Part 10 - Nature of Brahman

Vyāsa-tīrtha, iṇ describing the nature of illusion, says that, when the subconscious impression of silver is roused, the senses, being associated with specific defects, take the “thisness” of conch-shell as associated with silver. There is, therefore, no production of any imaginary silver such as the Śaṅkarites allege; the silver not being there, later perception directly shows that it was only a false silver that appeared. Inference also is very pertinent here; for whatever is false knowledge refers to non-existent entities simply because they are not existent. Vyāsa-tīrtha further points out that his view of illusion (anyathā-khyāti) is different from the Buddhist view of illusion (a-sat-khyāti) in this, that in the Buddhist view the appearance “this is silver” is wholly false, whereas in Vyāsa-tīrtha’s view the “this” is true, though its association with silver is false.

Vyāsa-tīrtha further points out that, if the illusory silver be regarded as a product of ajñāna, then it will be wrong to suppose that it is liable to negation in the past, present and future; for, if it was a product of ajñāna, it was existing then and was not liable to negation. It is also wrong to say that the negation of the illusory appearance is in respect of its reality; for, in order that the appearance may be false, the negation ought to deny it as illusory appearance and not as reality, since the denial of its reality would be of a different order and would not render the entity false.

Vyāsa-tīrtha had contended that, since Brahman is the subject of discussion and since there are doubts regarding His nature, a resolution of such doubts necessarily implies the affirmation of some positive character. Moreover, propositions are composed of words, and, even if any of the constituent words is supposed to indicate Brahman in a secondary sense, such secondary meaning is to be associated with a primary meaning; for as a rule secondary meanings can be obtained only through association with a primary meaning, when the primary meaning as such is baffled by the context. In reply to the second objection Madhusūdana says that a word can give secondary meaning directly, and does not necessarily involve a baffling of the primary meaning. As regards the first objection the reply of Madhusūdana is that the undifferentiated character of Brahman can be known not necessarily through any affirmative character, but through the negation of all opposite concepts. If it is objected that the negation of such opposing concepts would necessarily imply that those concepts are constituents of Brahma-knowledge, the reply of Madhusūdana is that, such negation of opposing concepts being of the very nature of Brahman, it is manifested and intuited directly, without waiting for the manifestation of any particular entity. The function of ordinary propositions involving association of particular meanings is to be interpreted as leading to the manifestation of an undivided and unparticularized whole, beyond the constituents of the proposition which deal with the association of particular meanings.

Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that, if Brahman is regarded as dif-ferenceless, then He cannot be regarded as identical with knowledge or with pure bliss, or as the one and eternal, or as the sākṣi- consciousness. Brahman cannot be pure consciousness; for consciousness cannot mean the manifestation of objects, since in emancipation there are no objects to be manifested. To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that, though in emancipation there are no objects, yet that does not detract from its nature as illuminating. To Vyāsa-tīrtha’s suggestion that Brahman cannot be regarded as pure bliss interpreted as agreeable consciousness (anukūla-vedanatva) or mere agreeableness (anukūlatva), since this would involve the criticism that such agreeableness is due to some extraneous condition, Madhusūdana’s reply is that Brahman is regarded as pure bliss conceived as unconditional desirability (nirupādhikeṣṭarūpatvāt).

Madhusūdana urges that this cannot mean negation of pain; for negation of pain is an entity different from bliss and in order that the definition may have any application it is necessary that the negation of pain should lead to the establishment of bliss. Vyāsa-tīrtha further argues that, if this unconditional desirability cannot itself be conditional, then the blissful nature of Brahman must be due to certain conditions. Moreover, if Brahman’s nature as pure bliss be different from its nature as pure knowledge, then both the views are partial; and, if they are identical, it is useless to designate Brahman as both pure knowledge and pure bliss. To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that, though knowledge and bliss are identical, yet through imaginary verbal usage they are spoken of as different. He further urges that objectless pure knowledge is defined as pure bliss^[1]; pure bliss is nothing but pure perceiver (dṛg-anatirekāt). On this view again there is no difference between bliss and its consciousness. Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that, if Brahman is regarded as non-dual, then that involves the negation of duality. If such a negation is false, then Brahman becomes dual; and, if such a negation is affirmed, then also Brahman becomes dual, for it involves the affirmation of negation. To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that the reality of negation is nothing more than the locus in which the negation is affirmed; the negation would then mean nothing else than Brahman, and hence the criticism that the admission of negation would involve duality is invalid.

Regarding the sākṣi-consciousness Vyāsa-tīrtha contends that the definition of sākṣi as pure being is unacceptable in the technical sense of the word as defined by Pāṇini. To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that sākṣi may be defined as the pure consciousness reflected either in avidyā or a modification of it; and thus even the pure being may, through its reflection, be regarded as the draṣṭā. The objection of circular reasoning, on the ground that there is interdependence between the conditions of reflection and the seeing capacity of the seer, is unavailing; for such interdependence is beginningless. The sāfot-consciousness, according to Madhusūdana, is neither pure Brahman ṇor Brahman as conditioned by buddhi, but is the consciousness reflected in avidyā or a modification of it; the sāfot-consciousness, though one in all perceivers, yet behaves as identified with each particular perceiver, and thus the experiences of one particular perceiver are perceived by the sākṣi-consciousness as identified with that particular perceiver, and so there is no chance of any confusion of the experience of different individuals on the ground that the sākṣi-consciousness is itself universal^[2].

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

etena viṣayānullekhi-jñānam evānandam ity api yuktaṃ.
      Advaita-siddḥi, p. 751.

[2]:

sarva-jīva-sādḥāraṇyepi tat-taj-jīva-caitanyābhedenābhivyaktasya tat-tad-duḥkhādi-bhāsakatayā atiprasaṅgābhāvāt.
      Ibid. p. 754.