A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of ramadvaya (a.d. 1300): a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the twenty-fourth part in the series called the “the shankara school of vedanta (continued)”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Rāmādvaya, a pupil of Advayāśrama, wrote an important work, called Vedānta-kaumudī, in four chapters, in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedāntic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the first four topics of the Brahma-sūtra. The work has not yet been published; but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. Rāmādvaya also wrote a commentary on his Vedānta-kaumudī , called Vedānta-kaumudī-vyākhyāna , a manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now.

The date of the writing of the copy of the Vedānta-kaumudī-vyākhyāna is given by the copyist ŚeṣaNṛsiṃha as A.D. 1512. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century. Rāmādvaya in the course of his discussions refers to many noted authors on Nyāya and Vedānta, none of whom are later than the thirteenth century. Vimuktātman, author of the īṣṭa-siddhi , has been placed by the present author in the early half of the thirteenth century; but Rāmādvaya always refers to him approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also in his Vedānta-kaumudī-vyākhyāna (MS. p. 14) refers to Janārdana, which is Ānandajñāna’s name as a householder; but Janārdana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems therefore probable that Rāmādvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century.

In the enunciation of the Vedāntic theory of perception and inference Rāmādvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the Prakaṭārtha ; for, though he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration[1]. Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable avidyā and appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition, so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help it in its work[2]. Such a conditioning factor is found in manas , which is of the stuff of pure sattva: on the occasion of sense-object contact this manas , being propelled by the moral destiny (adṛṣṭādi-kṣubdhaṃ), transforms itself into the form of a long ray reaching to the object itself[3].

The pure consciousness, as conditioned or limited by the antaḥkaraṇa (antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnaṃ caitanyaṃ), does by such a process remove its veil of avidyā, (though in its limited condition as individual soul this avidyā formed its own body), and the object also being in contact with it is manifested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject and the object, having taken place in the same process (vṛtti) there, are joined together in the same cognition as “this object is known by me” (vṛtter ubhayasaṃlagnatvāc ca tad-abhivyakta-caitanya-syāpi tathātvena mayedam viditam iti saṃśleṣa-pratyayaḥ) ; and, as its other effect, the consciousness limited by the antaḥkaraṇa, transformed into the form of the process (vṛtti) of right knowledge (pramā), appears as the cognizer

(vṛtti-lakṣaṇa-pramāśrayāntaḥ-karaṇāvacchinnas tat-pramātetyapi vyapadiśyate)[4].

The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as the object (karma-kārakābhivyaktaṃ ca tat prakāśātmanā phala-vyapadeśa-bhāk). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the vṛtti transformation of the antaḥkaraṇa ; but, as it is illusorily identified with the antaḥkaraṇa (antaḥkaraṇa-caitanyayor aikyādhyāsāt), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also identified with the vṛtti transformation of the antaḥkaraṇa, and, as the vṛtti becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting the vṛtti it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact of an illumination of the object (evaṃ vṛtti-vyañjakam api taptā-yaḥ-piṇḍa-nyāyena tad-ekatām ivāptaṃ vṛttivad-viṣaya-prākatyāt-manā sampadyate)[5]. The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to Rāmādvaya may thus be described. The sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (i adṛṣṭa) to stir up the antaḥkaraṇa , and, as a result thereof, the antaḥkaraṇa or mind is transformed into a particular state called vṛtti.

The pure consciousness underlying the antaḥkaraṇa was lying dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transformation of the antaḥkaraṇa into a vṛtti , the consciousness brightens up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it. The vṛtti thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to the object on which the vṛtti is superimposed, and, as a result thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the vṛtti transformation. Now, since the vṛtti joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object, these two are joined up (sarnśleṣa-pratyaya) and this results in the cognition “this object is known by me”; and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness, as limited by the antaḥkaraṇa as transformed into the vṛtti , and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated.

In the Vedānta-paribhāṣā we hear of three consciousnesses (caitanya), the pramātṛ-caitanya (the consciousness conditioned by the antaḥkaraṇa), the pramāṇa-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the vṛtti of the antaḥkaraṇa), and the viṣaya-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). According to this perception (pratyakṣa) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jñāna-gata-pratyakṣatva) or from the point of view of the object, both being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective, of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the pramāṇa-caitanya from the viṣaya-caitanya through spatial superimposition of the vṛtti on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object (viṣaya-gata-pratyakṣatva) is defined as the non-distinction of the object from the pramātṛ-caitanya or the perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the antaḥkaraṇa.

This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by antaḥkaraṇa (ghatāder antaḥkaraṇāva-cchinna-caitanyābhedaḥ), is open to the serious objection that really the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned by the antaḥkaraṇaantaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya) but with the cognition {pramāṇa-caitanya or vṛtti-caitanya ); for the cognition or the vṛtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and the object is in immediate contact with the vṛtti and not with the perceiver (antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya).

That this is so is also admitted by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarin, in his Śikhā-maṇi commentary on the Vedānta-paribhāṣā[6]. But he tries to justify Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra by pointing out that he was forced to define viṣaya-gata-pratyakṣatva as non-distinction of the object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakāśātman’s Vivaraṇa and also in other traditional works on Vedānta[7]. This however seems to be an error. For the passage of the Vivaraṇa to which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view[8]. It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or sense-knowledge (saṃvid)[9]. That other traditional Vedāntic interpreters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual process  given by Rāmādvaya.

Rāmādvaya says, as has just been pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the vṛtti, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject-predicate form “this is known by me.” The object is thus illuminated by the vṛtti , and it is not directly with the subject, but with the vṛtti, that the object is united. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book, one should feel “I am the book,” and not “I perceive the book”; in reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion of a relation of identity resulting in the notion “I am the book”[10]. This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are both but impositions of avidyā on one distinctionless pure consciousness ; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject-object experience.

The difference of the Vedāntic view of perception, as expounded in the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa , from the Buddhist idealiśm (vijñāna-vāda) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the ideas or percepts, the Vedānta accepted the independent manifestation of the objects in perception in the external world[11]. There is thus a distinction between visional percept and the object; but there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyavadhānena samvid-upādhitā aparokṣatā viṣayasya—Vivaraṇa , p. 50).

The object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness, whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or inference

(prameyaṃ karmatvena aparokṣam pramātṛ-pramitī punar aparokṣe eva kevalaṃ na karmatā)[12].

The views of the Vedānta-kaumudī, however, cannot be regarded as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the exposition of the subject in Padmapāda’s Pañca-pādikā and Prakāśātman’s Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa. The development of the whole theory of perception may be attributed to the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects are veiled by avidyā ; that, as the antaḥkaraṇa is transformed into states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the underlying consciousness; and that through the spatial contact with the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antaḥkaraṇa transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely of the antaḥkaraṇa transformations (called vṛtti in the Vedānta-kaumudī, and Vedānta-paribhāṣā and pure consciousness); to the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the antaḥkaraṇa (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the antaḥkaraṇa modification (or vṛtti), there would be nothing to explain the duality in perception (e.g. “I perceive the book,” and not “I am the book,” and it is only the latter form that could be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Prakāśātman’s reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness with the antaḥkaraṇa-consciousness (subject) is effected through the modification or the vṛtti of the antaḥkaraṇa and, since the antaḥkaraṇa is one with its vṛtti, the vṛtti operation is rightly attributed to the antaḥkaraṇa as its agent, and this is illuminated by the consciousness underlying the antaḥkaraṇa resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination of object to which the operation of the vṛtti is directed in spatial superimposition—the difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or the condition of the vṛtti with reference to the subject and the object[13].

This is exactly the interpretation of the Vedānta-kaumudī , and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā are largely different therefrom and are in all probability inexact. As this unity is effected between individual subjects (consciousness limited by specific antaḥkaraṇas) and individual objects (consciousness limited by specific avidyā materials constituting the objects) through the vṛtti , it can result only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects[14]. This has been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of ajñāna-veils, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one ajñāna corresponding to the illumination of one object[15]. But this also is not an original contribution of Rāmādvaya, since it was also propounded by his predecessor Ānandajñāna in his Tarka-saṃgraha and by others[16].

The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyāya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation); the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jñātatā), as Kumārila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (viṣayābhivyaktir nāma vijñāne tad-ākārollekha-mātraṃ na bahir-añga-rūpasya vijñānābhivyāptiK),2& is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists.

The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the mind (antaḥkaraṇa)[17]. Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each dispelling an intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects; perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of momentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the present time[18].

According to Rāmādvaya the definition of perception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object as a separate datum of perception ; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards it only as a mode of cognitive process.

Rāmādvaya’s definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra. Rāmādvaya defines right knowledge {pramā) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object (yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā), and he defines the instrument of right knowledge as that which leads to it[19]. Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, with whom the two conditions of pramā or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known (anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted[20]. The latter condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from Rāmādvaya’s definition; but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference.

For, though want of contradiction (Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra’s condition) and want of wrong representation (Rāmādvaya’s condition) may mean the same thing, yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are not fixed by correspondence with its object.

Considering the fact that the Vedānta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the modification of the antaḥkaraṇa (which is its cognitive operation) on the object, a Vedānta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of the Vedānta rests content in the view that, however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness. The definition of pramā by Rāmādvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yathārthā-nubhava) of objects could not be-found faulty because of the fact that according to the Vedānta all dual experience of the world was false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes it had a real existence, and Rāmādvaya refers to the Iṣṭa-siddhi to justify his view on this point.

As to the other point, viz. that a pramā must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhigata), Rāmādvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion[21]. He says that it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before, and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced.

There is therefore no justification for introducing anadhigatatva as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference between perception and inference, Rāmādvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the antaḥkaraṇa with the inferred object (e.g. fire). In inference the antaḥkaraṇa is in touch only with the reason or the liṅga (e.g. smoke), and through this there arises (liṅgādi-bala-labdhākārollekha-mātreṇa) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference[22].

On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) Rāmādvaya does not, like Dharmarājādhvarīndra, include the absence of defects (doṣābhāva) in the definition of svataḥ-prāmāṇya. It may well be remembered that Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra defines validity (prāmāṇya) of knowledge as an awareness that characterizes an object as it is (tadvati tat-prakāraka-jñānatvam), while self-validity (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying sākṣi consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective conditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects[23].

Rāmādvaya, however, closely follows Kumārila’s view of the self-validity of knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which is derived from other sources[24]. Later knowledge of the presence of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition; but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumārila and already discussed[25]. In this connection Rāmādvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and demerit, that they may be perceived by us[26].

Footnotes and references:


See Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47.


Rāmādvaya refers here to the daharādḥikaraṇa of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, presumably to I. 3, 19, where Śaṅkara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (jlva) and Brahman. Here Śaṅkara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both outside and inside the circle of Upaniṣadic interpreters, which regard individual souls as real (apare tu vādinaḥ pāramārthikam eva jaivaṃ rūpam tti manyante asmadīyāś ca kecit). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of the self as the only reality which through avidyā manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as parameśvara, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. Parameśvara, the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which, like a magician, appears as many through avidyā. There is no consciousness other than this (eka eva parameśvaraḥ kūṭastha-nityo vijñāna-dhātur avidyayā-māyayā māyāvivad anekadhā vibhāvyate nānyo vijñāna-dhātur asti).


This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakaṭārtha, as may be inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the Vedānta-kaumudī and the Prakaṭārtha borrowed it from the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa.


Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. transcript copy, p. 36.


Ibid, p. 37.


yad vā yogyatve sati viṣaya-caitanyābḥinna-pramāṇa-caitanya-viṣayatvaṃ ghaṭāder viṣayasya pratyakṣatvaṃ tatḥāpi viṣayasyāparokṣatvaṃ samvida-bhedāt iti vivarane tatra tatra ca sāṃpradāyikaiḥ pramātrabhedasyaiva viṣaya-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇatvenābhidhānād evaṃ uktaṃ.
      Śikhā-maṇi on Vedānta-pari-bhāsā, 
p. 75,
      Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press.




Tasmād avyavadhānena saṃvid-upādhitayāparokṣatā viṣayasya. Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa , p. 50, Benares, 1892.


It should be noted here that saṃvid means cognitional idea or sense-knowledge and not the perceiver (antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya), as the author of the Śikhāmaṇi says. Thus Akhaṇḍānanda in his Tattva-dīpana commentary explains the word saṃvid as saṃvic-chabdena indriyārtha-samprayoga-ja-jñānasya vivakṣitatvāt. Tattva-dīpana, p. 194, Benares, 1902


Vedānta-paribhāṣā, pp. 76, 77.


na ca vijñānābhedād eva āparokṣyatn avabhāsate bahiṣṭvasyāpi rajatāder āparokṣyāt.
p. 50.


Pañca-pādikā, p. 17, Benares, 1891.


See Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 70, and Tattva-dīpana, pp. 256-259, Benares, 1902.


etat prarnātṛ-caitanyābhinnatayaiva abhivyaktaṃ tad viṣaya-caitanyaṃ na pramātr-antara-caitanyābhedena abhivyaktam ato na sarveṣām avabhāsyatvam.
p. 71.


yāvanti jñānāni tāvanti sva-tantrāṇi para-tantrāṇi vā ajñānāmi tato na doṣaḥ.
      Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. copy, p. 43.


The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajñāna- veils; as soon as there is the vṛtti-object contact, the veil is removed aṇḍ the object is illuminated ; the next moment there is again an ajñāna-veil covering the object, and again there is the wm'-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time.

On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it

(vṛtti-vijñānasya sāvayavatvāc ca hrāsa-daśāyāṃ dīpa-jvālāyā iva tamo ’ntaraṃ mohāntaram āvaritum viṣayaṃ pravartate tato ’pi kramamāṇaṃ kṣaṇāntare sāmagry-anusāreṇa vijñānāntaraṃ viṣay īvaraṇa-bhaṅgenaiva sva-kāryaṃ karoti, tathā sarvāṇy api atiśaighryāt tu jñāna-bhedavad āvaraṇāntaraṃ na lakṣyate.
MS. copy, p. 46).

This view of the Vedānta-kaumudī is different from the view of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vṛtti and not different vṛttis removing different ajñānas (kiñ ca siddhānte dhārā-vāhika-buddhi-sthale na jñānā-bhedaḥ kintu yāvād ghaṭa-sphuraṇam tāvad ghaṭākārāntaḥkaraṇa-vrttir ekaiva na tu nānā vṛtteḥ sva-virodhi-vṛtty-utpatti-paryaṇtaṃ sthāyitvābhyupagamāt. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 1911).


ataḥ sāvayava-sattvātmakam antaḥkaraṇam eva anudbhūta-rūpa-sparśam adṛśyam aspṛśyaṃ ca viṣayākāreṇa pariṇamate.
MS. copy, p. 42.


na kālaḥ pratyakṣa-gocaraḥ .. .stambḥāḍir eva prāg-abhāva-nivṛtti-pradhvaṃ-sānutpatti-rūpo vartamānaḥ tad-avacchinaḥ kālo ’pi vartamānaḥ sa ca tathā-viḍho ’neka-jñāna-sādhāraṇa eva, na caitāvatā jñāna-yaugapadyāpattiḥ sūksma-kālāpekṣayā kraṃa-sambḥavāt, na ca sūkṣma-kālopādhīnām apratītiḥ kārya-krameṇaiva unnīyamānatvāt.
MS. copy, pp. 20-22.


Ibid. p. 16.


tatra smṛti-vyāvṛttam pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārtḥa-viṣaya-jñānatvam.
p. 20.


ajñāta-jñāpanaṃ pramāṇam iti tad asāram. Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. copy, p. 18.


Ibid. p. 47. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedāntic view of inference occurs in the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa, to which the Vedānta-kaumudī is in all probability indebted.


doṣābhāve sati yāvat-svāśraya-grāhaka-sāmagrī-grāhyatvarn ; svāśrayo vṛtti-jñānom, taḍ-grāhakaṃ sākṣi-jñānam tenāpi vṛtti-jñāne gṛhyamāṇe tad-gata-prāmāṇyam api gṛhyate.
pp. 336, 337.


vijñāna-sāmagrī-janyatve sati yat tad-anya-janyatvaṃ tad-abhāvasyaiva svatastvokty-angīkārāt.
MS. copy, p. 52.

jñaptāvapi jñāna-jñāpaka-sāmagrl-mātra-jñāpyatvaṃ svatastvam.
p. 61.


A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 372-375.


prākaṭyena yuktasyāpi tasya na sarvair viditatvaṃ sva-prakāśam api prākaṭyaṃ kasyacid evādṛṣṭa-yogāt sphurati na guṇatve jñānasya kathañcid artha-yogaḥ samastīti.
MS. copy, pp. 67, 68.

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