A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 4

Indian Pluralism

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1949 | 186,278 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of vyasa-tirtha, madhusudana and ramacarya on the falsity of the world: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the first part in the series called the “controversy between the dualists and the monists”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Part 1 - Vyāsa-tīrtha, Madhusūdana and Rāmācārya on the Falsity of the World

The Vedāntists urge that the world-appearance is false. But before entering into any discussion about the nature of falsehood it is required that the Vedāntists should give a definition of falsehood. Five principal definitions have been adduced by the old Vedāntists; of these the first is that falsehood is that which is the absence of being as well as the absence of non-being (sattvātyantā-bhāvattve sati asattvātyantatā-bhāvavattva-rūpaṃ viśiṣṭam[1]). But Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, since one of these is the negation of the other, joint assertion of them both will be against the Law of excluded middle and therefore will be self-contradictory; the fact that both being and non-being may be admitted independently is no reason for their joint admission (e.g., the hare and horn both exist separately, but the hare’s horn exists nowhere). To this the reply of Madhusūdana is that the Law of excluded middle does not apply to every case of the relation between being and non-being. Thus the false-appearances have being so far as they appear and non-being so far as they are non-existent; exclusion of being does not necessarily lead us to non-being, and vice versa. To this the retort given by the author of Taraṅgiṇī is that the Śaṅkarites themselves say that, if a thing has no being, it cannot appear, which shows that they themselves admit the Law of excluded middle, the force of which can never be denied, as Logic amply demonstrates in the examination of any and every specific relation of being and non-being.

The second definition of falsehood by the Śaṅkarites is that falsehood is that which can be denied at all times even where it appears to exist (prati-pannopādhu traikālika-niṣedha-prati-yogitvaṃ). To this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that, if the denial is true, then this true thing would exist side by side with Brahman and thus the theory of extreme monism would break down (niṣedhasya tattrikatve advaita-hāniḥ) ; if the denial is false or true only in a limited manner (vyāvahārika), then the world-appearance would become true. Again, what does the denial actually mean? These supposed appearances are said to be produced from a material cause, and they are perceived as existing at the time of perception; and, if it is held that even then they have no existence at all as such, then they must be absolutely without being, like the chimerical hare’s horn. If it is held that the difference of the world-appearance from chimerical entities like the hare’s horn, etc., is that they are absolutely indescribable, then the reply is that the very term “indescribable” describes their nature. Again, that which is absolutely nonexisting cannot in any way appear in knowledge (asataḥ a-pratītav) and therefore it is not possible to make reference to it or to relate it in any way to anything else. The Śaṅkarites themselves hold that what is non-existing cannot appear in knowledge (asac cet na pratīyeta), and thus they themselves deny the possibility of any being-in-knowledge of that which is non-existing. Again, reality is not the same as mere appearance in knowledge, and consequently, if Brahman remained always uncontradicted in knowledge, its reality could not on that ground be affirmed. Again, it is not true that words denoting absolutely non-existing and chimerical things, such as the hare’s horn, produce no knowledge; for they also produce some notion; the difference between ordinary illusions and the chimerical entities is this that, while the ground of the ordinary illusions is right and valid, chimerical entities have no ground at all. Therefore, since chimerical entities can also be made objects of awareness they appear in knowledge as non-existing. The Vedic text “non-being alone existed in the beginning” (asad eva idam agre āsīt) also testifies to the fact that “non-being” may appear as existent. Also non-being cannot be defined as that which is different from mere “being” (sat) and “the indescribable” (a-nirvācya) ; for the latter can only be understood through the concept of non-being and vice versa. Thus non-being may be defined as that which is different from that being which cannot at all times be denied at all places (sārvatrika-traikālika-niṣedha-prati-yogitva-rūpa-sadanyasyaiva tattvāc ca).

If the indescribable (a-nirvācya) is defined as that which can be denied at all times, it is the same as non-being itself. Also non-being cannot be defined as that which is incapable of fulfilling any practical purpose; for even the conch-shell-silver, which is admitted to be false, can serve to rouse an effort to grasp it in the deluded person and thus be considered to have some kind of practical efficiency, and the pure Brahman, which is regarded as ultimately real, is itself unable to serve any practical purpose of any kind. Again, falsehood or nonbeing cannot be defined as that which has no nature of its own; for, if that were so, then the denial of falsehood could not be said to be directed to its own nature as such; nor could the nature of falsehood be regarded as itself false, since such an interpretation would rest on a mere technical assumption of the meaning of falsehood, and it would not in the least clear the points at issue; for, if the nature of the so-called entity persisted in its own time and place, it would be meaningless to call such a nature false in itself. Such an assumption would also mean that no distinction is made between that which can serve practical efficiency and that which cannot; if that which persists in time and place and can serve a practical purpose could be called false, then there would be no difference between being and non-being, and the absence of the real could be said to be as much a cause of cloth as the thread itself. Thus absolute non-being may be defined as that which can always be denied in all places (sarvatra traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvaṃ).

Also it cannot be held that “non-being” (asat) cannot be the object of an absolute denial simply because it is non-being, as is said in the Nyāya-makaranda of Ānandabodha; for, if an absolute denial cannot have any object, then the reason “because it is non-being” as adduced above would have no object itself and would therefore be inapplicable. Moreover, just as positive entities can be denied, so the specific negations referring to positive entities may also be denied and so lead on to their corresponding positive affirmations. Again, it is also agreed that specific positive entities come into being through the negation of their corresponding negations immediately prior to their coming into being (prāg-abhāva). This also proves that denial or negation does not necessarily require positive characters or entities for the operation and their function of negation. The whole upshot of this discussion is that, if falsehood means absolute denial of anything where it appears in knowledge, then the implication is that no reality can be affirmed; for what could be affirmed either as false or as true would only apply to entities as they are known, and in that case even the reality of Brahman would be conditional, namely, so far as it is known. Again, absolute negation (sarvatra traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvaṃ) cannot be distinguished from what is known as chimerical entities. And, if the world-appearance could be an object of absolute negation, its status would be no better than that of chimerical entities (e.g., the hare’s horn).

In reply to the objections of Vyāsa-tīrtha against the definition of falsehood, that, if falsehood be real, then that implies dualism, and that, if falsehood is false, that implies re-affirmation of the world as real, Madhusūdana says that, since the denial is itself identical (so far as its ultimate ground is concerned) with Brahman, the reality of falsehood does not imply dualism; for the reality of the denial does not imply the reality of the phenomenon, denial of which has been denied by the denial of all phenomena. It has only so much reality as is implied in the ground of all phenomena, which is the Brahman. Again, the falsehood of the falsehood does not imply the affirmation of the reality of the world-appearance; for in the case of the conch-shell-silver, though it is known that not only was it false, but, since it is never existent, it never exists, and never will exist, and the attribution of falsity to it is also false, the conch-shell-silver is not for the matter of that re-affirmed as real. It is wrong to suppose that the falsity of the falsity or the denial of the denial is re-affirmation in all cases; it is only when the reality and the denial have the same status and identically the same scope that the denial of the denial means an affirmation; but, when the scope of their meaning varies, the denial of the denial does not imply an affirmation. It may further be pointed out that, when the denial of the denial is intended to re-affirm the positive entity, the denial of the denial leads to affirmation. But, when a denial denies both the positive entity and the denial (which is itself taken as an independent entity), the second denial does not lead to affirmation[2].

The denial of the world-appearance is the denial of the relaity of the very world-appearance as such (svarūpeṇa), like the denial of the conch-shell-silver. The fact that the world-appearance is believed to be a product of ajñāna does not in the least imply that its very nature cannot be false; for what is by its very nature false would be so, whether produced or not. The denial of the conch-shell-silver (“this is not silver”) means that the conch-shell-silver is other than the real market-silver, i.e., the negation here is that of otherness (anyo-anya-abhāva). But, when it is said that “here is no silver,” the negation is one of non-existence, and the falsity of the appearance is thereby definitely declared (sā ca purovartti-rajatasyawa vyāvahārikam atyanta-abhāvam viṣayīkaroti iti kanṭho-ktam eva mithyātvam), whereas in the former case falsehood is only implied (idaṃ śābda-nirdiṣṭe purovarti-prātītika-rajate rajata-śabda-nirdiṣṭa-vyāvahārika-rajata-anyonya-abhāva-pratiter ārthikaṃ mithyātvam)[3].

Now, if the world-appearance be denied (“there is no world-appearance here”), then, since there is no world-appearance anywhere else, the denial implies the absolute non-existence of the world-appearance, i.e., world-appearance is as non-existent as any chimerical entity, e.g., the hare’s horn. The reply to such an objection, that there is a difference between the absolute negation of the world-experience as indescribable (anirvācya) and the absolute negation as chimerical (tucca), is that the latter has not even a seeming appearance anywhere, whereas the former appears as really existent until it is contradicted (kvachid apy upādhau sattvena pratīty-anarhatvam atyanta-asattvaṃ yāvad bādham pratītiyogyatvaṃ prātītika-sattvam).

It must further be noted in this connection that the denial which leads to falsehood must have the same relation and the same extent and scope as the content which is being denied (yena rūpeṇa yad-adhikaraṇatayā yat pratipannaṃ tena rūpeṇa tan-niṣṭḥa-atyanta-abhāva-pratiyogitvasya pratipanna-padena sūcitatvāt ; tac ca rūpaṃ aṃbandha-viśeṣo’vacchedakaviśeṣaś ca)[4].

The Śaṅkarites, moreover, do not admit negation as a separate category, but consider the negation to be identical with the unqualified nature of the locus where the negation appears. Brahman has no qualities, and this does not therefore mean that it has a negative quality; for, there being more separate negations, the negation of all qualities simply means the pure nature of Brahman. The attribution of so-called positive qualities also as infinitude, etc., means the negation of the opposite qualities of falsehood and limitation, which ultimately implies a reversion to the pure nature of Brahman, etc. (adhikaraṇa-atirikta-dbhāva-abhyupagamena ukta-mithyātva-abhāva-rūpa-satyatvasya Brahma-svarūpa-virodhāt)[5].

Ramācārya, in his Taraṅgiṇī, refuting the view of Madhusūdana, says that, excepting the case of the negation of the negation-prior-to-becoming (prāg-abhāva), the negation of negation means positing and therefore, since no third alternative is possible, the denial of the denial of an entity necessarily posits. Again, the assertion of Madhusūdana, that the illusion consists in the appearance of the illusory silver as the real silver of the market, is groundless; for the material cause that produced the illusory silver is different from the material cause of the silver of the market. The illusory silver ceases to exist only when there is true knowledge removing the ignorance which was the material cause of the illusory silver (prātibhāsikasya svopādāna-jñāna-nivartaka jñāna-viṣayeṇaiva vā tādātmya-pratīteśca): where the same material cause produces two different appearances (e.g., the cloth and the whiteness) they may be experienced as identical. But, when the material causes are entirely different, their products can never be experienced as identical[6]. Again, it has been urged by Madhusūdana that the denial that constitutes falsehood must be qualified by the same conditions and relations whereby the positive entities were qualified; but this is unmeaning, for no amount of such conditioning can gainsay the truth that the negation of negations means position, until some definite proof of the existence of a third alternative escaping the sphere of the Law of Excluded Middle can be adduced[7].

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that falsehood moreover cannot be defined as absolute denial of reality; for, unless the meaning of denial is understood, the meaning of reality cannot be comprehended and vice versa. The point at issue here is whether conch-silver is denied in its very nature as such or whether its reality is denied. The former alternative is denied on the ground that, if it were accepted, then it would be difficult to account for the awareness of the conch-silver as existing in front of the perceiver; for, if it was absolutely non-existent, it could not be directly perceived. But it may be pointed out with the same force that the second alternative is also unacceptable, because, when the conch-silver was perceived, it was also perceived to be real, and, if that is so, how can that reality be denied? If in reply to this it is suggested that the reality of the conch-shell-silver is only a relative reality and not an absolute reality, then it may be pointed out that, if once a degree of reality be admitted, then infinite regress will follow; for one may as well ask whether the absolute reality is absolutely absolute or relatively absolute and so on. Again, falsehood is defined as that which is liable to be destroyed by knowledge in its function as knowledge. But Vyāsa-tīrtha does not tolerate such a position and says that knowledge of past events and things, even though false, ceases by itself without waiting to be destroyed by the so-called right knowledge; also it is not felt that the silver is destroyed by the knowledge of the conch-shell. It is further urged that right knowledge of the conch-shell also removes the error which, so far as it was an error, was true, and this shows that knowledge removes not only falsehood, but also true things, and on that account the definition in question cannot be a true definition of falsehood. Moreover, when an illusion is removed, the removal is not due to the function of cognition as such, but is by virtue of its perceptual immediacy (aparokṣa-adhyāsam prati jñānasya-aparokṣatayā nivartakatvena jñānatvena anivartakatvāc ca)[8].

Again, if a falsehood is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge which destroys the very material cause of the falsehood (svopādāna ajñāna-nivartaka jñāna-nivartyatvaṃ), the objection will be that it does not apply to the beginningless illusion[9]. It may similarly be held that the definition of falsehood as appearance in the place where it does not exist (svātyanta-abhāva-adhikaraṇe eva pratīyamānatvaṃ) may also be refuted; for many objections occur, as has already been pointed out, according as we consider the negation to be relatively real or illusory. Again, if falsehood be defined as that which is different both from being and non-being, then, since it has already been pointed out that non-being means absolute denial, the appearances or illusions would be inexplicable. If it be defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge, then that can prove its momentary character, but not its false nature (dhī-nāśyatve anityatā eva syāt na mṛṣālmatā)[10].

In reply to the objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha concerning the definition of falsehood as that which is liable to be destroyed by knowledge, Madhusūdana says that the real meaning of the definition is that the entity which is destroyed, both in its causal aspect and the aspect as effect, on account of the rise of knowledge is false. The jug though destroyed as effect by the stroke of the club is not destroyed in its causal aspect as the earthy pot. The hare’s horn does not exist at all: so its non-existence is not due to knowledge. Again, since the conch-shell-silver appears in consciousness and is destroyed immediately after the rise of true knowledge, its dissolution must be due to knowledge. Also it is not wrong to say that falsehood is negated by knowledge in its function as knowledge; for the later knowledge does not negate the prior knowledge by its function as knowledge, but merely on account of its posteriority; and therefore the definition of falsehood as that which can be negated by knowledge only in its function as knowledge clearly keeps aloof the case of the negation of the prior knowledge by the later, to which it was supposed that the above definition of falsehood could wrongly be extended. It is well, however, to point out that falsehood is negated by knowledge not in an indirect manner, but directly and immediately (vastutas tu sākṣātkāratvena jñāna-nivartyatvaṃ vivakṣitam)[11].

To this Rāmācārya replies that it is Madhusūdana who says that the definition of falsehood as that which can be negated by knowledge means the general absence of an entity through the rise of knowledge (jñāna-prayukta-avasthiti-sāmānya-viraha-pratiyogitvaṃ jñāna-nivartyatvaṃ (see Advaita-siddhi, p. 168, and Taraṅgiṇī, p. 22)[12]. It may be asked whether the word “generally” (sāmānya) or the negation is qualified by the existence (avasthityā sāmānyaṃ vā viśiṣyate viraho vā). The first alternative would mean the negation of the cause of an entity through the rise of knowledge; for the word avasthiti-sāmānya means cause. But in that case there would be an illicit extension of the definition of falsehood to the negation of the prior knowledge by the posterior knowledge; for the posterior knowledge destroys the cause of the persistence of the prior knowledge, and it would not apply to the beginningless avidyā. In the second alternative, i.e., if the word sāmānya is qualified by the negation, then it may be pointed out that the Śaṅkarite never admits a general negation as distinguished from the negation of any special entity. Moreover, since the conch-shell-silver is denied in its very nature as false, it cannot be said that its general absence (that is, both as cause and effect) was due to the rise of knowledge; for it is not admitted to be existent at any time[13]. Again, as it has been shown by Vyāsa-tīrtha that there ought not to be any difference between the non-existence of the conch-shell-silver and that of the hare’s horn, the non-existence of the hare’s horn might equally be said to be due to knowledge, if the nonexistence of the conch-shell-silver be said to be due to the rise of knowledge.

In supporting the fourth definition of falsehood as “appearance in the locus of its own absence” (svātyanta-abhāva-adhikaraṇe eva pratīyamānatvaṃ) or as the “absence in the locus of its own existence” (svāśraya niṣṭha-atyanta-abhāva-pratiyogitvam), Madhusūdana says that, since an entity may be both present and absent in one identical time, so it may be both present and absent in one identical space. To this Rāmācārya replies that, if this is admitted, then there is no difference between existence and nonexistence, and ordinary experience is inexplicable (tathā sati bhāvābhāvayor ucchinnakathā syāt iti vyāvahārikyapi vyavasthā na syāt) ; consequently dualism and its negation, monism, would be the same, and the monistic knowledge would be unable to dispel the dualistic consciousness.

In support of the fifth definition of falsehood as difference from the real (sad-viviktatvaṃ mithyātvaṃ) Madhusūdana defines existence of reality as that which is established by knowledge and not invalidated by defects. The definition of existence is further modified by him as that which appears as existent through proofs not invalidated by defects. By this qualification he excludes chimerical entities and Brahman; for chimerical entities do not appear as existent, and Brahman, though it exists in itself, is never an object to any mind to which it appears as existent (satvā-prakāraka-pratīti-viṣayatābhāvāt).

The existent is defined as that which is established by proof (pramāṇa-siddha), and this is again as that which is uncontradicted. To this it is objected by Rāmācārya that Brahman is not the object of any proofs, whereas the world, which is established by all proofs, is ultimately contradicted[14].

The question is raised by Vyāsa-tīrtha whether falsehood itself is contradicted or uncontradicted. If it is uncontradicted, then falsehood becomes real, and the doctrine of monism fails. If it is urged in reply that falsehood is identical with the ground of illusion, the Brahman, then the meaning of the phrase “world-appearance is false” (prapañco mithyā) is that the world-appearance is identical with Brahman (mithyā being identical with Brahman), and this is not disputed by us; for Brahman, being all-pervasive, is in a sense identical with the world-appearance. Moreover, if falsehood be identical with Brahman, the general argument that those things alone are false which are cognizable would be faulty, because falsity, being identical with Brahman, would itself be un-cognizable. If falsehood be contradicted, then it is self-false (bādhya), and the world would become real. Even if it is again urged that falsehood is not identical with Brahman, but is one with the reality of Brahman as underlying the second denial or the falsehood of the falsehood, to this the reply would be that our very inquiry centres round the question whether the second denial is itself contradicted or uncontradicted, and it is well known that, since the underlying reality is everywhere pure consciousness, the underlying reality of the second falsehood has no separate or independent existence regarding which any affirmation could be made. It is clear that, if in the first case the assertion of falsehood being identical with Brahman be meaningless, the attempt at an extension by making it identical with the pure consciousness underlying the second denial does not in reality lead to any new meaning. If it is again urged that, since the conch-shell-silver is false, the falsehood which is a quality of this conch-shell-silver is necessarily false; if the substance is false, its quality is necessarily false, and therefore the falsehood of this falsehood does not reaffirm the reality of the conch-shell-silver. Since both the falsehoods are based on the falsehood of the substance to which they are attributively associated the negation of negation does not mean a position. The negation of a negation can mean a position only if the substance be real. But this is clearly a confusion; for the absence of qualities follows on the absence of the substance only when such qualities are dependent on the nature of the substance; but falsehood is not so, since it is naturally opposed to that to which it refers[15].

Moreover, if the falsehood of the conch-shell-silver becomes false merely because it is associated with the illusory silver, though it is affirmed by an experience of contradiction, then it might equally well be real because of its ultimate association with Brahman, the ground reality of all things; or on the other hand the conch-shell might equally well be false because of its association with the illusory silver, and the non-existent would also be existent because of its association with existence, and vice versa[16]. Moreover, the conch-shell-silver is not regarded by the Śaṅkarites as absolutely nonexistent, like the chimerical hare’s horn, and therefore falsehood cannot be considered to be so on account of its association therewith. Again, the argument that falsehood has not the same status of existence as the world-appearance to which it refers and therefore the assertion of falsehood does not hurt extreme monism, is wrong: for, if falsehood has only a relative existence (vyāvahāriktve), the world of our daily experience, which is opposed to it and which is attested by perception, ought to be regarded as ultimately real. Thus our former objection remains valid, that, if falsehood be uncontradicted, the doctrine of monism fails and, if contradicted, the world would be real[17].

Madhusūdana has the former reply to the above objection that, when the position and negation have a different order of being, the negation of the negation does not imply affirmation. If the negation refers to a relative existence, then such negation does not take away the assertion of a fanciful existence[18]. Thus an entity may be in different senses both true and false. Madhusūdana further says that, when the denial is due to a specific quality, then the negation of negation cannot be an affirmation. Here both the conch-shell and its quality are denied on account of their common attribute of plausibility. Thus it may be said with impunity that both the horse and the cow may be denied in an elephant[19].

To this Rāmācārya’s reply is that existence and non-existence naturally exclude each other, and their denial is therefore not due to any other specific property. That existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive is acknowledged even by the Śaṅkarites when they speak of māyā as being different both from existence and nonexistence[20].

An important argument establishing the falsity of the world rests upon the fact that the world is cognizable; all that is cognizable is false, like dream experiences. At this point Vyāsa-tīrtha seeks to analyse what may be meant by the word cognizable. Several alternative meanings are offered, of which the first is termed vṛtti-vyāpyatva, i.e., that which is a content of a mental state. The Śaṅkarites are thus supposed to say that all that can be a content of a mental state is false. To this Vyāsa-tīrtha’s reply is that Brahman and the self must also be the content of at least some kind of mental state, and therefore, if the thesis of the Śaṅkarites be accepted, Brahman also would be false. If it is said that Brahman in its purity can never be the object of any mental state, and it can be so only when it is associated with ajñāna, to this the reply is that, if Brahman in its purity cannot manifest itself in awareness, it can never establish itself, and such a theory directly militates against the self-revealing nature of Brahman. Again, it is urged that, though Brahman is self-revealing, yet it cannot be the content of any mental state; for the very expression “Brahman is pure and self-revealing” would make it the content of that verbal cognition; if the expression carries no sense, then there is no meaning in it. Moreover, if Brahman as associated with ajñāna be admitted to be the content of a mental state, it would through such an association be a constituent of that mental content and therefore a content in itself. It cannot, moreover, be said that the objection cannot apply to Brahman because Brahman can be a content only in association and not in its nature; for, since the same conditions apply to eternal and transcendental entities of an indeterminate character which cannot be contents of consciousness in themselves, but only in later associated forms, Brahman would not be false on that account. Again, it is wrong to suppose that, when an object is known, the content of that mental state has the same form as the object of awareness; for we may know a hare’s horn through a verbal cognition without assuming that the mental state has the same form as a hare’s horn. The assumption therefore that the content of awareness must have the same form as its object is wholly invalid. It is clearly found to be so in the case of Brahma-knowledge; for no awareness can have an infinitude as its content. So to say that an awareness has content as an object simply means that it refers thereto (tad-viṣayatvam eva tad-ākāratvam)[21].

Since this is so, the condition of perception that pure consciousness must be reflected in the mental state in superimposition upon the physical object is wholly unnecessary. Thus the objection, that all that is cognizable is on that account false, is invalid.

To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that the pure consciousness, which is always self-revealing, is never the content of any awareness. It only appears to be so in association with the ajñāna modifications which alone can become the content of knowledge. Thus in all circumstances the pure consciousness is self-revealing and it can never be the content of itself. Madhusūdana would admit all the suggested interpretations of cognizability offered by Vyāsa-tīrtha, excepting the second (phala-vyāpyatva)[22]; he, however, admits that a stricter criticism would require the definition to be slightly modified by excluding cognizability through verbal cognition (vastutas tu śābdājanya-vṛtti-viṣayatvam eva dṛśyatvam) ; in this way, though one may be aware of chimerical entities through verbal propositions, they would not on that account be called false; for they are absolutely non-existent entities, which cannot be called either false or true[23].

Madhusūdana further interprets cognizability as that which has a definite formal content (sva-prakāraka-vṛtti-viṣayatvam eva dṛśyatvaṃ). By the term “formal” (sva-prakāraka) he means any describable characteristic (sopākhyaḥ kaścid dharmaḥ) and thereby excludes Brahman, which means purity having no describable characteristic: on the other hand, even the cognition of negations may be described as having the character of negativity. The effect of this interpretation is that cognizability is limited to all that comes within the purview of relative and pragmatic experience. In attempting to clear the meaning of cognizability Madhusūdana defines it as that which is somehow in relation with pure consciousness (cid-viṣayatva). This, being identical with self, is devoid of any such two-term relation. In the attempt to classify the meaning further, cognizability of things is defined as dependence for revelation on an alien consciousness (sva-vyavahāre svātirikta-samvid-apekṣā-niyati-rūpaṃ dṛśyatvaṃ) or as the character of being other than the self-revealing (a-sva-prakāśatva-rūpatvaṃ dṛśyatvam). It is clear therefore that anything other than pure consciousness depends on pure consciousness for revelation.

Rāmācārya, in attempting to refute Madhusūdana, says that merely from the knowledge of the concomitance of impurity (aśuddhatva) and dependent revelation (a-sva-prakāśatva) one cannot say that pure consciousness is self-revealed; but such a conclusion can be arrived at only when it is known that pure consciousness has no impurity in it. Again, the concomitance of dependent revelation and impurity can be known only when their opposites, “purity” and “self-revealingness,” are known to coexist with pure consciousness; thus the knowledge of concomitance of pure consciousness with self-revealingness and that of impure consciousness with dependent revelation are mutually independent. There is therefore no way in which it can be asserted that only pure consciousness is self-revealing[24]. The other reason adduced for falsehood is that the world-appearance is false because it is material. Now what is this materiality? Its character is given as “non-knower” (ajñātṛtva), “ignorance” (ajñānatva), as “non-self-revealing” (a-sva-prakāśatva), or “non-self.” If the first meaning of materiality be accepted, then it may be pointed out that according to the Śaṅkarites the ego is false, and yet it is the knower; the pure consciousness, which according to the Śaṅkarites is the only reality, is not itself the knower. If it is suggested that pure consciousness may be regarded as the knower through false assumption, then it may well be said that false assumption would validate any false reasoning, and that would be of no avail. Even the body appears as the knower when one says, “I, the white man, know,” yet on that account the body cannot be regarded as the knower. The second interpretation, which defines materiality as ignorance (ajñāna), cannot be held; for phenomenal knowledge is partly true and partly false. Again, it may in this connection be asked whether the knowledge of the self (ātman) has any content or not. If it has, then that content must necessarily be the object of a cognizing activity, and it is impossible that the cognizing activity of the self should direct its activity towards the self. If it is urged in reply that the self has no activity to be directed to itself, but the fact that it is distinguished as self is its cognition of itself, the obvious reply to this is that the cognition of all things is nothing more than the fact that they are distinguished in their specific characters. If again the knowledge of the self has no content, then it is no knowledge at all. If any knowledge be admitted which does not illuminate any object, then even a jug can be called knowledge. Therefore, if materiality be defined as ajñāna or ignorance, then even the self would for the above reasons be ajñāna. In this connection it may well be remembered that knowledge requires both the object and the knower: there cannot be any experience without the experiencer and the thing experienced. Again, if the self be regarded as mere knowledge, it may well be asked whether that knowledge is right knowledge or illusion. If the former, then, since the modifications of the avidyā are known by the self, these would be true. It cannot be the latter, because there is no defect associated with the self. Neither can the self be regarded as bliss: for the phenomenal enjoyment of worldly objects is not admitted as bliss, and there is no way in which the degrees of pleasure or bliss which may lead ultimately to the highest bliss can be admitted; for, once a degree of pleasure is admitted, an extraneous element naturally creeps in. Thus falsity of the world on the ground that it is material is unacceptable in any sense of the term[25].

To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that the second and third interpretations of materiality, i.e., that which is ignorance is material or that which is non-self is material, would be quite suitable. In finding fault with Vyāsa-tīrtha’s exposition of knowledge Madhusūdana says that, if knowledge be defined as that which illuminates an object, then even during emancipation objects would be illuminated, which is impossible; the relation of knowledge to objects is extraneous and therefore illusory. If it is objected that, if no objects are revealed during release, then even bliss is not revealed, and in that case no one would care to attain release, the reply is that the emancipated state is itself bliss and there is no separate manifestation of bliss as obtainable therein. The association of an object is perceivable only in sense-knowledge; in the knowledge of the self there is no association with the senses, and it is unreasonable to demand that even then objects should be manifested in knowledge. When it is said that self is of the nature of immediate knowledge, the suggestion that then it must be either valid or erroneous is unacceptable. For the exclusive classification of knowledge as valid or invalid applies to ordinary experienced knowledge. But the self as knowledge is like the indeterminate knowledge that is neither valid nor invalid.

Rāmācārya, however, says that, if the association of knowledge w ith objects be extraneous, then at the time of the dawn of ultimate knowledge the self should not be regarded as its object. If it is said that this is only so in the case of perceptual knowledge, where pure consciousness is reflected through the vṛtti of the form of the object, then the connection of the knowledge with the object would be false; for in that case the necessity of vṛtti and the reflection of consciousness through it would have to be admitted at the dawn of the knowledge of the self in the ultimate stage. The relation of the object to knowledge therefore cannot be extraneous and therefore false. In reply to Madhusūdana’s statement that, just as according to the Naiyāyikas, though universals and individuals are mutually correlated, yet in the state of ultimate dissolution the universals remain even though there are no individuals, so there may be a state where there is knowledge, but no object; for the sphere of knowledge is wider than that of knowledge with objects. Rāmācārya says that even in the state of pralaya, where there is no individual, the knowledge of the universals has the individuals within it as its constituents. Again, the association of objects with knowledge does not mean that the objects produce knowledge, but that knowledge is associated with the objects. Again, if the association with the object be regarded as meaning “necessarily produced by objects,” or if it necessarily means “in whichever place or at whichever time this object exists there is knowledge,” then the Śaṅkarites would not be able to affirm the unity of the soul. For, since the unity exists in Brahman, it could not be generated by the individual soul. And again, if it is affirmed that, whenever there is unity with Brahman, there is unity with the soul, then, since the Brahman is always one, all individual souls will be emancipated; it will also be impossible to determine the unity of individual souls and the unity of Brahman. So the objects do not generate the determinate knowledge, but are associated with it.

It is argued that whatever is limited and finite is false; now this limitation may be by time or space or by other entities (paricchinnatvam api deśataḥ kālato vastuto vā). Now as to this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that time and space cannot be limited by time and space and this is so much the case that even the supreme reality, the Brahman, is often spoken of as existing always and everywhere; time and space are thus universal characteristics and cannot be denied of others or of themselves. Thus the observation of Vācaspati, that whatever does not exist in some places and in some time is on that account absent everywhere and always, and that what is existent must always and everywhere be so (yat sat tat sadā sarvatra sad eva ... tathā ca yat kadācit kutracid asat tat sadā sarvatra asadeva), is wholly invalid; for, if by non-existence at some particular time existence at any other time can be invalidated, then by existence at that time non-existence at other times may also be invalidated. It is as good logic to say that, because it will not exist then, therefore it does not exist now, as to say that, because it exists now, it must exist then[26]. Again, what is meant by spatial limitation? If it means non-association with all bodies (sarva-mūrttāsamyogitvam) or the non-possession of the supreme measure (parama-mahat-parimāṇānadhikaraṇatvam ), then even Brahman is so; for He is untouchable (asaṅga) and He has no measure as His quality; if it means possession of limited measure (parimāṇa), then parimāṇa or “measure,” being a quality, cannot belong to a quality; so qualities would not be limited (guṇa-karmādau guṇānaṅgīkārāt).

Again, temporal limitation cannot be associated with negation as “otherness” ; for, if the limitation as otherness be denied at any time, then all things in the world would be one. Now limitation by other entities (which is the third definition of limitation) means “difference” (bhinnatva); but such a limitation (according to the Śaṅkarites) is absent in the world of everyday experience; for they deny the reality of difference. Again, difference from falsehood exists also in the self: therefore the argument of Ānandabodha, that whatever things exist divided (vibhaktatvāt) are on that account false, is invalid. It is, again, wrong to suppose that the unlimited nature of being consists in the fact that it alone remains universal, whereas everything else changes and must therefore be considered to be imposed upon it, since, when we say “a jug exists,” “a jug moves,” the jug seems to remain unchanged, while its verb changes, as “exists” and “moves.” As “many” is associated with “one,” so “one” also is associated with “many”; so nothing can be made of the argument that what remains constant is unlimited and valid and what is changeful is false.

To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that, since the Śaṅkarites do not admit universals, it is wrong to suppose that in all cases of the existence of a cow there is something like the cow-universal which persists, and, if that is not so, then the only other explanation is that it is the individuals that come and go and are imposed upon the persistent experience of being, which alone is therefore real. Now, again, it may be argued, the Brahman, as being, is always covered by ajñāna ; it has no distinguishable form, and so it is wrong to think that Brahman is manifested as being in our experience of the world-objects. To this the reply is that Brahman is itself not covered by ajñāna (sad-ātmanā na brahmaṇo mūlājñānenā-vṛtatvaṃ) : it is only by the limitations of the specific forms of world-objects that its nature is hidden; when the obstacles of these specific forms are broken by the function of the vṛtti modification of the mind, the Brahman underlying these objects manifests itself as pure being. It cannot be objected that Brahman, as such a pure being, has no visual characteristics and therefore cannot be perceived by the eye; for Brahman is not perceivable by any of the senses or by any specific sense[27].

Rāmācārya in reply says that the universal (as “cow”) has to be accepted; for otherwise how can the so-called universal as being be sometimes manifested as cow and at other times as other objects? Again, it is wrong to say that Brahman is not in itself covered by the avidyā; for it is said that, even when the being-aspect is revealed, the aspect as bliss may still remain covered; then, since being and bliss must be one (for otherwise the monism would fail), the veil must also be over the being-aspect as well. Again, as Brahman has no form and no characteristic, it cannot be said to be grasped by all the senses (atyantam avyakta-svabhāvasya brahmanaś cakṣur-ādi-sarvendriyagrāhyatve mānābhāvāt)[28].

The argument that falsehood consists in the non-existence of the whole in the parts is attacked by Vyāsa-tīrtha. He says that, so far as concerns the view that, because part and whole are identical, therefore the whole cannot be dependent on the part, he has no objection. If the whole is not dependent upon anything else and not on its parts either, then it may not be dependent on anything at all; but it cannot on that account be called false. But it may be pointed out that perception shows that the whole is dependent on the parts and rests in them, and therefore on the evidence of perception its non-existence in the parts cannot be admitted. The question arises whether “non-existence” or “negation” is valid or invalid: if it is valid, then monism breaks down, and, if it is invalid, then non-existence is denied, which will be in favour of Vyāsa-tīrtha. Now it cannot be urged that the existence of negation cannot be fatal to monism: for negation includes position as a constituent. Again, Brahman is denoted by the term advitīya (“devoid of any second”); this involves a negation, and, if negation is invalid, then its demolition of Brahman will also be invalid. Further, the denial of a second to Brahman may mean a denial not only of positive entities, but of negative entities also; positivity itself means the negative of the negative. Also, if negation is admitted, then, since one of its forms is “otherness,” its admission means the admission of otherness and hence of duality. Moreover, it would be difficult for the Śaṅkarites to describe the nature of negation; for, if no positive entities can be described, it goes without saying-that it will be still more difficult to describe negative entities. Moreover, not only is the non-existence of the whole in the parts contradicted by perceptual experience, but it is opposed to reason also; for, since the whole cannot be subsistent anywhere else, if it is not admitted to be subsistent in the parts, its very nature is inexplicable (anyāsamavetasyāṃśitvaṃ etat-tantu-samavetatvaṃ vinā na yuktaṃ)[29].

Again, the view that, since without knowledge nothing is revealed, the so-called things are nothing but knowledge, is wrong; for the things are experienced not as being themselves knowledge, but as those things of which we have knowledge (ghaṭasya jñānam iti hi dhīḥ na tu ghaṭo jñānam iti).

In reply to the above Madhusūdana says that, since the experience of cause and effect cannot be explained without assuming some difference between them, such a difference must be admitted for practical purposes, in spite of the fact that they are identical. Discussion regarding the validity or invalidity of negation is brushed aside by Madhusūdana as being out of place. Again, the opposition of perception is no objection; for perception is often illusory. Also, the objection that, if the whole, which is not elsewhere, is also not in the parts, its existence is inexplicable, is invalid; for, though the whole may not exist in the parts as an independent entity, it may still be there as identical with the material cause, the parts; for being materially identical (etat-samavetatva) with anything does not necessarily follow from a denial of its negation therein; for, if it were so, then all such qualities as are devoid of negative instances (being on that account present in it) would be materially identical with the thing[30]. But what really determines a thing’s material identity with another thing is that the former’s negation-prior-to-existence (prāg-abhāva) must be in it (kintu etan-niṣṭha-prāg-abhāva-pratiyogitvād aikyam). The objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha, that a cloth can have its negation in threads only when such threads are not its constituent parts, is invalid, for the very reason that what determines material identity is the existence of the prior-to-existence negation (prāg-abhāva-pratiyogitva) of the whole in the part or of the effect in the cause, and therefore it is not proper to say that a cloth can non-exist only in such threads as are not constituents of it: for the condition of the non-existence of the cloth in the threads is not the fact of the threads not being a constituent of the cloth, but the absence of the prior-to-existence negation of the cloth in the threads.

An objection is urged by Vyāsa-tīrtha that for the self-same reasons on account of which the world is called false Brahman as well may be regarded as false; for Brahman is the substratum of all our experience and therefore may be regarded as false. As to this Madhusūdana says that, so far as Brahman is associated with ajñāna, it is false, but, so far as it is beyond our practical experience, it is real. Moreover, if no ground-reality be admitted, then, the whole world-appearance being an illusion, we shall be landed in pure nihilism. Again, the objection that Brahman, being different from non-existent entity, is like the conch-shell-silver, which also, though not real, is different from non-existent entity, cannot be maintained. For difference from non-existent entity is difference from that which cannot appear anywhere as existent, and that alone is different from it which appears somewhere as an existent entity; but this cannot apply to Brahman, since pure Brahman does not appear anywhere as an existent entity.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, after adopting a number of tentative definitions of being, finds fault with them all, and says that, in whatever way being may be defined by the Śaṅkarites, that would be applicable in the same manner to the being of the world. Briefly speaking, the definition of being comes to be “that which at all times and in all places cannot be denied” (sarva-deśa-kāla-sambandhi-niṣedha - pratiyogitvaṃ sattvaṃ). It may also be defined as that which, being different from non-being, is not a false imposition, or as that which at some time or other is directly and rightly felt as existing (astitva-prakāraka-pramāṇam prati kadācid sākṣād-viṣayatvaṃ).

In reply to the above attempt at a definition of being by Vyāsa-tīrtha, Madhusūdana says that our perceptual experience is absolutely illegitimate in discerning truth as distinguished from falsehood or as opposed to it[31]. Truth and falsehood being mutually related, all attempts at defining them by mutual opposition become circular, and therefore illegitimate; definitions of being which refer in some way or other to the experience of being as such are also false, as they involve the very concept of being which is to be defined. It is also wrong to say that the world has as much reality of the same order as that of Brahman; for falsehood and reality cannot have the same order of being. The being of Brahman is of the nature of one pure luminous consciousness, and it is clear that the material world cannot have that order of being. Now falsehood is defined as non-existence at all times and places (sarva-deśīya-traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvaṃ); reality is its opposite. Sense-perception can never bring to us such a negation, and therefore it also cannot bring to us the opposite of negation, i.e., reality. The fact that some things are perceived to exist somewhere at some time is irrelevant; for even a false appearance may have such a temporary perceptual existence. There is a Nyāya view to the effect that there is a special mode of presentation of universals (sāmānya-pratyā-satti), by which all the individuals that come under such universals are presented in consciousness, and that it is by this means alone that inductive generalization leading to deductive inference is possible. On this view the contention is that, though all negations of an entity at all times and places may not be visually perceived, they may be presented to consciousness by the above means of presentation, and, if they are thus presented to consciousness, their negation, viz., the reality, may also be perceived.

Madhusūdana’s reply to this is, that there is no such special mode of presentation of universals by which all the individuals associated with them are also present in consciousness, i.e., there is no such sāmānya-pratyāsatti as is admitted by the Nyāyāyikas. He then indulges in a polemic against such a sāmānya-pratyāsatti and tries to show that deductive inferences are possible through the association of the special characteristics of the universals as determining the concomitance[32]; thus, if there is no sāmānya-pratyāsatti and if all the negations at all times and places cannot be presented to consciousness, their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived either.

The reply of Rāmācārya is that, though such negations at all times and all places may not be perceived by the senses, yet there is no reason why their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived; when one sees a jug, one feels that it is there and nowhere else. One perceives the objects negated and not the negation itself[33]. He further says that, though sāmānya-pratyāsatti may not be admitted, yet the unperceived negations may be known by inference, and thus the objection of Madhusūdana that, unless sāmānya-pratyāsatti is admitted, such negations cannot be known and their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived either, is doubly invalid[34].

Madhusūdana further says that the testimony of the testifying consciousness (sākṣī) in experience reveals only present entities, and in that way the world-objects are relatively real. But the testifying consciousness cannot in any way show whether they will be contradicted in future or not; the testifying consciousness is thus incapable of defying a future denial of world-experience, when the Brahma-knowledge is attained.

Vyāsa-tīrtha had objected to the Vedānta thesis that there is one Being, self-identical with pure consciousness, on which all the so-called forms of object and content of knowledge are imposed, pointing out that the mere fact that one experiences that a jug exists does not prove that the jug is imposed upon the pure being; for pure existence can never be perceived and all the characteristics, including false appearances, may also be considered to have the same existential character as existence itself.

Madhusūdana’s simple reply is that instead of admitting a number of individual entities it is much better to admit one constant being'on which the various forms of objects are imposed. The assertion of Vyāsa-tīrtha that perceptual evidence is by its very nature stronger than inference, which is slow in establishing itself on account of the various conditions that it has to depend on, is objected to by Madhusūdana, who says that, when perceptual evidence is contradicted by inference and scriptural testimony (e.g., as in the perception of the small dimensions of planetary bodies), it is the former that is negated. So perception has also to depend for its validity on its non-contradiction and other means of proof, and the other means of proof have no more to depend on perception than perception on them. So all these means of proof, being relatively dependent, are of inferior validity to the Vedic testimony, which, not being a man-made document, has naturally an inalienable claim to validity. It is well known that perception through one sense, say the visual, has often to be woven together with perception through other senses, e.g., the tactile, for arriving at valid experience of facts, as in the perception “fire is hot.” Thus perceptual evidence has no right of superior validity by reason of being perceptible, though it may be admitted that in certain spheres perception may dispel an ignorance which is not removed by inference[35]. The objection that an inferential evidence, because it establishes itself slowly (on account of its dependence on many facts), is of inferior validity to perception because this comes quicker is invalid; for validity depends upon proper examination and discovery of faultlessness and not on mere quickness. Moreover, since there are many scriptural texts declaring the oneness of all, which cannot be justified except on the assumption of the falsity of the world, and since such an admission would not take away from perception its natural claim to validity in the relative sphere, a compromise may well be effected by allowing perceptual validity to remain uncontrolled in the relative sphere and admitting the scriptural validity of oneness in the absolute sphere.

Again, Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, since inference and scriptural testimony both depend on visual and auditory perception, it will be wrong to think that the former could invalidate the latter. If perception is not valid in itself, then all inference and scriptural testimony would be invalid, since their data are supplied by perception.

To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that the scriptural testimony does not challenge the data supplied by perception, but challenges their ultimate validity, which can never be supplied by perceptual experience[36]. The bare fact that one knowledge springs up because it was preceded by another is no reason why it is to be less valid; the judgement “this is not silver, but conch-shell” is not less valid because it could not have come into being unless there had been a previous error with the perception of conch-shell as silver. It is said that the validity of sense-evidence is determined by a critical examination depending on correspondence. To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that, so far as concerns the validity of an awareness according to correspondence, the Śaṅkarites have nothing to say against it. What he challenges is that the ultimate validity or ultimate non-contradiction cannot be revealed by any critical examination. It is again argued that, if perception is invalid, the knowledge of concomitance arrived at through it is invalid, and therefore all inference is invalid. This is, however, wrong; for even by a false reasoning a right inference may be possible; from an illusory reflection it is possible to infer the existence of the thing reflected. Moreover, falsity of the evidence (inferential or perceptual) does not imply the falsity of the thing known; so the objection that, if perception is not regarded as valid, then all knowledge becomes invalid, is illegitimate.

Vyāsa-tīrtha urges that, if perceptual testimony can be contradicted in any place by inference, then any and every inference can contradict perception, and fire can be regarded as cold and a hare as having a horn, which is impossible.

To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that not any and every inference can be regarded as superior to perception, since it is well known that an illegitimate inference leads to no valid conclusion. The instances which have been adduced by Vyāsa-tīrtha are instances of illegitimate inferences, the fallacy of which is apparent. It is never admitted by anyone that an illegitimate inference is stronger than perception; but it also cannot be denied that there are many instances of illegitimate perception which are rightly denounced by right inferences.

Vyāsa-tīrtha further says that the science of mīmāṃsā itself admits in various places the superior validity of perception, and recommends a twisting interpretation of such scriptural passages as are not in harmony with perception. The scriptural text, “That art thou,” is directly contradicted in perceptual experience, and therefore should be so interpreted as not to come into conflict therewith.

To this Madhusūdana’s reply is that it is indeed true that certain scriptural passages which deal with ordinary mundane affairs are thus brought into harmony with experience and are sometimes interpreted in accordance with perception; but that is no reason why those texts which refer to ultimate experience and which do not refer to the accessory details of sacrifices should also be subordinate to perception.

Vyāsa-tīrtha says that it is wrong to suppose that perception is invalidated by inference or scriptural testimony; what happens in the case of perceptual illusions is that in both cases perception is vitiated by various types of defects, the presence of which is also known by perception.

To this Madhusūdana’s simple reply is that the presence of defects cannot be known by perception itself, and that most cases of illusory perception are invalidated by stronger inference. When it is said that the moon is no bigger than a foot the illusory perception is no doubt due to the defect of the long distance, but that this is so can be known only by an inference based upon the observation of the diminution of sizes in trees on distant hill-tops. Thus, though there are cases in which one perception invalidates another, there are also cases in which an inference invalidates a perception.

A question arises whether the present perception of the world-appearance may ultimately be contradicted; but to this Vyāsa-tīrtha says that such a fear of future contradiction may invalidate even that knowledge which contradicts this perception. Ordinarily the waking experience contradicts dream-experience, and, if waking experience be also contradicted, then there would be nothing to contradict dream-experience. In this way it will be difficult to find an instance of false experience. The knowledge that contradicts the illusory perception comprehends within it things which are not known at the time of illusory perception (e.g., the knowledge of the conch-shell which was not present at the time of perception of illusory shell-silver). But it cannot be urged that the knowledge that would contradict world-experience would have the specific nature of not being comprehended within the knowledge of world-appearance. Again, a knowledge that contradicts another knowledge must have a content; contentless knowledge has no opposition to false cognitions, yet Brahma-knowledge is regarded as contentless. Moreover, contradiction is possible only there, where a defect is, and that defect lies with the Śaṅkarites, who give a monistic interpretation of scriptural texts. Again, if the monistic experience is certified by monistic texts, the dualistic experience is also certified by dualistic texts, and a knowledge that would contradict and negate the world-experience would involve a duality by the very fact of such negation. Moreover, the last experience which would contradict the world-experience, being itself an experience, would be equally liable to contradiction; and, if uncontradicted experience be also doubted as being liable to contradiction, then there would be no end to such doubts.

Madhusūdana, in reply to the above objection of Vyāsa-tīrtha, emphasizes the point that it is no essential character of a knowledge that contradicts another that it should have a content; what is essential here is that a right knowledge should be grounded in the realization of the reality and thereby negate the false knowledge. It is also wrong to think that, when Brahma-knowledge negates world-appearance, an affirmation of duality is involved; for the Brahma-knowledge is of the very nature of reality, before which the falsehood, which has only appearance and no existence, naturally dissolves away. He further says that doubts regarding validity can only arise when it is known that there are defects; but, since there can be no defects in Brahma-knowledge, no doubts can arise. The assertion of Vyāsa-tīrtha that, if the world-appearance is false, then it is wrong to speak of the self as being of the nature of pure bliss on the ground that the experience of dreamless sleep reveals such a blissful state, is unwarranted, because the nature of self as blissful is known directly from scriptural testimony, and the experience of dreamless sleep is consistent with it.

Footnotes and references:


Nyāyāmṛta, p. 22.


Tatra hi niṣedhasya niṣedhe pratijogi-sattvam āyāti, yatra niṣedhasya nisedha-buddhyā pratiyogisattvaṃ vyavasthāpyate, na niṣedha-mātraṃ niṣedhyate, yathā rajate na idaṃ rajatam iti jñānāantaram idam na arajatam iti jñānena rajataṃ vyavasthāpyate. yatra tu prati-yogi-ṅisedhayor ubhayor api niṣedhas tatra na prati-yogi-sattvam.
, pp. 105-6.


Advaita-siddhi, pp. 130-1.    


Ibid. p. 151.


Ibid. p. 156.


Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī, p. 16(a).


Taraṅgiṇī, p. 20.


Nyāyāmṛta, p. 39(b).


Ibid. p. 40.


Ibid. p. 41.


jñānatva-vyāpya-dharmeṇa jñānanivartyatvam ityapi sādhu, uttarajñānasya pūrva-jñāna-nivartakatvaṃ na jñānatvavyāpyadharmeṇa kintu icchādi-sādhā-raṇenodīcyātmaviśeṣaguṇatvena udīcyatvena veti na siddha-sādhanādi.
pp. 171-2.


Ibid. p. 178.


śukti-rajatāder-avasthity-aṅgīkāre svarūpeṇa niṣedhokty-ayogaś-ca.
p. 22.


Taraṅgiṇī, p. 24.


dharmy-asattve dharmāsattvaṃ tu dharmi-sattvāsāpekṣa-dharma-viṣayam; mithyātvaṃ tu tat-pratikūlam.
p. 44.


Ibid. p. 45.


mithyātvaṃ yady abādhyaṃ syāt syad advaita-mata-kṣatiḥ
mithyātvaṃ yadi bādḥyaṃ syāt jagat-satyatvam āpatet.
p. 47.


paraspara-viraha-rūpatve’pi viṣama-satvākayor avirodhāt vyāvahārika-mithyātvena vyāvahārika-satyatvāpahāre’pi kālpanika-satyatvānapahārāt.
p. 217.


Advaita-siddhi, p. 213.


na tāvat paraspara-viraharūpayor ekaniṣedhyatā-avacchedakāvachinnatvaṃ sambhavati tvayāpi satyatvamithyātvayoḥ paraspara-samuccaye virodḥāt bibhyatā sad-asad-vailakṣaṇyasārūpye’aṅgīkārācca.
p. 26.


Nyāyāmṛta, p. 57.


The suggested interpretations of cognizability (dṛśyatva) as given by Vyāsa-tīrtha are of seven kinds:

  1. kim idaṃ dṛśyatvam;
  2. vṛtti-vyāpyatvaṃ vā;
  3. phala-vyāpyatvaṃ vā;
  4. sādhāraṇaṃ vā;
  5. kadācid-katkaṃcid-viṣayatvaṃ vā;
  6. sva-vyavahāre svātirikta-saṃvid-antarāpekṣā-niyatir vā;
  7. a-sva-prakāśatvaṃ vā.

(Ibid. p. 49.)


Advaita-siddhi, p. 268.


na tāvad a-sva-prakāśatvāśuddhatvayor vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva-grahamā-treṇa śuddhe sva-prakāśatā paryavasyati kintu śuddhe asva-prakāśatva-vyāpa-kasya aśuddhatvasya vyāvṛttāu jñātāyām eva. tathā ca vyāpaka-vyatireka-grahārtham avaśyaṃ śuddka-jñānam. kiṃcāsva-prakāśatvāśuddhatvayor vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva-graho’pi tadubhayavyatirekayoḥ śuddhatva-svaprakāśatvayoḥ śuddhe saḥacāra-grahe saty eveti ghaṭṭa-kuṭī-prabhāta-vṛttāntaḥ.
p. 31.


This argument that the world is false on account of its materiality is adduced in the Tattva-śuddhi.


Nyāyāmṛta, p. 79.


na ca rūpādi-hinatayā cākṣuṣatvādy-anupapattiḥ bādhikā iti vācyam, pratiniyatendriya-grāhyeṣv eva rūpādy-apekṣā-niyamāt sarvendriya-grāhyaṃ tu sad-rūpam brahma nāto rūpādi-hīnatve’pi cākṣusatvādy anupapattiḥ sattvāyāḥ parair api sarvendriya-grāhyatva-ābhyupagamāt ca.
p. 318.


Taraṅgiṇī, p. 52.


tathā ca aṃśitva-rūpa-hetor etat-tantu-niṣṭhātyantābhāva-pratiyogitva-rūpa-sādhyena virodhaḥ.
p. 86.


etanniṣṭhātyantābhāva-pratiyogitvaṃ hi etatsamavetatve prayojakaṃ na bhavati, paramate kevalānvayi-dharma-mātrasya etatsamavetatvāpatteḥ.
p. 324.


pp. 333-4.


vyāpti-smṛti-prakāreṇa vā pakṣadharmatā-jñānasya hetutā; mahānas(?)ya eva dhūmo dhūmatvena vyāpti-smṛti-viṣayo bhavati, dhūmatvena parvatīya-dhūma-jñānaṃ cāpi jātam, tac ca sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṃ vinaiva; tāvataiva anumiti-siddheḥ;
. . . pratiyogitāvacchedaka-prakāraka-jñānād eva tat-sambhavena tad-arthaṃ sakala-pratiyogi-jñāna-janikāyāḥ sāmānya-pratyāsatty anupayogāt.
pp. 338, 341.


Taraṅgiṇī, p. 61.


Ibid. p. 63.


nāpi anumānādy-anivartita-diṅmohanādi(?)-nivartakatvena prābalyam; etāvatā hi vaidharmya-mātraṃ siddhaṃ.


yat-svarūpam upayujvate tanna bādhyate, bādhyate ca tātvikatvākāraḥ, sa ca nopajīvyate kāraṇatve tasyāpraveśāt.
p. 363.

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