Part 5 - Madhva’s interpretation of important topics of the Brahma-sūtras

On the topic (adhikaraṇa) contained in sūtras 5-11 Śaṅkara suggests the following argument against the supposed Sāṃkhya claim that the ultimate causality is attributed in the Upaniṣads to prakṛti and not to Brahman: he says that prakṛti is foreign to the Upaniṣads; for they speak of perceiving (īkṣater nāśabdam)^[1], and perceiving can only be true of an intelligent agent. Brahman being all-revealing eternal intelligence, omniscience and perceiving (īkṣati) can very well be attributed to it. The word “perceiving” (īkṣati) of the text cannot be otherwise explained; for its reference to an intelligent agent is further emphasized by its being called ātman (self), a word whose application to conscious agents is well known^[2]; and we are certain that the word ātman cannot mean prakṛti ; for the instruction of liberation is given to it^[3]. Moreover, the whole chapter ends in the same vein, and there is no further correction of the sense in which the ātman, etc., have been used, as might have been the case, if this ātman had been rejected later on as bearing a meaning irrelevant to the teaching of release^[4]. Moreover, the cause referred to in the above passages is also spoken of in the same textual connection as being the last place of dissolution, to which everything returns^[5]. Moreover, there is in all Vedānta texts^[6] a complete agreement in regard to such an interpretation, and there are also explicit statements of the Upaniṣads (śrutatvāc ca Brahma-sūtra, I. 1. 11), which declare an Īśvara to be the ultimate cause of the world^[7]. So according to Śaṅkara the purport of this topic is that according to these sūtras Brahman is the ultimate cause and not prakṛti.

Madhva and his followers do not find any reference to a refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but a simple assertion of the fact that Brahman is not undescribed by the śāstras, because they themselves enjoin that He should be perceived^[8]. Unless Brahman could be described by the śāstras, there would be no meaning in their reference to the possibility of discussing it. This refers to the highest soul, Brahman, and not only to the lower and qualified soul, because it is said that liberation depends on it, and it is also said that the final return of all things in the great dissolution takes place in it; the nirguṇa Brahman is also definitely described in the Upaniṣad texts.

On the sixth topic (sūtras 12-19) Śaṅkara tries to prove, by a comparison of the several passages from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and the supposed objections from the other Upaniṣads, that the word “blissful,” ānandamaya (in Taittirīya, II. 5) refers to the supreme soul or Brahman; Madhva and his followers contend that the word ānandamaya refers to Viṣṇu and to him alone, and not to any other deity. All the other sūtras of this adhikaraṇa are explained as giving contextual references and reasons in support of this interpretation^[9].

On the seventh topic (sūtras 20, 21) Śaṅkara discusses the meaning of a passage (Chāndogya, 1. 6. 6, 7, 8), and comes to the conclusion that the person referred to as being in the orb of the sun and the eye is supreme Brahman. But Madhva refers to a quite different passage and quite a different relation of contexts; and he holds that the indwelling person referred to in that passage is Nārāyaṇa, the supreme lord^[10].

On the eighth topic (sūtra 22) Śaṅkara discusses Chāndogya, I. 9. 1, and concludes that the word ākāśa there does not mean elemental ākāśa, but supreme Brahman. Madhva also takes the same passage as being indicated by the sūtra and comes to the same conclusion; but with him supreme Brahman always means Viṣṇu.

On the ninth topic (sūtra 23) Śaṅkara discusses Chāndogya, I. 11. 4, 5, and concludes that the word prāṇa there is used to denote Brahman and not the ordinary prāṇa, which is a modification of vāyu. Madhva, however, comes to the same conclusion with reference to the use of the word prāṇa in another passage of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka^[11].

On the tenth topic (sūtras 24-27) Śaṅkara discusses Chāndogya, III. 13.7, and concludes that the word jyotiḥ there means Brahman and not ordinary light. Madhva does not discuss this topic in the Anuvyākhyāna ; in his Bhāṣya he comes to the same conclusion, but with reference to a quite different text. The 25th sūtra, which according to Śaṅkara belongs to the tenth topic, is considered by Madhva as forming a separate topic, where the word chandas, meaning gāyattrī (Chāndogya, III. 12. 1, gāyattrī vā idaṃ sarvaṃ bhūtam, “gāyattrī is all this”), means Viṣṇu and not the metre of that name or the combination of letters forming that metre.

The next and last topic of the first chapter of the first book (sūtras 28-31) is explained by Śaṅkara as referring to the Kauśītaki passage III. 1. 2, 3, where the word prāṇa is said by him to refer to Brahman, and not to any air current. Madhva, however, takes this topic in reference to a number of other passages occurring in the Aitareya, where the word prāṇa occurs, and holds that textual comparisons show that the word in those passages refers to Viṣṇu and not to ordinary air currents, or souls, etc.

The second chapter of the first book has altogether seven topics or subjects of discussion according to both Saṅkara and Madhva.

On the first topic Madhva, referring to certain Vedic passages, seeks to establish that they refer to Nārāyaṇa as the culmination of the fullness of all qualities^[12]. Though He is capable of rousing all the powers of all objects even from a distance, yet He in a sportive way (līlayā) is present everywhere and presides over the budding energies of all objects. It is further pointed out that the succeeding passages distinguish the all-pervading Brahman from jīvas, or souls, by putting the former in the accusative and the latter in the nominative case in such a way that there ought not to be any doubt that the references to the qualities of all-pervadingness, etc., are to Brahman and not to the jīvas^[13]. Śaṅkara, however, refers to an altogether different text (Chāndogya, III. 14. 1) as hinted at by the topic and concludes, after a discussion of textual comparisons, that the passage alludes to Īśvara and not to jīva.

On the second topic Madhva raises with reference to Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, I. 2. 5, the doubt whether the “eats” (atti) refers to the destructive agency of Viṣṇu or of Aditi, and decides in favour of the former, and states that Viṣṇu is also often called by the name Aditi^[14]. Śaṅkara, however , holds that the topic relates to Katha, I. 2. 24, and concludes that the “eater” there alluded to is Īśvara and not jīva or agni^[15].

The third topic relates according to both Madhva and Śaṅkara to Kaṭha, I. 3. 1, and the dual agents alluded to there are according to Madhva two forms of Īśvara, while according to Śaṅkara they are jīva and Īśvara. Madhva wishes to lay stress on what he thinks the most important point in relation to this topic, viz., that brahma and jīva are, upon the cumulative evidence of the Upaniṣad texts, entirely distinct^[16].

On the fourth topic Madhva alludes to a passage in Chāndogya, iv. 15, where a doubt seems to arise about the identity of the person who is there alluded to as being seen in the eye, i.e., whether this person is fire (agni) or Viṣṇu, and Madhva concludes on textual grounds that it is Viṣṇu^[17]. Śaṅkara also alludes to the same passage here; he comes to a similar conclusion, and holds that the person referred to is Īśvara.

The fifth topic is said, according to both Śaṅkara and Madhva, to allude to Bṛhadāraṇyaka, III. 7. 1. 2, where an inner controller (antar-yāmin) of the world is referred to, and it is concluded that this inner controller is Viṣṇu (Īśvara according to Śaṅkara) or jīva. One of the sūtras of this topic (śarīraś-cobhaye’pi hi bhedenainam adhīyate) points out clearly that in both recensions of the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, III. 7. 22 (the Kaṇvas and the Mādhyandinas), the soul (śārīra) is distinctly said to be different from the inner controller. Śaṅkara could not ignore this; but he, of course, thinks that the difference is due to the fact that the jīva is limited by the limitation of ajñāna, as the unlimited ākāśa is by a jug (ghaṭākāśavad upādhi-paricchinnatvāt). Vyāsa-tīrtha, in his Tātparya-candrikā, makes this an occasion for a severe criticism of the adherents of the theory of Advaita Vedānta. He says that, if, in spite of such manifest declarations of duality, these sūtras are otherwise explained, then even the Buddhists may be considered to be making a right interpretation of the sūtras, if they explain their purport to be the unreality of everything except th eśūnya (“the Void”). The Buddhists make their opposition from outside the Vedas, but the holders of the māyā doctrine do it from within the Vedas and are therefore the more dangerous^[18].

The sixth topic is said to relate to the Muṇḍaka, I. 1. 6 (according to both Madhva and Śaṅkara), and it is held by both that bhūta-yoni there and akṣara in Muṇḍaka, I. 1.7, refer to Viṣṇu (Īśvara according to Śaṅkara) and not to prakṛti or jīva. In sūtra 26 (rūpopanyāsāc ca) of this topic Śaṅkara first tries to refute a previous interpretation of it, attributed to Vrttikāra, who is supposed to hold here (on the ground of the contents of the Muṇḍaka passages (II. 1. 4) immediately following it) the view that Īśvara has for His self the entire changing universe (sarva-vikārātmakaṃ rūpaṃ upanyasyamānaṃ paśyāmaḥ). With reference to sūtra 21 of this topic, Vyāsatīrtha points out in his Tātparya-candrikā that, in opposing the supposition that, since only inanimate things can be the cause of other immediate things, it is only prakṛti that can be the cause of this immediate world; Vācaspati points out that in the occurrence of illusions through illusory superimpositions without real change (vivarta) there is no condition that there should be any similarity between the basis of illusion (adhiṣṭhāna) and the illusion imposed (āropya) on it. There is nothing to prevent illusions taking place through the perceiver’s mental deficiencies, his ignorance or passions, without any similarity.

The world is an illusory imposition on Brahman, the pure and unchangeable:

vivartas tu prapañco’yam brahmano pariṇāmiṇaḥ
anādi-sādhanodbhūto na sārūpyam apekṣate.

Vyāsa-tīrtha, of course, cannot agree to this interpretation of Śaṅkara, and tries to argue on the basis of other Upaniṣad texts, and also on the analogy of creation given there as of a spider (and not of the rope-snake, as would be the case with vivaria), that it should be admitted that the qualified Viṣṇu is referred to here^[19].

The seventh topic is said to relate to Chāndogya, V. 11, and the doubt arises whether the word Vaiśvānara used there refers to fire or to Viṣṇu; Madhva, upon a comparison of contextual passages, decides in favour of the latter (Śaṅkara prefers Īśvara)^[20].

The first topic of the third chapter of the first book is said to allude to Muṇḍaka, II. 11. 5, and it is held by Madhva that the “abode of Heaven and earth” (dyu-bhv-ādy-āyatana) refers to Viṣṇu and not to Rudra. Śaṅkara holds that it signifies Īśvara and not prakṛti, vāyu or jīva^[21].

The second topic is said to relate to certain passages in the Chāndogya (such as VII. 23, 24, VII. 15, 1, etc.), where prāṇa is described as great, and the conclusions of Madhva and Śaṅkara respectively are that prāṇa here means Viṣṇu and Īśvara.

The third topic is said to relate to Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, III. 8, 7, 8, where the word akṣara is said to mean Viṣṇu according to Madhva and Brahman according to Śaṅkara, not “alphabetic sign,” which also is ordinarily meant by that word.

The fourth topic alludes, according to Madhva, to Chāndogya, VI. 2. 1, and it is held that the word sat, there used, denotes Viṣṇu and not prakṛti, as the word aikṣata (“perceived”) occurs in the same context. With Śaṅkara the topic alludes to Praśna, V. 2, 5. This is opposed by Vyāsa-tīrtha in his Tātparya-candrikā on textual grounds^[22].

The fifth topic is said to allude to Chāndogya, VIII. 1. 1, and the word ākāśa there used is said to refer to Viṣṇu^[23].

The sixth topic is said to relate to the Muṇḍaka, and the light there alluded to is said to be the light of brahman and not some other light or soul.

The seventh topic is said to allude to Katha, II. 4. 13, and Madhva holds that the word “Lord” (Īśvara), there used, signifies not air, but Viṣṇu. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that the difficulty is with regard to another word of the sentence, viz., puruṣa, which according to him means Īśvara and not jīva.

The eighth topic purports to establish that even the gods are entitled to higher knowledge.

The tenth topic is said to allude to Katha, II. 6. 2, and it is held that the prāṇa, which is there referred to as shaking the world, is neither thunder nor wind, but God.

The eleventh topic, according to Madhva, alludes to Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, IV. 3. 7, and it is held that the word jyotih used there refers to Viṣṇu and not to Jīva. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that the topic alludes to Chāndogya, VIII. 12. 3, and maintains that the word jyotih used there means Brahman and not the disc of the Sun.

The twelfth topic is said to allude to Chāndogya, VIII. 14. 1, and ākāśa, as there used, is said to refer to Viṣṇu according to Madhva and to Brahman according to Śaṅkara.

The thirteenth topic, according to Madhva, alludes to Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, IV. 3. 15, and it is held that asaṅga (“untouched”) in this passage refers to Viṣṇu and not to Jīva. Śaṅkara, however, thinks that the allusion is to Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, IV. 3.7, and that vijñānamaya (“of the nature of consciousness”) refers to Brahman and not to Jīva.

The fourth chapter of the first book is divided into seven topics.

Of these the first topic discusses the possible meaning of avyakta in Kaṭha, I. 3. 11, and Śaṅkara holds that it means “human body,” while Madhva says that it means Viṣṇu and not the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya^[24].

The second topic, containing three sūtras, is supposed to allude to Śvetāśvatara, IV. 5, according to Śaṅkara, who holds that it refers to the material principles of fire, water and earth and not to prakṛti^[25]; according to Madhva it is more an extension of the previous topic for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that, like many other words (camasa, etc.), avyakta here means Viṣṇu and not prakṛti.

With Madhva, however, the second topic begins with sūtra I. 4. 9, and not with I. 4. 8 as with Śaṅkara. With Madhva the second topic is restricted to I. 4. 9 and I. 4. 10, and it alludes to a passage beginning vasante vasante jyotiṣā yaja, which is regarded by others as alluding to the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice; Madhva holds that the word jyotiṣ here used does not refer to the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, but to Viṣṇu.

The third topic with both Madhva and Śaṅkara consists of sūtras 12, 13 and 14, and they both allude here to the same passage, viz., Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, IV. 4. 17; Śaṅkara thinks that it refers to the five vāyus, not to the twenty-five categories of the Sāṃkhya, but Madhva holds that it refers to Viṣṇu. He has been called “five” (pañca-janāḥ), possibly on account of the existence of five important qualities, such as of seeing (cakṣuṣṭva), of life (prāṇatva), etc.

The fourth topic according to Śaṅkara conveys the view that, though there are many apparently contradictory statements in the Upaniṣads, there is no dispute or contradiction regarding the nature of the creator. Madhva, however, holds that the topic purports to establish that all the names, such as ākāśa, vāyu, etc., of things from which creation is said to have been made, refer to Viṣṇu. Madhva contends that the purport of the Samanvaya-sūtra (I. 1. 4) is that all words in the Upaniṣads refer to Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone, and it is in accordance with such a contention that these words (ākāśa, etc.), which seem to have a different meaning, should prove to refer to Viṣṇu and Viṣṇu alone. These proofs are, of course, almost always of a textual character. Thus, in support of this contention Madhva here quotes Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, III. 7. 12, etc.

The fifth topic, consisting of I. 4. 16 (I. 4. 15 according to Śaṅkara), 23 (I. 4. 24 according to Śaṅkara) according to Madhva, is to the effect that there is no difficulty in the fact that words which in the Upaniṣads are intended to mean Viṣṇu are seen to have in ordinary linguistic usage quite different meanings. Śaṅkara, however, counts the topic from I. 4. 15-18 and holds that it alludes to Kauśītaki Brāhmaṇa, IV. 19, and that the being who is there sought to be known is not Jīva, but Īśvara; this is opposed by Vyāsa Yati in his Tātparya-candrikā on grounds of sūtra context, which according to him does not justify a reference to the meanings of passages after the concluding remarks made shortly before in this very chapter^[26].

The sixth topic, consisting with Śaṅkara of I. 4. 19-22, alludes to Bṛhād-āraṇyaka, iv. 5. 6 and concludes that ātman there refers to Brahman and not to jīva enduring the cycles of saṃsāra. Madhva, however, thinks that the sixth topic (I. 4. 24-28) concludes after textual discussions that even those words, such as prakṛti, etc., which are of the feminine gender, denote Viṣṇu; for, since out of Viṣṇu everything is produced, there cannot be any objection to words of feminine gender being applied to him.

With Śaṅkara, however, the seventh topic begins with I. 4. 23-27 (Śaṅkara’s numbering), and in this he tries to prove that Brahman is not only the instrumental cause, but also the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the world. To this the obvious Madhva objections are that, if the material cause and the instrumental cause of the universe could be identical, that could also have been the case with regard to a jug; one could assume that the potter and the mud are identical. Stray objections are also taken against the Bhāmatī, which supposes that material cause here means “the basis of illusion” (bhramā-dhiṣṭhāna).

Śaṅkara, however, has an eighth topic, consisting of only the last sūtra of I. 4, which corresponds to the seventh topic of Madhva. Madhva holds that the import of this topic is that such words as asat (“non-existent”) or śūnya also denote Viṣṇu, since it is by His will that non-existence or even the hare’s horn is what it is.

Śaṅkara, however, holds that the topic means that so far the attempts at refutation were directed against the Sāṃkhya doctrine only, because this had some resemblance to the Vedānta doctrines, in that it agreed that cause and effect were identical and also in that it was partly accepted by some lawgivers, for instance Devala and others—while the other philosophical doctrines such as the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, etc., which are very remote from the Vedānta, do not require any refutation at all.

The first chapter of the second book contains thirteen topics. The whole chapter is devoted to refuting all objections from the point of view of the accepted works of other schools of thinkers.

Madhva holds that the first topic is intended to refute the objections of other schools of believers, such as the Pāśupata, etc., who deny that Viṣṇu is the ultimate cause of the world^[27]. But these views have no validity, since these teachings are not in consonance with the teaching of the Vedas; all such doctrines are devoid of validity. The Vedas are not found to lend any support to the traditional canonical writings (smṛti) known as the Pañcarātra or to those of the Pāśupatas or of the Yoga, except in certain parts only.

Śaṅkara, however, takes this topic as refuting the opinion that the Vedic texts are to be explained in consonance with the Sāṃkhya views on the ground that the Sāṃkhya represents some traditional canonical writings deserving of our respect; if models of interpretation were taken from the Sāṃkhya, that would come into conflict with other canonical writings such as Manu, the Gītā, etc., which deserve even greater respect than the Sāṃkhya. That the Sāṃkhya is entitled to respect is due to the fact that it is said to represent Kapila’s view; but there is no proof that this Kapila is the great sage praised in the Upaniṣads; and, if this is not so, the Sāṃkhya’s claim to respect vanishes.

The second topic of Madhva (third of Śaṅkara) is supposed by him to import that no one could, on account of the unfruitfulness of certain Vedic sacrifices in certain cases, doubt the validity of the Vedas, as one could the validity of the Pāśupata texts; for the Vedas are eternal and uncreated and, as such, are different from other texts. The authority of the Vedas has to be accepted on their own account and is independent of reference to any other text^[28]. If under the circumstances, in spite of the proper performance of any sacrifice, the desired results are not seen to follow, that must be explained as being due to some defects in the performance^[29].

The main points of the third topic of Śaṅkara (sūtras 4-12) are as follows: It may be objected that the unconscious and impure world could not have been produced from the pure Brahman of the pure intelligence, and that this difference of the world as impure is also accepted in the Vedas; but this is not a valid objection; for the Upaniṣads admit that even inanimate objects like fire, earth, etc., are presided over by conscious agents or deities; and such examples as the production of hair, nails, etc., from conscious agents and of living insects from inanimate cow-dung, etc., show that it is not impossible that the unconscious world should be produced from Brahman, particularly when that is so stated in the Upaniṣads. There cannot be objection that this would damage the doctrine of coexistence or pre-existence of effects (sat-kārya-vāda); for the reality of the world, both in the present state and even before its production, consists of nothing but its nature as Brahman. In the state of dissolution everything returns to Brahman, and at each creation it all joins the world cycle, except the emancipated ones, as in the awakened state after dreams; and such returns of the world into Brahman cannot make the latter impure, just as a magician is not affected by his magic creations or just as the earth-forms of jug, etc., cannot affect their material, earth, when they are reduced thereto. Moreover, such objections would apply also to the objectors, the Sāṃkhyas. But, since these difficult problems which cannot be settled by experience cannot be solved by inference— for, however strongly any inference is based, a clever logician may still find fault with it—we have to depend here entirely on Vedic texts.

The third topic of Madhva (sūtras 6, 7) is supposed to raise the objection that the Vedas are not trustworthy, because they make impossible statements, e.g., that the earth spoke (mṛd abravīt); the objection is refuted by the answer that references to such conscious actions are with regard to their presiding deities (abhimāni-devatā).

The fourth topic of Madhva (sūtras 8-13) is intended to refute other supposed impossible assertions of the Vedas, such as that concerning the production from non-existence (asat); it is held that, if it is urged as an answer that there may be some kind of nonexistence from which on the strength of Vedic assertions production is possible (though it is well-known that production is impossible from all kinds of non-existence, e.g., a hare’s horn), yet in that case the state of dissolution (pralaya) would be a state of absolute nonexistence (sarvā sattva), and that is impossible, since all productions are known to proceed from previous states of existence and all destructions must end in some residue^[30]. The answer given to these objections is that these questions cannot be decided merely by argument, which can be utilized to justify all sorts of conclusions.

Śaṅkara’s fourth topic consists of only the twelfth sūtra, which says that the objections of other schools of thought which are not generally accepted may similarly be disregarded.

The fifth topic of Śaṅkara (sūtra II. 1. 13) is supposed by him to signify that the objection that the enjover and the enjoyable cannot be identified, and that therefore in a similar way Brahman cannot be considered as the material cause of the world, cannot hold, since, in spite of identity, there may still be apparent differences due to certain supposed limitations, just as, in spite of the identity of the sea and the waves, there are points of view from which they may be considered different.

According to Madhva, however, this topic means that those texts which speak of the union of jīva with Brahman are to be understood after the analogy of ordinary mixing of water with water; here, though the water is indistinguishably mixed, in the sense that the two cannot be separated, still the two have not become one, since there has been an excess in quantity at least. By this it is suggested that, though the jīva may be inseparably lost in Brahman, yet there must be at least some difference between them, such that there cannot be anything like perfect union of the one with the other^[31].

The sixth topic, consisting of the same sūtras in Śaṅkara and Madhva (sūtras 14-20), is supposed by Śaṅkara to affirm the identity of cause and effect, Brahman and the world, and to hold that the apparent differences are positively disproved bv scriptural texts and arguments. Śaṅkara holds that Chāndogya, VI. 1. 1, definitely asserts the identity of Brahman with the world after the analogy of clay, which alone is considered to be real in all its modifications as jug, etc. So Brahman (like clay) alone is real and the world is considered to be its product (like jug, etc.). There are many Upaniṣad texts which reprove those who affirm the many as real. But this again contradicts ordinary experience, and the only compromise possible is that the many of the world have existence only so long as they appear, but, when once the Brahma-knowledge is attained, this unreal appearance vanishes like dream-experiences on awaking. But even from this unreal experience of the world and from the scriptures true Brahma-knowledge can be attained; for even through unreal fears real death might occur. The practical world (vyāvahārika) of ordinary experience exists only so long as the identity of the self with Brahman is not realized; but, once this is done, the unreal appearance of the world vanishes. The identity of cause and effect is also seen from the fact that it is only when the material cause (e.g. clay) exists that the effect (e.g. ghata) exists, and the effects also ultimately return to the cause. Various other reasons are also adduced in II. 1. 18 in favour of the sat-kārya-vāda.

Madhva, however, takes the topic in quite a different way. Brahman creates the world by Himself, without any help from independent instruments or other accessories; for all the accessories and instruments are dependent upon Him for their power. Arguing against Śaṅkara’s interpretation, Vyāsa-tīrtha says that the unreal world cannot be identified with Brahman (anṛtasya viśvasya satya-brahmābhedāyogāt). Moreover, abheda cannot be taken in the sense in which the Bhāmatī takes it, namely, as meaning not “identity”, but simply “want of difference”; for want of difference and identity are the same thing (bhedābhāve abhedadhranūyāt). Moreover, if there is no difference (bheda), then one cannot be called true and the other false (bhedābhāve satyānṛta-vyavasthāyogāc ca). The better course therefore is to admit both difference and nondifference. It cannot be said that ananyatva (“no-other-ness”) is the same as imposition on Brahman (brahmaṇy āropitatvam). What Vyāsa-tīrtha wants to convey by all this is that, even if the Upaniṣads proclaim the identity of Brahman and the world, not only does such an identity go against Śaṅkara’s accepted thesis that the world is unreal and untrue and hence cannot be identified with Brahman, but his explanation that “identity” means illusory imposition (āropa) is unacceptable, since no one thinks the conch-shell to be identical with its illusory imposed silver. There are no grounds for holding that knowledge of the basis should necessarily involve knowledge of the imposed, and so the former cannot be considered as the essence of the latter; and the knowledge of earth does not remove the knowledge of jug, etc., nor does knowledge of earth imply knowledge of its form as jug^[32].

Jaya-tīrtha in his Nyāya-sudhā on this topic formulates the causal doctrine of the Madhva school as being bhedābheda theory, which means that effect is in some ways identical with cause and in other ways different. Thus it opposes both the extremes—the complete difference of cause and effect as in Nyāya, and their complete identity as in Śaṅkara or the Sāṃkhya. He argues that, if the effect were already existing identical with the cause, then that also would be existent previously in its cause, and so on till the original root cause is reached. Now, since the root cause is never produced or destroyed, there could be no production or destruction of ordinary things, such as cloth, jug, etc., and there could be no difference between eternal entities, such as soul, etc., and non-eternal entities, such as jug, etc., and causal operations also would be useless. Moreover, if the effect (e.g., cloth) is previously existent in the cause (e.g., threads), it ought to be perceptible; if the existence of anything which is in no way perceptible has to be accepted, then even the existence of a hare’s horn has to be admitted. If the effect (e.g., cloth) were already existent, then it could not be produced now; the effect, again, is largely different from the cause; for, even when the effect is destroyed, the cause remains; the causes are many, the effect is one; and the utility, appearance, etc., of them both also widely vary. It is urged sometimes that production of the effect means its manifestation (vyakti) and its destruction means cessation of manifestation (1 avyakti). This manifestation and non-manifestation would then mean perception (upalabdhi) and non-perception (anupalabdhi). That would mean that whatever is perceived at a particular time is produced at that time. If the effect were previously existent, why was it not perceived at that time? In case everything must exist, if it is to appear as produced, then it may be asked whether the manifestation (abhivyakti) was also existent before the appearance of the effect; if so, then it ought to have been visible at the time; if the manifestation also requires another manifestation and that another, then there is infinite regress. The point of view of causal conception accepted by Jaya-tīrtha is that, if the cause of production exists, there is production, and if sufficient cause of destruction exists, there is destruction. A hare’s horn is not produced, because there is not a sufficient cause for its production, and ātman is not destroyed, because there is not a sufficient cause for its destruction^[33].

The seventh topic with Śaṅkara (sūtras 21-23) is said to answer the objection that, if Brahman and jīva are identical, then it is curious that Brahman should make Himself subject to old age, death, etc., or imprison Himself in the prison-house of this body, by pointing out that the creator and the individual souls are not one and the same, since the latter represent only conditional existence, due to ignorance; so the same Brahman has two different forms of existence, as Brahman and as jīva.

According to Madhva the topic is intended to introduce a discussion in favour of Īśvara being the creator, as against the view that individuals themselves are the creators. According to him this topic consists of sūtras 21-26; with Śaṅkara, however, of sūtras 24 and 25, which according to him mean that, on account of the existence of diverse powers, it is possible that from one Brahman there should be the diversified creation.

Again, sūtras 26-28 form according to Śaṅkara the ninth topic, which purports to establish that it is possible that the world should be produced from the bodiless Brahman.

The eighth topic begins with Madhva from the 28th sūtra, as counted by him, and extends to the 32nd. According to Madhva the object of this topic is to refute the arguments urged against the all-creatorship of Viṣṇu. Thus it refutes the objections that, if Brahman worked without any instrument, His whole being might be involved even in creating a single straw, etc. Everything is possible in God, who possesses diverse kinds of power.

According to Śaṅkara sūtras 30, 31, forming the tenth topic, maintain that Brahman possesses all powers and can perform everything without the aid of any sense organs. Sūtras 33 and 34 (32 and 33 of Śaṅkara’s counting) form a new topic, which maintains that, though all His wishes are always fulfilled, yet He creates this world only in play for the good of all beings. The same is also here the purport of Śaṅkara’s interpretation of this topic.

The tenth topic, consisting of sūtras 34-36, is said to maintain that the rewards and punishments bestowed by God upon human beings are regulated by Him in accordance with the virtuous and sinful deeds performed by them, and that He does so out of His own sweet will to keep Himself firm in His principle of justice, and therefore He cannot be said to be in any way controlled in His actions by the karma of human beings, nor can He be accused of partiality or cruelty to anyone. The same is also the purport of Śaṅkara’s interpretation of this topic. The chapter ends with the affirmation that the fact of Viṣṇu’s being the fullness of all good qualities (sadā-prāpta-sarva-sad-guṇam) is absolutely unimpeachable.

In the second chapter of the second book, which is devoted to the refutation of the views of other systems of Indian thought, Madhva and Śaṅkara are largely in agreement. It is only in connexion with the twelfth topic, which Śaṅkara interprets as a refutation of the views of the Bhāgavata school, that there is any real divergence of opinion. For Madhva and his followers try to justify the authority of the Pañcarātra and interpret the topic accordingly, while Śaṅkara interprets it as a refutation of the Bhāgavata school.

The third chapter of the second book begins with a topic introducing a discussion of the possibility of the production of ākāśa, since two opposite sets of Upaniṣad texts are available on the subject. Madhva’s followers distinguish two kinds of ākāśa, ākāśa as pure vacuity and ākāśa as element; according to them it is only the latter that is referred to in the Upaniṣad texts as being produced, while the former is described as eternal.

The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth topics relate to the production of air, the being (sat) or Brahman, fire and earth, and it is held that Brahman alone is originless and that everything else has come out of Him. These topics are almost the same in Śaṅkara and Madhva.

The seventh topic maintains according to Madhva that Viṣṇu is not only the creator, but also the destroyer of the world. According to Śaṅkara, however, this topic asserts that the successive production of the elements from one another is due not to their own productive power, but to the productive power of God Himself.

The eighth topic holds that the destruction of elements takes place in an order inverse to that in which they were produced. Madhva accepts the same meaning of the topic.

The ninth topic, according to Madhva, discusses whether it is true that all cases of destruction must be in inverse order to their production, and it is decided in the affirmative; the objection that, since vijñāna is produced from manas and yet the latter is destroyed first, tlfese two must be considered as exceptions, is not correct, since in reality vijñāna is not produced out of manas. Manas has two senses, as “category” and as “inner organ” (antaḥkaraṇa), and the word vijñāna also means “category” and “understanding” (avabodha). Where vijñāna is said to rise from manas, it is used only in a general way, in the sense of understanding as arising from grasping (ālocana); Śaṅkara, however, interprets this topic as consisting only of the 16th sūtra (while Madhva takes the 15th and 16th sūtras from this topic), asserting that the production of the sense faculties does not disturb the order of the production of the elements.

The tenth topic of Madhva, the 17th sūtra, is supposed to hold that there cannot be any destruction of Viṣṇu. With Śaṅkara this topic, the 16th sūtra, is said to hold that birth and death can be spoken of only with regard to body and not with regard to the soul.

The eleventh topic (the 17th sūtra with Śaṅkara) means that the birth oijīva is true only in a special sense, since in reality jīva has neither birth nor death.

The eleventh topic, consisting of the 18th and 19th sūtras, gives according to Madhva the view that the individual souls have all been produced from God.

According to Madhva the twelfth topic (sūtras 20-27) deals with the measure of jīvas. The topic gives, according to him, the view that th e jīva is atomic in size and not all-pervading. Being in one place, it can vitalize the whole body, just as a lamp can illuminate a room by its light, which is a quality of the lamp; for a substance may be pervading by virtue of its quality^[34].

The thirteenth topic (27th sūtra), according to Madhva, is supposed to affirm the plurality of souls.

The fourteenth topic (sūtras 28, 29) demonstrates that Brahman and jīva are different. The fifteenth topiG- of Madhva shows that, though the souls are produced from God, yet they are not destructible. The souls are like reflections from the Brahman, and they therefore must persist as long as the Brahman remains and must therefore be eternal. The conditions (upādhi) through which these reflections are possible are twofold, external (bāhya) and essential (svarūpa). The external condition is destroyed, but not the essential one^[35]. The souls are thus at once one with the Brahman and different; they depend on God for their existence and are similar to Him in nature.

The sixteenth topic seeks to establish the nature of souls as consciousness and pure bliss, which are however revealed in their fullness only in the state of emancipation by the grace of God, while in our ordinary states these are veiled, as it were by ignorance (avidyā)^[36].

The seventeenth topic seeks to reconcile the freedom of action of the jīva with the ultimate agency of God. It is God who makes the jīvas work in accordance with their past karmas, which are beginningless (anādi). Thus, though God makes all  jīvas perform all their works, He is guided in His directorship by their previous karmas.

The eighteenth topic seeks to establish that, though the jīvas are parts of God, they are not parts in the same sense as the part-incarnations, the fish-incarnation, etc., are; for the latter are parts of essential nature (svarūpāṃśa), whereas the former are not parts of an essential nature (jīvānām asvarūpāṃśatvam); for, though parts, they are different from God.

The nineteenth topic asserts that the jīvas are but reflections of God. With Śaṅkara, however, these sūtras yield quite different interpretations. Thus the twelfth topic (sūtra 18) is supposed to assert that even in deep sleep there is consciousness, and the circumstance that nothing is known in this state is due to the fact that there is no object of which there could be any knowledge (viṣayābhāvād iyam acetayamānatā na caitanyābhāvāt).

The thirteenth topic (sūtras 1932) discusses upon his view the question whether, in accordance with the texts which speak of the going out of self, the self should be regarded as atomic, or whether it should be regarded as all-pervasive; and he decides in favour of the latter, because of its being identical with Brahman.

The fourteenth topic (sūtras 33-39), after considering the possible agency of mind, senses, etc., denies them and decides in favour of the agency of soul, and holds that the buddhi and the senses are only instruments and accessories.

Yet in the fifteenth topic (sūtra 40) Śaṅkara tries to establish this agency of the self, not as real, but as illusory in presence of the conditions of the sense-organs, intellect, etc. (upādhi-dharmā-dhyāsenaiva ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṃ na svābhāvikam).

Upon the sixteenth topic (sūtras 41-42) Śaṅkara tries to establish the fact that God helps persons to perform their actions in accordance with their previous karma.

The seventeenth topic (sūtras 43-53) is interpreted by Śaṅkara as stating the view that the difference between the selves themselves and between them and Brahman can be understood only by a reference to the analogy of reflection, spatial limitations or the like; for in reality they are one, and it is only through the presence of the limiting conditions that they appear to be different.

In the fourth chapter of the first book the first topic of both Śaṅkara and Madhva describes the origin of the prāṇas from Brahman^[37].

The second topic of Madhva, containing the 3rd sūtra of Śaṅkara’s reading, describes the origin of manas from Brahman.

The 4th sūtra, forming the third topic of Madhva, holds the view that speech (vāk) also is produced from Brahman, though we sometimes hear it spoken of as eternal, when it is applied to the Vedas.

The 5th and the 6th sūtras, forming the fourth topic, discuss the purports of various texts regarding the number of the prāṇas, and hold the view that they are twelve in number.

The fifth topic of Madhva, consisting of the 7th sūtra, states the view that the prāṇas are atomic by nature and not all-pervasive, and that hence there cannot be any objection to the idea of their being produced from Brahman.

The sūtras 8 and 9, forming the sixth topic, show the production of prāṇas from Brahman.

The sūtras 10 and 11, forming the seventh topic, show that even the principal (mukhya) prāṇa is dependent on Brahman for its production and existence.

In the eighth topic, consisting of the 12th sūtra, it is held that the modifications (vṛtti) of the principal prāṇa are like servants, so their functions are also in reality derived from Brahman. The ninth topic, consisting of the 13th sūtra, repeats textual proofs of the atomic character of prāṇa.

The tenth topic, consisting of sūtras 14-16 , states the view that the senses are instruments of Brahman, though in a remote way they may also be regarded as instruments of the jīva.

The eleventh topic, consisting of the 17th to the 19th sūtras, states the view that all the other twelve prāṇas, excepting the thirteenth or the principal (mukhya) prāṇa, are so many senses. The difference between these and the principal prāṇa consists in this, that the work of these other prāṇas, though depending principally on Brahman, also depends on the effort of jīva (iśvara-paravaśā hi indriyāṇāṃ pravṛttir jīva-prayatnāpekṣaiva), but the functioning of the mukhya prāṇa does not in any way depend on the individual souls (mukhyaprāṇasya pravṛttir na puruṣa-prayatnāpekṣayā).

The twelfth topic (20th sūtra) shows that all our bodies also are derived from Brahman.

The last topic (21st sūtra) instils the view that our bodies are made up not of one element, but of five elements. According to Śaṅkara, however, the chapter is to be divided into nine topics, of which the first has already been described.

The second topic (sūtras 5-6) holds the view that there are eleven senses, and not seven only as some hold, after the analogy of seven prāṇas.

The third topic (7th sūtra) states that the senses are not all-pervasive, as the adherents of Sāṃkhya hold, but are atomic by nature.

The fourth topic (8th sūtra) states that the mukhya prāṇa is a modification of Brahman, like any other prāṇa.

The fifth topic (sūtras 9-12) states that prāṇa is not simply vāyu, but a subjective modification of it in the fivefold form, and its general function cannot be properly explained by reference to the individual actions of the separate prāṇas, like the movement of a cage by a concerted effort of each one of the birds encaged therein; for the actions of the prāṇas do not seem to be in any way concerted. As there are five states of mind, desire, imagination, etc., so the five prāṇas are but modifications of the principal prāṇa.

The sixth topic (13th sūtra) states that this principal prāṇa is atomic by nature.

The seventh topic (sūtras 14-16) states that the prāṇas in their functioning are presided over by certain deities for their movement and yet these can only be for the enjoyment of the jīvas.

The eighth topic (sūtras 17-19) states that the senses (conative and cognitive) are different categories (tattvāntara) from the principal prāṇa.

The ninth topic (sūtras 20-22) states that the jīva is not the creator, who is Īśvara.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The Upaniṣad passage referred to is tad aikṣata bahu syām, etc. Chāndogya, VI. 2. 3.

[2]:

gauṇaś cet nātma-śabdāt, Brahma-sūtra, I. 1. 6; see also anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya (Chāndogya, VI. 3. 2).

[3]:

tan-niṣṭhasya mokṣopadeśāt. Ibid. I. 1.7; also text referred to. Chāndogya, VI. 14. 2.

[4]:

[5]:

svāpyayāt, ibid. I. 1. 9; also Chāndogya, VI. 8. 1.

[6]:

gati-sāmānyāt. Ibid. I. 1. 10.

[7]:

Śvetāśvatara, VI. 9.

[8]:

Brahma-sūtra, I. 1. 5. This is quite a different interpretation of the rule and surely not less cogent. The objection raised against Śaṅkara’s interpretation is that his reference to the Sāṃkhya as being foreign to the Vedas (aśabda) is not accepted by the adherents of the Sāṃkhya, and there are certainly passages in the Upaniṣads (e.g. Śvet. iv. 51) which have to be taken as distinct references to the Sāṃkhya. Moreover, if Brahman could not be grasped and described by any of the pramāṇas, there would be hardly any proof of its existence; it would be like the hare’s horn.

[9]:

The Nyāya-sudhā points out that Śaṅkara’s commentary is based on an untenable hypothesis that two kinds of Brahman are referred to in the Upaniṣads, Brahman as under the cover of avidyā, and as pure Brahman. Of the Upani§ad passages (those which refer to the former), some are said to be for purposes of worship and consequent material advantage (upāsanāni abhyudayārthāni), some for attaining gradually the progressive stages towards liberation (krama-mukty-arthāni), etc. Jayatīrtha says that this theory is wholly wrong, since it is quite unwarrantable to hold that Brahman is of two kinds (brahmaṇo dvairūpyasya aprāmāṇikatvāt); for all the Vedānta texts refer to Nārāyaṇa, the repository of all qualities, but some describe him as being endowed with omniscience, omnipotence, all-controlling power, beauty, etc., some with the negative qualities of being devoid of sin, sorrow, ordinary elemental bodies (prākṛta-bhāntikara-vigraha-rahitatva), and others describe Him as unspeakable and beyond speech and thought (to show His deep and mysterious character); others again leave out all the qualities and describe Him as the one, and yet others as the soul of all (sarvātmaka) ; but these are all but different descriptions of the supreme person Viṣṇu (parama-puruṣa), and do not in any way refer to two different kinds of Brahman.

It is only through a misconception (that Brahman has only a unitary nature) that these have been so interpreted by Śaṅkara, who had no previous teachers who knew the Vedas to guide him

(tato vyākula-buddhayo guru-sampradāya-vikalā aśruta-veda-vyākhyātāraḥ sarvatrāpi veda-rūpatām anusanda-dhānā vedaṃ chindanti). Nyāya-sudhā, p. 124.

[10]:

According to Madhva doubt occurs in regard to the following passage of the Taittirīya, whether the word antaḥ-praviṣṭa in it refers to the supreme self or to some other being:

antaḥ-praviṣṭaṃ kartāram etam atitaś candramasi manasā carantaṃ sahaiva santaṃ na vijānanti devāḥ.
      Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, ill. 11. 5.

[11]:

tad vai tvaṃ prāṇo’ bhavaḥ; mahān bhagati; prajāpateḥ; bhujaḥ kariṣya-māṇaḥ; yaddevān prāṇayanneveti.
      Ibid.

[12]:

Aitareya-Āraṇyaka, III. 2. 3.

[13]:

Ibid.

[14]:

Some interesting points on this topic are here noted by Jaya-tīrtha in his Nyāya-sudhā on the Anuvyākhyāna. Thus Jaya-tīrtha says that an objection may be made that God, being the producer and the destroyer of the universe, is consequently eternal, but actions (kriyā) are non-eternal: and how then can the two contradictory qualities reside in God (nityānityayoḥ katham abhedah syāt)? The answer to the objection is that even actions in God are static (na kevalam īśvaraḥ sthiraḥ api tu sa tadīya-viśeṣa-dharmo’pi kṛyā-rūpaḥ sthiraḥ); and this is not impossible, since there is no proof that all actions must be of a vibratory (pariṣpanda) nature (which may not exist in God). Again, there can be no objection to admitting vibrations to be eternally existing in God.

As motion or action can as a result of continuous existence for many moments produce contacts and so forth, so eternally existing motion or action could produce contacts and separations at particular moments

(yathā aneka-kāla-vartiny api kriyā kadācit saṃyogādi ārabhate na yāvat sattvam, tathā nityāpi kadācit saṃyogādy ārabhatāṃ ko virodhaḥ).

All actions exist eternally in God in potential form as śakti, and it is only when this is actualized (vyakti) that real transformations of energy and performance of work happen (śakti-rūpeṇa sthiraḥ sa yadā vyajyate, tadā vyavahārālambanam); actuality is but a condition or special state of potential power (vyakti-śabdena śakter eva avasthāviśeṣasya vivakṣitatvāt). In this connection Java-tīrtha also indulges in a long argument and discussion to prove that karma or actions are directly perceived and not merely inferred (pratyakṣāśritaṃ karma praty-akṣam eva).

[15]:

The Tātparya-candrikā objects to Śaṅkara’s interpretation, pointing out that the word carācara in the sūtra is not mentioned in the text referred to, and the word odana in the text ought to mean destruction (saṃhārya). Madhva quotes the Skanda and Brahma-vaivarta purāṇas in support of his view.

[16]:

Madhva quotes in support of his view Brahma-purāṇa, Paiṅgi-śruti, Bhāllaveya-śruti, etc. Śaṅkara, however, seems to be fighting with an opponent (ākṣeptṛ) who held that the dual agents alluded to in the passage cannot be either buddhi and jīva or Jīva and Īśvara.

[17]:

Jaya-tīrtha, in his Nyāya-sudhā on this topic, points out that the quality that we possess of being controlled by God and the necessity that He should always remain as the controller have also been so ordained by God.

[18]:

advaitibhir vyākriyate kathaṃ vā dvaitadūṣaṇaṃ sūtrayatāṃ savsiddhānta-tyāgaṃ vinaiva tu yadi mithyārthavādīni sūtraṇītyeva kartavyaṃ, sūtra-vyākhyā tarhi veda-bādhya-mithyātva-bodhako bauddhāgamo’pi vedasya vyākḥyā-rūpaḥ prasajyate, bauddho’pi brahma-sūtraṃ vyākhyāyate yathā tathā bhavamiva mithyaiṣo’rthaḥ kiṃtu tattvaṃ śūnyameveti kīrttayet, asad-vetyādivcanaṃ tasya syāt tattva-vedakaṃ. svoktaṃ śrutibhiḥ sutre yatnena sādhitaṃ mithyārthatāṃ kathaṃ brūyāt sūtrāṇāṃ bhāṣyakṛt svyaṃ. saugatā veda-bāhyā hi vedāprāmāṇya-vādinaḥ, avaidikā iti jñātvā vaidikaiḥ parivarjitāḥ. vedān praviśya vedānām aprāmāṇyaṃ prasādhayan māyī tu yatnatas tyajyaḥ.

[19]:

Jaya-tīrtha discusses on this topic, in accordance with the discussions of the Anuvyākhyāna, the reality of negative qualifications, and argues that negation, as otherness from, has a full substantive force. Thus such qualifications of Brahman as adṛśya, etc., are real qualities of Him.

[20]:

With reference to rule 26 of this topic (I. 2. 26) Śaṅkara notes a different reading (puruṣavidham api cainam adblyate) for that which he accepts (puruṣam api cainam adhīyate). The former, however, is the reading accepted by Madhva.

[21]:

In the concluding portions of the first rule of this topic Śaṅkara refers to the views of some other interpreter as apara aha. It is hard to identify him; no clue is given by any of the commentators on Śaṅkara.

[22]:

Tātparya-candrikā, pp. 610-12. In the first rule of this topic Śaṅkara quotes the view of some other interpreter, which he tries to refute.

[23]:

In sūtra 19 of this topic a different interpretation of Chāndogya, VIII. 11, by some other interpreter is referred to by Śaṅkara. He also refers in this sūtra to more than one interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra.

[24]:

The word avyakta, ordinarily used to denote prakṛti on account of its subtleness of nature, can very aptly be used to denote Brahman, who is the subtlest of all and who by virtue of that subtlety is the ultimate support (āśraya) of prakṛti. Śaṅkara’s interpretation of avyakta as the subtle material causes of the body is untenable; for, if the direct meaning of avyakta is forsaken, then there is nothing to object to in its referring to the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya. The supposed Sāṃkhya argument—that the assertion contained in the passage under discussion (that avyakta is superior (parā) to mahat and puruṣa is superior to avyakta) can be true only if by avyakta prakṛti is meant here—is not true; for since all qualities of prakṛti are dependent on God, attributes which could be applied to prakṛti could also be applied to God its master

(pradhānādigata-parāvaratvādi-dharmāṇāṃ bhagavad-adhīnatvāt). Tāttva-prakāśikā, p. 67.

In this topic the sūtra, vadatīti cen na prājño hi prakaraṇāt (I. 4. 5), as read by Śaṅkara, is split up by Madhva into two sūtras, vadatīti cen na prājño hi and prakaraṇāt, which are counted as I. 4. 5 and I. 4. 6 respectively.

[25]:

ajam ekam lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇam, etc.
      Śvetāśvatara, iv. 5.

[26]:

Tātparya-candrikā, p. 821. Other objections also are made to Śaṅkara’s interpretation of this topic.

[27]:

According to Madhva the topic consists of the first three sūtras, while Śaṅkara has one topic for the first two sūtras and another for the third sūtra (etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ), and the latter merely asserts that the arguments given in the first topic against the Sāṃkhya refute the Yoga also.

[28]:

Madhva mentions here the following text as being alone self-valid, quoting it from the Bhaviṣyat-purāṇa in his Bhāṣya (II. 1. 5).

ṛg-yajuṣ-sāmātharvāś ca mūla-rāmāyaṇaṃ tathā
bhārataṃ pañca-rātraṃ ca veda ity eva śabditaḥ
purāṇāni ca yānīha vaiṣṇavā nivido, viduḥ
svataḥ-prāmāṇyam eteṣāṃ nātra kiṃcid vicāryate.

[29]:

There is not only a discrepancy in the division of topics, and the order of sūtras, between Madhva and Śaṅkara, but also addition of a new sūtra in Madhva’s reading of the text of the Brahma-sūtras. Thus the second topic with Madhva consists of the fourth and the fifth sūtras only, and the third topic of the sixth and the seventh sūtras. But the fifth sūtra is the sixth in the Śaṅkara’s text and the sixth of Madhva is the fifth of Śaṅkara. The seventh sūtra of Madhva is altogether absent in Śaṅkara’s text. The third topic of Śaṅkara consists of sūtras 4-11. But the topics of Madhva are as follows: second topic, sūtras 4, 5; third topic, sūtras 5, 6, 7; fourth topic, sūtras 8—13, the thirteenth being the twelfth of Śaṅkara’s text. Śaṅkara has for his fourth topic this sūtra alone.

[30]:

sata utpattiḥ saśeṣa-vināśaś ca hi loke dṛṣṭaḥ.
      Madhva-bhāṣya, II. 1. 10.

[31]:

It is pointed out by Vyāsa-tīrtha that Śaṅkara’s interpretation is wrong, both with regard to the supposed opponent’s view (pūrva-pakṣa) and as regards the answer (siddhānta). The illustration of the sea and the waves and foam (phena-taraṅga-nyāya) is hardly allowable on the vivarta view. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 872.

[32]:

mṛt-tattva-jñāne’pi tat-saṃsthāna-viśeṣatva-rūpa-ghaṭatvā-jñānena ghaṭas tattvato na jñāta iti vyavahārāt. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 879.

[33]:

yasya ca vināśa-kāraṇaṃ vidyate tat sad api nirudhyate, na ca khara-viṣāṇa-janmani ātmavināśe vā kāraṇam asti iti tayor janana-vināśābhāvaḥ.
      Nyāya-sudhā, p. 302.

[34]:

A discussion is raised here by Jaya-tīrtha regarding the nature of light, and it is held that light is of the nature of a quality and not a substance.

[35]:

jīvopādhir dvidhā proktaḥ svarūpaṃ bāhya eva ca,
bāhyopādhir layaṃ yāti muktāv anyasya tu sthitiḥ.
      Tattva-prakāśikā, p. 119.

[36]:

evaṃ jīva-svarūpatvena mukteḥ pūrvam apt sato jñānānanden īśvara-prasādenābhivyakti-nimittena ānandī bhavati; prāg anabhivyaktatvena anubhavā-bhāva-prasaṅgāt.
      Ibid. p. 120.

[37]:

This topic consists according to Śaṅkara of only four sūtras, and according to Madhva of the first three sūtras. Of these the third sūtra (pratijñānuparodhāc ca) happens to be absent in Śaṅkara’s reading of the Brahma-sūtras.