A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2

by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081

This page describes the philosophy of the world-appearance: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the first part in the series called the “the shankara school of vedanta (continued)”, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.

The Upaniṣads, called also the Vedānta, contain passages which indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upaniṣads before Śaṅkara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is contained in the meagre references that are found in Śaṅkara’s commentaries or the works of other, later, commentators.

As an example I may refer to Bhartṛprapañca, who tried to give a realistic interpretation of the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad by treating the world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman[1]. Śaṅkara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the Upaniṣads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but, being under the influence of Gaudapāda, differed from them on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elaborately in all his commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtras.

The main thesis of Śaṅkara, as has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the Upaniṣads; but in the Upaniṣads there are many passages which are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield a meaning which would support Śaṅkara’s thesis.

Śaṅkara therefore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (vyāva-hārika) and a philosophic view (pāramārthika), and explains the Upaniṣads on the supposition that, while there are some passages in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of view, there are many others which speak of things only from a common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real God as creator. Śaṅkara has applied this method of interpretation not only in his commentary on the Upaniṣads, but also in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. Judging by the sūtras alone, it does not seem to me that the Brahma-sūtra supports the philosophical doctrine of Śaṅkara, and there are some sūtras which Śaṅkara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations; for he could easily get out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions found in the sūtras or in the Upaniṣad passages were merely an estimate of things from the common-sense point of view.

Though on the basis of Śaṅkara’s own statements, as well as those of his later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of Śaṅkara’s philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought to prove that Śaṅkara’s philosophy was realistic[2]. That there was some amount of realism in Śaṅkara is proved by his own confession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists (vijñāna-vādins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (śūnya-vādins).

I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according to the Vedānta, from the point of view of the Saṅkara school of Vedānta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Śaṅkara’s own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is one of the most important points of the Śaṅkara school of philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail.

But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it seems desirable that Śaṅkara’s doctrine of illusion should be treated in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of Buddhistic thought which preceded Saṅkara. Taking the Śūnyavāda theory of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, we see that they also introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute truth. Thus Nāgārjuna says in his Mādhyamika-sūtras that the Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth, truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense presuppositions and judgments (saṃvṛti-satya) and truth as unqualified and ultimate (paramārtha-satya)[3].

The word saṃvṛti literally means “closed.” Candrakīrti explains saṃvṛti as meaning “closing on all sides” and says that it is ignorance (ajñāna) which is denoted by the term saṃvṛti here, because it covers the truth of all things[4]. In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an appearance which is hidden by ignorance.

This world is not contradicted in our world-experience; but, as each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and so on, it is not possible to assert anything as to the nature or characteristic (svabhāva) of anything as it is. Things are known to us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as product complexes. Nothing is produced of itself, and so the products are never by themselves self-existent, but exist only through the coming together of different entities. That which has any nature of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes, and so there is nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own.

The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil of ignorance over it, and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred to by the term loka-saṃvṛta. This is spoken of also as tathya-saṃmti (real ignorance), as distinguished from mithyā-saṃvṛti (false ignorance), properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations of magic, mirage reflections, etc.[5] Those appearances which are due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted in experience are called mithyā-saṃvṛta , because their falsehood is discovered in experience. The falsehood of the world-appearances, however, can be realized only when their real nature (paramārtha-rūpa) as a succession of essenceless products of causal complexes is properly understood.

The world holds good and remains uncontradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical experiences, and it is only when it is understood that these phenomena have no nature of their own that they are considered false. All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances, subjective and objective, and try to give a rational analysis and estimate of them; and it is only through an experience of these world-phenomena and a rational understanding of them that one realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid of essence.

The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true only in a limited manner during the period when the veil of ignorance is not removed from our eyes; and this is signified by designating the truth (satya) of the world as only loka-saṃvṛta. This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared with the ordinary illusions of perception (when, e.g., a piece of rope is perceived as a snake, or when one sees a mirage in a desert).

But a question arises—if the world-appearance has no essence of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it that the world-phenomena appear at all? To such a question Nāgārjuna’s answer is that the appearance of the world is like the appearance of mirages or dreams, which have no reality of their own, but still present an objective appearance of reality[6]. The world is not a mere nothing, like a lotus of the sky or the hare’s horn, which are simply non-existent (avidyamāna). Thus there is not only the ultimate truth (pavamārtha) ; there is also the relative truth of the phenomenal world (loka-saṃvṛti-satya) ; there are, further, the sense-illusions, hallucinations and the like which are. contradicted in ordinary experience (aloka-saṃmta or mithyā-saṃvṛta), and also that which is merely non-existent, like the hare’s horn.

The error (viparyāsa) of world-appearance is considered as being of four kinds, viz. the consideration of the momentary as eternal, the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable, the consideration of the unholy as holy, and of that which has no soul as having a soul[7]. And this error is due to ignorance {avidyā). Candrakīrti quotes a passage from the Ārya-dṛḍhāśaya-paripṛcchā, in which it is said that, just as a man may see in a dream that he is spending the night with the wife of the king, and, suddenly realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life (thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have perceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none[8].

Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing; but, as has already been explained, the Buddhists emphasized the fact that, in dreams, the illusory appearances were no doubt objectively known as objective presentations of which we had previously become aware—experiences through which we pass, though there is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. It was here that Śaṅkara differed. Thus, in his introduction to the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra he says that the essence of all illusory perception is that one thing is mistaken for another, that the qualities, characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken for the qualities, characteristics or attributes of another.

Illusion is defined as the false appearance in some object of something experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing in regard to another; others explain it as an error due to the nonapprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics (viparīta-dharmatva) ; but in all these different ways of analysis illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as two moons[9].

Śaṅkara then suggests that, since the universal self (pratyag-ātmari) is felt through our feeling of “I” and since it is immediate in all experience (aparokṣa), it is not absolutely unrelated and unindicated (aviṣaya) in experience, and consequently it is quite possible that the non-self (anātman) and its characteristics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the universal self is called nescience (avidyā).

In his commentary on Gaudapāda’s Kārikā , I. 17, Śaṅkara says that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appearance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake, which later on became non-existent when right knowledge supervened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence at all[10]. Śaṅkara in commenting on Gaudapāda’s Kārikā explains with approval Gaudapāda’s view that the world of common experience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false; for in a dream a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet, when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed.

The dream experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of experiences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other well-known instances of illusion—the mirage, for example. Since it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period of appearance.

The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the pragmatic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences, is invalid; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may well be contradicted by dream experiences; a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations[11]. But Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara differ from the Śūnyavādin Buddhists in this—that they think that even false creations must have some basis in truth.

If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope: there could not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis of truth (āspada) underlying them[12]. Nāgārjuna, it will be remembered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the ground of their being interdependent and not having anything which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self-evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearances that was called “nothingness” or śūnyatā by Nāgārjuna.

There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything independently by itself without reference to something else; nothing therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself. All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom creations; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth anywhere. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither Śaṅkara nor Gaudapāda appears to have tried to show why the inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances.

Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experiences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing appearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are imposed—and this basis is the self (ātman), or Brahman, which is the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit, negating all differences and duality (viśuddha-vijñapti-mātra-sattā - dvaya-rūpeṇa)[13].

Just as the false creation of “snake” appears in the case of the “rope,” so all such judgments as “I am happy,” “I am unhappy,” “I am ignorant,” “I am born,” “I am old,” “I am with a body,” “I perceive,” etc., are all merely false predications associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining independently by itself.

By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, pratītyasamutpāda, Nāgārjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena show itself? Śaṅkara did not try to prove with a keen logical dialectic that the world-appearance was false: he simply took it for granted, since the Upaniṣads proclaimed Brahman as the ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself? Saṅkara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due to ignorance {avidyā) ; it could not be spoken of as either existing or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver.

But Padmapāda, who wrote the commentary known as Pañca-pādikā on the first four sūtras of Saṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, says that the precise meaning of the term “false conception” (mithyā-jñāna) in Śaṅkara’s introduction to his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras is that there is a force or power or potency (śakti) of nescience which constitutes materiality (jaḍātmikā avidyā-śaktiḥ), and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff {upādāna) of the world-appearance[14]. It is well to remember in this connection that, according to Śaṅkara’s philosophy, it is not only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance, but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that may be associated with the self.

Thus, when one says “I,” this ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts—the one, pure intelligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated. The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objectivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence, thus causing the judgment “I am” or “I am a man[15].” This avidyā-śakti, or power of avidyā , subsists in the pure self and, on the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman, and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary experience[16].

The illusion consists in the association of the psychological qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the transcendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). These psychological determinations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys and sorrows—so these psychological determinations in a beginningless cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent self-luminous self[17].

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as Padmapāda or Prakāśātman explains, ajñāna or nescience is some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have come into being. This ajñāna is not the ajñāna of the Buddhists, i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this adhyāsa, or illusion, is not the viparyaya of Nāgārjuna; for here it is a positive power or stuff. Thus Prakāśātman argues that all effects have at their back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world-appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which it has evolved or was made up; and ajñāna , lying in the transcendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause[18].

This avidyā- potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature. This positive ajñāna is directly perceived in such immediate perceptions as “I do not know myself or others,” and can also be inferred or comprehended by implication[19]. The fact that ajñāna or avidyā is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self shows that it is dependent thereon; avidyā is not, however, a power, but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and objective ; yet it is called a power, or śakti , because of its dependence (para-tantratā) on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration of the entire dependence of avidyā and its transformations on the self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects— the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind[20].

The self thus not only holds the ajñāna within it as a dependent function, but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the ajñāna with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be veiled by this ajñāna and made the underlying basis of all world-appearances of flyñāna-transformations[21].

Appaya Dīkṣita, referring in his Siddhānta-leśa to the view of the writer of the Padārtha-tattva , summarizes the matter thus: Brahman and Māyā form together the material cause (ubhayam upādānam), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are two distinct characteristics, “being” (sattā) from Brahman and materiality (jāḍya) from Māyā. Brahman is the cause, as the unchanging basis of the Māyā, which is the cause as being the stuff that actually undergoes transformation[22]. Vācaspati Miśra also conceives Brahman, jointly with its avidyā , to be the material cause of the world (avidyā-sahita-brahmopādānam)[23]. In his adoration hymn at the beginning of his Bhāmatī he describes Brahman as being in association with its companion, the indefinable avidyā , the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe[24].

Sarva-jñātma Muni, however, does not wish to give māyā the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of Māyā; for Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be in a remote and modified sense (upalakṣaṇa), through the instrumentality of māyā[25]. The author of the Siddhānta-muktāvalī is referred to by Appaya Dīkṣita as holding that it is the māyā and māyā alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance; and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is only the basis of the subsistence of māyā and is only from that point of view spoken of as being the material cause[26].

It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between māyā and the self or Brahman in the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic disputes over words or modes of expression, and have but little philosophical significance. As has already been said, these questions do not seem to have arisen in Śaṅkara’s mind. He did not think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of avidyā and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared; for even illusions required something on which they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of māyā to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe.

The natural objection against such views is that the term avidyā (formed by compounding the negative particle a and vidyā “knowledge”) may mean either absence of knowledge (vidyā-bhāvaḥ) or false knowledge (mithyā-jñānam); and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made[27]. The answer given by Ānandabodha Bhattāraka to such an objection is that this avidyā is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category, which is beginningless and indefinable (anādy-anirvācyāvidyāśra-yaṇāt).

The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts. Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instrumental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) that which is true, nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is naturally forced upon the Vedāntists that the material cause of this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent[28].

Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇa-mālā quotes approvingly from the Brahma-tattva-samīkṣā of Vācaspati to show that avidyā is called avidyā or nescience because it is a hypothetic category which is neither “is” nor “is not,” and is therefore unintelligible; avidyā signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category[29].

Ānandabodha points out that the acceptance of avidyā is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance—considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be regarded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not make this concept either intelligible or consistent[30]. The concept of avidyā is thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent.

Footnotes and references:


Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca from the writings of Śaṅkara and his commentator Ānandajñāna and from Sureśvara’s Vārttika have been collected by Prof. Hiriyanna, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925.


Advaita Philosophy by K. Vidyāratna, published by the Calcutta University Press, 1924.


dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharma-deśanā
loka-saṃvṛti-satyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ.
xxiv. 8, p. 492, B.B. edition.


Ajñānaṃ hi samantāt sarva-padārtha-tattvāvacchādanāt saṃvṛtir ity ucyate.

Candrakīrti however gives two other meanings of the word saṃvṛti, which do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology. In the first of the two meanings saṃvṛti means interdependent origination or pratītyasamutpāda, and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense, which can be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known—

saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo loka-vyavahāraḥ, sa ca abhidhānābhidheya-jñāna-jñeyādilak-ṣaṇaḥ.


Bodhi-caryāvatāra-pañjikā, p. 353, Biblotheca Indica Series, 1902.


Mādhyamika-sūtra, xxiii. 8.


Iha catvāro viparyāsā ucyante: tadyathā pratikṣaṇa-vināśini skandha-pañcake yo nityam iti grāhaḥ sa viparyāsaḥ . . .duḥkhātmake skandha-pañcake yaḥ sukham iti viparīto grāhaḥ so ’paro viparyāsaḥ ,... śarīram aśuci-svabhāvaṃ tatra yo śucitvena grāhaḥ sa viparyāsaḥ,.. .pañca-skandḥaṃ nirātmakaṃ tasmin ya ātma-grāhaḥ anātmani ātmābḥiniveśaḥ sa viparyāsaḥ.

Candraklrti’s commentary on ibid. xxiii. 13. Compare it with the Yoga-sūtra, 11. 5, Ānandāśrama Series.


Candrakīrti’s commentary on the Mādhyamika-sūtra, xxiii. 13.


Śaṅkara’s Adhyāsa-bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, Nirnaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1904.


Rajjvāṃ sarpa iva kalpitatvāt na tu sa vidyate. . .na hi rajjvāṃ bhrāntibuddhyā kalpitaḥ sarpo vidyamānaḥ san vivekato nivṛttaḥ; tathedaṃ prapañcākhyaṃ māyā-mātram. Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, 1. 17, Ānandāśrama Series.


Śaṅkara’s commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, n. 1-12.


Na hi nirāspadā rajju-sarpa-mṛgatṛṣṇikādayaḥ kvacit upalabhyante. Ibid.


Gaudapāda’s Kārikā, II. 17.


Pañca-pādikā, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891.


asmat-pratyaye yo ’nidam-aṃśaś cid-eka-rasaḥ tasmiṃs tad-bala-nirbḥāsita-tayā lakṣaṇato yuṣmad-arthasya manuṣyābhimānasya sambhedaivāvabhāsaḥ sa eva adhyāsaḥ.
p. 3.


ataḥ sā pratyak-citi brahma-svarūpāvabhāsaṃ pratibadhnāti ahaṃkārād-y-atad-rūpa-pratibhāsa-nimittaṃ ca bhavati.
p. 5.


Prakāśātman’s Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 10, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1892.


sarvaṃ ca hāryam sopādānaṃ bhāva-kāryatvāt ghaṭādivad ity anumānāt ... tasmān mithyārtha-taj-jñānātmakaṃ mithyā-bhūtam adhyāsam iipñdāna-kāraṇa-sāpekṣam ... mithyā-jñānam eva adhyāsopādānam.
pp. 11—12.


Ibid. p. 13.


śaktir ity ātma-para-tantratayā ātmanaḥ sarva-kāryopādānasya nirvodlh-ṛtvam. Ibid. p. 13. Ātma-kāraṇatva-nirvodhṛtvād ātma-para-tantratvā ca śakti-matyām api śakti-śabda upacāritaḥ.
      Akhaṇḍānanda Muni’s Tattva-dtpana, p. 65,
      Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902.


ataḥ svaprakāśe ’pi ātmani vicitra-śakti-bhāva-rūpāvidyā-prayuktam āvaraṇaṃ durapahṇavam.
      Rāmānanda Sarasvatī’s Vivaraṇopanyāsa, p. 16,
      Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.


Siddhānta-leśa, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890.


Bhāmatī on Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya, 1. 1.2, Nirnaya-Sāgara Press, 1904.


Anirvācyāvidyā-dvitaya-sacivasya prabhavato vivartā yasyaite viyad-anila-tejob-avanayaḥ .
p. I.


Saṃkṣepa-śārtraka, I. 333, 334, Bhāū Śāstri’s edition.


Siddhānta-leśa, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890.


avidyā hi vidyābhavo mithyā-jñānaṃ vā na cobhayaṃ kasya cit samavāyi-kāraṇatn adravyatvāt.
      Ānandabodha’s Nyāya-makaranda, p. 122,
      Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.


Ibid. pp. 122-124.


sad-asad-ubhayānubhayādi-prakāraiḥ anirvacanīyatvam eva hy avidyānām avidyātvam.
as quoted in Pramāṇa-mālā, p. 10,
      Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1907.


Vailakṣciṇya-vāco-yuktir hi pratiyogi-nirūpaṇād yauktikatva-prakaṭana-phalā na tv evaṃ-rūpatāyāḥ sāmanjasya-sampādanāya ity avocāma. 
p. 10.

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