A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of mandana (a.d. 800): a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the ninth part in the series called the “the shankara school of vedanta (continued)”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

Maṇḍana Miśra’s Brahma-siddhi with the commentary of Śaṅ-khapāṇi is available in manuscript, and Mahāmahopādhyāya Kup-pusvāmi Śāstrī of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvāmi Śāstrī the present writer had an opportunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Śaṅkhapāṇi’s commentary[1].

The Brahma-siddhi is in four chapters,

  1. Brahma-kāṇḍa,
  2. Tarka-kāṇḍa,
  3. Niyoga-kāṇḍa,
  4. and Siddhi-kāṇḍa,

in the form of verses (kārikā) and long annotations (vṛtti). That Maṇḍana must have been a contemporary of Śaṅkara is evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who flourished before Śaṅkara, such as Śabara, Kumārila or Vyāsa, the author of the Yoga-sūtra-bhōṣya, and makes profuse references to the Upaniṣad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished after Śaṅkara[2].

Vācaspati also wrote a commentary, called Tattva-samīkṣā, on Maṇḍana’s Brahma-siddhi ; but unfortunately this text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been discovered.

  1. In the Brahma-kāṇḍa chapter Maṇḍana discusses the nature of Brahman;
  2. in the Tarka-kāṇḍa he tries to prove that we cannot perceive “difference” through perception and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upaniṣad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference.
  3. In the third chapter, the Niyoga-kāṇḍa, he tries to refute the Mīmāṃsā view that the Upaniṣad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā principle of interpretation, that all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This is by far the longest chapter of the book.
  4. The fourth chapter, the Siddhi-kāṇḍa, is the shortest: Maṇḍana says here that the Upaniṣad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the avidyā of jīva.

In the Brahma-kāṇḍa the most important Vedāntic concepts are explained by Maṇḍana according to his own view. He first introduces the problem of the subject (draṣṭṛ) and the object (dṛśya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained. For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject, then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality[3].

Proceeding further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been made to bring about this subject-object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (antaḥkaraṇa); but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure unchangeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects; if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the antaḥkaraṇa , then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there is only an appearance of perception.

If objects are not perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate and independent existence from the self[4]. Just as the very same man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (cit) ; for in that case it would be impossible to relate the two[5].

According to Maṇḍana avidyā is called māyā , or false appearance, because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhāva) of Brahman nor different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called avidyā; if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience (na vyavahāra-bījam) such as avidyā has; it has thus to be admitted that avidyā is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacanīyā)[6].

According to Maṇḍana avidyā belongs to the individual souls (jīva). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view; but he thinks that, avidyā being itself an inconsistent category, there is no wonder that its relation with jīva should also be inconsistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of avidyā with the jīvas arises as follows: the jīvas are essentially identical with Brahman, and the diversity of jlvas is due to imagination (kalpanā) ; but this imagination cannot be of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (tasyā vidyātmanaḥ kalpanā-śūnyatvāt); it cannot be the imagination of the jlvas, since the jīvas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination[7].

Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly, that the word māyā implies what is inconsistent; had it been a consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not māyā[8]. Secondly, it may be said that from avidyā come the jīvas and from the jīvas comes the avidyā , and that this cycle is beginningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the jīvas or of the avidyā[9].

This view is held by those who think that avidyā is not the material cause of the world: these are technically called avidyopādāna-bheda-vādins. It is through this avidyā that the jlvas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this avidyā is natural to the jīvas, since the jīvas themselves are the products of avidyā[10]. And it is through listening to the Vedāntic texts, right thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the avidyā is destroyed; it was through this avidyā that the jlvas were separated from Brahman ; with its destruction they attain Brahma-hood[11].

In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Śaṅkhapāṇi the commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative condition[12]. He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously and not as negation of each other.

A man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simultaneously (sukha-duḥkhe yugapaj janyete). Again, according to the scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g. in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure[13]. Śaṅkhapāṇi then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (viṣaya-prāptiṃ vinū kāma eva duḥkham ataḥ tan-nivṛttir eva sukham bhaviṣyati) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them[14].

An objection to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural, but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential condition[15]. Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to these objections Śaṅkhapāṇi points out that, even if a thing is much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of enjoying the pleasurable experience; for the desires are not wholly extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain.

So it is to be admitted that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its existence even before the desires are sublated[16]. If negation of desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food through bilious attacks is to be called happiness[17]. So it is to be admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedāntic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss[18].

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra and in his commentaries on some of the Upaniṣads and the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians, Śrīharṣa, Ānandajñāna and Citsukha, of the Śaṅkara school, are well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. But among the disciples of Śaṅkara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of the Śaṅkara school, Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa, Ānandajñāna, Citsukha, Nṛsiṃhāśrama and others, was Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana’s great dialectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of difference (bheda) in the Tarka-kāṇḍa chapter of his Brahma-siddhi.

The argument arose as follows: the category of difference (bheda) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upaniṣad texts should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of “difference.” Against such a view-point Maṇḍana undertakes to prove that “difference,” whether as a quality or characteristic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception (pratyakṣa)[19].

He starts by saying that perception yields three possible alternatives, viz.

  1. that it manifests a positive object,
  2. that it presents differences from other objects,
  3. that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects[20].

In the third alternative there may again be three other alternatives, viz.

  1. simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from others,
  2. first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference,
  3. first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object[21].

If by perception differences from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object and its differences, then it has to be admitted that “difference” is presented in perception; but, if it can be proved that only positive objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any presentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case the verdict of the Upaniṣads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now follows the argument.

Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects, e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated, and both these are positive in their notion.

The negation of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be interpreted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied), or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can be imagined only as a mental idea[22]. If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present senśe-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two[23].

In the case of the discovery of one’s own illusion, such as “this is not silver, but conch-shell,” only the latter knowledge is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was only when the presented object was perceived as “this before” that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch-shell. There is no negative concept without there first being a positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept[24]. This is therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences[25].

Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions, yet, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition, it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also have its difference from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anya-vyavacchedaḥ)[26]. Against such a view Maṇḍana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time; but, if the very perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and, since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities.

There is again a view that things are by their very nature different from one another (prakrtyaiva bhinnā bhāvāḥ), and thus, when by perception an object is experienced, its difference from other objects is also grasped by that very act.

In reply to this objection Maṇḍana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences; firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference, and hence there would be no difference among them; secondly, as “difference” has no form, the objects themselves would be formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation; fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept, no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many[27].

In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (parāpehṣaṃ vastuno bheda-svabhāvaḥ nātmāpekṣam), but not in relation to itself.

In reply to this objection Maṇḍana says that things which have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence; all relationing is mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things, and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things[28]. If relationing with other things constituted their essence, then each thing would depend on others—they would depend on one another for their existence (itaretarāśraya-prasaṅgāt).

In reply to this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition; but, if this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes; for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed.

In reply to this it is urged by the objector that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. Maṇḍana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function of this oppositional relation (apekṣā); for it does not produce the object, which iś produced by its own causes, and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated with the other objects (nānāpekṣa-pratiyogināṃ bhedah pratīyate). Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation; it is only when there is an oppositional relation between objects already experienced that difference manifests itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds of those who perceive and conceive[29]. But it is further objected to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive.

To this Maṇḍana’s reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion of production; that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence.

In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions, then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But Maṇḍana’s reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in name; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedānta view it is held that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object, the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them is not valid.

Again, the difficulty in the case of the Buddhist is in its own way none the less; for according to him all appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain the similarities of effects that we notice? It can be according to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes; so, if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedāntist may also in his turn explain all appearances of diversity through illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of difference in experience[30]. Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes.

But this objection is not valid, because even the self-same thing can serve diverse purposes; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no objection to there being a number of limited (avacchinna) qualities or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that things are different from one another because of their divergent powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is produced from milk and not from sesamum); but divergence of powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity.

It is a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such a special efficiency (sāmarthyātiśaya) that it can be the basis of innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent appearances.

Again,-it is held by some that “difference” consists in the negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of all things in all places would make them empty. If, however, specific negations are implied with reference to determinate entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these implied negations can operate only when there are these different entities, they depend mutually upon one another (itaretarāśraya) and cannot therefore hold their own.

Again, it cannot be said that the notion of “difference” arises out of the operation of perceptual processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination of the perceptual process); for there is no proof whatsoever that “difference,” as apart from- mutual negation, can be definitely experienced.

Again, if unity of all things as “existents” (sat) was not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms itself into various notions of difference[31]. In this connection Maṇḍana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways.

But it is not necessary to enter into these details. The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this, that he show’s that it is inconceivable and dialectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception[32].

In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi , called the Niyoga-kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana refutes the Mīmāṃsā view that the Vedāntic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā canon of interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth chapter, called the Siddhi-kāṇḍa , Maṇḍana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upaniṣad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its manifestation is due to the ignorance (avidyā) of the individual souls {jīva). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upaniṣad texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by ordinary experience, that the Upaniṣads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained.

Footnotes and references:


Citsukha, the pupil of Jñānottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called Abhiprāya-prakāśikā, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the beginning, is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. No. 3853. Anandapūrna also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siddhi, called Bhāva-śuddhi.


Maṇḍana’s other works are Bhāvanā-viveka, Vidhi-viveka , Vibhrama-viveka and Sphoṭa-siddhi. Of these the Vidhi-viveka was commented upon by Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-kaṇikā, and the Sphoṭa-siddhi was commented upon by the son of Bhavadāsa, who had also written a commentary, called Tattva-vibhāvanā, on Vācaspati Miśra’s Tattva-bindu. The commentary on the Sphoṭa-siddhi is called Gopālika. Maṇḍana’s Vibhrama-viveka is a small work devoted to the discussion of the four theories of illusion (khyāti),ātma-khyāti, asat-khyāti, anyathākhyāti and ākhyāti. Up till now only his Bhāvanā-viveka and Vidhi-viveka have been published.


ekatva evāyaṃ draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-bḥāvovakalpate, droṣṭur eva cid-ātmanaḥ tatḥā tathā vipariṇāmād vivartanād vā; nānātve tu vivikta-svabḥōvayor asamsṛṣṭa-paraspara-svarūpayor asambaddhayoḥ kīdṛśo draṣṭṛ-dṛśya-bhāvaḥ.
      Kuppusvāmi Śāstrī’s edition of Brahma-siddhi, p. 7. (In the press.)


ekāntaḥkaraṇa-saṃkrāntāv asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, citeḥ śuddhatvād apariṇāmādaprati-saṃkramāc ca; dṛśyā buddḥiḥ citi-sannidheś chāyaya vivartata iti ced atha keyaṃ tac cḥāyatā? a-tad-ātmanaḥ tad-avabhāsaḥ; na tarḥiparamārthato dṛśyarn dṛśyate, paramārtḥataś ca dṛśyamānaṃ draṣṭṛ-vyatiriktam asti iti dur-bhanam.


Śaṅkhapāni in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the antaḥkaraṇa or durbhaṇam and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified:

na tu sphaṭikopame cetasi indriya-praṇālī-saṃkrāntānām orthānāṃ tatraiva saṃkrāntena ātma-caitanyena sambaddhānāṃ tad-dṛśyatvaṃ ghaṭiṣyate.

Adyar MS. p. 75.

It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, as developed later on by Dharmarājādhvarīndra, which held that the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) becomes superimposed on external objects in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Sāṃkhya doctrine of cic-chāyāpatti in perception, which was somehow forced into Śaṅkara’s loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. The fact that Maṇḍana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of Śaṅkara and may, on the other hand, be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary interpretation of Padmapāda. But probably the reply of that school would be that, though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (cit).


tathā hi darpaṇa-tala-stkam ātmānaṃ vibhaktam ivātmanaḥ pratyeti; cites tu vibhaktam asaṃsṛṣṭam tayā cetyata iti dur-avagamyam.


Ibid. p. 9. It may not be out of place here to point out that Ānandabodha’s argument in his Nyāya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyā, which has been treated in a later section of this chapter, is based on this argument of Maṇḍana.


itaretarāśraya prasaṅgāt kalpanōdhīno hi
jīva vibhāgaḥ, jīvāśrayā kalpanā.
     Ibid. p.


anupapadyamānārthaiva hi māyā; upapadyamānārthatve vathārtha-bhāvān na māyā syāt.


anāditvān netaretarāśrayatva-doṣah.


na hi jīveṣu nisarga-jā vidyāsti, avidyaiva hi naisargikī, āgantukyā vidyāyāh pravilayaḥ.
pp. 11-12.


avidyayaiva tu brahmaṇo jlvo vibhaktaḥ, tan-nivrttau brahma-svarūpam eva bhavati, vathā ghatādi-bhede tad-ākāśam pariśuddham paramākaśam eva bhavati.


duḥkha nivṛttir vā tad-viśiṣṭ.ātmopalabdhir vā sukham astu, sarvathā sukham nāma na dharmāntaram asti.
      Adyar MS. of the Śaṅkhapāni commentary, p. 18.


Ibid. pp. 20, 21.


Ibid. p. 22.


saḥajo hi rāgaḥ sarva-puṃsām asti sa tu viṣaya-viśeṣeṇa āvir-bhavati.
P. 23


ataḥ kāma-nivṛtteḥ prag-bhavi sukhu-vastu-bhutam eṣṭavyam.
p. 27.


Ibid. p. 25.


yadi duḥkḥā-bhāvaḥ sukhaṃ syāt tataḥ syād evaṃ bhāvāntare tu sukhe duḥkhābhāve ca tathā syād eva.
p. 161.


This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to the end of the second chapter.


tatra pratyakṣe trayaḥ halpāḥ, vastu-svarūpa-siddhiḥ vastv-antarasya vyavacchedaḥ ubhayaṃ vā.


ubhayasminn api traividhyam, yaugapadyam, vyavaccheda-pūrvako vidhiḥ, vidhi-pūrvako vyavacchedaḥ.


kutaścin nimiltād buddhau labdha-rūpāṇām baḥir niṣedhaḥ kriyate.


kramaḥ samgacchate yuktyā naika-vijñāna-karmaṇoḥ
na sanniḥita-jaṃ tac ca tadanyāmarśi jāyate.
ii. Kārikā 3.


pūrva-vijñāna-viḥite rajatādau “idam” iti ca sannihitārtha-sāmānye niṣedho vidhi-pūrva eva, śuktikā-siddhis tu virodhi-niṣedha-pūrva ucyate; vidhi-pūrvatā ca niyamena niṣedhasyocyate, na vidher niṣedḥa-pūrvakatā niṣidhyate.
ii. Kārikā 3.


na ca tatra eka-jñānasya kramavad-vyāpāratā ubhaya-rūpasya utpatteḥ.


riīlasya nirvikalpaka-darśanasya yat sāmarthyaṃ niyataika-kāraṇatvaṃ tena anādi-vāsanā-vaśāt pratibhāsitaṃ janitam idam nedam iti vikalpo bhāvābhāva-vyavahāram pravartayati... satyam jñāna-dvayam idaṃ savikalpakaṃ tu nirvikalpakaṃ tayor mūla-bhūtaṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anya-vyavaccheda iti brūma iti.
       Śaṅkhapāni’s commentary, ibid.


na bhedo vastuno rūpaṃ tad-abhāva-prasaṅgataḥ
arūpeṇa ca bhinnatvaṃ vastuno nāvakalpate.
, n. 5.


nāpekṣā nāma kaścid vastu-dharmo yena vastuni vyavasthāpyeran, na khalu sva-hetu-prāpitodayeṣu sva-bhāva-vyavasthiteṣu vastuṣu sva-bhāva-sthitaye vastvantarāpekṣā yujyate.
11. 6, vṛtti.



pauruṣeyīm apekṣām na vastv anuvartate, ato na vastu-svabhāvaḥ.


at ha nir-anvaya-vināśānām api kalpanā-viṣayād abhedāt kāryasya tulyatā hanta tarhi bhedād eva kalpanā-viṣayāt kāryābheda-siddher mūdhā kāraṇa-bheda-kalpanā.


pratyekam anubiddḥatvād abhedena mṛṣā mataḥ
bhedo yathā
taraṅgāṇām bhedād bhedaḥ kalāvataḥ.
u. Kārikā 31.


ekasyaivōstu mahimā yan nāneva prakāśate
lāghavān na tu bhinnānām yac cakāśaty abhinnavat.
, 11. Kārikā 32.

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