A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 3

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1940 | 232,512 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of shaila shrinivasa: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the twenty-first part in the series called the “philosophy of the ramanuja school of thought”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Śaila Śrīnivāsa was the disciple of Kauṇḍinya Śrīnivāsa Dīkṣita, the son of Śrīnivāsa Tātācārya, and the brother of Anvayārya Dīkṣita. He was very much influenced by the writings of his elder brother Anvayārya and some of his works are but elaborations of the works of his elder brother who wrote many books, e.g. Virodha-bhaṅjanī, etc. Śaila Śrīnivāsa wrote at least six books:

  1. Virodha-nirodha,
  2. Bheda-darpaṇa,
  3. Advaita-vana-kuthāra,
  4. Sāra-darpaṇa,
  5. Mukti-darpaṇa,
  6. Jñāna-ratna-darpaṇa,
  7. Guṇa-darpaṇa,
  8. and Bheda-maṇi.

In his Virodha-nirodha, probably the last of his works, he tries mainly to explain away the criticisms that are made on the different Rāmānuja doctrines by the Śaṅkarites, and also by the writers of other Vedāntic schools—viz. that the Rāmānuja views are not strictly faithful to the scriptural texts—by showing that the scriptural texts favour the Rāmānuja interpretations and not the views of the other Vedāntic writers.

In the first chapter of the Virodha-nirodha Śaila Śrīnivāsa first takes up the view that the Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world—which he thinks is possible only in the conception that Brahman has the individual souls and the matter-stuff associated with Him (brahmaṇi cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-rūpatām antoreṇa na ghatate). The Brahman remains unchanged in itself but suffers transformations through its two parts, the soul and the matter-stuff. Brahman as cause is associated with souls and the matter-stuff in their subtle forms, and when it undergoes transformation the souls expand and broaden as it were through the various intellectual states as a result of their karma, and the matter-stuff passes through its grosser stages as the visible material world; the portion of God as the inner controller of these two suffers transformation only so far as it is possible through its association with these two transforming entities[1]. When the scriptural texts deny the changing character of the Brahman, all that is meant by them is that it does not undergo the changes through which matter and individual souls pass through their karma, but that does not deny the fact that Brahman is the material cause[2].

Brahman has two parts, a substantive and a qualifying part, and it is the substantive part that through its subtle material parts becomes the transforming cause of the grosser qualifying material part. This material part being inseparable from Brahman may be regarded as subsisting in it. So also the Brahman has a spiritual part which undergoes a sort of expansion through thought-experiences and behaves as individual souls. Thus Brahman suffers modification through its physical and spiritual parts, and from this point of view God is subject to development through its two parts and through their association independently as their inner controller. Unlike Veṅkaṭa, Śaila Śrīnivāsa holds that this causal transformation is like the Sāṃkhyist causal transformation[3]; vikāra or change here means change of states.

Brahman thus suffers change directly in the spiritual and the intellectual part and indirectly as their inner controller, though in itself it suffers no change. To the objection that if matter and spirit are regarded as suffering transformation there is no meaning in attributing causality to Brahman as qualified by them, the reply is that the causality of Brahman is admitted on the strength of scriptural testimony. So far as Brahman remains as the inner controller and does not suffer any change in itself, it is regarded as the efficient cause[4].

In the second chapter Śaila Śrīnivāsa replies to the criticisms against the Rāmānuja doctrine of soul, and says that the contraction and expansion of soul due to ignorance and increase of knowledge does not imply that it is non-eternal, for non-eternality or de-structibility can be affirmed only of those who undergo accretion or decrease of parts (avayavo-pacayā-pacayayor eva anityatva-vyā-pyatayā). Knowledge is partless and so there is no contraction or expansion of it in any real sense. What are called contraction and expansion consist in reality of its absence of relationship with objects due to the effects of karma or the natural extension of relations with objects like the ray of a lamp; karma is thus regarded as the upādhi (limiting condition) which limits the natural flow of knowledge to its objects and is figuratively described as contraction. It is on account of this nature of knowledge that unless obstructed by karma it can grasp all sensations of pain and pleasure spreading over all parts of the body, though it belongs to soul which is an atomic entity. So knowledge is all-pervading (vibhu)[5]. Knowledge also is eternal in its own nature though changeful so far as its states are concerned.

In the third chapter Śrīnivāsa deals with the question as to whether the souls are produced or eternal, and his conclusion is that in their own nature they are unproduced, but they are produced so far as their own specific data of knowledge are concerned[6]. The production of eternal knowledge is possible only so far as its contraction and expansion are concerned, which is due to the action of the body and other accessories. It is only in this sense that knowledge though eternal in itself can be said to be suffering production through its various kinds of manifestation (abhivyakti).

In the fourth chapter Śrīnivāsa discusses the same question in which the Upaniṣads urge that by the knowledge of one everything is known. He criticizes the Madhva and the Śaṅkarite views and holds that the knowledge of one means the knowledge of Brahman which, being always associated with the individual souls and matter, involves the knowledge of these two entities. His exposition in this subject is based throughout on the interpretations of scriptural texts.

In the fifth chapter Śrīnivāsa explains the same question in which the individual souls can be called agents (kartā). Agency (kartṛtva) consists in an effort that may lead to the production of any action (kāryā-nukūla kṛtimattvam). In the Rāmānuja view effort means a particular intellectual state and as such it may well belong to the soul, and so the effort that may lead to any action also belongs to the soul which, though eternal in itself, is changeful so far as its states are concerned[7]. The agency of the individual souls, however, is controlled by God, though the fruits of the action are enjoyed by the former, for the direction of God which determines the efforts of the individuals is in accordance with their actions. This virtually means an admixture of determinism and occasionalism.

In the seventh chapter Śrīnivāsa contends that though knowledge is universal it only manifests itself in accordance with the deeds of any particular person in association with his body, and so there is no possibility that it should have all kinds of sufferings and enjoyments and should not be limited to his own series of experiences. In the eighth and ninth chapters he tries to establish the view that during emancipation the individuals are cleanly purged of all their deeds, virtues and sins, but at this stage God may be pleased to endow them with extraordinary bodies for the enjoyment of various kinds of pleasures. In the remaining nineteen chapters Śaila Śrīnivāsa introduces some of the relatively unimportant theological doctrines of the Rāmānuja system and discusses them on the basis of scriptural texts which may very well be dropped for their insignificance as philosophical contribution.

In the Bheda-darpaṇa also Śaila Śrīnivāsa takes some of the important doctrines where the Rāmānujists and the Śaṅkarites part company, and tries to show by textual criticism that the Rāmānuja interpretation of the scriptural texts is the only correct interpretation[8]. The work, therefore, is absolutely worthless from a philosophical point of view. In most of his other works mentioned above, Śaila Śrīnivāsa prefers to discuss the doctrines of Rāmānuja philosophy in the same style of scriptural criticism, and any account of these is therefore of very little value to students of philosophy.

Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa, in his Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, discusses the nature of Brahma-causality. Brahman is both the instrumental (;nimitta) and the material (upādāna) cause of the world. Such a Brahman is the object of our meditation (dhyāna). An object of meditation must have knowledge and will. A mere qualityless entity cannot be the object of meditation. In order that Brahman may be properly meditated upon it is necessary that the nature of His causality should be properly ascertained. It is no use to attribute false qualities for the sake of meditation. If the world is an illusion, then the causality of Brahman is also illusory, and that would give us an insight into His real nature. If God is the real cause of the world, the world must also be real. It is sometimes said that the same entity cannot be both a material and instrumental cause (samavāya-samavāyi-bhinnaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimitta-kāraṇamiti). The material cause of the jar is earth, while the instrumental cause is the potter, the wheel, etc. To this the reply is that such an objection is groundless; for it is difficult to assert that that which is an instrumental cause cannot be a material cause, since the wheel of the potter, though an instrumental cause in itself, is also the material cause of its own form, colour, etc.

There is thus nothing which can lead us to suppose that the material cause and the instrumental cause cannot exist together in the same entity. It may further be contended that the same entity cannot behave as the material and instrumental cause with regard to the production of another entity. To this the reply is that the internal structure of rod is both the material cause for its form as well as the instrumental cause for its destruction in association with other entities. Or it may be contended that time (kāla) is the cause for both the production and destruction of entities (kāla-ghata-saṃyogā-dikaṃ prati kālasya mmittatvād upādānatvācca).

To this the obvious reply would be that the behaviour of the same entity as the material and the instrumental cause is limited by separate specific conditions in each case. The association of separate specific conditions renders a difference in the nature of the cause; and therefore it would be inexact to say that the same entity is both the material and the instrumental cause. This objection, however, produces more difficulty in the conception of the causality of Brahman according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory, for in our view Brahman in His own nature may be regarded as the instrumental cause and in His nature as matter (acit) and souls (cit). He may be regarded as the material cause[9]. It is sometimes objected that if Brahman as described in the texts is changeless, how can He be associated with changes as required by the conception of Him as the material and instrumental cause, which involves the view of associating Him with a body? Moreover, the association of body (śarīra) with God is neither an analogy nor an imagery.

The general conception of body involves the idea that an entity is called the body where it is only controlled by some spiritual substance[10]. To this the reply is that Brahman may Himself remain unchangeable and may yet be the cause of changes in His twofold body-substance. The objection is that the material world is so different from the bodies of animals that the conception of body cannot be directly applied to it. The reply is that even among animal bodies there is a large amount of diversity, e.g. the body of a man and the body of a microscopic insect. Under the circumstances we are to fall upon a general definition which would cover the concept of all bodies and ignore the individual differences. The definition given above suits the concept of bodies of all living beings and applies also to the concept of the world as the body of Brahman. This is also supported by the Śruti texts of the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa, where the world has been spoken of as the body of God. If there is an apparent difference in our conception of body as indicated in the definition as testified by the Vedic texts, with our ordinary perception of the world which does not reveal its nature as body, the testimony of the Vedic texts should prevail; for while our perception can be explained away as erroneous, a scientific definition and the testimony of texts cannot be dismissed.

Our ordinary perception is not always reliable. We perceive the moon like a small dish in size, whereas the scriptural testimony reveals its nature to us as much bigger. When there is a conflict between two sources of evidence, the decision is to be made in favour of one or the other by the canon of unconditionality (i ananyathā-siddhatva).

An evidence which is unconditional in its nature has to be relied upon, whereas that which is conditional has to be subordinated to it. It is in accordance with this that sometimes the Vedic texts have to be interpreted in such a manner that they may not contradict perceptual experience, whereas in other cases the evidence of perceptual experience has to be dismissed on the strength of scriptural testimony. It cannot also be said that the evidence of a later pramāṇa will have greater force, for there may be a series of errors, in which case there is no certitude in any of the later pramāṇas. Again, there is no force also in mere cumulation of evidence, for in the case of a blind man leading other blind men mere cumulation is no guarantee of certitude[11]. In the case of the conflict of pramāṇas, the dissolution of doubt and the attainment of certitude are achieved on the principle of unconditionality. That which is realized in an unconditional manner should be given precedence over what is realized only in a conditional manner[12].

Our powers of perception are limited by their own limitations and cannot therefore discern whether the world may after all be the body of the transcendent Brahman, and therefore it cannot successfully contradict the testimony of the Vedic texts which declare the world to be the body of God. The Vedic texts of pure monism are intended only to deny the duality of Brahman, but it can well be interpreted on the supposition of one Brahman as associated with his body, the world. The denial of dualism only means the denial of any other being like Brahman. Thus Brahman as cit and acit forms the material cause of the world, and Brahman as idea and will as affecting these is the instrumental cause of the world. The twofold causality of Brahman thus refers to twofold conditions as stated above which exist together in Brahman[13].

In the Vedāntic texts we have expressions in the ablative case indicating the fact that the world has proceeded out of Brahman as the material cause (upādāna). The ablative case always signifies the materiality of the cause and not its instrumentality[14]. But it also denotes that the effect comes out of the cause and it may be objected that the world, being always in Brahman and not outside Him, the ablative expressions of the Vedāntic texts cannot be justified. To this the reply is that the conception of material cause or the signification of the ablative cause does not necessarily mean that the effect should come out and be spatially or temporally differentiated from the cause. Even if this were its meaning, it may well be conceived that there are subtle parts in Brahman corresponding to cit and acit in their manifested forms, and it is from these that the world has evolved in its manifested form. Such an evolution does not mean that the effect should stand entirely outside the cause, for when the entire causal substance is transformed, the effect cannot be spatially outside the cause[15]. It is true that all material causes suffer a transformation; but in the Viśiṣṭādvaita view there is no difficulty, for it is held here that Brahman suffers this modification and controls it only so far as it has reference to his body, the cit and acit. God’s instrumentality is through His will, and will is but a form of knowledge.

In the Bheda-darpaṇa Śrīnivāsa tries to support all the principal contentions of the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory by a reference to Upaniṣadic and other scriptural texts. In his other works mentioned above the subjects that he takes up for discussion are almost the same as those treated in Virodha-nirodha, but the method of treatment is somewhat different; what is treated briefly in one book is elaborately discussed in another, just as the problem of causality is the main topic of discussion in Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, though it has been only slightly touched upon in Virodha-nirodha. His Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha is a brief summary in verse and prose of the contents of what the author wrote in his Naya-dyu-maṇi, a much bigger work to which constant references are made in the Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha.

Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa wrote also another work called Naya-dyu-maṇi-dipikā which is bigger than Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha. It is probably smaller than Naya-dyu-maṇi, which is referred to as a big work[16]. There is nothing particular to be noted which is of any philosophical importance in Naya-dyu-maṇi-dipikā or Naya-dyu-maṇi-saṃgraha. He generally clarifies the ideas which are already contained in the Śruta-prakāśikā of Sudarśana Sūri. He also wrote Oṃkāra-vādārtha, Anandatāra-tamya-khaṇḍana, Arunā-dhikaraṇa-saraṇi-vivaraṇi and Jijñāsā-darpaṇa. He lived probably in the fifteenth century.

Śrīnivāsa wrote first his Sāra-darpaṇa which was followed by Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, and Virodha-nirodha. In fact Virodha-nirodha was one of his last works, if not the last. In the first chapter of this work he deals with the same subject as he did in the Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, and tries to explain the nature of Brahman as the material and instrumental cause of the world. In the second chapter he tries to refute the objections against the view that the souls as associated with knowledge or rather as having their character interpreted as knowledge should be regarded as the means for God’s manifestation as the world. The objector says that thought is always moving, either expanding or contracting, and as such it cannot be the nature of self which is regarded as eternal.

In the case of the Jains the soul is regarded as contracting and expanding in accordance with the body that it occupies, and it may rightly be objected that in such a conception the soul has to be regarded as non-eternal. But in the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception it is only thought that is regarded as expanding or contracting. The expansion or contraction of thought means that it conceives greater or lesser things, and this is different from the idea of an entity that grows larger or smaller by the accretion or dissociation of parts. The expansion or contraction of thought is due to one’s karma and as such it cannot be regarded as non-eternal. Knowledge in its own nature is without parts and all-pervading; its contraction is due to the effect of one’s bad deeds which is often called māyā or avidyā[17].

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not regard knowledge as produced through the collocations of conditions as the Naiyāyikas think, but they regard it as eternal and yet behaving as occasional (āgantuka-dharmav-attvarri) or as being produced. Earth in its own nature is eternal, and remaining eternal in its own nature suffers transformation as a jug, etc. In this way the conception of the eternity of the soul is different from the conception of knowledge as eternal, for in the case of knowledge, while remaining all-pervasive in itself, it seems to suffer transformation by virtue of the hindrances that obstruct its nature in relation to objects[18].

Universal relationship is the essential nature of knowledge, but this nature may be obstructed by hindrances, in which case the sphere of relationship is narrowed, and it is this narrowing and expansive action of knowledge which is spoken of as transformation of knowledge or as the rise or cessation of knowledge. A distinction has thus to be made between knowledge as process and knowledge as essence. In its nature as essence it is the eternal self; in its nature as process, as memory, perception, thinking, etc., it is changing.

The Jaina objection on this point is that in the above view it is unnecessary to admit a special quality of ajñāna as the cause for this expansion or contraction of thought, for it may well be admitted that the soul itself undergoes such a transformation through the instrumentality of its deeds. To this the reply is that the Vedic texts always declare that the soul is in itself unchangeable, and if that is so the change has to be explained through the instrumentality of another factor, the ajñāna. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as the pure essence or nature of the soul and not as its dharma or character, and it is this character that is in itself universal and yet is observed to undergo change on account of obstructions. Thus, the soul in itself is eternal, though when looked at in association with its character as knowledge which is continually expanding or contracting it may seemingly appear to be non-eternal[19]. Thought in itself has no parts and therefore cannot itself be regarded as non-eternal. It is nothing but relationship, and as such the analogy of change which, in other objects, determines their non-eternity cannot apply to it.

Now there are different kinds of Upaniṣadic texts, from some of which it may appear that the soul is eternal, w hereas from others it may appear that the soul is created. How can this difficulty be avoided? On this point Śrīnivāsa says that the eternity and uncreated nature of the self is a correct assertion, for the soul as such is eternal and has never been created. In its own nature also the soul has thought associated with it as it were in a potential form. Such an unmanifested thought is non-existent. But knowledge in its growing richness of relations is an after-production, and it is from this point of view that the soul may be regarded as having been created. Even that which is eternal may be regarded as created with reference to any of its special characteristics or characters[20]. The whole idea, therefore, is that before the creative action of God the souls are only potentially conscious; their real conscious activity is only a result of later development in consequence of God’s creative action.

Again, the Upaniṣads assert that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else is known. Now according to the Śaṅkarite explanation the whole world is but a magical creation on Brahman which alone has real being. Under the circumstances it is impossible that by the knowledge of Brahman, the real, there would be the knowledge of all illusory and unreal creation, for these two, the reality and the appearance, are entirely different and therefore by the knowledge of one there cannot be the knowledge of the other. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita view it may be said that when God as associated with his subtle body, the subtle causal nature of the souls and the material world, is known the knowledge of God as associated with the grosser development of His body as souls and the world is also by that means realized[21].

In performing the actions it need not be supposed that the eternal soul undergoes any transformation, for the individual soul may remain identically unchanged in itself and yet undergo transformation so far as the process of its knowledge is concerned. In the Viśiṣṭādvaita view, will and desire are regarded as but modes of knowledge and as such the psychological transformations of the mind involved in the performance of actions have reference only to knowledge[22]. It has already been shown that possibly knowledge in its essential form is unchangeable and yet unchangeable so far as its nature as process is concerned. Such an activity and performance of actions belongs naturally to the individual souls.

The Virodha-nirodha is written in twenty-seven chapters, but most of these are devoted to the refutation of objections raised by opponents on questions of theological dogma which have no philosophical interest. These have therefore been left out in this book.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

acid-aṃśasya kāraṇā-vasthāyāṃ śabdā-di-vihīnasya bhogyatvāya iabdā-di-mattvayā svarūpū-nyathā-bhāva-rūpa-vikāro bhavati ubhaya-prakāra-viśiṣṭe niyantr-aṃie tad-avastha-tad-ubhaya-viśiṣṭatā-rūpa-vikāro bhavati.
     Virodha-nirodha.
MS.

[2]:

cid-acid-gata-karmā-dy-adhīna-vikāratvaṃ nirvikāratva-śrutir niṣedhati ity etādṛśaṃ jagad-upādānatvaṃ na sā śrutir bādhate.
     Ibid.

[3]:

viśiṣṭaṃ brahma kāraṇam ity uktaṃ tena kārvam api viśiṣṭaṃ eva tatra ca brahmaṇa upādānatvaṃ viśeṣaṇā-ṃśaṃ viśeṣyā-ṃśaṃ prati tatra cā'cid-aṃśaṃ prati yad-upādānatvaṃ tat sukṣmā-vasthā-cid-aṃśa-dvārakaṃ tatra tatra dvāra-bhūtā-cid-aṃśa-gata-svarūpā nyathā-bhāva-rūpa eve vikāraḥ sa ca apṛthak-siddha-vastu-gatatvāt brahma-gato’pt. . . evaṃ ca sāṃkhyā-bhimato-pādānatāyāḥ siddhānte'py anapāyāt na ko’pi virodhaḥ.
     Virodha-nirodha.
MS.

[4]:

tena tad eva advārakam nimittam-sad-vārakam upādānam.
     Ibid.

[5]:

Ibid.

[6]:

tatra niṣedhāḥ viyad-ādivat jīva-svarūpo-tpattiṃ pratiṣedhanti utpatti-vidhayaas tu svā-sādhāraṇa-dharma-bhūta-jñāna-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa utpattiṃ vadanti.
     Virodha-nirodha.
MS.

[7]:

prayatnā-der buddhi-viśeṣa-rūpatayā kāryā-nukūla-kṛtimattvasy'āpi kartṛ-tvasva jñāna-viśeṣa-rūpatayā tasya svābhā vikatayā tad-ātmanā jīvasya jnānasya nityatve pi tat-pariṇāma-viśeṣasya anityatvāt.
     Ibid.

[8]:

bhedā-bheda-śruti-vrāta-jāta-sandeha-santatāḥ
bheda-darpaṇam ādāya niścinvantu vipaścitaḥ.
     Bheda-darpaṇa.
MS.

[9]:

evaṃ hi brahmaṇy’api no’pādānatva-nimittatvayor virodhaḥ; tasya cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa upādānatvāt svarūpeṇa nimittatvāc ca. tat- tad-avacchedaka-bheda-prayukta-tad-bhedasya tasya tatrā’pi nispratyūhavtāt.
     Siddhānta-cintāmani.
MS.

[10]:

yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṃ sarvā-tmanā svārthe niyāmyam tat tasya śarīram.
     Ibid.

This subject has been dealt with elaborately in Śrī Śaila Śrīnivāsa’s Sāra-darpaṇa.

[11]:

na ca parati'ād uttareṇa purva-bādhaḥ iti yuktaṃ dhārā-vāhika-bhrama-sthale vyabhicārāt nta eva na bhūyastvam opi nirṇāyakaṃ śatā’ndha-nyāyena aprayojakatvāc ca.
     Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi.
MS.

[12]:

ananyathā-siddhatvam eva virodhy-aprāmāṇya-vyavasthā pakatā-vaccḥe-dakam iṣyate.
     Ibid.

[13]:

sarva-śarīra-bhūtā-vibhakta-nāma-rūpā-vasthā panna-cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa brahmaṇaḥ upādānatvam; tad-upayukta-saṃkalpā-di-viśiṣṭa-svarūpeṇa nimittatvam ca niṣpratyūham iti nimittatvo-pādānatvayor ihā’ py avacchedaka-bheda-prayukta-bhedasya durapahnavatvā ttayor ekāśraya-vṛttitvasya prāg upapādita-tvāt na brahmaṇo abhinna-nimitto-pādānatve kaś cid virodhaḥ.
     Siddhānta-cintāmaṇi.
MS.

[14]:

Such as yato vā imāni bhūtōni jāyante.

[15]:

upādānatva-sthale’pi na sarvatra loke'pi viśleṣah kṛtsna-pariṇāme tad a-sambhavāt kintv ekadeśa-pariṇāma eve'ti tad-abhiprāyakaṃ pratyākhyānam vācyam. tac ce’kā’ pi sambhavati. viśiṣṭai-kadeśa-pariṇāmā-ṅgīkārāt. ato na tad-virodpah; kiñca sūkṣma-cid-acid-viśiṣṭam upādānatvam iti vakṣyate tasmāc ca sthūlā-vasthasya viśleṣo yujyate viśleṣo hi na sarvā-tmanā kāraṇa-deśa-parityāgaḥ.
     Ibid.
MS.

[16]:

Unfortunately this Naya-dyu-maṇi was not available to the present writer.

[17]:

jñānasya svābhāvikam prasaraṇam aupaḍhikas tu samkocaḥ; upādhis tu prācīnaṃ karma eva. Virodha-nirodha, pp. 39, 40 (MS.).

[18]:

na hi yādṛśam ātmano nityatvam tādṛg jñānasyā'pi nityatvam abhyapugac-chāmaḥ karaṇa-vyāpāra-vaiyarthy  prasaṅgāt. kintu tārkikā’dy abhimataṃ jñānasya āgantuka-dharmatvaṃ ni ākartuṃ dṛśer iva svarūpato nityatvam āgantukā’-vasthā’-śrayatvaṃ ca; tena rūpeṇa nityatvaṃ tu ghaṭatvā’-dy-avasthā-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa mṛdāderiva iṣṭam eva.
     Ibid.
p. 44.

[19]:

nityā-nitya-vibhāqa-svarupa-dvārakatva-svabhāva-dvārakatvābhyāṃ vya-vasthita iti na kaś cid doṣaḥ.
     Virodha-nirodha.
MS.

[20]:

svā-sādhāraṇa-dharma-bhuta-jñāna-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa utpattiṃ vadanti sid-dhasya pi hi vastunaḥ dharmā-ntara-viśiṣṭa-veṣeṇa sādhyatā vrīhyā-dau drṣṭā.
     Ibid.

prāk ṣrṣṭer jīvānāṃ niṣkriyatvo-ktyā ca idam eva darśitarn.
     Ibid.

[21]:

sūkṣma-cid-acic-charīrake brahmaṇi jñāte sthūla-cid-acic-charīrakasya tasya jñānam atrā’ hhimatam.
     Virodha-nirodha.
MS.

[22]:

iha prayatnāder buddhi-viśeṣa-rūpatayā kāryā-nukūla-kṛtimattvasyā’pi kartṛtvasya jñāna-viśeṣa-rūpatayā tasya svābhāvikatayā tad-ātmanā jīvasya jñānasya nityatve’pi tat-pariṇāma-viśeṣasya amtyatvāc ca.
     Ibid.

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