Chapter 3 - The Science of Right Action (karma-yoga-śāstra)

tasmād yogāya yujyasva yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam |
  — Gītā (2.50)

"Therefore, take shelter in the Yoga, 'Yoga' is the name given to the skill, the wisdom or the gracefulness of performing Action (Karma)".^[1]

If a man is not actuated by the desire of acquiring the knowledge of a particular science, he is unfit to study that science, and explaining such a science to such an unfit person is like pouring water on an obverse vessel. Not only is the disciple not benefited by it, but even the preceptor wastes his labour, and both waste their time. Therefore, the aphorisms "athāto dharmajijñāsā" and " athāto brahmajijñāsā " appear at the beginning of both the Jaiminī and the Bādarāyaṇa-Sūtras. Just as the teaching of the Brahman is best imparted to a 'mumukṣu' (one who is desirous of Release) or as the teaching of Law or justice is best imparted to one who seeks that knowledge, so also is the teaching of the Science of Right Action (Karma) most properly given to the person who has been inspired with the 'jijñāsā' (desire of knowing) how to rightly perform Action while leading a worldly life; and that is why I have disposed of the 'athāto' in the first chapter and have outlined the nature of 'karmajijñāsā' and the importance of the science of Karma-Yoga in the second chapter. Unless a man has by experience found where his difficulty lies, he does not realise the importance of the science of getting over that difficulty; and if this importance is not realised, a science which has been learnt merely by rote, is later on found difficult to remember. Therefore, good teachers first ascertain whether or not the disciple has been inspired with, desire for the knowledge, and if there is no such inspiration, they attempt to rouse the desire. The Science of Right Action (Karma-Yoga) has been expounded in the Gītā on this basis.

When, being beset with the doubt whether or not he should take part in a war in which he would be responsible for the slaughter of ancestors and preceptors and also of all kings and brethren, Arjuna was inspired by the desire to give up the war and renounce the world, and when he was not satisfied by the ordinary arguments that abandoning a duty which had befallen him was a foolish and weak act and that by doing so, far from obtaining heaven he would on the other hand, suffer disgrace, Śrī Kṛṣṇa preached to him the science of Karma-Yoga, after in the first instance seeming to ridicule him by saying:

aśocyān anvaśocas tvaṃ prajñāvādaṃś ca bhāṣase

I.e., "you lament those for whom you ought not to lament and at the same time, tell me big tales about the knowledge of the Brahman".

I have shown in the last chapter that the doubt by which Arjuna had been beset, was not groundless, and that even great sages are in certain circumstances, puzzled as to 'what to do and what not to do'. But the starting advice of Śrī Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna is: that it is not. proper to give up Action (karma) on the ground that numerous difficulties arise in the consideration of what should be done and what should not be done; that, a wise man should practise such a 'yoga' or device whereby instead of Actions being done away with in the world, one will only escape their evil effects or binding force, and that: "tasmād yogāya yujyasva" i.e., "therefore, you, should do the same". This 'Yoga' is the science of 'KARMA-YOGA'; and in as much as, the circumstances in which Arjuna found himself were not unique, but every one of us comes across small or big difficulties of the same nature in worldly life, it is necessary that we should all profit by the exposition of this Karma-Yoga science which has been made in the Bhagavadgītā. But whichever science is taken, it is necessary to properly define the important words occurring in its exposition so that their meanings are properly understood, and to first precisely explain the fundamental outline of the exposition of that science; otherwise, many misunderstandings or difficulties subsequently arise. Therefore, following this usual practice, I shall first examine and explain the meanings of some of the important words which occur in this science.

The first of these words is 'KARMA'. The word 'karma' comes from the root 'kṛ', and means 'doing', 'affairs', or 'activity'; and that same ordinary meaning is intended in the Bhagavadgītā. My only reason for explaining this is, that the reader should not be confused by the limited and restricted meanings in which this word has been used in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy or in other places. Whichever religion is taken, it prescribes some Action or other for reaching the Īśvara. According to the ancient Vedic religion, this Action was sacrificial ritual; and the Pūrva-vyavasāyātmikā of Jaiminī has been written with the sole purpose of showing how the various different and sometimes apparently contradictory statements which are to be found in the Vedic treatises regarding the performance of this sacrificial ritual can be reconciled with each other. According to Jaiminī, the performance of this Vedic or Śrauta (prescribed by the Śrutis) sacrificial ritual was the principal and the ancient religion. Whatever a man does, must be taken to have been done by him for the purpose of the 'yajña' (sacrifice). If he earns money, he must earn it for the sake of the yajña; and if he collects grain, that also must be understood to have been done for the yajña (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 26. 25). In as much as the Vedas themselves have enjoined the performance of the yajñas, any Action done for the purpose of the yajña cannot of itself be a source of bondage to man; it is a means for the yajña and not an independent object; and therefore, the effect of that Action is included in the result to be achieved by the yajña; it has no independent effect. But although these Actions, which are performed for the purpose of the yajña, may not have an independent effect, yet the yajña itself leads to heaven (which, according to the Mīmāṃsā school, is a kind of happiness), and the performer of the yajña performs it willingly, only in order to attain heaven. Therefore, the performance (karma) of the yajña itself falls into the category of 'puruṣārtha' (something which a man desires). Any particular thing which a man likes and which he desires to attain is called 'puruṣārtha' (Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras 4.1.1 and 2). 'Kratu' is a synonym for 'yajña' and therefore, the word 'kratvartha' is also used in place of the word 'yajñārtha' and therefore, all Actions fall into the two divisions of 'yajñārtha' ('kratvartha') that is, Actions which do not give any independent fruit or benefit and are, therefore, non-binding, and 'puruṣārtha' that is, Actions performed for the benefit of the doer and, therefore, binding. The Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas contain nothing else but a description of sacrificial ritual. It is true that in the Ṛg-Veda-saṃhitā there are verses (sūkta) in praise of Indra and the other gods; but as these are to be used only at the time of the yajña, the Mīmāṃsā writers say that all Śruti treatises preach only the yajña and other sacrificial ritual. These orthodox ritual-masters, and pure karma-vādins say that heaven can be attained only by performing the sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Vedas and not otherwise; and that, that is so, whether you perform the yajñas ignorantly or after Realising the Brahman. Although this sacrificial ritual is accepted by the Upaniṣads, yet their worth is declared to be lower than that of the Knowledge of the Brahman, and the Upaniṣads say that though heaven may be attained by the yajñas, Realisation of the Brahman (brahma-jñāna) is necessary for attaining the true Release. The desire-prompted Actions in the shape of sacrificial ritual, described in the second chapter of the Bhagavadgītā by the words "vedavādaratāḥ Pārtha nānyad astīti vādinaḥ" (Bhagavadgītā 2.42) are the above-mentioned sacrificial ritual, performed without having realised the Brahman. In the same way, the sentence "yajñārthāt karmaṇonyatra loko 'yaṃ karmabandhanaḥ" i.e., "Actions performed for the purpose of the yajña, do not create bondage; all other Actions have a binding force" (Bhagavadgītā 3.9) is only a repetition of the opinion of the Mīmāṃsā school. Besides this sacrificial ritual, (being the Actions prescribed by the Vedas and the Śrutis), there are other Actions, necessary from the point of view of religion, which have been prescribed by the Manu-Smṛti and other religious treatises, having regard to the division of society into the four castes. For instance, fighting has been prescribed for the warrior (kṣatriya), trade for the merchant (vaiśya) etc.; and, as these have been for the first time systematically prescribed in the Smṛti writings, they are referred to as 'Smārta' (prescribed by the Smṛtis) Actions or yajñas. There are besides these Actions prescribed by the Śrutis and the Smṛtis, other religious Actions, e.g., fasting, austerities etc., which have for the first time been described in detail in the Purāṇas, and these may, therefore, be described as 'paurāṇika karma' (Actions). All these Actions are again sub-divided into everyday (nitya), occasional (naimittika), and for-a-particular- purpose (kāmya) Actions. Such Actions as must be performed every day, such as bathing and offering prayers at twilight, are called nitya-karma. By performing these, no special purpose (arthasiddhi) is achieved; but if they are not performed, one incurs sin. Naimittika (occasional) Actions are such as have to be performed because some occasion necessitating them has arisen, such as, the pacification of inauspicious stars, penances etc. If that occasion for which we perform this pacification or penance had not come into existence, there would be no necessity for performing this Action. In addition to these, there are certain other Actions which we very often perform because we desire a particular thing and for acquiring that thing, as enjoined by the Śāstras. These Actions are kāmya (desire-prompted) actions; e.g., sacrificial ritual for causing rain or for obtaining a son. In addition to these every day, occasional, and desire-prompted Actions, there are other Actions such as, drinking etc. which have been pronounced to be totally objectionable by the Śāstras and therefore, they are named niṣiddha (objectionable) actions. Which Actions are everyday Actions, which occasional, which desire-prompted and which objectionable has been laid down by our religious treatises; and if any parson versed in religion is asked whether a particular act performed by a particular person is sinful or virtuous, he will consider whether that particular Action is yajñārtha or puruṣārtha or nitya or naimittika or kāmya or niṣiddha according to the directions of the Śāstras and give his opinion accordingly. The view-point of the Bhagavadgītā is more exhaustive than this or may even be said to be beyond this. It may be that a particular Action has not been pronounced as objectionable by the Śāstras; nay, it may even have been prescribed as proper, e.g., in the case in point, the warrior-religion was the 'prescribed ' (vihita) thing for Arjuna; but on that account, it does not follow that one should always perform that Action, nor also that it will always be certainly beneficial; and the injunctions of the Śāstras are very often mutually contradictory, as has been shown in the previous chapter. The subject-matter of the Gītā is to show whether or not there are any means for ascertaining what course should be followed by a person on such an occasion and if so, what those means are. It is not necessary for the purpose of this exposition to pay any special attention to the divisions of 'karma' mentioned above. In order to explain to what extent the doctrines laid down by the vyavasāyātmikā school regarding the sacrificial ritual etc. prescribed by the Vedas or the other duties prescribed for the four castes are consistent with the Karma-Yoga advocated in the Gītā, their theories have been examined in the Gītā as occasion arose; and in the last chapter, the question whether or not a Self-Realised (jñānin) man should perform sacrificial ritual has been precisely answered (Bhagavadgītā 18.6). But in as much as the principal subject-matter of the Gītā is more exhaustive than this, the word 'Karma' as used in the exposition made in the Gītā must not be taken in the restricted meaning of Actions prescribed by the Śrutis or the Smṛtis, but in a more comprehensive meaning. In short, all the Actions which a man performs, e.g., eating, drinking, playing, sitting, rising, residing, breathing, smiling, weeping, smelling, seeing, speaking, hearing, walking, giving, taking, sleeping, waking, killing, fighting, meditating or contemplating, commanding, or objecting, giving, performing sacrificial ritual, agriculture or commerce, desiring, deciding, keeping quiet, etc., etc., etc., are all included in the word 'Karma' as used in the Bhagavadgītā, whether those Actions are bodily (kāyika) or vocal (vācika) or mental (mānasika) (Gītā 5.8–9). In short, even the remaining alive or the dying of the body itself, are Actions, and as occasion arises, it becomes necessary to consider which of the two actions of 'remaining alive' or 'dying' is to be chosen. When this consideration arises, the word 'karma' (Action) can also be understood in the meaning of Duty (kartavya-karma) or proper action (vihita-karma) (Bhagavadgītā 4.16). We have so far considered the actions of human beings. Going beyond this, the word 'karma' is also applied to the activities of the moveable and immoveable world, 'that is to say, even of lifeless things. But that matter will be considered in the subsequent chapter on Cause and Effect (karma-vipāka-prakriyā).

The word "YOGA" is even more complicated in its meaning than the word 'karma'. The present-day ordinary meaning of this word is 'controlling the mental impulses of the organs by means of prāṇāyāma, i.e., 'control of the breath' or 'the Yoga of mental absorption or meditation prescribed by the Pātañjala-Sūtras ', and the word has been used in the same meanings also in the Upaniṣads (Kaṭhopaniṣad 6.11). But it must first be borne in mind that this restricted meaning is not the meaning in which it has been used in the Bhagavadgītā. The word 'Yoga' comes from the root 'yuj' which means 'to join', and its root meaning is 'the state of union', 'combination', 'addition' or 'co-existence' or 'staying together', and later on, it has also come to mean the 'means', 'device' or 'method' or 'thing to be done', that is, the 'Karma' (Action) which is necessary for acquiring that state, and the Amarakośa has given all these meanings of the word in the following sentence: "yogaḥ saṃnahanopāya-dhyāna-saṃgati-yuktiṣu" (3.3.22). In practical astrology, if some planets have become propitious or unpropitious, we say that they are forming a propitious or unpropitious 'yoga', and the word 'yoga in the phrase 'yoga-kṣema' means 'acquiring such things as one has not got' (Bhagavadgītā 9.22). On seeing that Droṇācārya would not be vanquished in the Bhāratī war, Śrī Kṛṣṇa has, in the following words said that: "there was only one 'yoga' (means or ' trick ') for vanquishing him":–"eko hi yogo 'sya bhaved vadhāya", i.e., "he can be killed only by one trick" (Śriman Mahābhārata Dro. 181.31) and later on He has narrated how He had killed Jarāsaṃdha and other kings for the protection of the Religion by means of 'yoga'. It is stated in the Udyoga parva that after Bhīṣma had taken away the damsels Ambā, Ambikā and Ambālikā, the other kings pursued him crying: "Yoga, Yoga" (U. 172), and the word 'yoga' has been used in the same meaning in numerous other places in the Mahābhārata. In the Gītā, the words 'yoga', 'yogī' or other compounds from the word 'yoga' have occurred about 80 times. But nowhere except in at most four or five places has it been used in the meaning of 'Pātañjala-yoga' (Bhagavadgītā 6.12 and 23). "We find almost everywhere the word used more or less in the meaning of 'means', 'skilful device,' 'method', 'the thing to be done', 'union', etc., and it must be said that this is one of the comprehensive words used in the Gītā-science. Still, it is not enough even to say in a general way that 'yoga' means 'means', 'skilful device' or 'method'. Because, according as the speaker may wish, it may be a means of Renunciation (saṃnyāsa) or Action (karma) or mental control (citta-nirodha) or of Release (Mokṣa) or of something else. For instance, the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gītā itself, in three or four places, to signify the divine skill or wonderful power of the Blessed Lord in creating the variegated perceptible creation (Bhagavadgītā 7.25; 9.5; 10.7; 11.8) and on that account, the Blessed Lord has been referred to as 'Yogeśvara' (Bhagavadgītā 18.75). But this is not the principal meaning of the word 'yoga' in the Gītā. Therefore, in order to explain what particular skill, means, method or process is principally signified in the Gītā by the use of the word 'yoga', this word has intentionally been clearly defined in the Gītā itself as: "yogaḥ karmesu kauśalam" (Bhagavadgītā 2.50) i.e. " 'yoga' means some special skill, device, intelligent method, or graceful way of performing Actions"; and in the Śāṃkarabhāṣya on this phrase, the phrase 'karmesu kauśalam has been interpreted as meaning: "the device of eliminating the natural tendency of karma to create a bondage". Normally, there are numerous 'yoga or means of performing one and the same action, but the best of all these methods is specially referred to as 'yoga'. For instance, the earning of money can be achieved by theft or deceit or by begging or by service or by borrowing or by physical labour, and many other such ways; and although the word 'yoga' can be applied to each of these ways, according to the root meaning of the word, yet, 'earning money by one's own labour without sacrificing one's independence' is principally referred to as "the yoga of acquiring wealth" (dravya-prāpti-yoga).

If the Blessed Lord Himself has intentionally and specifically defined the word 'yoga' in the Gītā itself as: "yogaḥ karmesu kauśalam" i.e., "'Yoga' means a special device of performing Actions", then, there should strictly speaking remain no doubt whatsoever about the primary meaning of this word in the Gītā. But, as several commentators have extracted various hidden meanings from the Gītā by twisting the meaning of this word, disregarding this definition of the word given by the Blessed Lord Himself, it is necessary here to go deeper into the meaning of the word 'yoga' in order to clear that mis-interpretation. The word 'yoga' appears for the first time in the second chapter of the Gītā and at that very place the meaning of that word is explained. After haying justified the war on the authority of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the Blessed Lord goes on to say that He will next give Arjuna the justification of the war on the authority of the Yoga (Bhagavadgītā 2.39), and He, to begin with, describes how the minds of persons continually engrossed in desire-prompted Action like sacrificial ritual, become disintegrated on account of the desire for the reward (Bhagavadgītā 2.41–46). He then goes on to say that Arjuna should not allow his mind to be disintegrated in this way, and should "give up all attachments (āsakti), but not think of giving up Action", and He has further said to him: "become steeped in the yoga (yogastha) and perform Actions" (Bhagavadgītā 2.48) and in the same place the word 'yoga' has been to begin with clearly defined as meaning: "'Yoga' means equability of mind towards success or failure". Then, He goes on to say: "this 'yoga' of equability of mind is better than performing Actions with the desire for the fruit" (Gi, 2.49) and that "when the mind is equable, the doer is not affected by the sin or the virtue of the Action, and, therefore, acquire this Yoga". Immediately thereafter, He again defines the nature of 'Yoga' by the words: "yogaḥ karmesu kauśalam" (Bhagavadgītā 2. 50).

From this, it becomes clear that the special device mentioned to start with by the Blessed Lord for the sinless performance of Actions, namely an equable mind, is what is known as "kauśala" (skilful device) and that performing Actions by this 'kauśala' or device is, in the Gītā, known as 'yoga'; and this very meaning of that word has further been made perfectly clear by Arjuna who says:

yo 'yaṃ yogas tvayā proktaḥ sāmyena madhusūdana
  (Bhagavadgītā 6.33),

I.e., "this yoga of equality, that is, of an equable frame of mind which has been prescribed by you to me".

There are two ways in which the Self-Realised man should live in this world which have been prescribed by the Vedic religion in existence long before the date of Śrī Śaṃkarācārya. One of these ways is the literal abandonment (saṃnyāsa) or giving up (tyāga) of all Action after Self -Realisation, and the other way is of not giving up Actions even after SelfRealisation, but going on performing them while life lasts, in such a way that one does not thereby incur either sin or merit. It is with reference to these two paths that the words 'saṃnyāsa' and 'karma-yoga' have been used later on in the Gītā (Bhagavadgītā 5.2). 'saṃnyāsa' means 'give up' and 'yoga' means 'stick to'; therefore, these are two independent paths of the giving up or the sticking to Action. The two words 'sāṃkhya' and 'yoga' (Sāṃkhya-yoga) are two abbreviated terms, which are used later on with reference to these two paths (Bhagavadgītā 5.4). It is true that the sixth chapter of the Gītā contains a description of the postures (āsanas) of the Pātañjala-yoga necessary for steadying the mind; but for whom has that description been given? Not for the ascetic, but for the Karma-Yogi, i.e., for the person who continues skillfully performing Actions, and, in order that he might thereby acquire an equable frame of mind. Otherwise, the sentence "tapasvibhyo 'dhiko yogī", i.e., "the yogi is superior to the ascetic" is meaningless. Also, the advice given to Arjuna at the end of this chapter in the terms "tasmād yogī bhavārjuna" (6.46), i.e., "therefore, O Arjuna, become a yogi", does not mean "take to the practice of Pātañjala-Yoga" but has to bs taken as meaning "become a yogi, who performs Actions skillfully or a Karma-Yogi", in which meaning that word has been used in the phrases: "yogasthaḥ kuru karmāṇi" (2.48) i.e., "perform Action, having become a yogi", or after that: "tasmād yogāya yujyasva yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam" (Bhagavadgītā 2. 50), i.e., "therefore, take shelter in yoga; 'yoga' means the skill of performing Action", or at the end of the fourth chapter, "yogam ātiṣṭhottiṣṭha Bhārata' (4. 42), i.e., "take shelter in the yoga, O, Bhārata, and stand up". Because, His saying "follow the Pātañjala-yoga and stand up and fight" would be impossible and even improbable. It has been clearly stated previously that: "karmayogena yoginām" (Bhagavadgītā 3.3) i.e., "yogis are persons who perform Actions"; and in the exposition of the Nārāyaṇīya or the Bhāgavata religion in the Mahābhārata, it is stated that persons belonging to that religion 'do not abandon worldly affairs but perform them skillfully ("suprayuktena karmaṇā") and attain the Parameśvara (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 34S. 56).

From this it follows, that the words 'yogi' and 'karma-yogi' have been used synonymously in the Gītā, and that they mean: "a person who performs Action according to a particular device." Yet, instead of using the long word 'karma-yoga', its abbreviated form 'yoga' has been more frequently used both in the Gītā and in the Mahābhārata. The word 'yoga', which has been used by the Blessed Lord three times in succession in the stanza: "this yoga which I have explained to you had been taught by me before to Vivasvān (Bhagavadgītā 4.1); Vivasvān taught it to Manu, but as this yoga subsequently ceased to exist, I had once more to-day to explain that yoga to you", has not been intended to mean the Pātañjala-yoga; and one has to understand it as meaning "a particular kind of device, method, or process of performing Action". In the same way, the reference by Sañjaya to the conversation between Śrī Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna as ' yoga ' (Bhagavadgītā 18.75) means the same thing. Although Śrī Śaṃkarācārya himself followed the path of Renunciation, yet he has in the beginning of his Gītā-bhāṣya pointed out the two divisions of the Vedic Religion into 'pravṛtti' and 'nivṛtti' and the word ' yoga ' has been interpreted by him in some places. according to the definition given by the Blessed Lord as; "samyag darśanopāya karmānuṣṭhānam" (Bhagavadgītā Bhā. 4.42) and in other places as "yogaḥ yuktiḥ" (Bhagavadgītā Bhā. 17. 7). In the same way also in the Mahābhārata, these two words have been clearly defined in the Anugītā in the phrase "pravṛtti lakṣaṇo yogaḥ jñānaṃ saṃnyāsa lakṣaṇam" i.e., "yoga means the path of Energism (pravṛtti-mārga) and jñāna means the path of Renunciation (saṃnyāsa or nivṛtti-mārga) (Śriman Mahābhārata Aśva. 43. 25) and even in the Nārāyaṇīyopākhyāna at the end of the Śāntiparva the words 'sāṃkhya' and 'yoga' have occurred on numerous occasions in these two senses, and it is explained how and why these two paths were created by the Blessed Lord in the beginning of the creation itself (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 240 and 348). That this Nārāyaṇīya or Bhāgavata religion has been pro- pounded in the Bhagavadgītā will become perfectly clear from the quotation from the Mahābhārata which has been given at the beginning of the first chapter. Therefore, one has to say that the meanings of 'sāṃkhya' as 'nivṛtti' and of 'yoga' as 'pravṛtti', which are their ancient technical meanings according to the Nārāyaṇīya religion, are also their meanings in the Gītā; and, if anybody has any doubts about this, these doubts, ought to be fully cleared by the definition of that word given in the Gītā as: "samatvaṃ yoga uccyate", i.e., " 'yoga' is the name given to equability" or "yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam", i.e., "'yoga' means skill in Action," as also by such phrases used in the Gītā as " karma-yogeṇa yoginām" etc.; and, it is established beyond argument that the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gītā in the sense of only the path of Energism (pravṛtti-mārga) i.e., the "KARMA-YOGA". Not only in the Vedic religious treatises, but also in the Buddhistic religious treatises in Pali and in Sanskrit, the word Yoga is found to have been used in this meaning. For instance, in the Pali work, named Milindapraśna written about Śaka 200, we come across the word. "Pubba-yoga (pūrvayoga)" where its meaning has been defined, as "pubbakamma" (pūrva-karma) (Milinda Praśna 1.4); and in the 50th. verse of the first canto (sarga) of the Sanskrit poem Buddhacarita written by the poet Aśvaghoṣa in the beginning of the- Śalivāhana era, we find the following statement:–"ācāryakaṃ yogavidhau dvijānām-aprāptim-anyair-janako jagāma " i.e., "The king Janaka had become an ācārya (preacher) for teaching the Yoga methods (yoga-vidhi) to Brahmins, and such a, preceptorship had not been acquired by any one before him." In this place, the word 'yoga-vidhi' has to be interpreted as meaning "the method (vidhi) of the Desire-less Karma-Yoga". Because, the Gītā, and all the other works emphatically say that that was the true bearing of the mode of life of Janaka and Aśvaghoṣa has in the Buddhacarita (9.19–20) given the illustration of Janaka himself in order to show "how Release can be obtained notwithstanding that one leads the life of a house-holder". When it has been in this way proved that even according to the Buddhistic treatises, this path of Action, prescribed by Janaka was known as 'yoga', one has to understand the word 'yoga' used in the Gītā also in the same meaning; because, the Gītā itself says that the path prescribed by Janaka is the very path it advocates (Bhagavadgītā 3.20). We will later on consider in greater detail the two paths of 'Sāṃkhya' and 'Yoga'. The matter under consideration at present is in what meaning the word 'yoga' has been used in the Gītā.

When the principal meanings of the words 'yoga', namely, 'Karma-Yoga', and 'yogi', namely 'Karma-Yogi ', have in this way been established, it is not necessary to say in so many words what the subject-matter of the Bhagavadgītā. is. The Blessed Lord Himself refers to the advice given by Him as 'yoga' (Bhagavadgītā 4.1–3). Not only that, but as I have already.stated above, Arjuna in the sixth chapter (Bhagavadgītā 6.33), and Sañjaya in the conclusion (upasaṃhāra) at the end of the Gītā (Bhagavadgītā 18.75) have characterised the preaching of the Gītā as 'yoga'. In the same way, in the enunciatory words used at the end of each chapter of the Gītā signifying the conclusion of the chapter (which is technically called saṃkalpa), it is clearly stated that the Science of Yoga (yoga-śāstra) is the subject-matter of the Gītā; but none of the commentators on the Gītā, seem to have paid any attention to this meaning of the word in the saṃkalpa. After the two opening words "Śrīmad-Bhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu" in this saṃkalpa, come the two words "brahma-vidyāyāṃ yoga-śāstre" '. Out of these, the first two words mean "in the Upaniṣat sung by the Blessed Lord" and it is quite clear from the following two words that "the Yoga-Śāstra which is one of the Brahma-Vidyās", that is, the, is the subject matter of the Gītā. 'Brahma-vidyā' means 'Knowledge of the Brahman' (Brahmajñāna); and when that has been acquired, the Self-Released man has two cults or paths open before him (Bhagavadgītā 3.3). One is the Sāṃkhya path or the saṃnyāsa (Renunciation) path, that is, the path of abandoning all worldly affairs or Actions after Self-Realisation, and living like an apathetic (virakta) person; and the other path is the path of Yoga or of Karma-Yoga, that is to say, of not giving up worldly affairs but continuing to perform them in such a way that they do not create any difficulty in the matter of obtaining Release. Out of these two paths, the first one is also known as the 'path of Self-Realisation' (jñāna-niṣṭha) and an exposition of that will be found to have been made by many ṛṣis in the Upaniṣads and other writers. But there is no scientific exposition anywhere, except in the Gītā, of the Karma-Yoga, which is included in the Brahma-vidyā. Therefore, it now becomes quite clear that those persons who first prepared that saṃkalpa–and, as I have stated above, it must have been there before any of the commentaries on the Gītā were written, since it is to be found in all the editions of the Gītā–must have added the words "brahma-vidyāyāṃ yogaśāstre" in this saṃkalpa on proper authority, and intentionally, for emphasising the uniqueness of the subject-matter of the Gītā-śāstra, and not uselessly or frivolously; and at the same time, we also easily understand what the import of the Gītā was understood to be before any commentaries in support of particular cults came to be written on it. It is our great fortune that this work of preaching the Karma-Yoga was taken on his. own shoulders by Śrī Kṛṣṇa Bhagavan, who was the promulgator of this path of Yoga and who was the personified 'Īśvara of all yogas' ('Yogeśvara' is 'yoga' plus 'Īśvara'), and who has explained the esoteric import of it to Arjuna for the benefit of the whole world. It is true that the words 'karma-yoga' and 'karma-yoga-śāstra' are longer than the words 'yoga' and 'yoga- śāstra' used in the Gītā; but in order that there should no more be any doubts as to what the Gītā preaches, I have intentionally given the name "Karma-Yoga-Śāstra" to this work and to this chapter.

That science by means of which we can decide such questions as: Which is the best and purest of the several 'yogas', means, or processes in which a particular Action can be performed; whether it can be always followed; if not, what are the exceptions to it, and how they arise; why is that path which we call good, really good, or that which we call bad, really bad, and on the strength of what, is this goodness or badness to be decided and who is to do so or what is the underlying principle in it etc. is known as the 'KARMA-YOGA-ŚĀSTRA' (science of Karma-Yoga) or, as expressed briefly in the Gītā 'YOGAŚĀSTRA' (the science of Yoga). 'Good' or 'bad' are words in ordinary use and the following other words: propitious and unpropitious, or beneficial and harmful, or meritorious and non-meritorious, or sin and virtue, or righteous and unrighteous, are used in the same sense. The same is the meaning conveyed by the word-couples doable and notdoable (kārya and akārya), duty and non-duty (kartavya and akartavya), just and unjust (nyāyya and anyāyya). Nevertheless, as the various persons who have used these words have different ideas about the formation of the universe? there have also come into existence, different ways in which the 'Karma-Yoga' science has been expounded. Whatever science is taken, the subject-matter of it can be discussed ordinarily in three ways:–(1) considering the various objects in the physical world from the point of view that they really are as they are perceived by our organs, and that there is nothing- beyond, is the first of these methods, which is known as "ĀDHI-BHAUTIKA" (positive or materialistic) way of considering them. For instance, when you look upon the Sun not as a deity, but as a round-mass of gross matter made up of the five primordial elements, and examine its various properties, such as its heat, or light, or weight, or distance, or power of attraction, etc., that becomes the positive or material examination of the Sun. Take the tree as another illustration. If we do not consider the internal force in the tree which is responsible for its getting leaves etc., but consider the tree purely externally, that is, consider only the facts that when the seed is put into the earth, it takes root and becomes a sprout, which grows later on and goes through the visible changes of leaves, flowers, fruits etc., that is a purely material examination of the tree. The examination of the subjectmatter in Chemistry or Physics or the science of electricity or other modern sciences is of this kind. Nay, materialists imagine, that when they have examined in this way the visible properties of any object, that is all they need to do and that it is useless to further examine the objects in the world. (2) When we discard this point of view, and examine what there is at the root of the object in the material world and whether the activities of these objects are due to some inherent properties in them or there is some other power or principle behind those activities, then one has to transcend the material, examination of the object. For instance, if we believe that in the gross or lifeless globe of the Sun, made up of the five primordial elements, there exists a deity called the 'Sun' which dwells within it, and that this deity carries on the activities of the material Sun, such examination is called an ĀDHI-DAIVIKA (Theological) examination of the object. According to this point of view, there are in the tree, water air, etc., innumerable deities, which are distinct from those objects, and which activate those objects. (3) But, when instead of believing in this way that there are millions and millions of independent deities in all the various objects in the gross world, we believe that there exists in this world some

Spiritual Force, i.e., factor of consciousness (cicchakti) imperceptible to the organs, which carries on all the activities of the external world; and that this Spiritual Force exists in the human body in the shape of an Ātman and acquaints the human being with the entire creation; and that this cosmos is kept going by that force, such consideration of the object is called an ĀDHYĀTMIKA (metaphysical) examination of the object. For instance, metaphysicians believe that the movements of the Sun and the Moon or even of the leaves of the tree are inspired by this unimaginable Power and that there are not different and independent deities in the Sun or in other objects. These throe ways of examining any subjectmatter have been in existence from times immemorial and they seem to have been followed even in the Upaniṣads. For instance, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and other Upaniṣads, while considering whether the organs of perception (Jñānendriya) or the vital force (prāṇa) is superior, their respective strengths are considered, once from the point of view that they have deities like Agni etc., and again by considering their subtle (metaphysical i.e., ādhyātmika) forms (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.5.21 and 22; Chāndogyopaniṣad 1. 2 and 3; Kauṣītakyupaniṣat or Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇopaniṣad 2. 8); and the consideration of the form of the Īśvara at the end of the seventh chapter and in the beginning of the eight chapter of the Gītā is also from this point of view. Out of these three methods, our religious writers attach a higher importance to the metaphysical (ādhyātmika) method of consideration than to others, relying on the authority "adhyātma-vidyā vidyānām" (Bhagavadgītā 10.32) i.e., "the metaphysical science is the highest of all sciences". But in modern times, the meanings of these three words are to a certain extent changed and the well-known French Materialist Comte^[2] has given the highest importance to the Positive (material) exposition. He says that there is no sense in trying to find out the fundamental element, if any, which exists at the root of the world; and in as much as this element is always unknowable (agamya) it is neither possible nor proper to found on it the edifice of a science. When the aboriginal man for the first time, saw trees, clouds, volcanoes and other moving objects, he credulously began to believe that they were all deities. According to Comte, this was the Theological consideration of the universe. But man very soon gave-up this idea and began to think that there must be some element in the shape of an Ātman in all these objects- According to Comte, this is the second stage of the progress of human knowledge; and this stage is called by him the Metaphysical stage. But when even after considering the universe in this way, actual practical scientific knowledge did not grow, man ultimately began to examine deeper and deeper only the visible properties of the objects in this world; and on that account, man has now begun to exercise greater control over the external world, as a result of his having been able to invent steam-engines, telegraphs etc. Comte calls this the Positive ādhibhautika) consideration and he has come to the conclusion that this method of consideration of any science or object is the most profitable one. According to Comte, we must adopt this method for scientifically considering Sociology or the science of Karma-Yoga; and after a careful consideration of the history of the world, this philosopher has drawn the following conclusion regarding the science of worldly life, from that point of view, namely that: the highest religion of every human being is to love the whole human race and to continually strive for the benefit of everybody. Mill, Spencer and other English philosophers may be said to- support this opinion. On the other hand, Kant, Haegel, Schopenhauer and other German philosophers, have proved, that this positive method of considering Ethics is inefficient, and they have recently revived in Europe the method of basing. Ethics on Metaphysics adopted by our Vedānta philosophers. This matter, however, will be dealt with in greater detail later on.

The reason why different writers have used the different, words 'kārya' and 'akārya' (doable and not-doable), 'dharmya' and 'adharmya' (moral and immoral) in the meaning of 'good' and 'bad' although they all convey the same meaning, is that everyone has his own different way or view of dealing; with a particular subject-matter. The question of Arjuna was whether or not that war in which he would have to kill Bhīṣma, Droṇa, etc., was meritorious (Bhagavadgītā 2.7); and if a. Materialist had to answer this question, he would have, critically considered the palpable profit or loss of it to Arjuna personally, as also the results of it on the entire society and would have declared whether the fight was just (nyāyya) or unjust (anyāyya); because, these Materialists do not admit of any other test for determining the goodness or badness of any particular Action except the material, that is, the actual, external results of that Action on the world. But such an answer would not have satisfied Arjuna; his vision was more comprehensive; what he wanted was to know whether that war would in the end benefit his Self (ātman), not in this world alone, but from the next-world point of view. He had no doubt as to whether or not he would acquire the kingdom or material happiness as a result of the death of Bhīṣma and Droṇa or whether his rule would be more beneficial to people than the rule of Duryodhana. In short, he had to see whether or not what he did was 'dharmya' (moral) or 'adharmya' (immoral), 'puṇya' (non-sin) or 'pāpa' (sin); and the exposition in the Gītā has been made from that point of view. Not only in the Gītā but also in other places in the Mahābhārata has the examination of karma (Action) and akarma (non-Action) been made from this next-world and Metaphysical point of view and in it, the two words 'dharma and 'adharma' have been primarily used in order to show the goodness or badness of any particular act. But as the word 'dharma' and its opposite correlative 'adharma are likely to create confusion on account of their very comprehensive meaning, it is necessary to discuss here in greater detail the meanings in which those words have been principally used in the science of Karma-Yoga.

The word 'DHARMA' is in ordinary practice very often used to imply only the path leading to next-world happiness. When we ask someone "What is your dharma (religion)"? our intention is to ask him by what path he goes–whether "Vedic, Buddhist, Jain, Christian, Mahomedan or Parsi–for acquiring happiness in the next world; and the reply which he gives is also from the same point of view. In the same way, where the subjectmatter of the Vedic yajñas and yāgas instrumental to the acquisition of heaven is being considered, the word 'dharma' is used in the same [meaning, as in the canon "athāto dharmajijñāsā" etc. but the word 'dharma' is not to be understood in such a restricted meaning, and it is very often used for indicating the limitations of worldly morality, as in the phrases, 'rājadharma' (the duty of kings), 'prajādharma' (the duty of subjects), 'deśadharma' (the duty of a country), 'jātidharma' (the duty pertaining to a caste), ' kuladharma' (the duty pertaining to clan or family), 'mitradharma' (one's duty as a friend) etc. If these two meanings of the word dharma are to be individually explained, the dharma relating to the life after death may be called ' mokṣadharma ' or simply 'mokṣa' and the dharma relating to this worldly life, i.e., Ethics may be given the name of 'dharma' simply. For instance, in enumerating the four ideals of manhood (puruṣārtha), we say 'dharma' (morality), 'artha' (wealth), 'kāma' (desire), 'mokṣa' (Release). If 'mokṣa' is meant to be included in the first word 'dharma', then it would not be necessary to mention 'mokṣa' as an independent ideal at the end. Therefore, we must say that the writers of our scriptures use the word 'dharma' in this place as meaning the numerous ethical duties which form part of our worldly life. The same meaning is conveyed by the words kartavya-karma (duty), 'nīti' (Ethics), 'nītidharma' (morality) or 'sadācaraṇa' (good conduct) used now-a-days. But in ancient Sanskrit treatises, the words 'nīti' ' or 'nītiśāstra' were used principally with reference to regal jurisprudence (rājanīti) and therefore, the ordinary exposition of duty (kartavya-karma) or good conduct (sad-vartana) used to be called the 'exposition of dharma ('dharma-pravacana') instead of the ' exposition of 'nīti' ' ('nīti-pravacana'). But this technical distinction between the two words 'nīti'. ' and 'dharma' has not been adopted in all Sanskrit treatises; and, therefore, I too, have used the terms 'nīti', 'kartavya' or simply 'dharma' as synonymous; and, where the subject of Release (mokṣa) has to be considered, I have used the independent terms 'adhyātma' (Metaphysics) or 'bhakti-mārga' (Path of Devotion). The word 'dharma' has appeared on numerous occasions in the Mahābhārata, and whenever it has been said there that a particular person is bound to do a particular thing according to his 'dharma', the word 'dharma' means ethical science (kartavya-śāstra) or the then sociology (samāja-vyavasthā-śāstra); and wherever there has been occasion to refer to the paths leading to next- world happiness, in the latter half of the Śānti-parva, the specific word 'mokṣa-dharma' has been used. So also in the Manu-Smṛti and other Smṛti texts, in mentioning the specific duties of the four castes, Brahmin, kṣatriya, vaiśya, and śūdra, the word 'dharma' has been used on many occasions and in many places; and even in the Bhagavadgītā the word 'dharma' has been used as meaning 'the duties of the four castes in this world' in the expression "svadharmam api cāvekṣya" (Bhagavadgītā 2.31) where the Blessed Lord is telling Arjuna to fight, having regard to what his 'dharma' is, and also later on in the expression: "svadharme nidhanaṃ śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ" (Bhagavadgītā 3.5), i.e., "it is better to die performing one's caste duties; following the duties enjoined on another caste is dangerous". The ancient this had created the institution of the four castes–which was in the nature of a division of labour–in order that all the affairs of society should go on without a hitch, and that society should be protected and maintained on all sides, without any particular person or group of persons having to bear the whole burden. Later on, people belonging to this society "became 'jātimātropajīvī' that is "persons, who forgetting their respective caste duties, belonged to a particular caste merely by- reason of birth." and became mere nominal Brahmins, kṣatriyas, vaiśyas, or śudras; but let us keep that thing aside for a time. Originally, this institution had been made for the maintenance- of society and it is quite clear that if any one of the four castes. had given up the 'dharma' i.e., duties allocated to it, or if any particular caste had totally ceased to exist and its place had not been taken by some other persons, the entire society would to that extent have been disabled and would later on have either been gradually destroyed or at least have sunk to a very low stage. There are numerous societies in the Western hemisphere, which have come to prominence notwithstanding that they do- not have the institution of the four castes. But we must not forget that although the institution of the four castes may not be in existence among them, yet all the duties of the four castes are seen being performed in those societies, if not in the shape of castes, at any rate by some other arrangement in the shape of professional divisions or classes. In short, when we use the word 'dharma' from the worldly point of view, we- consider in what way society will be maintained (dhāraṇā) and benefited. Manu has said that that 'dharma' which is 'asukhodarka', that is to say, 'from which unhappiness ultimately results' should be given up (Manu-Smṛti 4.176); and Bhīṣma says in the Satyānṛtādhyāya of the Śāntiparva (Śān. 109.12), where the exposition of 'dharma' and 'adharma' is made, and before that, Śrī Kṛṣṇa also says in the Karṇaparva (Śriman Mahābhārata Karṇa. 69. 59), that:–dhāraṇād dharmam ity ahur dharmo dhārayate prajāḥ । yat syād dhāraṇa saṃyuktaṃ sa dharma iti niścayaḥ ॥ that is, "the word Dharma comes from the root dhṛ, i.e., to hold or uphold, and all human beings are held together by dharma. That by which the holding together (of all human beings) takes place is dharma". Therefore, when this dharma ceases to be observed, the binding-ropes of society may be said to have become loose, and when these binding ropes are loosened, society will be in the same position as the planetary system consisting of the Sun and the planets would be in the sky without the binding force of gravitation or as a ship would be on the ocean without a rudder.

Therefore, Vyāsa in the Bhārata gives the advice that, in order that society should not come to an end by reaching such a lamentable state, money (artha) if it has to be acquired, must be acquired by 'dharma', that is, without disturbing the arrangement of society; and if the desires, such as the sex impulses (kāma) etc. have to be satisfied, that should also be done consistently with 'dharma';. and he says at the end of the Bhārata that:–

ūrdhvabāhur viraumy eṣa na ca kaścic chṛṇoti mām |
dharmād arthaś ca kāmaś ca sa dharmaḥ kiṃ na sevyate ||

I.e., "Oh people I am haranguing you with raised hands, (but) no one listens to me! if both wealth (artha) and desires (kāma) can be acquired by dharma, (then) why do you not follow such a dharma?"

My readers will from this understand the chief meaning in which the word 'dharma' has been used in the expression dharma-saṃhitā, when the Mahābhārata, from the point of view of 'dharma', is looked upon as the fifth Veda or dharma-saṃhitā; and for the same reason, namely, on the ground that it is a dharma-grantha, has the Mahābhārata been included among the religious texts prescribed for daily recital in the Brahma-yajña (ritual for Brahmins)–as is shown by the use of the symbolical words: "Nārāyaṇaṃ namaskṛtya"–along with the two treatises Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (which deal with the question of next-world happiness).

Reading the exposition made by me above of what is dharma and what is adharma, someone may object: if you accept these principles of 'the maintenance of society' (samāja-dhāraṇā and 'general welfare' (sarva-bhūta-hitaṃ), as mentioned in the second chapter when discussing the question of Truth and Falsehood (satyānṛta), then there is no difference between your point of view and the Materialistic point of view; because, both these principles are outwardly real, that is Materialistic. This question has been dealt with by me in detail in the next chapter. For the present, I will only say that although we accept maintenance of society as being the chief outward use of dharma, yet we never lose sight of the Redemption of the Ātman (ātma-kalyāṇa) or Release (mokṣa) which is the highest ideal according to the Vedic or all other religions and which is the special feature of our view-point. Whether it is maintenance of society or the general material welfare of everybody, if these externally useful principles obstruct the Redemption of the Ātman, we do not want them. If even our works on medicine maintain that the medical science is a useful science, because it serves as a means for obtaining Release (mokṣa), by protecting the body, then it is absolutely impossible that our religious writers would divorce the Karma-Yoga-Śāstra, which considers the most important subject of the performance of various worldly Actions, from the Metaphysical philosophy of Release. And therefore, we look upon that Action which is favourable to our Metaphysical betterment as 'puṇya (religiously meritorious), 'dharma' (moral), or 'śubha' (good) and that which is unfavourable to it, as 'pāpa' (sinful), 'adharma (immoral), or 'aśubha' (bad). It is for this very reason that we use the words 'dharma' and 'adharma' (notwithstanding that they have a double meaning and are to a certain extent ambiguous) in place of the words 'kartavya' (duty) 'akartavya' (non-duty) and 'kārya' (doable) and 'akārya' (non-doable). Even when the worldly affairs or activities in the external world are primarily to be considered, we consider whether or not these activities are conducive to Ātmic^[3] benefit, simultaneously with considering their external effects. If a Materialist is asked why I should sacrifice my own benefit for the benefit of others, what answer can he give except by saying: "That is ordinary human nature"? The writers of our Śāstras have seen further than this and the science of KarmaYoga has been considered in the Mahābhārata from this comprehensive Metaphysical standpoint, and Vedānta has for the same reason been dealt with in the Bhagavadgītā. Even the ancient Greek philosophers were of the opinion that one has to take 'the greatest benefit' or 'the climax of virtue' as the highest ideal of mankind and dealt with the question of the doable and the not-doable from that point of view; and Aristotle has in his book on Ethics said that all these things are included in the Ātmic benefit (1.7, 8). Yet, Aristotle has not given due importance to Ātmic benefit. That is not the case with our philosophers. They have laid down, that Ātmic benefit or Metaphysical perfection is the first and the highest duty of every man; that the question of the doable and the not-doable must be considered on the basis that Ātmic benefit is more important than any other benefit; and that, it is not proper to consider that question without reference to Metaphysical philosophy. The same position seems to have been accepted in modern times by some Western philosophers, in dealing with the question of the doable and the not-doable. For instance, the German philosopher Kant first wrote the metaphysical book Critique of Pure Reason, that is, of 'vyavasāyātmikā', (i.e., pure) 'buddhi' (i.e., Reason), and subsequently the book Critique of Practical Reason, that is, of 'vāsanātmaka' (i.e. practical) 'buddhi' (i.e., Reason).^[4] And even in England, Green has started his book entitled Prolegomena to Ethics with the consideration of the Ātman, which is the bed-rock of the entire universe. But, as the works of purely materialistic philosophers on Ethics are principally taught in our colleges the fundamental principles of the Karma-Yoga mentioned in the Gītā, are not well understood even by learned persons among us, who have had an English education.

It will be clear from the exposition made by me above why we apply the common word 'DHARMA' chiefly to worldly morality or to systems laid down for the maintenance of society. Not only in the Sanskrit treatises, Mahābhārata and Bhagavadgītā, but also in vernacular works is the word ' dharma ' always used as meaning worldly duties or laws- We understand the words kuladharma and kulācāra as synonymous. The Marathi poet, Moropant, has used the word 'dharma' in this sense, in describing the incident in the Bhārata war when Karṇa had got out of his chariot for raising the wheel of his chariot which had sunk into the earth, and Arjuna was on the point of killing him.

Karṇa then said:–"It is not the ethics of warfare (yuddhadharma) to kill an enemy when he is unarmed," and Śrī Kṛṣṇa retaliated by reminding him of the previous incidents of the attempted denuding of Draupadī, or the murder of Abhimanyu, when alone, by a number of persons, and asking him: "Where was then your dharma, Oh, Rādhāsuta?" with reference to all those incidents; and even in the Mahābhārata the word 'dharma' has been used in relating this incident in the expression "kva te dharmas tadā gataḥ", i.e., "where did your 'dharma' (morality) go then?", and it is shown that it is morally right to give measure for measure to such immoral persons. In short, as it has become usual, whether in Sanskrit or in Prakrit literature, to use the word 'dharma' as indicating the rules of morality which have been laid down by high and reverend persons, with reference to various matters, for the maintenance of society, I have adopted the same word in this book.

These rules, which have been laid down by reverend people (śiṣṭa) and which have become acceptable on all hands and are known as 'respectable behaviour' (śiṣṭācāra), are, from this point of view, the root of morality (dharma); and therefore, in the Mahābhārata (Anu. 104.157) and also in the Smṛti treatises there are such statements as: "ācāraprabhavo dharmaḥ", i.e., "morality springs from custom" or: "ācāraḥ paramo dharmaḥ", i.e., " rules of custom are the highest morality" (Manu-Smṛti 1.108), or (where the origin of morality is mentioned),

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ,
  (Manu-Smṛti 2.12),

I.e., "the Vedas, the Smṛtis, good conduct and that which we ourselves desire."

But that is not enough for the science of Karma-Yoga, and, as has been stated by me before in the second chapter, it is necessary to fully and critically consider what causes led to a particular ācāra or code of conduct being fixed.

We must also here consider another definition of the word 'dharma' which is come across in ancient treatises. This is the definition given by the Mīmāṃsā school. That school says: "codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ" (Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras 1.1.2). 'Codanā ' means 'inspiring,' that is, some authoritative person saying or ordering: "Do this" or "Do not do this". So long as no one has laid down such a limitation or such a limitation has not come into existence, one is at liberty to do what he likes. This means that dharma originally came into existence as a result of such limitations, and this definition of morality is to a certain extent similar to the opinions of the well-known English writer Hobbes. The human being, in the aboriginal condition behaved according to the particular frame of mind ruling at the time. But when he later on found out that such unrestricted behaviour wag not beneficial on the whole, he came to the definite conclusion that it was in the best interests of everybody to lay down and observe certain restrictions on the self -inspired actions of the organs, and every human being began to observe these limitations, which have gained ground on account of general acceptance (śiṣṭācāra), or for some other reason, as if they were laws; and when such limitations grew in number, they formed themselves into a code. I have mentioned in the previous chapter that the institution of marriage was not at first in vogue, but was brought into existence by Śvetaketu, and also that the prohibition against drink was first laid down by Śukrācārya. In defining the word dharma as: "codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ" only the fact of such restrictions having been dictated by these law-givers has been taken into account and the motives of Śvetaketu or of Śukrācārya in laying down these limitations has been lost sight of. Even in the case of a rule of morality (dharma), someone first realises its importance and then it is promulgated. It is not necessary to ask anyone to eat, drink, and make merry, because, those are the inherent tendencies of the physical organs. That is what is meant by Manu when he says: "na māṃsabhakṣaṇe doṣo na madye na ca maithune" (Manu-Smṛti 5.56), i.e., "Eating flesh or drinking wine or enjoying sexual intercourse, is not sinful.", that is, there is nothing in them which is contrary to the rules of nature. All these things are the inherent desires, not only of, men but of every living being[ "pravṛttir eṣā bhūtānām", i.e., "these are the tendencies of created beings".

Morality consists in putting proper limitations on an unrestricted course of life resulting from passions in the interest of the maintenance of society or of general welfare. Because:–

āhāranidrā bhayamaithunam ca sāmānyam etat paśubhir narāṇām |
dharmo hi teṣām adhiko viśeṣo dharmeṇa hīnāḥ paśubhiḥ samānāḥ ||

I. e., "eating, sleeping, fear, and sexual relations are the heritage of men, same as of animals; dharma, (that is, restraining them by rules of morality), is the difference between man and beast; and those who are not governed by this code of morality may be looked upon as beasts."

There is in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata, a similar verse (Śān. 294.29 ] and the verse in the Bhāgavata, which prescribes limitations on the desires of hunger etc. has been quoted in the previous chapter.

In the same way what the Blessed Lord is referring to, is the nature of morality to lay down limitations on unrestricted mental impulses, where in the Bhagavadgītā, He says to Arjuna:–

indriyasyendriyasy ārthe rāga dveṣau vyavasthitau |
tayor na vaśam āgacchet tau hy asya paripanthinau ||

I.e. "the attractions and repulsions between the organs of sense on the one hand and the various objects which are pleasurable or repulsive to them on the other are unchangingly inherent. One should not become their slaves, because, both love and hate are enemies".

The organs of a man urge him to behave like a beast, and his intelligence pulls him in the opposite direction. 'Those persons who redeem themselves by sacrificing the animal tendencies rampant in their bodies into the fire of this warfare are the true sacrificers, and are indeed blessed.

Call dharma, 'ācāra-prabhava' (born of custom), or call it 'dhāraṇāt' (something which upholds or keeps together), or call it 'codanālakṣaṇa' (some precept which has been dictated), which-ever definition of dharma (worldly morality) is accepted, none of them is much, useful for coming to a definite conclusion, when one has to decide between what is moral and what immoral. The first definition only tells us what the fundamental form of dharma is! The second definition tells us what its external use is, and the third definition tells us that moral restrictions were laid down in the beginning by some persons or other. Not only is there much difference between customs and customs but, as there are numerous consequences of one and the same act, and also as the 'codanā' i.e., precepts of different ṛṣis are also different, we have to look out for some other way of. determining what the dharma is, when there are doubts in the matter.

When Yakṣa asked Yudhiṣṭhira what this other way was, Yudhiṣṭhira replied:-

tarko 'pratiṣṭhaḥ śrutayo vibhinnāḥ naiko ṛṣir yasya vacaḥ pramāṇam |
dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guhāyām mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ ||
  (Śriman Mahābhārata Vana. 312.115).

That is: " inferential logic is uncertain, i.e., it is such that if will give birth to various inferences according to different degrees of keenness of intelligence in men; the Śrutis, that is the precepts of the Vedas, are all mutually conflicting; and, as regards the Smṛtis, there is not a single ṛṣi (sage) whose precept we can look upon as more authoritative than that of others. Well, if we seek the fundamental principle of this (worldly) dharma, it is lost in darkness, that is to say, it is such as cannot be understood by a man of ordinarily intelligence. Therefore, the path which has been followed by venerable persons is the path of dharma."

Very well! But who are the venerable persons (mahājanaḥ)? That word ‘mahājanaḥ’ cannot be interpreted to mean ‘a large (mahā) collection of persons (janaḥ)’. Because; following the path which is laid down by ordinary persons (or collection of people), whose minds are never troubled by consideration of what is right and what is wrong, will be like playing a blind man’s buff or like "andhenaiva niyamānā yathāndhāḥ" i.e. " the blind was led by the blind ", as stated in the Kaṭhopaniṣad. If you interprete the word "mahājanaḥ" as meaning 'erudite and venerable persons'–and that is the meaning conveyed in the above verse–then, where is there any uniformity in behaviour? The sinless "Rāmacandra" discarded his wife though she had passed through the ordeal of fire, merely on the ground of public criticism; and the same Rāmacandra, order that Sugriva should be on his side, entered into a- offensive and defensive alliance with him, by making him, 'tulyārimitra', i.e., 'with common friends and enemies', and killed Vāli who had in no way wronged him! Paraśurāma murdered his own mother at the behest of his father, and as regards the Pāṇḍavas, five of them had only one wife!

If you consider the gods in the heavens, then some of them are the paramours of Ahilyā, whereas others are seen lying in the sky with mutilated bodies, being wounded by the arrows of Rudra, as was Brahmadeva because he ran after his own daughter in the form of a stag (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 3.33). With these things before his mind's eye, Bhavabhūti has put the words: "vṛddhās te na vicāraṇīyacaritāḥ", i.e., "one must not attach too much importance to the doings of these old people " in the mouth of Lava in the Uttararāmacaritra. A writer, who has written in English the history of the Devil, has said in his book that if one considers the history of the warfare between the supporters of the gods and of the Devil, we see that very often the gods (devas) have cheated the non-gods (daityas); and in the same way, in the Kauṣītakī-Brāhmaṇopaniṣad (See, Kauṣītakyupaniṣat or Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇopaniṣad 3.1 as also Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 7.28), Indra says to Pratardana: "I have killed Vṛtra (although he was a Brahmin); I have torn into pieces the ascetic Arunmukha, and thrown the carrion to wolves and, breaking all the various treaties which had been made by me, I have killed the friends and clansmen of Prahlāda and also killed the demons named Pauloma and Kālakhañja; yet on that account, "tasya me tatra na loma ca mā mīyate" i.e., "not a hair of my head has been touched". If one says: "You have no occasion to consider the evil these venerable persons, but, as stated in the Taittirīyopaniṣad (Taitti. 1.11.2), imitate only their good actions, and neglect the rest; for instance, obey your father, as was done by Paraśurāma, but do not kill your mother", then, the primary question of how good actions are to be differentiated from bad actions again arises. Therefore, after having described his various deeds as mentioned above, Indra says to Pratardana: "Bearing in mind that that man who has fully Realised his Self is not prejudicially affected by patricide, matricide, infanticide, theft, or any other sinful actions, try and realise in the first instance what the Ātman is, so that all your doubts will be answered"; and he has thereafter explained to Pratardana the science of the Ātman.

In short, although the precept "mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ" may be easy to allow for ordinary persons; yet it does not meet all possible contingencies; and thoughtful persons have ultimately to enter into the Philosophy of the Ātman (ātma-jñāna) and ascertain the true principle underlying the actions of the venerable persons (mahājanaḥ), however deep that principle may be. It is for this reason that the advice: "na devacaritaṃ caret" i.e., "one must not follow only the external actions of gods", is given. Some persons have hit upon an easier way for determining the doable and the not-doable. They Bay that whatever virtue is taken, we must always take care against excess of it, for such excess turns a virtue into a vice. Charity is a virtue; but, "atidānād balir baddhaḥ", i.e., "because of too much charity, Bali was undone". The well-known Greek philosopher Aristotle has in his book on Ethics prescribed the same test for distinguishing between the doable and the notdoable; and he has clearly shown how every virtue, in excess, is the cause of one's undoing. Even Kālidāsa has come to the conclusion (see Raghuvaṃśa 17.47) that courage, pure and simple, is like the cruel behaviour of an animal like a tiger; and morality, pure and simple, is nothing else but cowardice; and that the king Atithi, used to rule by a judicious admixture of the sword and regal jurisprudence. If a man speaks too much, he is talkative, if he speaks too little, he is reserved; if he spends too much, he is a spendthrift, if he spends too little, he is a miser; if he is too advanced, he is wayward, and if he lags behind, he is a laggard; if he insists on anything too much, he is obstinate, and if he insists too little, he is fickle; if he is too accommodating, he makes himself cheap, and if he remains stiff, then he is proud: this is how Bhartṛhari and others have described some good and bad qualities. However, such a rule of the thumb does not overcome all difficulties, because, who is to decide what is 'too much', and what is 'moderate'? What may be 'too much' for one or on any particular occasion, may be too little for another person or on another occasion. Jumping into the firmament at the moment of his birth in order to catch hold of the Sun was as nothing to Maruti (Vā. Rāma. 7. 35).

Therefore, as the śyena bird advised the King Śibī, every man, when faced with the discernment between the duty (dharma) and the non-duty (adharma) should on every occasion consider the relative merits and the importance or unimportance of mutually conflicting duties, and intelligently arrive at a conclusion as to the true duty or proper Action:–

avirodhāt tu yo dharmaḥ sa dharmaḥ satyavikrama |
virodhiṣu mahīpāla niścitya gurulāghavam |
na bādhā vidyate yatra taṃ dharmaṃ samupācaret ||
  (Śriman Mahābhārata Vana. 131.11.12 and Manu-Smṛti 9.299)

i.e., "Oh, Satyavikrama! that is dharma (duty) in which there is no contradiction; Oh, King!, if there is such a contradiction, then come to a decision as to the relative worth of the act and the opposition, and follow that path of duty in which, there is no opposition".

But one cannot, on that account only, say that the true test of determining the proper conduct on a doubtful occasion is to discriminate between the duty and the nonduty. Because, as we often see in ordinary life, different learned people discriminate in different ways, according their own lights, and arrive at several different decisions as regards the morality of a particular act; and this is what is meant by the words, "tarko 'pratiṣṭhaḥ" in the words above. We must, therefore, now see whether or not there are any other means for arriving at a correct solution of these doubtful points about the duty and the non-duty; and if so, what those means are; and if there are more than one ways, then, which is the best way of all. This is what science has to determine for us.

The true characteristic feature of a science- is:

anekasaṃśayocchedi parokṣārthasya darśakam,

I.e., "it must remove confusion regarding matters which the mind cannot at first grasp on account of numerous doubts which spring up, and make their meaning free from doubt and easy,, and, even give a proper insight into matters which might not. be actually before the eyes or which may be matters of the future";

And the fact that by learning astronomy, one can. predict the occurrence and the time of future eclipses justifies. the words "parokṣārthasya darśakam" used in the latter part of the above definition. But in order that all these various, difficulties should be solved, one has first to see what these, difficulties are. And, therefore, ancient as also modern writers, before dealing with the subject-matter to be proved by a science first enumerate all the other existing aspects of the same subject-matter, and show the faults or insufficiency in them. Following this method, I shall, before mentioning the YOGA or device established or preached in the Gītā for determining the doability or non-doability. of any particular Action, first consider the more well-known of the other devices which are prescribed by philosophers for the same purpose. It is true that these other devices were not very much in vogue in India but were promulgated principally by Western philosophers. But it cannot, on that account, be said that I should not consider them in this book; because, it is necessary to be acquainted with these other devices, if even to a small extent, not only for the purpose of comparison, but also in order to understand the true importance of the Metaphysical (ādhyātmika) Karma-Yoga expounded in the Gītā.

–-:o:–-

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Such is the definition or connotation of the term 'Yoga', which has been more fully dealt with later on in this chapter.

[2]:

Auguste Comte was a great philosopher who lived in France in the last century. Ha wrote a very important book on Sociology and has shown for the first time how tie constitution of society can be scientifically considered. He has come to the conclusion after considering numerous sciences, that whichever science is taken, the consideration of it is first Theological and then Metaphyseal and that, lastly it attains the Positive form. These three systems have been respectively given by me the ancient names of 'ādhidaivika', 'ādhyātmika' and 'ādhibhautika' in this book. Comte has not invented these methods. They are old methods, but he has fixed a new historical order for them and the only discovery made by him is that of all tile three, the positive (ādhibhautika) system of consideration is the best. The most important of the works of this writer have been translated into English.

[3]:

This word Ātmic (i.e., of the 'Ātman') has been coined by me on the analogy 'Vedic'—Translator.

[4]:

Kant was a German philosopher, and he is looked upon at the father of modern philosophy. Two of his works, the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason are well-known. The work written by Green is known as Prolegomena to Ethics.