A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of logical speculations and terms relating to academic dispute: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the thirteenth part in the series called the “speculations in the medical schools”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Part 13 - Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute

Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat), and they can be investigated by the four pramāṇas , viz.

  1. the testimony of trusty persons (āptopadeśa),
  2. perception (pratyakṣa),
  3. inference (anumāna)
  4. and the coming to a conclusion by a series of syllogisms of probability (yukti)[1].

Those whose minds are free from the impurities of rajas and tamas through the force of their ascetic endeavours, who possess unlimited knowledge extending through the past, present and future, are to be considered as trustworthy (āpta). Such persons neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as absolutely trusty (āpta), and their testimony may be regarded as true[2].

The valid and certain knowledge that arises as the result of the relation of self, senses, manas and sense-objects is called “perception.”

This contact of the sense with the object is regarded by Cakrapāṇi as being of five kinds, viz.

  1. contact with the dravya (substance), called samyoga ;
  2. contact with the guṇas (qualities) through the thing (saṃyukta-samavāya) in which they inhere by samavāya (inseparable) relation;
  3. contact with the guṇas (such as colour, etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (rūpatva), which exist in the guṇas in the samavāya relation; this is called saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya since the eye is in contact with the thing and the colour is in the thing by samavāya relation, and in the specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic character of colour by samavāya relation;
  4. the contact called samavāya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear: the auditory sense is ākāśa , and the sound exists in ākāśa by the samavāya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound by a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavāya ;
  5. the generic character of sound as the sound universal (śabdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavāya.

It is only immediately resulting (tadātve) cognition of such a contact that is called perception {pratyakṣa); for inference, memory, etc. also may come in as a result of such a cognition at later stages through other successive processes (pāraṃparya).. Cakrapāṇi further notes that the four kinds of contact spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of perception; in reality, however, “knowledge that results as the effect of sense-contact” would be a sufficient definition of pratyakṣa ; so in the perception of pleasure, though none of these contacts are necessary, it is regarded as a valid case of direct perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all kinds of cognition[3]. It is easy to see that the above theory of perception is of the same type as that found in the Nyāya system. The nir-vikalpa perception is not taken into consideration; for there is nothing corresponding to the term avyapadeśya in the Nyāya-sūtra[4]. Inference must be based on perception, by which the concomitance of the hetu can first be observed. Inference is of three kinds, viz. from kārya (effect) to kāraṇa (cause), as the inference of cohabitation from pregnancy; from cause to effect, as the inference of the future production of fruit from a seed with the other attendant causes, sprinkling with water and the like; and inference by associations other than that of cause and effect, as the inference of fire from smoke[5].

Yukti is not counted as a separate pramāṇa by any other system of Indian thought. When our intelligence judges a fact by a complex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations, through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called yukti[6]. As Cakrapāṇi points out, this is not in reality of the nature of a separate pramāṇa ; but, since it helps pramāṇas, it is counted as a pramāṇa . As an example of yukti , Caraka mentions the forecasting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrapāṇi rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as the combined application of a number of reasonings, is properly called ūha and is current among the people by this name. It is here counted as a separate pramāṇa. It is in reality an inference of an effect from causes and, as such, cannot be used at the present time, and hence it cannot be called tri-kāla, valid in all the three times, past, present and future, as Caraka says.

The Buddhist, writes Śāntarakṣita in discussing Caraka’s doctrine of yukti as a separate pramāṇa, holds that yukti consists in the observation that, since, when this happens, that happens, and, since, when this does not happen, that does not happen, this is the cause of that. It may be argued that this is not a case of inference, since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a dṛṣṭānta , or example, in Nyāya inference (e.g. whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen). It is held, as Kamalaśīla interprets, that the cause-effect idea is derived from the idea of “this happening, that happens,” and there is no other idea in the notion of causality; if in any case any particular example is given, then another example might be asked for, and after that another, and we should have regressus ad infinitum[7].

These arguments in support of yukti as the concluding of the cause-effect relation from “this happening, that happens” relation are refuted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who point out that there are no separate cognitive processes which link up the relation of “this happening, that happens” with the cause-effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause-effect relation is the same as “this happening, that happens.” It may be argued that, whenever anything invariably and unconditionally happens on the happening of any other thing, then the two are considered to be related as cause and effect, just as a jug, etc. are invariably seen to appear after the proper operations of the potter and his wheels. If this is yukti, then it is not a different source of knowledge.

Cakrapāṇi, however, points out that these criticisms are all beside the point, since yukti , according to Caraka, is not kārya-kāraṇatā from tad-bhāva-bhāvitā ; it is the arriving at a conclusion as a result of a series of reasonings. But it is important to note that in hi. 4. 6 and 7 Caraka speaks of three kinds of pramāṇas, viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda, and describes anumāna as being tarka depending on yukti. Tarka is explained by Cakrapāṇi as being the knowledge of things which cannot be perceived (tarkopratyakṣa-jñānam), and yukti is here paraphrased by Cakrapāṇi as the relation of a-vinū-bhāva. It is said in this connection that a disease is to be determined by pratyakṣa, the medical texts (āpto - padeśa) and inference. But in 111. 8. 6. 33 and 34 Caraka counts aitihya as āptopadeśa, though ordinarily aitihya is considered in Indian philosophy as being “tradition” or long-standing popular belief, different from āptopadeśa ; upamāna , under the name of aupamya, is also referred to.

It may not be out of place here to note that the obstacles to perception referred to in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā are all mentioned here. Thus it is said that even those things which have colour (rūpa) cannot be perceived if they are covered by a veil, or if the senses are weak, or if the mind is unsettled, or if they are mixed up in any homogeneous medium indistinguishable from them, or when in the case of smaller lights they are overcome by stronger luminaries, or when they are too fine or too subtle[8].

Logic was of use with Indian medical men not only in diagnosing a disease, but also in the debates which they had with one another. The rival practitioners often had to show their skill and learning in debates on occasions of the treatment of illness of rich patients. The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners. Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes, such as are never found in any other literature, excepting the Nyāyfi-sūtra. In the Caraka-saṃhitā almost the whole of the chapter called the “Roga-bhiṣag-jitīya-vimāna (ill. 8) is devoted to this purpose. It is well to remember that different kinds of disputes and fallacies are mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra, and it will be useful to refer to these when dealing with similar topics from either the Caraka-saṃhitā or the Suśruta-saṃhitā.

The four terms referred to in connection with disputes in the Nyāya-sūtra are tarka, vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Tarka is said to be the same as ūha, and this is explained as a process of reasoning carried on in one’s mind before one can come to any right conclusion. It is a name for the subjective weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt before a conclusive affirmation or denial (nirṇaya) is made.

Disputes are said to be of three kinds,

  1. vāda,
  2. jalpa
  3. and vitaṇḍā.

Vāda means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth,
a dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly,
and vitaṇḍā a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent’s thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis.

Vāda is thus essentially different in its purpose from jalpa and vitaṇḍā ; for vāda is an academical discussion with pupils, teachers, fellow-stūdents and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain[9].

Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair methods of argument.

Caraka, in in. 8, says that a medical man should hold discussions (sambhāṣā) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal for knowledge (saṃharṣa), clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech and of achieving fame, removes doubts in the learning acquired before and strengthens convictions. In the course of these discussions many new things may be learnt, and often out of zeal an opponent will disclose the most cherished secret teachings of his teachers. These discussions are of two classes, friendly (sandhāya saṃbhāṣā) and hostile (vigṛhya saṃbhāṣā). A friendly discussion is held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such discussions, even though there may be the fallacies described, no one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant over the other’s defeat and no attempt is made to misinterpret or misstate the other’s views.

Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one should behave in an assembly where one has to meet with hostile disputes. Before engaging oneself in a hostile discussion with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his opponent is inferior (para) to him and also the nature of the assembly (pariṣat) in which the discussion is undertaken. A pariṣat may be learned (jñānavatī) or ignorant (mūḍhā), and these again may be friendly (suhṛt), neutral (udāsīnā), or hostile (pratiniviṣṭā). When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand, whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a fearful nature, etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is superior to him in these qualifications or not.

No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant, friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by proceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by reciting long sūtras and to demoralize or stun them, as it were, by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language.

When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection with such disputes. Like the Nyāya, Caraka divides such hostile disputes (vāda) into two classes, jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Pratijñā is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. “The puruṣa is eternal.” Sthāpanā is the establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya and nigamana.

Thus the above thesis (pratijñā),

  • “The puruṣa is eternal,” is to be supported by a reason (hetu), “because it is uncreated”;
  • by an example (dṛṣṭānta),  “The sky is uncreated and it is eternal”;
  • by a proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya), viz. “Just as the ākāśa is uncreated, so the puruṣa is also uncreated”;
  • and finally by establishing the thesis (nigamana), “Therefore the puruṣa is eternal[10].”

Pratiṣṭhāpanā is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus, when the thesis of the sthāpanā is “Puruṣa is eternal,” the prati-sthāpanā proposition would be “Puruṣa is non-eternal,” because “it is perceivable by the senses,” and “The jug which is perceptible to the senses is non-eternal,” and “Puruṣa is like the jug,” so “Puruṣa is non-eternal.”

Caraka defines hetu as “the cause of knowledge” (hetur nāma upalabdhi-kāraṇam), and the cause of knowledge is the pramāṇas of pratyakṣa, anumāna, aitihya and aupamya. The definition of hetu in the Nyāya-sūtra refers only to the perceived hetu in the case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a relation is established by inference[11]. Here Caraka points out that a hetu may be either perceived, inferred or found by analogy or from the scriptures, but, in whichever way it may be found, when it leads to knowledge, it is called a hetu.

Thus, when I say,

“The hill is fiery, because it smokes”

(parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt),

the smoke is the hetu, and it is directly perceived by the eye.

But when I say,

“He is ill, because he is of low digestion,”

the hetu is not directly perceived, but is only inferred; for the fact of one’s being in low digestion cannot be directly perceived.

Again, when it is said,

Puruṣa is eternal, because it is uncreated”

(nityaḥ puruṣaḥ a-kṛtakatvāt),

the uncreatedness (a-kṛtakatva) is the hetu, but it is neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the testimony of the scriptures.

Again, in the proposition,

“His face is most beautiful, because it has been compared with the moon”

(asya mukhaṃ kāntatamaṃ candropamatvāt),

the fact of being compared with the moon is the hetu and it is known by upamā[12]. Thus Caraka’s definition of hetu does not really come into conflict with that of Gautama: he only says that a hetu may be discovered by any of the pramāṇas, and, by whichever pramāṇa it may be discovered, it may be called a hetu , if it is invariably and unconditionally (a-vinā-bhāva) associated with the major term (sādhya)[13].

Caraka then proceeds to describe uttara, which is in purport the same as th c jāti of the Nyāya-sūtras. When an opponent wants to prove a thesis on the basis of a similarity of the subject of the thesis with the hetu, attempts have to be made to upset the thesis by showing its dissimilarity to the hetu. Thus one may say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from causes similar to them; in reply it may be said that effects are dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be an effect of cold[14].

The long list of jatis given in the Nyaya-sūtra and explained in the commentaries and in the Nyāya-mañjarī is not referred to by Caraka; nor does the technical name of jāti find any place in Caraka’s description of it. If these elaborate descriptions of jāti were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed them over without referring to them.

An example (dṛṣṭānta) is that on which the common folk and the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot, water is liquid, the earth is firm.

A siddhānta, or conclusion, is that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and demonstration by proper reasons.

This siddhānta is of four kinds, viz.

  1. sarva-tantra-siddhānta, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g. “There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones can be cured”;
  2. prati-tantra-siddhānta, or conclusions which are not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons: e.g. some say that there are eight rasas, others say that there are six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six;
  3. adhikaraṇa-siddhānta , or conclusions which being accepted or proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted: e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits of karma , as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the suffering of the fruits of karma , emancipation, the existence of soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted;
  4. abhyupagama-siddhānta , or conclusions which are accepted only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined critically nor considered as proved[15].

Śabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz.

  1. dṛṣṭārtha —of experienced purport (e.g. “The doṣas lose their equilibrium through three causes”);
  2. adṛṣṭārtha —of unper-ceivable purport (e.g. “There is after-life; there is emancipation”);
  3. satya , or truth, that which tallies With facts (e.g. “There is Āyurveda; there are means for curing curable diseases”);
  4. anṛta , the opposite of truth, untruth[16].

Saṃśaya, or doubt, occurs with reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether in this world death happens timely or untimely.

Prayojana, or the object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may not touch me[17].

Sa-vyabhicāra means variability, e.g. “This may or may not be a medicine for this disease[18].”

Jijñāsā means experimenting ; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments (jijñāsā).

Vyavasāya means decision (niścaya), e.g. “This is a disease due to predominance of vāyu ; this is the medicine for this disease.”

Artha-prāpti is the same as the well-known arthāpatti, or implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g. the statement, “This disease cannot be cured by allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink,” implies that it can be cured by fasting, or, if it is said, “He should not eat during the day,” this means that “He should eat during the night[19].”

Sambhava is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six dhātus may be considered as the sambhava of the foetus; wrong diet, of disease; and right course of treatment, of health.

Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omits such details as should have been given in the answer, e.g. “This disease can be cured by purificatory action”; such an answer is faulty, as it does not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting or purging. Anatiuyojya is what is different from anuyojya.

Anuyoga is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned colleague: e.g. a learned man says, “Puruṣa is eternal,” and another learned man asks, “What is the reason?” Such a question is called anuyoga. A counter-question, such as “What is the reason for your asking such a question?” is called praty-anuyoga.

Vākya-doṣa, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz.

  1. nyūna,
  2. adhika,
  3. anarthaka,
  4. apārthaka
  5. and viruddha.

1) Nyūna, or the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of reasons, only one is offered and others are omitted, materially affecting the strength of the support of the original statement. Thus several reasons are given in support of the eternality of puruṣa , viz. beginninglessness, not being the product of any effort, unchangeableness, etc. Proposing to give all these reasons, and giving only one, is an instance of nyūna.

2) Adhika is where, when Āyurveda is being discussed, the opponent makes irrelevant references to learned works on politics or the art of government. It may also mean cases where words or statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two kinds, verbal repetition and sense repetition. Verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different words may be used.

3, 4) Anarthaka and apārthaka mean the use of meaningless and unconnected words or expressions.

5) Viruddha, or contrary statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the example (dṛṣṭānta-viruddha) or the accepted conclusion (siddhānta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever; or when a medical man (vaidya) says that medicine does not cure diseases.

Samaya-viruddha is the making of any statement against the accepted conclusions of any particular śāstra. Thus, for example, if a Mīmāṃsaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it will be against his accepted doctrine that animals should be sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of emancipation (mokṣa - śāstra) it be said that injury to living beings is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of that śāstra.

Vākya-praśaṃsā is that kind of statement in which the faults mentioned above in vākya-doṣa do not occur.

Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent is wilfully misinterpreted.

It is of two kinds, 

  1. vāk-chala
  2. and sāmānya-chala.

The word nava means “nine” as well as “new,” and if, when one says about one’s opponent, “This physician is nava-tantra” (has newly learnt his texts), and the opponent replies, “I have not nine text-books, I have one text,” the other person objects, “I do not say you have nine texts, I say that you are navābhyasta-tantra (have newly learnt the texts), navābhyasta-tantra might also mean “read nine times”; and then the opponent might well say, “I have several times read the texts, and not nine times, as you say.” This is an example of vāk-chala.

Again, when a physician says “Medicine cures diseases,” the opponent may take the most general characteristics of the terms and say that the above statement comes to this, that an existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then, since bronchitis exists (san kāsaḥ) and consumption exists (san kṣayaḥ), bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure another existent entity, consumption. This is called sāmānya-chala[20].

Fallacies (a-hetu) are of three kinds,

  1. prakaraṇasama,
  2. saṃśayasama
  3. and varṇyasama[21].

Prakaraṇa-sama is where that which is given as the hetu remains to be proved. Thus, when it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is eternal, and because the body is unconscious it is non-eternal, it may be urged (as by the Cārvāka school of philosophers) that both the points, viz. that the self is different from the body and that the body is not endowed with consciousness, which are offered as the hetu , are themselves to be proved; for according to the Cārvākas the body is endowed with consciousness and is non-eternal. A reference to the footnote below shows that this prakaraṇa-sama is different from the prakaraṇa-sama of the Nyāya-sūtra.

Saṃśaya-sama is that in which that which is the cause of doubt is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person quotes a passage from Āyurveda—is he or is he not a physician? Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage from Āyurveda leaves us in doubt as to the man’s being a physician or not. If this itself is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion and if it is said, “He is a physician because he has quoted a passage from Āyurveda,” it becomes a case of saṃśaya-sama. Gautama speaks of saṃśaya-sama as an instance of jāti ; but the former is a case where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of any of these characteristics. Here, however, saṃśaya-sama is used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the reason for a particular conclusion.

Varṇya-sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous affirmation, e.g. “Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is untouchable, like the latter.” But the non-eternality of sound stands as much in need of proof as that of buddhi, and the former affirmation cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy is similar to the jāti called sādhya-sama and the fallacy sādhya-sama of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386.

Atīta-kāla is that in which that which should be said first is said later, e.g. the thesis, or pratijñā, should be stated first and the conclusion, or nigamana , last; if instead the nigamana is stated first and the pratijñā after, then we have the fault of kālātīta.

Upālambha (criticism) is the finding fault with the hetus , also called a-hetu, as described above, or hetv-ābhāsas.

Parihāra (reply) means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent; e.g. the self is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different from the body and is eternal.

Pratijñā-hāñi (to give up one’s thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to give up one’s original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis that puruṣa is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and say that puruṣa is not eternal.

Abhyanujñā (to bring a countercharge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects[22].

Hetv-antara (dodging with a wrong reason) is where, when the cause of some root fact (prakṛti) is asked, the reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations (vikṛti) of that root fact[23].

Arthāntara (wrong answer) is where, when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given[24].

Nigraha-sthāna is where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-sthānas many of the cases which have already been enumerated and described.

Thus he counts

  1. pratijñā-hāni,
  2. abhyanujñā,
  3. kālātīta,
  4. a-hetu,
  5. nyūna,
  6. atirikta,
  7. vyartha,
  8. apārthaka,
  9. punar-ukta,
  10. viruddha,
  11. hetv-antara,
  12. arthāntara[25].

After this Caraka further describes the ten categories, a knowledge of which he thinks is very necessary for a mastery of the subject-matter of Āyurveda.

These are

  1. kāraṇa (the agent or the mover),
  2. karaṇa (the instrument necessary for an agent to bring about an effort),
  3. kārya-yoni (the material cause by the modification of which effects are produced),
  4. kārya (that for the production of which the mover makes his effort),
  5. kārya-phala (that for which a particular effect is intended by the agent),
  6. anubandha (the good or bad result which attaches itself to the doer after the production of the effect),
  7. deśa (place),
  8. kāla (the seasons, days, etc.),
  9. pravṛtti (the effort and the action needed for the production of the effect)
  10. and upāya (the passivity and special aptitude of the agent, the instrument and the material cause which can make the effect possible).

(same list, explained:)

  1. The physician is the cause (kāraṇa),
  2. the medicines the instruments (karaṇa) ;
  3. the want of equilibrium of the dhātus the kārya-yoni;
  4. the restoration of the equilibrium of the dhātus the kārya ;
  5. the happy state of body and mind the kārya-phala ;
  6. length of life, anubandha ;
  7. the place and the diseased person, deśa ;
  8. the year and the condition of the diseased person, kāla ;
  9. the efforts of the physician, pravṛtti ;
  10. the qualifications of the physician, the qualities of the medicine, etc., upāya.

It may be pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-tantra of Suśruta also mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to physicians in refuting the statements of hostile critics and in establishing their own points, which are called tantra-yukti[26].

These are said to be

  1. adhikaraṇa,
  2. yoga,
  3. padārtha,
  4. hetv-artha,
  5. uddeśa,
  6. nirdeśa,
  7. upadeśa,
  8. apadeśa,
  9. pradeśa,
  10. atideśa,
  11. apavarja,
  12. vākya-śeṣa,
  13. arthāpatti,
  14. viparyaya,
  15. prasaṅga,
  16. ekānta,
  17. anekānta,
  18. pūrva-pakṣa,
  19. nirṇaya,
  20. anu-mata,
  21. vidhāna,
  22. anāgatāvekṣaṇa,
  23. atikrāntāvekṣaṇa,
  24. saṃśaya,
  25. vyā-khyāna,
  26. sva-saṃjñā,
  27. nirvacana,
  28. nidarśana,
  29. niyoga,
  30. samuccaya,
  31. vikalpa
  32. and ūhya.

But these technical terms are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics, like the maxims of Mīmāṃsā, and are not points of dispute or logical categories. It is said that these maxims are like the sun to a group of lotuses, or like a lamp to a house, for the illumination or the expression of the subject of discourse[27]. This remark very much resembles the remark of Vātsyāyana that ānvīkṣikī (logic) is like a light to all sciences (pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām). But the difference between tantra-yukti and anvīkṣikī is this, that, while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter refers to technical modes of expression in medical science in general and in the Suśruta-saṃhitā in particular. They therefore refer to the ways of deducing the inner meaning or intention of the medical texts from their abbreviated forms of expression. Thus, when one reads in the text, “about rasa or doṣa” and nothing else is said, one understands that this style of expression signifies thst it is an adhikaraṇa (topic of discourse) and that something is going to be related about rasa or doṣa, though it is not explicitly so stated.

Now the maxim (tantra-yukti) of yoga means that the verb at a distant part of the sentence may be joined with its relevant case in another part of the sentence[28].

The maxim of padārtha means that, when a word having two or more senses is used, then that meaning alone has to be accepted which suits the previous and the later contexts. Thus, when it is said in a medical text that we shall now describe the origin of the Veda, then only Āyurveda is to be meant and not Rg, Yajus or Atharva.

The maxim of hetv-artha illustrates the condition of invisible things by visible and known examples. Thus it is said that, just as a muddy ball becomes dissolved and sticky through water, so do milk and other drugs dissolve a boil by their application.

The maxim of uddeśa is the method of briefly touching a subject without going into details. Thus, when one says “disease” (śalya), it means both internal and external diseases without any kind of specification.

The maxim of nirdeśa is the method of describing a thing in detail.

The maxim of upadeśa is the method of giving a general instruction. Thus it is said that one should not sit up at night nor sleep during the day. This is, however, only a general instruction which has its exceptions.

The maxim of apadeśa is the method of showing the reasons of things. Thus it is said that phlegm (śleṣman) increases through the taking of sweet things (madhureṇa śleṣmā ’bhivardhate).

The maxim of pradeśa is the analogy by which a present difficulty is solved in the way in which a past difficulty was solved (prakṛtasya atikrāntena sādhanam pradeśaḥ). Thus it may be said that, since this has cured Devadatta in this way in the past, it would also cure Yajñadatta in a similar way now.

The maxim of atideśa is that of anticipating a future event from a present indication or prognostication. Thus from the fact of the increase of uprising wind in a man’s system it may be predicted that he will have a specific bowel-disease (udāvarta).

The maxim of apavarja consists in allowing exceptions to general directions (e.g. cases of poisoning should not be fomented, except in the case of poisoning through the bites of insects).

The maxim of vākya-śeṣa consists in supplying an idea suggested by the context, but not expressly mentioned. Thus when it is said “of the head, hands, feet, sides, back, belly, heart,” it is the whole man that is to be understood though it is not expressly stated in the context.

That which is understood, by implication, though not directly mentioned, is called the maxim of arthāpatti. Thus, when a man says “I shall eat rice,” it is understood that he is not thirsty, but hungry.

The maxim of viparyaya is that by virtue of which from a positive or a negative assertion its contrary is asserted also, e.g. when it is said that those who are lean, weak and of fearful temperament are difficult to be cured.

The maxim of prasaṅga is that by virtue of which allusion is made to things repeatedly described in another chapter.

The maxim of ekānta allows of affirming a specific action of things unexception-ably (e.g. madana fruit induces vomiting, i.e. under all circumstances).

The maxim of anekānta is that by virtue of which one understands that different opinions prevail on a particular subject. Thus some teachers think that substances are the most important, while others think that rasa is so; others, again, think that the inner essence (vīrya) is the most important, while still others think that chemical action through digestion (vipāka) is so.

The maxims of pūrva-pakṣa and uttara-pakṣa allow of discussing a matter in the form of question and answer.

The maxim of anumata is that by virtue of which it is to be understood that, when the opinion of other authorities is referred to and not contradicted, it is signified that it is approved.

The maxim of vidhāna is that by virtue of which one understands that, when certain descriptions follow certain enumerations, the former are to be taken in the order in which the latter are related.

The maxim of anāgatāvekṣaṇa allows of leaving certain things for future description and elaboration, and atikrāntāvekṣaṇa permits alluding to things described before (e.g. it is said in the Śloka-sthāna that this matter will be described in the Cikitsā chapter, and about another matter it may be said in the Cikitsā chapter that it has been described in the Śloka-sthāna).

The maxim of saṃśaya allows a way of statement which may create doubt and confusion in the mind of the reader. The method of elaborate description is called vyākhyāna. The method of using words in a sense different from what they have in other literatures is called sva-saṃjñā , i.e. technical use (e.g. mithuna in Āyurveda means honey and clarified butter). A definition is called nirvacana.

The maxim of nidarśana allows of describing anything after the analogy of other things. Thus it may be said that, just as fire in a room grows bigger and bigger with wind, so does a boil grow with vāta , pitta and kapha. Niyoga means a direction (e.g. “only what is good to the system is to be taken”).

Samuccaya means the taking of two or more things together as having equal value. Vikalpa is the method of giving alternative or optional directions.

Ūhya is the maxim by which things which are apparent from the context can be understood.

It is easy to see that of these thirty-two maxims some are ways of interpreting ideas, others are ways of interpreting the arrangement and manner of textual words and their connections, while there are others which are but descriptions of specific peculiarities of style.

The redactor (Nāgārjuna) says that he has collected all these maxims as general principles of textual understanding, and he calls them śabda-nyāyārtha , i.e. the meaning of the maxims of verbal interpretation.

Footnotes and references:


Caraka-saṃhitā, I. II. 17.


Ibid. I. II. 18, 19.


Cakrapāṇi on Caraka-saṃḥitā, 1 . 11 . 20.


The definition of pratyakṣa given in Caraka-saṃḥitā, 1. 11. 20, is:

ātmendriya-mano-’rthānāṃ sannikarśāt pravartate
vyaktā taḍātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣaṃ sā nirucyate.

The definition of pratyakṣa in the Nyāya-sūtra is as follows:

indriyārtha-satmikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam
avyabḥicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.

For a discussion thereon see vol. 1, pp. 333-343.


pratyakṣa-pūrvaṃ tri-vidḥaṃ
tri-kālaṃ cānumīyate
vaḥnir rdgūḍḥo dhūmena
maitḥunaṃ garbha-darśanāt.
Evaṃ vyavasyanty atītaṃ
bījāt phalam anāgataṃ
dṛstvā bījāt phalaṃ jātam
ihaiva sadṛśam budḥāḥ.
I. 11. 21, 22.


buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yogajān
yuktis tri-kāla sā jñeyā tri-vargah sādhyate yayā.
1. 11. 25.


dṛṣṭānte 'py ata eva tad-bḥāva-bhāvitvāt kāryatā-pratipattiḥ, tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntonyonveṣaṇīyaḥ, tatrāpy apara ity anavasthā.
      Kamalaśīla as quoted by Cakrapāṇi on Caraka-saṃhitā, i. 11. 25.

Śāntarakṣita misrepresents Caraka’s view of yukti in a very strange manner. He says that, when from the fact that in all cases when A is present B is present and in all cases when A is absent B is also absent one thinks A to be the cause of B, this is regarded by Caraka as the new pramāṇa of yukti.

Śāntarakṣita’s exact words are:

asmin sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asatīti ca
tasmād ato bhavaty eva yuktir eṣā ’bhidhlyate
pramāṇāntaram eveyam ity āha carako muniḥ
nānumānam iyaṃ yasmād dṛṣṭānto
’tra na labhyate.
p. 482.

This, however, is entirely different from what Caraka says, as is pointed out by Cakrapāṇi in his commentary on Caraka-saṃhitā. Caraka’s idea of yukti is the logic of probability, i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called yukti, and, as it is different from inference or any of the other accepted pramāṇas, it is to be counted as a separate pramāṇa. So far as I know, this is the only example of the introduction of the logic of probability in Indian thought.


Caraka-saṃḥitā, I. 11. 8.


vādaṃ ca nirṇaya-phalārtkibḥir eva śiṣya-sabrahmacāri-gurubhiḥ saha vlta-rōgaiḥ, na khyāti-lābha-rabhasa-prativardhamāna-spardhānubandha-viḍhurātma-bhir ārabheta.
p. 594.


It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions that are admitted in the Nyāya-sūtra.


udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt sādhya-sādhanaṃ hetuḥ
tathā vaidharmyāt.    
1. 1. 34, 35.


See Gaṅgādhara’s Jalpa-kalpa-taru, 111. 8. 122.


hetuś cāvinābhāva-liṅga-vacanaṃ yady api, tathāpīha liṅga-pragrāḥakāṇi pratyakṣādi-pramāṇāny eva yathokta-hetu-mūlatvena hetu-śabdenāḥa.
Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, 111. 8. 6. 25.


1. 2. 18.

There are twenty-four kinds of this jāti, e.g.

  • (1-2) sādharmya-vaidharmya-sama,
  • (3-8) utkarṣāpakarṣa-varṇyāvarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-sama,
  • (9-10) prāpty-aprāpti-sama,
  • (11-12) prasaṅga-pratidrṣṭānta-sama,
  • (13) anutpatti-sama,
  • (14) saṃśaya-sama,
  • (15) prakaraṇa-sama,
  • (16) ahetu-sama,
  • (17) arthāpatti-sama,
  • (18) aviśeṣa-sama,
  • (19) upapatti-sama,
  • (20) upalabdhi-sama,
  • (21) anupalabdhi-sama,
  • (22) nitya-sama,
  • (23) anitya-sama,
  • (24) kārya-sama.

Sādharmya-vaidharmya-sama is that in which, when an argument is given on

the basis of the similarity or dissimilarity to a certain hetu, it is pointed out that quite the opposite conclusions may be drawn from other points of similarity or dissimilarity with other hetus.

Thus, when it is said,

Śabda is non-eternal, because it is produced by an effort, and whatever is produced by an effort is non-eternal, as a jug,”

it may be answered,

Śabda is eternal, because it is partless: a partless entity like the ākāśa is found to be eternal; there is no special reason why on account of its similarity to a jug sound should be non-eternal, and not eternal owing to its similarity to ākāśa.

An escape from the dilemma is possible by enquiring as to what may constitute an unconditional and invariable (avyabhicārī) similarity.

Utkarṣāpakarṣa-varṇyāvarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-sama is that in which similarity is pressed too far. Thus it is urged that, because sound is non-eternal like a jug, it must also be visible like a jug, and, if it is not so, it cannot be non-eternal like a jug. Moreover, it may be said that the reason why sound is expected to be non-eternal like a jug is that the former is produced by an effort (prayatnāntarīyaka). But things which are produced by efforts differ in many of their qualities; thus a cloth is soft, and a jug is hard, though both of them are produced by effort; so it may be argued that, though śabda is as much a product of effort as a jug, it may not agree with the jug in being non-eternal. Moreover, instead of arguing that sound is like a jug, it may as well be argued that a jug is like souṇḍ; so that the status of the jug is as uncertain as sound itself

(yadi yathā ghaṭas tathā śabdaḥ prāptaṃ tarhi yathā śabdaḥ tathā ghaṭa iti śabdaś cānityatayā sādhya iti ghato 'pi sādhya eva syād anyathā hi na tena tulyo bhavetNyāya-mañjarī , p. 624).

In answer to these kinds of fault-finding the proper argument is that no similarity should be extended beyond its limits, and an example (dṛṣṭānta) should not be considered to have the same status as a probandum (sādhya); for an example is that which is already agreed upon among the disputants and the common people

(laukika-parīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminn arthe buddhi sāmyaṃ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ).

Prāpty-aprāpti-sama is that in which it is urged that, if the hetu and the probandum are together, they cannot be distinguished from each other; if they are separate, hetu cannot lead us to the sādhya. The answer to this is that a hetu can produce an effect either by direct contact (e.g. the rope and the stick in contact with clay produce a jug) or from a distance (e.g. the śyena sacrifice can destroy an enemy from a distance).

Prasaṅga-sama is that in which a reason for the hetu is asked. Thus, if the character of immediately following an effort (prayatnāntarīyakatva) is the cause of non-eternality, what can establish the prayatnāntarīyakatva of a jug, etc.? The answer to this is that a reason is necessary only for that which is not directly experienced as being evident in itself. That a jug immediately follows the efforts that produce it is directly experienced ānd does not require any argument or reason to establish it, as no light is required to see a burning lamp.

Dṛṣṭānta-sama is that in which from the same hetu two different conclusions are seen to result. Thus it may be said that both the jug and ākāśa have the character of immediately following an effort

(e.g. as by digging new space is produced in underground wells which before the effort of digging were solid earth without space— kūpa-khanana-prayatnānantaraṃ tad-upalambhāt —and this character is therefore to be regarded as prayatnāntariyaka) ;

yet, as a jug is non-eternal and ākāśa eternal, so śabda, though it immediately follows an effort, is eternal. The answer is that, if such an opposite conclusion is drawn, a separate hetu has to be given, which is not done in the present case.

If sound is non-eternal, it must possess the character of coming into existence immediately after an effort that produces it; but how can it possess that character before being produced or coming into existence? If it cannot at that stage possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternality is absent.

This objection is called anutpatti-sama. The reply is that, unless the sound is in existence, its eternality or non-eternality cannot be discussed. If it is non-existent, of what is the eternality to be affirmed by the opponent?

Again, it may be argued that śabda has prayatnāntarīyakatva, and therefore it may be expected to be non-eternal; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects.

This doubt is called saṃśaya-sama. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known.

Prakaraṇa-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to hetus, so that no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both prayatnāntarīyakatva and niravayavatva (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second hetu cannot be pressed as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist.

Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a hetu ; for, if there is no sādhya (probandum), what is it that the hetu produces? and again, if there is no hetu before the sādhya, how can the sādhya be produced? So, as hetu is only a concomitant of sādhya, no inference is possible from it. The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing hetu the non-existing sādhya should be produced.

Arthāpatti-sama is where, for example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to ākāśa and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being prayatnāntarīyaka.

Aviśeṣa-sama is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of prayatnāntarīyakatva, śabda and ghaṭa are said to be equally non-eternal, then, owing to all things having the same quality of existence (sattā), they are all the same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality in all respects.

Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing to its prayatnāntarīyakatva and eternal owing to its being partless like ākāśa.

Upalabdhi-sama is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort (prayatnāntarīyakatva) I, and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between prayatnāntarīyakatva and non-eternality and not between non-eternality and prayatnāntarīyakatva ; so that all that is produced by human effort is noneternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by prayatnāntarīyakatva emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are produced.

Anitya-sama is an objection where it is urged, for example, that, if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal, then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some similarity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal.

The nitya-sama objection runs as follows: Is non-eternality in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal. If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal.

The kārya-sama objection suggests that prayatnāntarīyakatva leads to production in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled condition; and it remains undecided what sort of prayatnāntarīyakatva applies to śabda.

The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta’s Nyāya-mañjarī.



All these siddhāntas occur under the same names in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 28, 29, 30, 31.


The first two divisions, dṛṣṭārtha and adṛṣṭārtha, occur in the Nyāya-sūtra, I. 1.8, sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt.


Prayojana, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 1, though it is nowhere critically examined. It is explained by Vātsyāyana as that which goads men to action (yena prayuktaḥ pravartate). Uddyotakara explains it as the realization of pleasure and the fear of pain (sukha-prāpti-duḥkha-hāni).


anaikāntikaḥ sa-vyabhicāraḥ. Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 2. 5. E.g. “sound is eternal” because it is untouchable; but untouchability does not lead to eternality, since the touchable atoms are eternal, whereas untouchable thoughts are shortlived.


Cakrapāṇi says that Caraka does not think that artha-prāpti is a separate pramāṇa ; according to him it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of pramāṇas.


Chala is treated in the Nyāya-sūtra exactly on the same lines as here. Thus the definition of chala there (Nyāya-sūtra , i. 2. 10) is

vacana-vighātortha-vikalpopapattyā chalam

(to attack one’s speech by a wilful misinterpretation of it is chala).

This is divided into three classes,

  1. vāk-chala,
  2. sāmānya-chala
  3. and upacāra-chala ;

of these vāk-chala is exactly the same as in Caraka-saṃhitā, and so also the sāmānya-chala (because a Brahman is well-read in scriptures, a vrātya (outcast Brahman) is also well-read, because he also is a Brahman in some sense).

Upacāra-chala, which, however, resembles vāk-chala, is not mentioned in the Caraka-saṃhitā. Its definition in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1.2.14, is

dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe ’rtha-sad-bhāva-pratiṣedha upacāra-chalam

(to make one’s statement impossible by taking it in one sense, say the primary, when the secondary one was intended).

Thus, if it is said, “This porter is an ass,” it may be objected that the porter, being a man, cannot at the same time be an ass. Gautama, however, tentatively raises the objection that chalas should be regarded as three in number and not tw’o, taking upacāra-chala within sāmānya-chala. This means a criticism in view of Caraka’s division of chala into two classes. For Gautama argues that, if on account of some similarity upacāra-chala should be included within sāmānya-chala, and chalas should be counted as being of two kinds instead of three, then for the very same reason of similarity chalas may as well be regarded as being of one kind instead of two. So, in view of the specific differences that exist between the chalas, they should be regarded as being of three kinds.


Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 2. 4, describes the fallacies (hetv-ābhāsa) as of five kinds,

  1. sa-vyabhicāra,
  2. viruddha,
  3. prakaraṇa-sama,
  4. sādhya-sama
  5. and kālātīta.

1) Sa-vyabhicāra hetu is that which has no invariable concomitance with the probandum, e.g. sound is eternal because it is untouchable, and that which is touchable is non-eternal, like a jug. But untouchability has no invariable concomitance with eternality; for an atom is touchable and at the same time eternal, and thoughts (buddhi) are untouchable and at the same time non-eternal.

2) Viruddha hetu is where the reason (hetu) demolishes the very theory on which its security depends, e.g. this changeable world (vikāro) disappears (vyakter apaiti), because it is non-eternal (nityatva-pratiṣedhāt); but, though it disappears (apeto ’pi), yet it exists (asti), because it is not destructible (vināśa-pratiṣedhāt). Now a thing which is non-eternal cannot but be destructible. Destructibility and eternality cannot abide together.

3) Prakaraṇa-sama is where two opposite hetus exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of them. Thus it may be argued with as much force that “sound is eternal, because it has in it the qualities of eternal things,” as that “sound is non-eternal, because it has in it the qualities of non-eternal things”; so no conclusion can be drawn from either of these hetus.

4) Sādhya-sama is where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument, “shadow is a substance because it moves,” the movability of shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives rise to the formation of shadows at different places ?

4) Kālātīta is where the hetus in the case of the accepted example and the case to be proved vary, because in the latter case the hetu is not properly a hetu; for the hetu and sādhya exist in two successive moments and are therefore not concomitant; but in the former case they are concomitant and simultaneous, e.g. sound is eternal, because it is manifested, like colour, owing to a particular contact, like light, being manifested by the contact of a stick and a drum, just as colour is manifested by the contact of light with a thing. But the similarity fails; for, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the contact of light and the things, sound is heard at a moment different from that at which actual contact of the stick and the drum takes place.


This corresponds to matāmijñā of the Nyāya-sūtra, v. 1. 42.


In Nyāya-sūtrc, v. 2. 6, we hear of a hetv-antara, but that seems to be different from this. The significance of hetv-antara, as it stands there, may be illustrated as follows. An adherent of Sāṃkhya says that all this world of things is derived from one root cause, because all these are limited and whatever is limited is derived from one root cause. This may be refuted by pointing out that there are many limited things which are derived from more than one root cause. To this the Sāṃkhya adherent replies that only those which are associated with pleasure and pain and ignorance are to be regarded as proceeding from one root cause; but this is an addition which was not contained in the original thesis.


This is also mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra, v. 2. 7.


The nigraha-sthānas mentioned in the Nyīya-sūtra, v. 2.1, are the following:

  1. pratijñā-hāni,
  2. pratijñāntara,
  3. pratijñā-virodha,
  4. pratijñā-sannyāsa,
  5. hetv-antara,
  6. arthāntara,
  7. nirarthaka,
  8. avijñātārtha,
  9. apārthaka,
  10. aprāpta-kāla,
  11. nyūna,
  12. adhika,
  13. punar-ukta,
  14. ananubhāṣana,
  15. ajñāna,
  16. apratibhā,
  17. vikṣepa,
  18. matānujñā,
  19. paryanuyojyo-pekṣeṇa,
  20. niranuyojyānuyoga,
  21. apa-siddhānta,
  22. hetv-ābhāsa.

Many of these, however, are not mentioned by Caraka.


asad-vādi-prayuktānāṃ vākyānāṃ pratiṣedhānaṃ sva-vākya-siddhir api ca kriyate tantra-yuktitaḥ.
      Suśruta-saṃhitā, Uttara-tantra, 65. 5.


yathāmbwa-vanasyārkaḥ pradīpo veśmano yatḥā
prabodhyasya prakāśārthas tathā tantrasya yuktayaḥ.
      Suśruta-saṃhitā, Uttara-tantra,
65. 7.


tailam pivec cāmṛta-vallī-nimba-kiṃsrābhayā-vṛkṣaka-pippalībhiḥ
siddhaṃ balābhyāṃ ca sa-devadāru hitāya nityaṃ gala-gaṇḍa-roge.
9, 10.

In the above verse it is enjoined that a particular medical decoction is to be made with a number of drugs which are to be boiled (siddham), and this boiled decoction has to be drunk (pivet). But the word pivet is in the first line and the word siddham is in the third line, and it is allowed that these two distant words may be combined (yoga).

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: