A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 4

Indian Pluralism

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1949 | 186,278 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of ontology: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the first part in the series called the “a general review of the philosophy of madhva”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

The philosophy of Madhva admits the categories, viz.,

Dravya is defined as the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa)[2]. A dravya is a material cause with reference to evolutionary changes (pariṇāma) and manifestation (abhivyakti) or to both. Thus the world is subject to evolutionary changes, whereas God or souls can only be manifested or made known, but cannot undergo any evolutionary change; again, ignorance (avidyā) may be said to undergo evolutionary changes and to be the object of manifestation as well.

The substances are said to be twenty, viz.,

The qualities of Madhva are of the same nature as those of the Vaiśeṣika; but the inclusion of mental qualities, such as

is considered indispensable, and so the qualities include not only the twenty-four qualities of the syncretist Vaiśeṣika, but many more.

Actions (karma) are those which directly or indirectly lead to merit (puṇya) or demerit (pāpa). There are no actions which are morally absolutely indifferent; even upward motion and the like —which may be considered as indifferent (udāsīna) karmas —are indirectly the causes of merit or demerit. Karmas are generally divided into three classes, as vihita, i.e., enjoined by the śāstra, niṣiddha, prohibited by it, and udāsīna, not contemplated by it or indifferent. The latter is of the nature of vibration (pariṣpanda), and this is not of five kinds alone, as the Vaiśeṣika supposes, but of many other kinds[3]. Actions of creation, destruction, etc., in God are eternal in Him and form His essence (svarūpa-bhūtāḥ); the contradictory actions of creation and destruction may abide in Him, provided that, when one is in the actual form, the other is in the potential form[4]. Actions in non-eternal things are non-eternal and can be directly perceived by the senses.

The next question is regarding jāti, or universals, which are considered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as one and immutable. These are considered in the Madhva school as eternal only in eternal substances like the jīvas, whereas in non-eternal substances they are considered to be destructible and limited specifically to the individuals where they occur. There are in destructible individuals no such universals, which last even when the individuals are destroyed. An objection is raised that, if the existence of permanent universals is not agreed to, then the difficulty of comprehending concomitance (vyāpti) would be insurmountable, and hence inference would be impossible. The answer that is given on the side of Madhva is that inference is possible on the basis of similarity (sādṛśya), and that the acceptance of immutable universals is not necessary for that purpose; and this also applies to the comprehension of the meaning of words: when certain objects are pointed out as having any particular name, that name can be extended to other individuals which are extremely similar to the previous objects which were originally associated with that name[5]. A difference is also drawn between jāti (“universal”) and upādhi (“limiting condition”) in this, that the latter is said to be that which depends for its comprehension upon the comprehension of some other primary notion, while the former is that whose comprehension is direct and does not depend upon the comprehension of some other notion[6]. Thus the universal of cow (gotva) is known immediately and directly, whereas the notion of the universal of “cognizability” (prameyatva) can only be known through the previous knowledge of those things which are objects of knowledge. So the universal of cognizability is said to be upādhi, and the former jāti. It is further objected that, if objections are taken against an immutable universal existing in all individuals of a class at one and the same time, then the same objection may be taken against the acceptance of similarity, which must be supposed to exist at one time in a number of individuals. The answer to this is that the relation of similarity between two or three individuals is viewed in Madhva philosophy as existing uniformly between the number of individuals so related, but not completely in any one of them. When two or three terms which are said to be similar exist, the relation of similarity is like a dyadic or triadic relation subsisting between the terms in mutual dependence[7]; the relation of similarity existing between a number of terms is therefore not one, but many, according as the relation is noted from the point of view of one or the other of the terms. The similarity of A to B is different from the similarity of B to A, and so forth (bhinnābhinnaṃ sādṛśyam iti siddham).

We next come to the doctrine of specific particulars (viśeṣa) in the Madhva school. It supposes that every substance is made up of an infinite number of particulars associated with each and every quality that it may be supposed to possess. Thus, when the question arises regarding the relation of qualities to their substances (e.g., the relation of colour, etc., to a jug) if any quality was identical with the substance, then the destruction of it would mean destruction of the substance, and the words denoting the substance and the quality would mutually mean each other; but that is not so, and this difficulty can be solved only on the supposition that there are specific particulars corresponding as the basis to each one of the qualities. As to the exact relation of these to their substance there are divergences of view, some holding that they are identical with the substance (abheda), others that they are different (bheda), and others that they are both identical and different (bhedābheda). Whatever view regarding the relation of the qualities to the substance is accepted, the doctrine of specific particulars (viśeṣa) has to be accepted, to escape the contradiction. Thus viśeṣas in each substance are numberless, corresponding to the view-points or qualities intended to be explained; but there are no further viśeṣas for each viśeṣa, as that would lead to an infinite regress. For a satisfactory explanation of the diverse external qualities of God it is necessary to admit eternal viśeṣas in Him. In order to explain the possibility of a connection of the continuous eternal space or vacuity (ākāśa) with finite objects like jug, etc. it is necessary to admit the existence of viśeṣas in ākāśa[8].

It will be seen from the above that the acceptance of viśeṣas becomes necessary only in those cases where the unity and difference of two entities, such as the substance and the qualities or the like, cannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained. For these cases the doctrine of viśeṣas introduces some supposed particulars, or parts, to which the association of the quality could be referred, without referring to the whole substance for such association. But this does not apply to the existence of viśeṣa in the atoms; for the atoms can very well be admitted to have parts, and the contact with other atoms can thus be very easily explained without the assumption of any viśeṣa. An atom may be admitted to be the smallest unit in comparison with everything else: but that is no reason why it should not be admitted to be bigger than its own parts. If the atoms had not parts, they could not be held to combine on all their ten sides[9]. So the Vaiśeṣika view, admitting viśeṣas in atoms, has to be rejected. It is well worth remembering here that the Vaiśeṣikas held that there were among the atoms of even the same bhūta, and also among the souls, such specific differences that these could be distinguished from one another by the yogins. These final differences, existing in the atoms themselves, are called viśeṣas by the Kaṇāda school of thinkers. This conception of viśeṣa and its utility is different from the conception of viśeṣa in the Madhva school[10].

Samavāya, or the relation of inherence accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is discarded in the system of Madhva on almost the same grounds as in Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras. The view is that the appearance of the cause in the effect and of the qualities in the substance is manifestly of the nature of a relation and, as this relation is not contact (saṃyoga), it must be a separate relation, viz., the relation of inherence (samavāya). But in the same way samavāya (e.g., in the sentence iha tantuṣu pata-samavāyaḥ) itself may have the appearance of existing in something else in some relation, and hence may be in need of further relations to relate it. If without any such series of relations a relation of inherence can be related in the manner of a quality and a substance, then that sort of relatedness or qualifiedness (viśiṣṭatā) may serve all the purposes of samavāya. This brings us to the acceptance of “related” or “qualified” as a category separate and distinct from the categories of quality (guṇa) and substance (dravya) and the relation involved between the two[11]. So also the whole (aṃśī) is not either the relations or the parts or both, but a separate category by itself.

Power (śakti), as a separate category, exists in four forms:

  1. as mysterious—acintya-śakti—as in God,
  2. causal power (kāraṇa-śakti or sahaja-śakti), which naturally exists in things and by virtue of which they can produce all sorts of changes,
  3. a power brought about by a new operation in a thing called the ādheya-śakti, as in an idol through the ritual operations of the installation ceremony (pratiṣṭhā), and
  4. the significant power of words (pada-śakti).

Negation is said to be of three kinds:

  1. the negation preceding a production (prāg-abhāva),
  2. that following destruction (dhvaṃsābhāva),
  3. as otherness (anyonyabhāva), e.g., there is the negation of a jug in a pot and of a pot in a jug: this is therefore the same as differences, which are considered as the essence of all things[12].

When things are destroyed, their differences are also destroyed. But the five differences between God and souls, between souls themselves, between inanimate objects themselves, between them and God, and between them and the souls, are all eternal; for the differences in eternal things are eternal and in noneternal things non-eternal[13]. The fourth kind of negation, atyantā-bhāva, is the non-existence belonging to impossible entities like the hare’s horn.

God, or Paramātman, is in this system considered as the fullness of infinite qualities. He is the author of creation, maintenance, destruction, control, knowledge, bondage, salvation, and hiding (āvṛti). He is omniscient, and all words in their most pervading and primary sense refer to Him. He is different from all material objects, souls and prakṛti, and has for His body knowledge and bliss, and is wholly independent and one, though He may have diverse forms (as in Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, etc.); all such forms of Him are the full manifestation of all His qualities.

The souls (jīva) are naturally tainted with defects of ignorance, sorrow, fear, etc., and they are subject to cycles of transformation. They are infinite in number. They are of three kinds, viz., those who are fit for emancipation (mukti-yogya), e.g., gods such as Brahmā, Vāyu, etc., or sages, like Nārada, etc., or like the ancestors (pitṛ), or kings like Ambaiīśa, or advanced men; these advanced souls think of God as being, bliss, knowledge and ātman. It is only the second class of souls that are subject to transmigration and suffer the pleasures of Heaven and the sufferings of Earth and Hell. There is a third class of beings, the demons, ghosts and the like. Each one of these souls is different from every other soul, and even in emancipation the souls differ from one another in their respective merits, qualifications, desires, etc.

Next comes the consideration of unmanifested space (avyākṛta ākāśo dig-rūpaḥ), which remains the same in creation and destruction. This is, of course, different from ākāśa as element, otherwise called bhūtākāśa, which is a product of the tāmasa ego and is limited. Ākāśa as space is vacuity and eternal[14].

Prakṛti also is accepted in the Madhva system as the material cause of the material world[15]. Time is a direct product of it, and all else is produced through the series of changes which it undergoes through the categories of mahat, etc. Prakṛti is accepted here as a substance (dravya)[16] and is recognized in the Madhva system as what is called māyā, a consort of God, though it is called impure (doṣa-yukta) and material (jaḍa), evolving (pariṇāminī), though under the full control of God, and may thus be regarded almost as His will or strength (Harer icchāthavā balam). This prakṛti is to the world the cause of all bondage (jagabhandhātmikā)[17].

The subtle bodies (liṅga-śarīra) of all living beings are formed out of the stuff of this prakṛti. It is also the source of the three guṇas (guṇa-trayādy-upādāna-bhūta). It is held that during the time of the great creation prakṛti alone existed and nothing else. At that time God out of His creative desire produced from prakṛti in three masses sattva, rajas and tamas[18]. It is said that rajas is double of tamas and sattva is double of rajas. Sattva exists by itself in its pure form: rajas and tamas are always mixed with each other and with sattva. Thus sattva exists not only in this pure form, but also as an element in the mixed rajas variety and tamas variety. In the mixed rajas there are for each part of rajas a hundred parts of sattva and one hundredth part of tamas. In the tamas mixture there are for each part of tamas ten parts of sattva and one-tenth part of rajas. At the time of the world-dissolution (vilaya) ten parts return to sattva and one part to rajas with one part in tamas. The evolution of the mahat-tattva takes place immediately after the production of the three guṇas, when the entire amount of the produced rajas becomes mixed with tamas ; the mahat-tattva is constituted of three parts of rajas and one part of tamas. With reference to the later derivatives this mahat-tattva is called sattva[19].

In the category ahaṃkāra (that which is derived immediately after mahat) there is for every ten parts of sattva one part of rajas and a tenth part of tamas. From the sattva of the tamas part of it the manas, etc., are produced, out of the rajas part of it the senses are produced, and out of the tamas the elements are produced. They are at first manifested as tan-mātras, or the powers inherent in and manifested in the elements. As ahaṃkāra contains within it the materials for a threefold development, it is called vaikārika, taijasa and tāmasa accordingly. In the Tattva-saṃkhyāna buddhi-tattva and manas-tattva are said to be two categories evolving in succession from ahaṃkāra. The twenty-four categories counted from mahat are in this enumeration mahat, ahaṃkāra, buddhi, manas, the ten indriyas (senses), the five tan-mātras and the five bhūtas[20]. As buddhi is of two kinds, viz., buddhi as category and buddhi as knowledge, so manas is also regarded as being of two kinds, manas as category and manas as sense-organ. As sense-organ, it is both eternal and noneternal; it is eternal in God, Lakṣmī, Brahmā and all other souls, as their own essence (svarūpa-bhūtam) or self.

The non-eternal manas, as belonging to God, brahma, individual souls, etc., is of five kinds;

  1. manas,
  2. buddhi,
  3. ahaṃkāra,
  4. citta
  5. and cetana,

which may also be regarded as the vṛttis or functions of manas. Of these manas is said to be that to which is due imagination (saṃkalpa) and doubt (vikalpa); buddhi is that to which is due the function of coming to any decision (niścayātmikā buddhi); ahaṃkāra is that through the functioning of which the unreal is thought of as real (asvarūpe svarūpa-matiḥ), and the cause of memory is citta. The senses are twelve, including five cognitive, five conative, manas and the sākṣīndriya, as buddhi is included within manas. The senses are considered from two points of view, viz., from the point of view of their predominantly tejas materials, and as being sense-organs. In their aspects as certain sorts produced in course of the evolution of their materials they are destructible; but as sense-organs they are eternal in God and in all living beings. As regards the bodily seats of these organs, these are destructible in the case of .all destructible beings. The internal sense of intuition (sākṣī) can directly perceive pleasure and pain, ignorance, time and space. The sense-data of sounds, colours, etc., appearing through their respective sense-organs, are directly perceived by this sense of intuition. All things that transcend the domain of the senses are intuited by the sense of intuition (sākṣī), either as known or unknown. To consider the sākṣi-jñāna as a special source of intuitive knowledge, indispensable particularly for the perception of time and space, is indeed one of the important special features of Madhva’s system. In Śaṅkara Vedānta sākṣī stands as the inextinguishable brahma- light, which can be veiled by ajñāna, though ajñāna itself is manifested in its true nature, ignorance, by the sākṣī[21]. Madhva holds that it is through the intuitive sense of sākṣī that an individual observes the validity of his sense-knowledge and of his own self as the ego (aham). Our perception of self, on this view, is not due to the activity of mind or to mental perception (manonubhavd) ; for, had it been so, one might as a result of mind activity or mental functioning have doubted his own self; but this never happens, and so it has to be admitted that the perception of self is due to some other intuitive sense called sākṣī. Sākṣī thus always leads us to unerring and certain truths, whereas, wherever in knowledge there is a discriminating process and a chance of error, it is said to be due to mental perception[22].

The tan-mātras are accepted in Madhvaism as the subtler materials of the five grosser elements (bhūtas). It must be noted that the categories of ahaṃkāra and buddhi are considered as being a kind of subtle material stuff, capable of being understood as quantities having definite quantitative measurements (parimāṇa)[23].

Ignorance (avidyā) is a negative substance (dravya), which by God’s will veils the natural intelligence of us all[24]. But there is no one common avidyā which appears in different individuals; the avidyā of one individual is altogether different from the avidyā of another individual. As such, it seems to denote our individual ignorance and not a generalized entity such as is found in most of the Indian systems; thus each person has a specific (prātisviki) avidyā of his own.

Time (kāla) is coexistent with all-pervading space (avyākṛta ākāśa), and it is made directly from prakṛti stuff having a more primeval existence than any of the derived kinds[25]. It exists in itself (sva-gata) and is, like space, the vehicle (ādhāra) of everything else, and it is also the common cause of the production of all objects.

Darkness (andhakāra) is also considered as a separate substance and not as mere negation of light. A new conception of pratibimba (“reflection”) is introduced to denote the jīvas, who cannot have any existence apart from the existence of God and who cannot behave in any way independent of His will, and, being conscious entities, having wilL and feeling, are essentially similar to him; though reflections, they are not destructible like ordinary reflections in mirrors, but are eternal (pratibimbas tu bimbāvinābhūta-sat-sadrśaḥ)[26].

The system of Madhva admits the qualities (guṇa) more or less in the same way as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does; the points of difference are hardly ever of any philosophical importance. Those which deserve to be mentioned will be referred to in the succeeding sections.

Footnotes and references:


In the Tattva-saṃkhyāna (p. 10) it is said that reality (tattva) is twofold, independent (svatantra) and dependent (asvatantra), and elsewhere in the Bhāṣya it is said that there are four categories (padārtha), viz., God, prakṛti, soul (jīva) and matter (jaḍa):

iśvaraḥ prakṛtir jīvo jaḍaṃ ceti catuṣṭayaṃ
padārthānāṃ sannidhānāt tatreśo viṣṇurucyate.

But the present division of Madhva’s philosophy, as admitting of ten categories, is made in view of similar kinds of division and classification used by the Vaiśeṣika and others.


There is another definition of dravya, when it is defined as the object of a competitive race in the second canto of Bhāgavata-tātparya, also referred to in the Madhva-siddhānta-sāra. Thus it is said:

dravyaṃ tu dravaṇa-prāpyaṃ dvayor vivadamānayoḥ pūrvaṃ vegābhisambandhādākāśas tu, pradeśataḥ.

But this does not seem to have been further elaborated. It is hardly justifiable to seek any philosophical sense in this fanciful etymological meaning.


The syncretistic Vaiśeṣika view, that action is of five kinds, is described here; for it is held that the Vaiśeṣika view that by simple rectilineal motion (gamana), circular motion (bhramaṇa) or other kinds of motion could be got, is strongly objected to, because circular motion is not a species of rectilinear motion; and hence the Vaiśeṣika classification of karma into five classes is also held to be inadequate.


sṛṣṭi-kāle sṛṣṭi-kriyā vyakty-ātmanā vartate, anyadā tu śakty-ātmanā, evaṃ saṃhāra-kriyāpi.
p. 4.


anugata-dharmaṃ vināpi sādṛśyena sarvatra vyāpty-ādi-graha-sambhavāt, ayaṃ dhūmaḥ etat-sadṛśaś ca vahni-vyāpya ity evaṃ-krameṇa vyāpti-grahah,

“even without the basis of the existence of identical characteristics, comprehension of vyāpti is possible on the basis of similarity, e.g., ‘This is smoke and entities similar to these are associated with fire, etc.’”

Madhva-siddhānta-sāra, p. 6.


itara-nirūpaṇādhīna-nirūpaṇakatvam upadhi-lakṣaṇam
and anya-nirupaṇā-dhīna-nirūpaṇatvaṃ jātitvam.
p. 7.


eka-nirūpitāparādhikaraṇa-vṛttitvena tri-vikrama-nyāyena tat-svīkārāt, pratiyogitvānuyogitvādivat.
. p. 6.


ato gaganādi-vibhu-dravyasya ghaṭādinā saṃyoga-tadabhāvobhaya-nirvāhako viśeṣo’nanya-gatyā svīkaraṇīyaḥ.
p. 9.


anyāpekṣayā paramāṇutve’pi svāvayavāpekṣayā mahattvopapatteḥ:...kiṃ ca paramāṇor avayavānaṅgīkāre tasya daśadikṣv abhisaṃbandho na syāt.
p. 10.


asmad-viśiṣṭānāṃ yogināṃ nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātmasu ca anya-nimittāsaṃbhavād yebhyo nimittebhyaḥ pratyādhāraṃ vilakṣaṇo’yaṃ vilakṣaṇo’yam iti pratyaya-vyāvṛittiḥ, deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānaṃ ca bhavati te antyā viśeṣāḥ.
pp. 321-2.


viśiṣṭaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-tatsambandhātiriktam avaśyam aṅgīkartavyam.
p. 11.


bhedas tu sarva-vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ naijam avyayam.
p. 20.


Jaya-tīrtha, however, in his Nyāya-sudhā, I. 4. 6 (adhikaraṇa, p. 222), holds that differences (whether in eternal or in non-eternal things) are always eternal:

na ca kadāpi padārthānām anyonya-tādātmyam asti iti anityānām api bhedo nitya eva ity āhuḥ.

Padmanābha-tīrtha also in his San-nyāya-ratnāvalī or Anuvyākhyāna holds exactly the same view on the same topic (I. 4. 6):

vināśino’pi ghaṭāder dharma-rūpo bhedaḥ para-vādy-abhyupagataghaṭatvādi-jātivan nityo’bhyupagantavyaḥ.


bhūtākāśātiriktāyā deśa-kāla-paricchinnāyās tārkikādy-abhimata-diśā evā-smākam avyākṛtākāśatvāt.
II. 3. 1 (p. 932).
      Also Nyāya-sudhā, II. 3. 1.


sākṣāt paramparayā vā viśvopādānaṃ prakṛtiḥ.


Nyāya-sudhā and San-nyāya-ratnāvali on the Anuvyākhyāna, II. 1. 6 (p. 21).


Bhāgavata-tātparya, III. 10. 9 (p. 29).


Madhva-siddhānta-sāra, p. 36


Bhāgavata-tātparya, III. 14, by Madhvācārya. In this passage the original sattva is spoken of as being the deity Śrī, the original rajas as Bhū, and the original tamas as Durgā, and the deity which has for her root all the three is called Mahā-lakṣmī. The Lord Janārdana is beyond the guṇas and their roots.


There seems to be a divergence of opinion regardingthe place of the evolution of buddhi-tattva. The view just given is found in the Tattva-saṃkhyāna (p. 41):

asaṃsṛṣṭam mahān ahaṃ buddhir manaḥ khāni daśa mātra-bhūtāni pañca ca,

and supported in its commentary by Satyadharma Yatī. This is also in consonance with Katha, I. 3. 10. But in the passage quoted from Madhva’s Bhāṣya in the Madhva-siddhānta-sāra it is said that the vijñāna-tattva (probably the same as buddhi-tattva) arises from the mahat-tattva, that from it again there is manas, and from manas the senses, etc.:

vijñāna-tattvaṃ mahataḥ samutpannaṃ caturmukhāt,
vijñāna-tattvāc ca mono manās-tattvācca khādikam.

The way in which Padmanābha Sūri tries to solve the difficulty in his Padārtha-saṃgraha is that the buddhi-tattva springs directly from the mahat-tattva, but that it grows in association with taijasa ahaṃkāra (taijasāhaṃkāreṇa upacita). This explains the precedence of aharnkāra as given in the Tattva-saṃkhyāna. Buddhi, of course, is of two kinds, as knowledge (jñāna-rūpa) and as category (tattva).


yat-prasādād avidyādi sphuraty eva divā-niśam tam apy
apahnute’vidyā nājñānasyāsti duṣkaram.
p. 312.

As this work also notices, there are in Śaṅkara Vedānta four views on the status of sākṣī. Thus the Tattva-śuddhi holds that it is the light of Brahman, appearing as if it were in th e jīva; the Tattva-pradīpikā holds that it is Īśvara manifesting Himself in all individual souls; the Vedānta-kaumudī holds that it is but a form of Īśvara, a neutral entity which remains the same in all operations of the jīva and is of direct and immediate perception, but is also the nescience (avidyā) which veils it. The Kūṭastha-dīpa considers it to be an unchangeable light of pure intelligence in jīva, which remains the same under all conditions and is hence called sākṣī.


yat kvacid vyabhicāri syāt darśanaṃ mānasaṃ hi tat. Anuvyākhyana.
evaṃ sa ḍevaḍatto gauro na vā paramāṇuḥ gurutvāḍhikaraṇam na vā iti saṃśayo mānasaḥ.
Maḍhva-siḍḍhānta-sāra, p. 44.


Manu-bṛhaspaty-āḍayas tu ahaṃkārāt parimāṇato hīnena buḍdki-tattvena svocita-parimāṇena parimita-ḍeśa-paryantam avasthitam viṣṇuṃ paśyanti soma-sūryaṃ tu buddhi-tattvāt parimāṇato hīnena manas-tatvena parimita-ḍeśa-paryantaṃ avasthitam viṣṇuṃ paśyataḥ varuṇādayas tu ākāśa-vāyv-āḍi-bhūtaiḥ krameṇa parimāṇato daśāhīnaiḥ parimita-deśa-paryantam avasthitaṃ viṣṇuṃ yogyatānusāreṇa paśyanti.
and Maḍhva-sidḍhānta-sāra, p. 49.


ataḥ parameśvara eva sattvāḍi-guṇamay-āvidyāvirodhitvena avidyayā svādhīnayā prakṛtyā acintyādbhutayā svaśaktyā jīvasya sva-prakāśam api svarūpa-caitanyam apy ācchādayati.
on the topic of jijñāsā.


The objection that, if time is made out of prakṛti stuff, from whence would mahat, etc., be evolved, is not valid; for it is only from some parts of prakṛti that time is evolved, while it is from other parts that the categories are evolved:

sarvatra vyāptānām katipaya-prakṛti-sūkṣmāṇāṃ kālopādānatvam, katipayānāṃ mahad-āḍy-upāḍānatvaṃ katipayānāṃ ca mūla-rūpeṇa avasthānam.
p. 64.


Padārtha-saṃgraha, 193.

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: