A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 5

Southern Schools of Śaivism

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1955 | 79,816 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of introductory: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the first part in the series called the “philosophy of shrikantha”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

It has often been stated in the previous volumes of the present work that the Brahma-sūtra attributed to Bādarāyaṇa was an attempt at a systematisation of the apparently different strands of the Upaniṣadic thought in the various early Upaniṣads, which form the background of most of the non-heretical systems of Indian philosophy. The Brahma-sūtra had been interpreted by the exponents of different schools of thought in various ways, for example, by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Mādhva, Vallabha, and others, and they have all been dealt with in the previous volumes of the present work. Vedānta primarily means the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Consequently the Brahma-sūtra is supposed to be a systematisation of Upaniṣadic wisdom; and its various interpretations in diverse ways by the different exponents of diverse philosophical views, all go by the name of the Vedānta, though the Vedānta philosophy of one school of thinkers may appear to be largely different from that of any other school. Thus while the exposition of the Brahma-sūtra by Śaṅkara is monistic, the interpretation of Mādhva is explicitly pluralistic. We have seen the acuteness of the controversy between the adherents of the two schools of thought, extending over centuries, in the fourth volume of the present work.

As Śrīkaṇṭha expounded his views as an interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra and accepted the allegiance and loyalty to the Upaniṣads, the work has to be regarded as an interpretation of the Vedānta. Like many other interpretations of the Vedānta (for example, by Rāmānuja, Mādhva, Vallabha, or Nimbārka), the philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭha is associated with the personal religion, where Śiva is regarded as the highest Deity, being equated with Brahman. It can, therefore, be claimed as an authoritative exposition of Śaivism. Śaivism, or rather Śaiva philosophy, also had assumed various forms, both as expressed in Sanskritic works and in the vernacular Dravidian works. But in the present work, we are only interested in the exposition of Śaiva philosophy in Sanskrit works. The present writer has no access to the original Dravidian literature such as Tamil, Telegu and Canarese, etc., and it is not within the proposed scheme of the present work to collect philosophical materials from the diverse vernacular literature of India.

In introducing his commentary, Śrīkaṇṭha says that the object of his interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra is the clarification of its purport since it has been made turbid by previous teachers[1]. We do not know who were these previous teachers, but a comparison between the commentary of Śaṅkara and that of Śrīkaṇṭha shows that at least Śaṅkara was one of his targets. Śaṅkara’s idea of Śaiva philosophy can briefly be gathered from his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra II. 2. 35-8, and his view of the Śaiva philosophy tallies more with some of the Purāṇic interpretations which were in all probability borrowed by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra called Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya, and his commentary on the Īśvara-gītā of the Kūrma-purāṇa. Śaṅkara lived somewhere about the eighth century A.D., and his testimony shows that the sort of Śaiva philosophy that he expounded was pretty well known to Bādarāyaṇa, so that he included it as a rival system for refutation in the Brahma-sūtra. This shows the great antiquity of the Śaiva system of thought, and in a separate section we shall attend to this question.

Śaṅkara came from the Kerala country in the South, and he must have been acquainted with some documents of Śaiva philosophy or the Śaivāgamas. But neither Śaṅkara nor his commentators mention their names. But obviously Śrīkaṇṭha followed some Śaivāgamas, which were initiated in early times by one called Śveta, an incarnation of Śiva, who must have been followed by other teachers of the same school, and according to Śrīkaṇṭha’s own testimony, twenty-eight of them had flourished before Śrīkaṇṭha and had written Śaivāgama works. The original teacher Śveta has also been mentioned in the Vāyavīya saṃhitā of the Śiva-mahāpurāṇa[2].

In the initiatory adoration hymn Śrīkaṇṭha adores Śiva, the Lord, as being of the nature of ego-substance (ahaṃ-padārtha). The sub-commentator Appaya Dīkṣita (a.d. 1550), in following the characterisation of Śiva in the Mahābhārata, tries to give an etymological derivation in rather a fanciful way from the root vaśa, ‘to will.’ This means that the personality of Śiva, the Lord, is of the nature of pure egohood and that his will is always directed to the effectuation of good and happiness to all beings. This egohood is also described as ‘pure being’ (sat), ‘pure consciousness’ (cit) and ‘pure bliss’ (ānanda). Śrīkaṇṭha further says that his commentary will expound the essence of the teachings of the Upaniṣads or the Vedānta and will appeal to those who are devoted to Śiva[3]. Śrīkaṇṭha describes Śiva on the one hand as being the category of aham or egohood which forms the individual personality, and at the same time regards it as being of the nature of ‘pure being,’ ‘pure consciousness,’ and ‘pure bliss.’ He thinks that this individual personality can be regarded only in unlimited sense to be identified with the infinite nature of Śiva. Appaya Dīkṣita in commenting on this verse quotes the testimony of some of the Upaniṣads to emphasise the personal aspect of the God Śiva as a personal God. Ordinarily the word ‘sac-cid-ānanda-rūpāya’ would be used in the writings of monistic Vedānta of the school of Śaṅkara, in the sense of a concrete unity of ‘pure being,’ ‘pure consciousness,’ and ‘pure bliss.’ But that kind of interpretation would not suit the purposes of a purely theistic philosophy. For this reason Appaya says that the words ‘sac-cid-ānānda’ are the qualities of the supreme God Śiva and that this is indicated by the terminal word ‘rūpāya,’ because Brahman as such is arūpa or formless. The expansion of the limited individual into the infinite nature of Śiva also implies that the individual enjoys with Him qualities of bliss and consciousness. In a Śaṅkarite interpretation the person who attains liberation becomes one with Brahman, that is, with the unity of sat, cit and ānanda. He does not enjoy consciousness or bliss but is at once one with it. The Brahman in the system of Śaṅkara and his school is absolutely qualityless and differenceless (nirviśeṣa). Rāmānuja in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra tries to refute the idea of Brahman as qualityless or differenceless and regards the Brahman as being the abode of an infinite number of auspicious and benevolent characters and qualities. This is called saguṇa-brahman, that is, the Brahman having qualities. The same idea is put forward in a somewhat different form by Śrīkaṇṭha. Except in the Purāṇas and some older Sanskrit literature, the idea of a Brahman with qualities does not seem to be available in the existent philosophical literature outside Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja is said to have followed the Bodhāyana-vṛtti which, however, is no longer available. It may, therefore, be suggested that Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya was inspired by the Bodhāyana-vṛtti, or by Rāmānuja, or by any of the Śaivāgamas following a simple theistic idea.

On the one hand Lord Śiva is regarded as the supreme and transcendent Deity, and on the other he is regarded as the material cause of this material universe, just as milk is the material cause of curd. This naturally raises some difficulties, as the supreme God cannot at the same time be regarded as entirely transcendent and also undergoing changes for the creation of the material universe which is to be regarded as of the nature of God Himself. To avoid this difficulty Appaya summarises the view of Śrīkaṇṭha and tries to harmonise the texts of the Upaniṣads, pointing to monistic and dualistic interpretations. He thus says that God Himself is not transformed into the form of the material universe, but the energy of God which manifests itself as the material universe is a part and parcel of the entire personality of God. The material universe is not thus regarded either as illusion or as an attribute of God (in a Spinozistic sense), nor is the universe to be regarded as a part or a limb of God, so that all the activities of the universe are dependent on the will of God, as Rāmānuja holds in his theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita ; nor does Śrīkaṇṭha regard the relation between the universe and God as being of the same nature as that between the waves or foam and the sea itself. The waves or foam are neither different from nor one with the sea; this is called the bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara. It may also be noted that this view of Śrīkaṇṭha is entirely different from the view of Vijñāna Bhikṣu as expressed in the Vijñānāṃrta-bhāṣya, a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra in which he tries to establish a view well known in the Purāṇas, that the prakṛti and the puruṣa are abiding entities outside God and are co-existent with Him; they are moved by God for the production of the universe, for the teleological purposes of enjoyment and experience of the puruṣas, and ultimately lead the puruṣas to liberation beyond bondage. It may not be out of place here to refer to the commentary of Śaṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra (II. 2. 37 et seq.) where he tried to refute a Śaiva doctrine which regards God as the instrumental cause that transforms the prakṛti to form the universe, a view somewhat similar to that found in the Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya of Vijñāna Bhikṣu. This Śaiva view seems to have been entirely different from the Śaiva view expressed by Śrīkaṇṭha, expressly based on the traditions of the twenty-eight yogācāryas beginning with Śveta. Lord Śiva, the supreme personal God, is regarded as fulfilling all our desires, or rather our beneficent wishes. This idea is brought out by Appaya in his somewhat fanciful etymology of the word ‘śiva’ a twofold derivation from the root vaśa and from the word ‘śiva’ meaning good.

Śrīkaṇṭha adores the first teacher of the Śaiva thought and regards him (Śveta) as having made the various Āgamas. But we do not know what these Āgamas were. Appaya in his commentary is also uncertain about the meaning of the word ‘nānāgama-vidhāyine’ He gives two alternative interpretations. In one he suggests that the early teacher Śveta had resolved the various contradictions of the Upaniṣadic texts, and had originated a system of Śaiva thought which may be properly supported by the Upaniṣadic texts. In the second interpretation he suggests that the word ‘nānāgama-vidhāyine,’ that is, he who has produced the various Āgamas, only means that the system of Śveta was based on the various Śaivāgamas. In such an interpretation we are not sure whether these Āgamas were based on the Upaniṣads or on other vernacular Dravidian texts, or on both.[4] In commenting upon the bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra (II. 2. 37), Vācaspati says in his Bhāmatī that the systems known as Śaiva, Pāśupata, Kāruṇika-siddhāntin, and the Kāpālikas are known as the fourfold schools called the Māheśvaras[5]. They all believe in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of prakṛti, mahat, etc., and also in some kind of Yoga on the syllable om; their final aim was liberation and end of all sorrow. The individual souls are called paśus and the word ‘pāśa’ means bondage. The Maheśvaras believe that God is the instrumental cause of the world as the potter is of jugs and earthen vessels.

Both Śaṅkara and Vācaspati regard this Maheśvara doctrine, based upon certain treatises (Siddhānta) written by Maheśvara, as being opposed to the Upaniṣadic texts. None of them mentions the name of the teacher Śveta, who is recorded in Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya and the Śiva-mahāpurāṇa. It is clear therefore that, if Śaṅkara’s testimony is to be believed, this word ‘nānāgama-vidhāyine’ cannot mean the reconciliatory doctrine based on the Upaniṣads as composed by Śveta and the other twenty-seven Śaiva teachers[6]. We have already pointed out that the Śaiva doctrine, that we find in Śnkaṇtha, is largely different from the Maheśvara school of thought which Śaṅkara and Vācaspati wanted to refute. There Śaṅkara had compared the Maheśvara school of thought as being somewhat similar to the Nyāya philosophy.

What the Siddhānta treatises, supposed to have been written by Maheśvara, were, is still unknown to us. But it is certain that they were composed in the beginning of or before the Christian era, as that doctrine was referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in his Brahma-sūtra. Śrīkaṇṭha definitely says that the souls and the inanimate objects, of which the universe is composed, all form materials for the worship of the supreme Lord. The human souls worship Him directly, and the inanimate objects form the materials with which He is worshipped. So the whole universe may be regarded as existing for the sake of the supreme Lord. Śrīkaṇṭha further says that the energy or the power of the Lord forms the basis or the canvas, as it were, on which the whole world is painted in diverse colours. So the reality of the world lies in the nature of God Himself; the universe, as it appears to us, is only a picture-show based on the ultimate reality of God who is regarded as definitely described and testified in the Upaniṣads[7]. On the testimony of Śrīkaṇṭha, the philosophy of Śaivism as interpreted by him follows an interpretation of the Upaniṣads and is based on them. It is unfortunate that most of the scholars who have contributed articles to the study of Śaivism or written books on it, have so far mostly ignored the philosophy propounded by Śrīkaṇṭha, although his work had been published as early as 1908.

We have already seen that Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra II. 2. 37, had attributed the instrumentality of God as being the doctrine of the Siddhānta literature supposed to have been written by Maheśvara. Appaya, in commenting upon the same topic dealt with by Śrīkaṇṭha, says that this is the view which may be found in the Śaivāgamas when they are imperfectly understood. But neither he nor Śrīkaṇṭha mentions the names of any of the Śaivāgamas which have come down to us, which describe the instrumentality of God. So Śrīkaṇṭha also undertakes to refute the view of Śaivism which holds that God is only the instrumental cause of the world. We may therefore infer that some of the Śaivāgamas were being interpreted on the line of regarding God as being the instrumental cause of the world.

Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra II. 2. 37 and the commentary of Appaya on it bring out some other important points. We know from these that there were two types of Āgamas, one meant for the three castes (Varṇa) who had access to the Vedic literature, and the other for those that had no access to the Vedic literature. These latter Āgamas might have been written in the Dravidian vernaculars, or translated into the Dravidian vernaculars from Sanskrit manuals. Śrīkaṇṭha’s own interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra is based mainly on the views propounded in the Vāyavīya-saṃhitā section of the Śiva-mahāpurāṇa. In the Kūrma-purāṇa and the Varāha-purāṇa also we hear of different types of Śaivāgamas and Śaiva schools of thought. Some of the Śaiva schools, such as Lakulīśa or Kāpālikas, are regarded in those Purāṇas (Kūrma and Varāha) as being outside the pale of Vedic thought, and the upholders of those views are regarded as following delusive Śāstras or scriptures (mohā-śāstra). In reply to this it is held that some of those schools follow some impure practices, and have on that account been regarded as moha-śāstra. But they are not fully opposed to the Vedic discipline, and they encourage some kinds of adoration and worship which are found in the Vedic practice. The Āgamas of this latter type, that is, which are for the Śūdras and other lower castes, are like the well-known Āgamas such as Kāmika, Mṛgendra, etc. It is urged, however, that these non-Vedic Āgamas and the Vedic Śaivism as found in the Vāyavīya-saṃhitā are essentially authoritative, and both of them owe their origin to Lord Śiva. Their essential doctrines are the same, as both of them regard Śiva as being both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. It is only that some superficial interpreters have tried to explain some of the Āgamas, emphasising the instrumentality of the supreme Lord, and the above topic of the Brahma-sūtra is intended to refute such a view of the supreme Lord as being only the efficient or instrumental cause.

It is curious to note that the two systems of Śaiva philosophy called Lākulīśa-pāśupata and the Śaiva-darśana as treated in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, deal mainly with the aspect of God as the efficient cause of the universe; they lay stress on various forms of ritualism, and also encourage certain forms of moral discipline. It is also surprising to note that the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha should not mention Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya, though the former was written somewhere about the fourteenth century A.D. and Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya must have been written much before that time, though it is not possible for us as yet to locate his time exactly. Neither does the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha refer to any Purāṇic materials as found in the Śiva-mahāpurāṇa, the Kūrma-purāṇa and the Varāha-purāṇa. But we shall treat of the systems later on in other sections and show their relation with the philosophy as propounded in Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya, so far as manuscript material and other published texts are available.

In interpreting the first sūtra of the Brahma-sūtra (athāto-brahma-jijñāsāy Śrīkaṇṭha first introduces a long discussion on the meaning of the word ‘atha.’ The word ‘atha’ generally means ‘after,’ or it introduces a subject to a proper incipient. Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the entire Mīmāṃsā-sūtra by Jaimini, beginning with “athāto dharma-jijñāsā” to the last sūtra of the Brahma-sūtra IV. 4. 22 “anāvṛttiḥ śabdād anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt is one whole. Consequently the brahma-jijñāsā or the inquiry as to the nature of Brahman must follow the inquiry as to the nature of dharma, which forms the subject-matter of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra of Jaimini. We have seen in our other volumes that the subject-matter of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā starts with the definition of the nature of dharma, which is regarded as being the beneficial results accruing from the dictates of the Vedic imperatives “codanā-lakṣaṇoṛtho dharmaḥ”). The sacrifices thus are regarded as dharma, and these sacrifices are done partly for the attainment of some desired benefits such as the birth of a son, attainment of prosperity, a shower of rain, or long residence in heaven after death; partly also as obligatory rites, and those which are obligatory on ceremonial occasions. Generally speaking these sacrificial duties have but little relation to an inquiry about the nature of Brahman. Śaṅkara, therefore, had taken great pains in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra as well as in his commentary on the Gītā, to show that the sacrificial duties are to be assigned to persons of an entirely different character from those who are entitled to inquire about the nature of Brahman. The two parts of sacrifices (karma) and knowledge (jñāna) are entirely different and are intended for two different classes of persons. Again, while the result of dharma may lead to mundane prosperity or a residence in heaven for a time and will, after a time, bring the person in the cycle of transmigratory birth and death, the knowledge of Brahman once attained or intuited directly, would liberate the person from all bondage eternally. So, these two courses, that is the path of karma and the path of knowledge, cannot be regarded as complementary to each other. It is wrong to regard them as segments of the same circle. This is what is known as the refutation by Śaṅkara of the joint performance of karma and jñāna, technically called the jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda.

Śrīkaṇṭha here takes an entirely opposite view. He says that the Brāhmin who is properly initiated with the holy thread has a right to study the Vedas, has even an obligatory duty to study the Vedas under a proper teacher, and when he has mastered the Vedas he also acquaints himself with their meaning. So the study of the Vedas with a full comprehension of their meaning must be regarded as preceding any inquiry or discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. As dharma can be known from the Vedas, so the Brahman has also to be known by the study of the Vedas. Consequently, one who has not studied the Vedas is not entitled to enter into any discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. But then it cannot be said that merely after the study of the Vedas one is entitled to enter into a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. For such a person must, after the study of the Vedas, discuss the nature of dharma, without which he cannot be introduced into a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. So the discussion about the nature of Brahman can only begin after a discussion on the nature of dharma[8]. He further says that it may be that the principles and maxims used in the interpretation of Vedic injunctions as found in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā were necessary for the understanding of the Upaniṣadic texts leading to a discussion on the nature of Brahman. It is for this reason that a discussion of the nature of dharma is indispensably necessary for the discussion of the nature of Brahman.

It cannot, however, be said that if sacrifices lead to an understanding of the nature of Brahman, what is the good of any discussion on its nature. One might rather indulge in a discussion of the nature of dharma, because when the Vedic duties are performed without desire for the fulfilment of any purpose, that itself might purify the mind of a man and make him fit for inquiring into the nature of Brahman, for, by such a purposeless performance of Vedic sacrifices, one may be purified of one’s sins, and this may lead to a proper illumination of the nature of Brahman[9]. He also makes references to Gautama and other smṛtis to establish the view that only those who are initiated in the Vedic ceremonial works are entitled to abide with Brahman, and get commingled with him. The most important point is that only those Vedic sacrifices which are done without any idea of the achievement of a purpose lead finally to the cessation of sins, and thereby making the Brahma-illumination possible. In the case of such a person the result of karma becomes the same as the result of knowledge. The karmas are to be performed until true knowledge dawns. Consequently one can say that the discussion on the nature of Brahman must be preceded by the discussion on the nature of dharma accruing from the prescribed Vedic duties. The inquiry after the nature of Brahman is not meant as the carrying out of any Vedic mandate, but people turn to it for its superior attraction as being the most valued possession that one may have, and one can perceive that only when one’s mind is completely purified by performing the Vedic duties in a disinterested manner, can one attain the knowledge of Brahman. It is only in this way that we can regard the discussion on the nature of dharma as leading to the discussion of the nature of Brahman. If the mind is not purified by the performance of the Vedic duties in a disinterested manner, then the mere performance of the Vedic duties does not entitle anyone to inquire about the nature of Brahman.

Appaya Dlkṣita, in commenting on the above bhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭha, says that the discussion on the nature of Brahman means a discussion on the texts of the Upaniṣads. Such discussions would naturally lead to the apprehension of the nature of Brahman. The word ‘brahman’ is derived from the root ‘bṛṃhati’ meaning ‘great’ which again is not limited by any qualification of time, space, or quality, that is, which is unlimitedly great. We have to accept this meaning because there is nothing to signify any limitation of any kind (saṃkocakābhāvāt). The Brahman is different from all that is animate (cetana) and inanimate (acetana). There are two kinds of energy: that which is the representative of the material power or energy (jaḍa-śakti), which transforms itself in the form of the material universe under the direction or instrumentality of the Brahman; and there is also the energy as consciousness (cicchakti), and this consciousness energy, as we find it in animate beings, is also controlled by the Brahman[10]. The Brahman Himself is different from the phenomenal world consisting of inanimate things and conscious souls. But as the conscious souls and unconscious world are both manifestations of the energy of God called Brahman or Śiva or any other of His names, God Himself has no other instrument for the creation and maintenance of the world. So the greatness of Brahman is absolutely unlimited as there is nothing else beyond Him which can lend Him any support. The two energies of God representing the material cause and the spiritual force may be regarded somehow as the qualities of God.

Just as a tree has leaves and flowers, but still in spite of this variety is regarded as one tree, so God also, though He has these diversified energies as his qualities, is regarded as one. So, when considered from the aspect of material and spiritual energies, the two may be differentiated from the nature of Brahman, yet considered internally they should be regarded as being one with Brahman. These two energies have no existence separate from the nature of God. The word ‘ brahman ’ means not only unlimitedness, it also means that He serves all possible purposes. He creates the world at the time of creation and then leading the souls through many kinds of enjoyment and sorrow, ultimately expands them into His own nature when the liberation takes place.

Appaya Dīkṣita, after a long discussion, conclusively points out that not all persons who had passed through the discipline of sacrificial duties are entitled to inquire about the nature of Brahman. Only those who, by reason of their deeds in past lives, had had their minds properly purified could further purify their minds in this life by the performance of the Vedic duties without any desire for fruit, and can attain a discriminative knowledge of what is eternal and non-eternal, and have the necessary disinclination (vairāgya), inner control and external control of actions and desire for liberation, thereby qualifying themselves for making an inquiry about the nature of Brahman. Appaya Dīkṣita thus tries to bridge over the gulf between the standpoint of Śrīkaṇṭha and the standpoint of Śaṅkara. With Śaṅkara it is only those inner virtues and qualities, desire for liberation and the like that could entitle a person to inquire about the nature of Brahman. According to Śaṅkara the discussion on the nature of Vedic duties or their performance did not form an indispensable precedent to the inquiry about the nature of Brahman. But Appaya Dīkṣita tries to connect Śrīkaṇṭha’s view with that of Śaṅkara by suggesting that only in those cases where, on account of good deeds in past lives, one’s mind is sufficiently purified to be further chastened by the desireless performance of Vedic duties, that one can attain the mental virtues and equipments pointed out by Śaṅkara as an indispensable desideratum for inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

Appaya Dīkṣita tries to justify the possibility of a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman by pointing out that in the various texts of the Upaniṣads the Brahman is variously described as being the ego, the food, the bio-motor force (prāṇa), and the like. It is necessary, therefore, by textual criticism to find out the exact connotation of Brahman. If Brahman meant only the ego, or if it meant the pure differenceless consciousness, then there would be no scope for discussion. No one doubts his own limited ego and nothing is gained by knowing Brahman, which is pure differenceless consciousness. For this reason it is necessary to discuss the various texts of the Upaniṣads which give evidence of a personal God who can bestow on His devotee eternal bliss and eternal consciousness.

Footnotes and references:


Vyāsa-sūtram idaṃ netraṃ viduṣāṃ brahma-darśane.
pūrvācāryaiḥ kaluṣitaṃ śrīkaṇtḥena prasādyate.
Śrīkantha’s bḥāṣya, introductory verse, 5.


Śiva-mahāpurāṇa, Vāyavīya saṃhitā I. 5. 5 et seq. (Veṅkateśvara Press, Bombay, 1925).


oṃ namo’haṃ-padārthāya lokānāṃ siddhi-hetave,
saccidānanda-rūpāya śivāya paramātmane.
      Preliminary adoration to Śiva by Śrīkaṇṭha.


asmin pakṣe ’nānāgama-vidḥāyinā’ity
asya nānāvidha-pāśupatāḍy-āgama-nirmātrā ity arthaḥ.
Appaya’s commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya (Bombay, 1908), Vol. 1, p. 6.


Rāmānuja, however, in his commentary on the same sūtra mentions as the fourfold schools the Kāpālas, the Kālamukhas, the Pāśupatas, and the Śaivas.


The Vāyaiñya-saṃhitā section mentions the names of the twenty-eight yogācāryas beginning with Śveta. Their names are as follows:

Śvetaḥ sutāro madanaḥ suhotraḥ kaṅka eva ca,
laugākṣiś ca mahāmūyo jaigīṣavyas tathaiva ca.
dadhivāhaś-ca ṛṣabho munir ugro
’trir eva ca,
supālako gautamaś ca tathā vedaśirā muniḥ.
gokarṇaś-ca guhāvāsī śikhaḍī cāparaḥ smṛtaḥ,
jaṭāmālī cāṭṭahāso dāruko lāṅgulī tathā.
mahākālaś ca śūlī ca daṇḍī muṇḍīśa eva ca,
saviṣṇus soma-śarmā ca lakulīśvara eva ca.
      Vāyavīya-saṃhitā 11. 9, verses 2-5 (compare Kūrma-purāṇa 1. 53, 4 et seq.).

The names of their pupils are given from 11. 9, verses 6-20 (compare Kūrma-purāṇa 1. 53, 12 et seq.).

Each one of the yogācāryas had four disciples. The better known of them are as follows (Vāyavīya-saṃhitā II. 9, 10 et seq.): Kapila, Asuri, Pañcaśikha, Parāśara, Bṛhadaśva, Devala, Śālihotra, Aksapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka, Vatsa.


sa jayati śivaḥ parātmā nikhilāgama-sāra-sarvasvam.
bhavatu sa bhavatāṃ siddhyai paramātmā sarva-maṅgalo-petaḥ,
cidacinmayaḥ prapañcaḥ śeṣo’ śeṣo’ pi yasyaiṣah.
      Introductory verses, Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya.


tarki kiṃ anantaram asyārambhaḥ. dharma-vicārānantaram.
      Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya i. i. i, Vol. i, p. 34.

na vayam dharma-brahma-vicāra-rūpayoś śāstrayor atyanta-bhedavādinaḥ. kintu ekatva-vādinaḥ.


tasya phalābhisandhi-rahitasya pāpāpanayana-rūpacitta-śuddhi-sampādana-dvārā bodha-hetutvāt.
      Śrīkaṇṭha’s bhāṣya I. i. i, Vol. I, p. 39.


tasya cetanācetana-prapañca-vilakṣanatvā-bḥyupagamena vastu-paricchinatvād ity āśaṅkāṃ nirasitum ādya-viśeṣaṇam. sakala-cetanācetana-prapañcā-kāryayā tadrūpa-pariṇāminyā parama-śaktyā jaḍa-śakter māyāyā niyāmakatvena tata utkṛṣṭayā ciccḥaktyā viśiṣṭasya.
Appaya’s commentary, Vol. I, p. 68.

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