meanings of the word 'mango', so also, when it is necessary to differentiate between the two meanings of the word 'buddhiḥ', the 'buddhiḥ' which discriminates, that is to say, the technical 'buddhiḥ' is referred to by qualifying it by the adjective 'vyavasāyātmikā' and Desire is referred to as simply 'buddhiḥ' or at most as 'vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ'. In the Gītā the word 'buddhiḥ' has been used in both the above meanings (Bhagavadgītā 2.41, 44, 49 and 3.42); and in order to properly understand the exposition of the Karma-Yoga, both these meanings of the word 'buddhiḥ' have to be continually kept before the mind. When man begins to do any particular act, he first considers whether it is good, or bad, doable or notdoable etc., by means of his Pure Reason (vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ), and when the Desire or Intention (that is, the 'vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ) of doing that act enters his mind, he becomes ready to perform the act. This is the order of the mental functions. When that buddhiḥ out of the two (namely the vyavasāyātmikā) which has to decide between the doability and the non-doability of any particular Action is functioning properly, the Mind is not polluted by improper Desires (buddhiḥ) entering it. Therefore, the first theorem of the Karma-Yoga preached in the Gītā is that the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ (Pure Reason) must be made pure and steady (Bhagavadgītā 2.41). Not only the Gītā, but also Kant has differentiated between two kinds of buddhiḥ and he has described the functions of the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ (Pure Reason) and of the vyavahārikā or vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ (Practical Reason) in two different books.^[4] Really speaking, steadying the Pure- Reason is the subject-matter of the Pātañjala Yoga-Śāstra,- and not of the Karma-Yoga Śāstra. But in considering any particular act, one must, according to the doctrine of the Gītā, first consider the desire or the vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ of the doer of the act, before one looks at the effect of the act (Bhagavadgītā 2.49); and in the same way when one considers- the question of Desires it will be seen that the man whose pure Reason has not become steady and pure, conceives different shades of desire in his mind, and therefore), it is not certain that these desires will be always pure or holy (Bhagavadgītā 2.41). And if the desires themselves are not pure, how will the resulting Action be pure?

Therefore, one has to consider in detail, even in the science of Karma-Yoga, the methods or means which have to be employed to keep the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ pure, and therefore, the Pātañjala Yoga has been, described in the sixth chapter of the Bhagavadgītā as one of the means by which the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ can be made pure. But some doctrinal commentators have disregarded this fact and drawn the inference that the Gītā supports and" preaches the Pātañjala Yoga! From this it will be clear to my readers how necessary it is to bear in mind the above mentioned two meanings of the word 'buddhiḥ' and their mutual relation.

I have in this way explained what the respective functions of the Mind and the Reason are, after explaining the internal working of the human mind, and I have also mentioned the other meanings of the word 'buddhiḥ'. Having in this way differentiated between the Mind and the 'vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ' (Pure Reason), let us see how this aspect affects the question of the deity which discerns between good and evil (Sad-asad-viveka-devatā). As the only purpose which this deity serves is to choose between good and evil, it cannot be included in the (minor) Mind; and as there is only one 'vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ' (Pure Reason) which considers all matters and comes to a decision on them, we cannot give an independent place for the sad-asad-vivecana śakti (power of discriminating between good and evil). There may be numerous matters about which one has to think, discriminate, and come to a conclusion. In commerce, war, civil or criminal legal proceedings, money-lending, agriculture, and other trades, there arise any number of occasions on which one has to discriminate. But, on that account, the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ in each case does not become different. The function of discrimination is common to all these cases; and therefore, the buddhiḥ (Reason) which makes that discrimination or decision must also be one only. But in as much as the buddhiḥ is a bodily faculty (śārīra-dharma) just like the Mind, it can be sāttvikī, rājasī, or tāmasī according to previous Actions, hereditary impressions, or education or for other reasons; and therefore, a thing which might be acceptable to the buddhiḥ of one person may be looked upon as unacceptable to the buddhiḥ of another person. But on that account, we cannot say that the organ of buddhiḥ is different in each case. Take for instance, the case of the eye some people have squint eyes, while others have half-closed eyes, and others one eye only, and some have dim vision, while others have a clear vision. But, on that account, we do not Bay that the eye is a different organ in each case, but say that the organ is one and the same. The same argument must be applied to the case of the buddhiḥ. That same buddhiḥ which differentiates between rice and wheat, or between a stone and a diamond, or which distinguishes between black and white, or sweet and bitter, also discriminates between what is to be feared and what not, what is good and what evil, what is profitable and what disadvantageous, what is righteous and what unrighteous, or what doable and what not-doable, and comes to a final decision in the matter. However much we may glorify it in ordinary parlance by calling it a 'Mental Deity' yet from the philosophical point of view, it is one and the same vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ (pure Reason).

That is why in the 18th Chapter of the Gītā, one and the same buddhiḥ has been divided into the three kinds of sāttvikī, rājasī, and tāmasī and the Blessed Lord first says to Arjuna:–

pravṛttiṃ ca nivṛttiṃ ca kāryākārye bhayābhaye |
bandhaṃ mokṣaṃ ca yā vetti buddhiḥ sā pārtha sāttvikī ||
(Bhagavadgītā 18.30)

That is, "that buddhiḥ which (properly) understands which Action should he begun and which not, which is proper to be performed and which not, what should be feared and what not, what leads to bondage and what to Release (mokṣa), is the sāttvikī buddhiḥ ";

And then He goes on to say:–

yayā dharmam adharmaṃ ca kāryaṃ cākāryam eva ca |
ayathāvat prajānāti buddhiḥ sā Pārtha rājasī ||
  (Bhagavadgītā 18.31)

That is, "that buddhiḥ which does not make a proper discrimination between the dharmam (righteous) and the adharmam (unrighteous), or between the doable and the notdoable, that buddhiḥ is rājasī";

And He lastly says:–

adharmaṃ dharmam iti yā manyate tamasāvṛtā |
sarvārthān viparītāṃś ca buddhiḥ sā Pārtha tāmasī ||
  (Bhagavadgītā 18.32)

That is, "that buddhiḥ which looks upon that as righteous–(dharmam) which is unrighteous (adharmam), that is to say, which gives a totally perverse, that is, contrary verdict on all matters is the tāmasī buddhiḥ".

From this explanation, it will be clear that the theory that there is an independent and distinct deity of which the function is sad-asad-vivekaḥ, (i.e., discrimination between good and evil) is not accepted by the Gītā. That does not mean that there can never exist a buddhiḥ (Reason) which will always choose the right thing. What is meant is that the buddhiḥ is one and the same, but the sāttvika quality of choosing only the right thing is acquired by it by previous impressions, or by education, or by control of the organs, or by the nature of the food which a man eats etc., and in the absence of such factors as previous impressions etc., that same buddhiḥ becomes rājasī or tāmasī, not only in the matter of the discrimination between the doable and the not-doable but also in all other matters. Such is the import of the above stanzas. The facts of the difference between the buddhiḥ of a thief and that of an honest man, or of persons belonging to different countries is explained by this theory in a satisfactory way, in which it cannot be explained by looking upon the Power of -discrimination between good and evil (sad-asadvivecana-śakti) as an independent deity. "Making one's buddhiḥ, sāttvikī, is what one oneself can do; and it cannot be done without the control of the organs. So long as the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ acts only according to the dictates of the organs, without discriminating between or examining what promotes one's true benefit, it cannot be called Pure (śuddha); therefore, one must not allow the buddhiḥ to become the slave of the Mind and the organs, but one must on the other hand arrange it so that the Mind and the organs are under its control, This principle has been enunciated in numerous places in the Bhagavadgītā (Bhagavadgītā 2.67, 68; 3.7, 41; 6.24, 36) and, on that account, the body, has been compared to a chariot in the Kaṭhopaniṣad, and it is metaphorically stated that in order that the horses in the shape of the organs which pull that chariot should be properly guided in the path of the enjoyment of objects of pleasure, the charioteer in the shape of the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ has to courageously keep taut and steady the reins in the shape of the Mind (Kaṭhopaniṣad 3.3.9); and in the Mahābhārata also, the same simile has been adopted in two or three places with some slight difference (Śriman Mahābhārata Vana 210.25; Strī. 7.13; Aśva. 51.5). 'This simile is so proper for describing the function of the control of the organs, that the famous Greek Philosopher Plato has in his book (Phoedrus. 246) made use of the same illustration in describing the control of the organs. This illustration does not appear literally in the Bhagavadgītā. Yet, the description of the control of the organs in the above-mentioned stanzas has been made keeping this illustration in mind, as cannot but be noticed by anybody who keeps in sight the previous and posterior context of this subject-matter. Ordinarily, that is, when it is not necessary to make subtle scientific distinctions, this is known as 'manonigraha' (control of the Mind); but when, as mentioned above, a distinction is made between the manas (Mind) and the buddhiḥ (Reason), the function of control falls to the share, not of the Mind, but of "the pure (vyavasāyātmikā) Reason. In order this vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ should become pure, the principle that there is only one Ātman in all human beings, must be deeply impressed on the mind by realising the true nature of the Parameśvara whether by the mental absorption (samādhi) taught in the Pātañjala Yoga, or by Devotion or by Knowledge (jñāna) or by Meditation (dhyāna). This is what is known as Self- devoted (ātma-niṣṭha) buddhiḥ. When the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ has in this way become Self-devoted (ātmaniṣṭha), and the Mind and the organs have learnt to act according to its directions as a result of mental control, Desire, Intention, or other mental functions (manodharma) or the vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ (Practical Reason), naturally become pure and chaste, and the bodily organs naturally tend towards sāttvika actions. From the Metaphysical point of view, this is the foundation of all good actions, that is to say, the esoteric teaching (rahasya) of the science of Proper Action (KarmaYoga).

My readers will now have realised why our philosophers have not accepted Conscience as an independent deity, in addition to the ordinary functions of the Mind and the Reason. From, their point of view, there is no objection to looking upon 'the Mind or the Reason as deities by way of glorification; but they have come to the conclusion that considering the matter scientifically, there is no third element like Conscience which is distinct from and in addition to the two things which we call manas (mind), and buddhiḥ (Reason) and which is inherent. We now clearly see the propriety of the word satām having been used in the phrase 'satāṃ hi saṃdeha padeṣu' etc. Those whose minds are pure and Self-devoted (ātmaniṣṭha), need not at any time be afraid of consulting their Conscience (antaḥkaraṇa). We may even say that they should purify their Mind as much as possible before performing any Action, and consult their Conscience, But, there is no sense in dishonest people saying: "We do the same thing", because, the Conscience of both is not the same, and whereas the Conscience of saints is sāttvika, that of thieves is tāmasa. In short, that which the Intuitionist School refers to as 'the Deity which discerns between Good and Evil' (the sadasad-viveka-devata), is seen not to be an independent deity when the matter is considered from the philosophical point of view, but to be only the Self-devoted and the sāttvika form of the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ This is the theory of our philosophers, and when this theory is accepted, the Intuitionist point of view naturally falls to the ground.

When we have thus seen that the Materialistic aspect is onesided and insufficient, and also that the easy device found out by the Intuitionist school is ineffective, it becomes necessary for us to see whether or not there is some other way for justifying the doctrine of Karma-Yoga. This way is the Metaphysical aspect of the matter; because, when we have, once come to the conclusion that there is no such independent and self-created (svayaṃbhū) deity like the sad-asad-vivekabuddhiḥ (Conscience), notwithstanding the fact that the Reason is superior to external Action, it becomes necessary to consider, even in the science of Karma-Yoga, how one can keep one's Reason pure in order that one should be able to perform pure Action, what is meant by Pure Reason, and how the Reason, can be made pure; and the consideration of these questions, cannot be complete unless one leaves aside the Material sciences which deal only with the external physical world, and enters into Metaphysics. Our philosophers have laid down the ultimate doctrine, in this matter, that the Reason, which has not fully realised the true and all-pervading nature of the Parameśvara, is not pure; and the science of the Highest Self (adhyātma) has been expounded in the Gītā solely in order to explain what this Self-devoted Reason (ātmaniṣṭha buddhiḥ) is. But, disregarding this anterior and posterior context, some doctrinal commentators on the Gītā have laid down the conclusion that Vedānta is the principal subjectmatter of exposition in the Gītā. It will be shown later on exhaustively that this conclusion arrived at by these commentators as to the subject-matter expounded in the Gītā, is not correct. I have for the time being only to show how it is necessary to consider the question of the Ātman when one wishes to find out how the Beason [Reason?] is to be purified. This question of the Ātman has to be considered from two points of view:–(1) the first method of exposition is to examine one's own body,' (piṇḍaḥ, kṣetra, or śarīram), as also the activities of one's Mind, and to explain how as a result of such examination, one has to admit the existence of the Ātman in the shape of a kṣetrajña, or an owner of the Body (Bhagavadgītā Chap. 13). This is known as the śārīrakavicāra or the KŚETRA-KŚETRAJÑA-VICĀRA (the Consideration of the Body and the Ātman); and that is why the Vedānta-Sūtras are known as śārīraka (dealing with the Body) sūtras. When in this way we have examined our Body and Our Mind, we have next to consider (2) whether the elementary principle which is arrived at by such examination, and the principle which is arrived at by the examination of the brahmāṇḍam or the visible world around us, are the same or are different.' The examination of the world made in this way is known, as the KṢARĀKṢARA-VICĀRA or the VYAKTĀVAYKTA-VICĀRA (the consideration of the Mutable and the Immutable, or the consideration of the Perceptible and the Imperceptible). The 'kṣara' or 'vyakta' is the name of all the mutable objects in the world, and akṣara or avyakta is the name of the essential and eternal element in the mutable objects in this creation (Bhagavadgītā 8.21; 15.16). The fundamental Element which we dis- cover by further examining these two elementary principles arrived at by the consideration of the Body and the Ātman and of the Mutable and the Immutable, and which is the Element from which both these elements have been evolved, and which is beyond (para) both of them, and is the Root Element of everything, is called the Absolute Self (Paramātman) or the Puruṣottamaḥ (Bhagavadgītā 8. 20): All these ideas are to be found in the Bhagavadgītā, and the science of Proper Action has been expounded in it by showing how the buddhiḥ is ultimately purified by the Realisation (jñānam) of this Element in the shape of the Paramātman, which is the Root Cause of everything. If, therefore, we have to understand this method of exposition, we must also follow the path which has been followed in the Gītā. Out of these two subject-matters, the knowledge of the brahmāṇḍam or the consideration of the Mutable and the Immutable (kṣarākṣara) will be dealt with" in the next chapter. I shall now complete the science of the piṇḍa, or the consideration of the Body and the Ātman which I had commenced in this chapter in order to explain the true nature of the Conscience, and which has remained incomplete.

I have finished my exposition of the gross Body made up of the five primordial elements, the five organs of Action, the five organs of Perception, the five objects of these five organs of Perception in the shape of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, the Mind which is the conceiver of ideas (saṃkalpavikalpa), and the Pure Reason (vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ). But that does not exhaust the consideration of the Body. The Mind and the Reason are the means or the organs for thought. If the gross Body does not possess movement (cetanā) in the form of Vitality (prāṇaḥ) in addition to these, it will be just the same whether the Mind and the Reason exist or not. Therefore, it is necessary to include one more element in the Body in addition to these other things, namely, Movement (cetanā). The word 'cetanā', is sometimes also used as meaning the same things 'caitanyam' (Consciousness). But one must bear in mind that the word cetanā has not been used in the sense of caitanyam in the present context, 'cetanā' here means the movement, activity, or the vital motion of the Life forces seen in the gross Body. That caitanyam (Power of Consciousness) by means of which movement or activity is created even in Gross Matter, is known as caitanyam; and we have now to consider what that

Power is. That factor which gives rise to the distinction between "mine", and "other's" which is to be seen in the Body in addition to its Vital activity or Movement, is a different quality altogether; Because, in as much as the Reason is only an organ which comes to a decision after proper consideration, Individuation (ahaṃkāraḥ), which is at the root of the distinction between one's and another's, must be looked upon as something different from Reason. Like and dislike, pain and happiness, and other correlative couplets (dvaṃdvam) are the properties of the Mind. But as the Nyāya school looks upon these as properties of the Ātman, Vedānta philosophy includes them among the properties of the Mind in order to clear that misunderstanding. In the same way, that fundamental element in the shape of Matter (prakṛti), from which the five primordial elements have sprung, is also included in the Body (Bhagavadgītā 13.5, 6). That Power by which all these elements are controlled or kept steady, is again a different power (Bhagavadgītā 18.33), and it is called 'dhṛti' (cohesion). ' That amalgamated product which results from the combination of all these things is scientifically called the 'savikāra śarīra' (activated Body), or 'kṣetra'; and this is what we, in ordinary parlance, call the activated (savikāra) human body, or the piṇḍa. I have defined the word 'kṣetra' in this way, consistently with the Gītā. But in mentioning the qualities Desire, Hate etc., this definition is sometimes more or less departed from. For instance, in the conversation between Janaka and Sulabhā, in the Śānti parva (Śān. 320), the five organs of Action have not been mentioned in the definition of the Body, but instead of them the six qualities of Time-feeling (kāla), Realisation of Good and Evil (sad-asad-bhāvaḥ). Method (vidhiḥ), Vitality (śukram), and Strength (bala) have been mentioned. According to this classification, the five organs of Action have to be included in the five primordial elements, whereas according to the classification adopted in the Gītā, we are to include Time in the Ether (ākāśam), and Method, Vitality, Strength etc., in the five primordial elements or in Matter. Whatever may be the case, the word 'kṣetra' conveys only one meaning to everybody. That collection of mental and bodily elements or qualities in the shape of prāṇaḥ (Life force), which has specific activities (viśiṣṭa-cetanā), is known as 'kṣetra'. As the word 'śarīra' is also applied to dead bodies, the different word 'kṣetra' has been used in this particular place, 'kṣetra' originally means 'field', but in the present context, it has been used metaphorically as meaning the 'activated (savikāra) and living (sajīva) human body'. That which has been referred to by me above as a great factory is this 'kṣetra'. The organs of Perception, and the organs of Action, are the portals of this factory for taking in material from outside and for sending out the manufactured products respectively and, the Mind, the Reason, Individuation (ahaṃkāra), and Activity (cetanā) are the workmen in this factory; and all the functions carried on or caused to be carried on by these workmen, are referred to as the activities (vyāpārāḥ), feelings (vikārāḥ), or properties (dharmāḥ) of this Body.

When in this way, the meaning of the word 'kṣetra' has. been defined, the next question which naturally arises is, to whom does this kṣetra or field belong, is there or is there not some owner for this factory? Although the word 'Ātman is very often used in the meaning of 'Mind' or 'Conscience' or 'one's Self', yet, its principal meaning is 'the owner of the Body (kṣetrajña)'. "Whatever functions are performed by man, and whether they are mental or bodily, are carried on by his internal organs such as buddhiḥ etc., his organs of Perception such as the eyes etc., and his organs of Action, such as hands,, feet, etc. In the whole of this group, the Mind and the Reason- are the most superior. But although they may, in this way, be superior to the other organs, yet they are both fundamentally the manifestations (vikārāḥ) of Matter (prakṛti) or of the gross Body, just like the other organs. (See the next chapter.) Therefore, although the Mind and the Reason may be the highest of all the organs, yet they cannot do anything beyond their particular functions, and it is not possible that they should be able to do anything else. It is true that the Mind thinks and the Reason decides. But, knowing this, we do not arrive at a conclusion as to for whom the Mind' and the Reason perform these functions, or as to who performs- that synthesis which is necessary for obtaining a synthetic knowledge of the diverse activities carried on by the Mind: and the Reason on various occasions, or as to how all the organs subsequently receive the directions to perform their various functions consistently with that synthesis. It cannot be said that all this is done by the gross Body of man. Because, when 'cetanā' or activity leaves this gross Body, this gross Body is unable to perform these functions although it remains behind; and as the component parts of the gross Body, namely, the flesh, the muscles, etc., are the result of food, and these are continually worn out and continually reformed, it cannot be said that the feeling of sameness by which a person realises that "I", who saw a particular thing yesterday, am the same as the "I" who see a different thing to-day, is the property of the continually changing gross Body. If, however, one leaves aside the gross Body, and says that cetanā (Activity) is the owner of the body, then, in deep sleep, one does not continue to possess the 'I' feeling although such activities or cetanā as breathing or blood-circulation are going on. (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.1.15–18). It, therefore, follows that Activity or the functioning of Life forces, is a specific quality which has been acquired by the gross Body, and is not the controlling factor, owner or power which synthesizes all the activities of the organs (Kaṭhopaniṣad 5.5). The possessive case adjectival forms 'mine' or 'another's prove to us the existence of the quality of Individuation (ahaṃkāraḥ). But by knowing that, we do not come to a conclusion as to who this 'aham' or 'I' is. If you say, that this 'I' is a pure illusion, then the experience of everybody is just the contrary; and imagining something which is inconsistent with this personal experience of every- body, would place one in the position described by Śrī Samartha Rāmadāsa as: "saying something which is inconsistent with experience is wholly tiresome; it is as useless as opening one's mouth wide and crying" (Dāsabodha 9.5.15); and even if we do this, the fact of the synthesis of the activities of the organs is not satisfactorily explained. Some go so far as to say that there is no such individual thing as 'I' but that the name 'I' should be given to the conglomeration or the fusion of all those elements, such as, the Mind, Reason, Activity, gross Body etc., which are included in the word 'kṣetra'. But we see by our own eyes, that by merely piling a piece of wood on another piece of wood, we cannot make a box.; nor is motion created in a watch by merely putting together all its various wheels. We cannot, therefore, say that activity arises by mere juxtaposition. Nobody need be told that the various activities of the kṣetra are not purely -foolish activities and that there is some specific intention or object in them. "Who is it that gives this direction to the various workmen, such as, buddhiḥ etc., in the factory of the Body? Juxtaposition (saṃghātaḥ) means merely putting together. Although several things may be put together, it is necessary to thread them together in order that they should form one whole. Otherwise, they will become disorganised at any moment. We have now to see what this thread is. It is not that the Gītā does not accept the principle of conglomeration (saṃghātaḥ); but that is looked upon as part of the kṣetra (Bhagavadgītā 13.6). We do not thereby get an idea as to who the kṣetrajña or the owner of the Body is. Some persons think, that conglomeration gives rise to some new quality. But this opinion itself is not correct; because, philosophers have after mature consideration come to the conclusion that that which was not in existence before, in some form or other, cannot come into existence anew (Bhagavadgītā 2.16), But even if we keep this doctrine aside for a moment, the next question which naturally springs up is why should we not look upon the new quality which arises in the conglomeration, as the owner of the Body? To this, some Materialist philosophers, reply, that a substance cannot be different from its qualities, and that the qualities want some superintendence (adhiṣṭhānam), and, therefore, instead of looking upon the property acquired by the Aggregate as the owner of the Body, we look upon the Aggregate itself as such owner. Very well; then why do you not say 'wood' instead of

'fire', or 'cloud' instead of 'electricity', or 'the earth' instead of 'the gravity of the earth' in ordinary parlance? If it is not disputed that there must be in existence some Power which is distinct from the Mind and the Reason in order that all the activities of the Body should be carried on systematically and according to some proper arrangement, then can we, because the seat of that Power is still unknown to us, or because we cannot properly explain the full nature of that Power or of that seat, say that that Power does not exist at all? No person can sit on his own shoulders; in the same way, it is absurd to say that an Aggregate (saṃghātaḥ) gives to itself the knowledge of itself. Therefore, we come to the emphatic conclusion even from the logical point of view, that THAT THING for the enjoyment or the benefit of which, the various functions of the Aggregate of the bodily organs etc. are carried on, must be something which is quite distinct from the Aggregate itself. It is true that this Element which is distinct from the Aggregate, is an element which cannot become an object of perception (jñeya) or become visible to itself like other objects in the creation, since it is self-enlightened. But, on that account, the fact of its existence cannot come into question; because, there is no rule that all objects must fall into the single category of the 'perceivable' (jñeya). All objects fall into two categories, namely, the 'jñātā' and the 'jñeya', i.e., the Perceiver, and That which is perceived by the Perceiver, and if something does not fall into the second category, it can come into the first category and its existence is as fully established as the existence of the Perceivable. Nay, we may go further and say that in as much as the 5.tman, which is beyond the Aggregate (saṃghāta) is itself a Knower, there is no wonder that it does- not become the subject-matter of the knowledge which it acquires; and therefore, Yājñavalkya has said in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, that "vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt" i.e. "Oh! how can there be someone else, who can know That which knows everything? " (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 2.4.14). Therefore, one has to come to the ultimate conclusion, that there exists in this activated living Body some comprehensive and potent Power which is more powerful and more comprehensive than the various dependent and onesided workmen in the Body who work in grades rising from organs like the hands and feet to Life, Activity, Mind and Reason; that this Power remains aloof from all of them, and synthesises the activities of all of them and fixes for them the direction in which they are to act, and is an ever-awake witness of all their activities. This doctrine has been accepted both by the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophies, and the modern German philosopher Kant has shown by minutely examining all the activities of Reason that this is the doctrine which one arrives at. The Mind, the Reason, Individuation or Activity are all qualities or component parts of the Body, that is, of the 'kṣetra'. The inspirer of these components is different from them, independent of them, and beyond them. "yo buddheḥ paratas tu saḥ" (Bhagavadgītā 3.42), i.e., "It is beyond the grasp of the Reason". This is- what is known in the Sāṃkhya philosophy as 'puruṣa', and in Vedānta philosophy as 'kṣetrajña', that is to say, the Ātman which knows or controls the Body; and the actual experience which everyone has of the feeling that 'I am', is the most excellent proof of the existence of this Knower of the Body (Śāṃkarabhāṣya 3.3.53, 54). Not only doss nobody think that 'I am not', but even if a person by his mouth utters the words: 'I am not', he thereby inferentially acknowledges the existence of the Ātman or the 'I' which is the subject of the predicate 'am not'. The Vedānta philosophy has been propounded only in order to explain as clearly as possible the fundamental, pure, and qualityless form of this kṣetrajña or Ātman, which manifests itself in this way in the body in the individuated and qualified form 'I' (Bhagavadgītā 13. 4); nevertheless, this conclusion is not arrived at by merely considering the Body, that is to say, the kṣetra. I have stated before that we have to see what can be ascertained by considering the Cosmos (brahmāṇḍam) that is to say, the external world, in addition to consideration of the Body and the Ātman. This consideration of the Cosmos is known as 'kṣarākṣara-vicāra'. By considering the Body and the Ātman, we come to know the fundamental element (kṣetrajña or Ātman) which exists in the kṣetra (the Body, or the piṇḍa) and by considering the Mutable and the Immutable (kṣarākṣara), we understand the fundamental element in the Cosmos (brahmāṇḍa), that is, in the external creation. When in this way, the fundamental elements of the Body (piṇḍa) and of the Cosmos (brahmāṇḍa) have been definitely and severally fixed, Vedānta philosophy, after further consideration comes to the conclusion that both these are uniform or one and the same,–or that WHATEVER IS IN THE BODY (PIṆḌA), IS ALSO IN THE COSMOS (BRAHMĀṆḌAM).^[5] This is the ultimate truth of the moveable and the immoveable Cosmos. When we realise that this kind of examination has been made even in the Western countries, and that the doctrines advanced by Western philosophers like Kant etc. are very much akin to the doctrines of Vedānta philosophy, we cannot but feel a wonder about the supermanly mental powers of those persons, who laid down these doctrines of Vedānta by mere introspection, in an age when the Material sciences were not so advanced as they are in the present day; hut we must not stop with feeling wonder about this matter,–we must feel proud of it.

–-:o:–-

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

This 'sad-asad viveka-buddhi' means 'Conscience' in English; and the 'ādhidaivata pakṣa' is the Intuitionist School.

[2]:

This writer is James Martineau, and he has published this list in his work entitled "Types of Ethical Theory" (Vol. II. p. 266; 3rd Ed.). Martineau calls his school the Idio-psychological School. But I include this school in the Intuitionist School.

[3]:

Max Müller has said that Maitryupaniṣad must be earlier in point of time than Pāṇinī. See Sacred Books of the East Series Vol. XV pp. xlvii–li. This matter has been more fully dealt with by me in the Appendices.

[4]:

Kant calls the vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ Pare Reason; and the vāsanātmikā buddhiḥ Practical Reason and he has dealt with these two kinds of Reason in two separate books.

[5]:

The classification made in oar philosophy of kṣarākṣara-vicāra and kṣara-kṣetrajña-vicāra was not known to Green. Yet the exposition of Metaphysics made by him in the commencement of his book called Prolegomena to Ethics, has been made by him in a twofold way, namely, regarding the 'Spiritual Principle in Nature' and the 'Spiritual Principle in Man'; and later on, he has shown the identity between the two. The kṣara-kṣetrajña-vicāra includes such, mental philosophies as Psychology etc., and the kṣarākṣara-vicāra includes such sciences as Physics, Metaphysics etc. and even Western philosophers have accepted the position that the nature of the Ātman has to be arrived at, after taking into consideration all these things.