5.3. Three Stages (3): Mokṣa (Liberation)

At the third stage mokṣa comes into being. It is mokṣa when the partnership between soul and matter is dissolved and his ideal character is restored to the soul. It then transcends saṃsāra and flies up to its permanent abode at the summit of lokakāśa. The final condition is one of inactivity, but it is characterized by complete knowledge and absolute bliss.

The soul in its pure state is endowed with infinite with infinite perception infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power. The liberated soul transcends saṃsāra. It goes straight to the top of the world and dwells there forever. The freed soul has a beginning but has no end. These free souls enjoy a kind of interpenetrating existence on account of their oneness of statues.

Those who have followed our line of thought from Karmaphenomenology to the chapter proceeding this, must have understood the inner psychology of the whole trend of thought and culture, the sole objective of which is the emancipation of the soul from the miseries of the world and its a element to a state of the highest felicity of the concern of everyman to know and which the sadhu takes so much pains to acquire. The Jain sadhu, as it is now well-known, aims at nothing less than the complete deliverance of the soul from all veil and covering–Sarvavaranavimukti-rmiktih. But it is not so with the followers of the other systems of thought and culture. They have various states of the beatitude which they aim at according to the different schools of thought to which they belong. For instance the Vedantist has two states of bliss in view viz., one inferior which is attained in this life by means of knowledge, tatraparah jīvanmukti lakshanam tatvajnantarena; and the other superior, obtainable after many births of gradual advancement to perfection, param niksreyasam kramena bhavati.

Similarly the Charvakas hold it to be either absolute autonomy here in this life or death that is bliss, svatantryam mrityurba mokshah.

The Madhyāmikas say that it is the extinction of the self-hood that is called liberation, atmochhedo mokshah.

The Vijnani philosophers have it to be for a clear and edified understanding, nirmala jnanodayah.

The Ramanujists hold it be the knowledge of vasudeva as the cause of this all, Vasudeva jnanam.

The Ballabhis find it in the sporting with Krishna in Heaven, Krishnena saha goloke lilanubhava.

The Pasupatas and the Maheswaras see it in the holding of all dignity, Paramaiswaryam.

The Kapalikas define it to be the delight found in the sweet embrace of Hara and Parvati, Hara-Parvatyalinganam.

The Raseswarvadins find it in the possession of sound health and happiness by virtue of mercury, Paradena dehasthairyam.

The Vaishesikas seek it in the extinction of all kinds of pain - dukkha nivrittiriti.

The Mimansakas trace it in the enjoyment of Heavenly bliss - Swargadi sukhabhoga.

The Panini grammarians find it in the powers of speech, Brahma rupaya banya darshanam.

The Sankhya materialists have it in the fusion of matter and spirit - Prakritow Purushasyavasthanam.

The Udasina atheists trace it in the eradication of egotism, ahamkara nivritti.

The Patanjalas see it in the absolute nonchalant state of the Person originating as it does from the utter indifference to matters worldly, Purusasya nirlepa kaivalyam.

The Pratyabhignanis interprete is as the realization of the perfection of the soul, Purnatma labhah.

The Sarvagnas find it in the eternal continuum of the feeling of the highest felicity-nitya niratishaya sukha bodhah.

The Mayavādins say it to be manifest on the removal of the error of one's having a separate existence as a particle of the Supreme BeingBrahmansika jīvasya mithyajnana nivritti.

Such are the conceptions of the Highest Good which the different schools of thought ultimately aim at. A comparative study of the nature of these conceptions will make it clear that the Jain conception of the same gives us but a clear idea as to what a mumukshin soul really strives and struggle for. It is a kind of swaraj, self-rule, a state of autonomy, pure and simple, which every jīva instinctively aspires after to realize by tearing asunder the veil or the covering in and through the process of which the Ideal is realized. In the ordinary empirical state of our being the ideal is ideal; it is far ahead of the practical And the Jains hold that if the ideal remains an ideal, far ahead of the practical forever and evermore, it can never be made realizable. So the Jains interpret it otherwise, from their points of view, and really speaking, there are two tendencies running parallel all through the human life and culture.

One is to idealize the real and the other is realizing the ideal. These two tendencies are often at war with each other. One tends us to take the existing state of things and affairs as the best of their kind and so we must make the most of it. From this point of view whoever is found to go out of the way and to pull the world up to a higher level to have a so-called richer outlook of life, he is dubbed as the impatient idealist moving in eccentric orbits. But the other tendency by virtue of which they struggle to raise the world to a higher or ideal state of things, the tendency that is born of the intense dissatisfaction at the present state of things and affairs, is the tendency to realize the Ideal. Be that as it may, complete deliverance from the veil and covering of karma is called mokṣa or emancipation from the miseries and afflicttions of the world. Karma, we have seen, is the cause of bondage of the soul. But the karma which whirls us round and round through the cycle of saṃsāra has been classified either into papa or punya.

Punya and papa are the causes of all our weals and woes with this difference only that those who commit sin go down to the lower grades of saṃsāra, or sink into hell to suffer penalties as the natural consequences thereof whereas those who perform virtuous acts take births in the higher grades of saṃsāra to enjoy there the pleasure of life and achieve the objects of their desire. So papa and punya both have got to be worked out for the attainment of freedom-mokṣa.

Here one may argue that if nirjarā or purging means complete washing out the soul of all karma-matter, papa and punya, foreign to it, how are we then to look upon punya-karma which is enjoined on us as means to the attainment of the state of bliss and beatitude which is only possible when the soul has got rid of all karma-matter?

To this the Jains reply it is true that punya ensures comfort, and happiness; but they are but comforts or pleasure of this mundane world. The eternal felicity born of the born of the complete deliverance from all veil and covering, cannot be the consequence of punya however wisely and carefully may it have been discharged: for the consequences of punya karma are always conditioned in as much as karma and the consequences thereof are possible only in so far, as the mundane existence is concerned, but with reference to what is devoid of all name and form, being above all causality, it is not possible. In other words, karma cannot evolve things of permanent character. Karma can produce, transform, conjoin, or re-adjust. Over nothing beyond these has karma any jurisdiction. Thus it is clear that karma is possible only in saṃsāra.

Some may remark that karma done with judiciousness and indifference to the consequences thereof might result in the emancipation of the soul. But this, the Jains hold, does not stand to reason; because mokṣa is not the result of anything done or performed. Mokṣa is the tearing asunder to the snares of karma binding the jīva under the sway of subjection to the saṃsāra, and, therefore, it is not the effect of anything preceding it as its cause. A Karma cannot destroy karma. It changes only to re-appear in another form. Besides the effects of karma are traced in things which have origination (utpada) and the like. But mokṣa which is eternal in reality cannot be said to be the result of any work. Ordinarily karma manifests itself in the production of a thing, in joining one thing to another, in transforming one into another and the like But speaking from the mishchaya naya, mokṣa has no origin. The jīva, as we have seen elsewhere, is constitutionally free and potentially divine. And it is simply due to subjection (mithyatva) that it appears to us as otherwise.

Indeed what is contended is partially true, replies the opponent, but not wholly admissible; since the nature of the work done without the knowledge thereof is of one kind; and different is the nature of the duty discharged with a thorough knowledge of the same and simply discharged for duty's sake with absolute indifference to the results that would accrue thereof. To show an analogous case, poison kills: but when judiciously administered by a physician efficient in the science and art of the administration of drugs, it acts like nectar. And this is what we mean when we state that mokṣa or deliverance is derived or results from the wise discharging of duties for duty's sake.

But we the Jains hold it to be altogether meaningless or misleading, since the analogy does not hold good here; nor is there any proof to verify the truth of the statement: for, it is in and through origination, conjunction, transformation or re-adjustment, that karma can work itself out and through nothing else beyond these four; because of the want to all manner of evidence, direct or indirect. So it cannot be maintained that mokṣa is derived from the wise discharging of duties for duty's sake.

The opponent might remark that to say this is to deny the merit of such scriptural injunctions as laid down-under the heading of Jural Seventies (Chran sittari) which have been imperatively enjoined both on the monks and the laity. Does not this denial stand as an indirect evidence to prove that mokṣa results from the wise discharging of duties as laid down in the Jural Ethics? Complete deliverance from the veil and covering, therefore, we hold, is the result, though not the effect, of our wisely working along the lines of Jural Ethics which is imperatively enjoined on every man. Otherwise none would have ever been inclined in any way to work along the lines of Jural Ethics.

To say this rejoined the Jains is to state that ' mokṣa is the result of our being true in thought and deed to the injunctions of Jural Ethics and on that account it cannot be said to be the effect of our doing something. But what does this your statement mean? Mere euphonic difference in the words result and effect which are synonymous in sense and significance does not always make out the difference in respect of their imports. For, it involves a contradiction to say that though mokṣa is the result of our being true to the injunctions of Jural Ethics yet it is not the effect of our performing the duties as laid down therein. Of course to maintain your position you will perhaps contend that here karma takes the position of knowledge.

Though mokṣa is not really the product of knowledge, yet in common parlance we say "deliverance is due to knowledge." But this your contention we, the Jains, hold is of no avail; because when we say deliverance is due to knowledge, we thereby mean that the light of knowledge dispels the darkness of ignorance hindering the deliverance and it is because of the light of knowledge dispelling the hindering darkness of ignorance whereby mokṣa is realized, that we say ' mokṣa or deliverance is due to knowledge'; but karma cannot remove this dark veil of ignorance.

Karma is conceived as hindrance to mokṣa and this hindrance cannot be removed by karma itself; because karma cannot destroy karma; rather karma generates karma and until and unless all karmic energetic are dissipated away from the body of the soul, its natural freedom cannot be made manifest. And moreover because this mokṣa or freedom is constitutional (swabhava) with the very soul itself, it cannot be said to be derived out of or result from anything else.

Then again it can't be maintained that karma removes ne-science (Avidya) for there is a gulf of difference in the essential nature between karma and knowledge. To make it more clear, ne-science or nonknowledge (ajñaṇa) is subreption as to the true nature of one's own self, while knowledge (jñāṇa) as opposed to ne-science is the realizetion of the true nature of the same. Hence ne-science which is of the nature of the subreption is contradictory to knowledge which is of the nature of true realization. And in this way we may well interpret that light of knowledge dispels darkness of ne-science. Therefore karma and knowledge are altogether opposite to each other in kind. But karma does not stand in such relation of opposition to no-science. Hence karma cannot be said remove no-science (ajñaṇa). Taking an alternative position, if we interpret ne-science either as want of know-ledge, doubtful knowledge or misapprehension, then this ne-science can only be removed by knowledge alone and not by karma, because ne-science taken as such does not stand in opposition to karma.

So we see mokṣa is not the product of anything. It is the realization of the Ideal. Self in and by itself which is possible only when all the karma-particles have fallen off from It, Jīvasya krita karma kshayena yatswarupavasthanam tanmoksha. Conventionally (Vyavahar naya) mokṣa is said to be a kind of paryaya of the jīva. It is important to note that soul is no airy nothing as the Intellectualist of the Buddhists hold. It is a sustentative, positive entity, and as such it much exists in a state of being called a paryaya from the phenomenal point of view (vyavahar naya). And this paryaya too cannot be wholly distinct and different from the substance itself whereof it is a paryaya; for, who has ever seen or conceived of a substance bereft of paryaya and paryaya without substance, dravyam paryaya viyutam paryaya dravya barjitah: kah kada kena kim rupa drista mane a kena veti.

Mokṣa, thus, is the emancipation of the soul from the snares of karma (karma-pasha). Like the other moral categories the Jain sages have also resolved this mokṣa into bhava and dravya. When the soul becomes free from the four Ghatiya karmas or the 'Action-currents of Injury' it is said to have bhava mokṣa and when the four Aghatiya karmas or the ‘Action-currents of Non-injury’ disappear from the constitution of the soul, it is said to have attained dravya mokṣa. The psychology underlying this resolution of mokṣa into subjective (bhava) and objective (dravya) is too obvious to require any detailed discussion. When the soul in and through the processes of nirjarā or dissipation of karmas, gets rid of the four-fold action-currents of injury to the natural vision (darshan) knowledge (jnana), and the like of the soul, it becomes omniscient (kevalin), because the soul is just like a mirror which becomes dim and hazy when the karma barganas veil its surface. By nirjarā, the karma-barganas are purged from the constitution of the soul which on that account, attains to clearness and omniscience (keval jnana).

Having attained the keval jnana, the cause of forging fresh fetters of bondage being absent by virtue of samvara or stoppage, and nirjarā being yet in the processes of working, the jīvanmukta kevalin gradually becomes free from all the residuum of aghatiya karmas known as vedanya, ayu, nama and gotra and thereafter attains to a state of bliss never-ending and beatitude everlasting. The realization by the jīva of this viz., his permanent state of being in knowledge and delight infinite is what is termed as mokṣa, freedom or emancipation from the snares of karma for which reason we have the adage,—karma-pasha vinirmuktah mokshah. And when the soul is thus liberated it goes straight up to the siddhasila or the Region of the Free and the Liberated at the summit of lokakash. Speaking from the stand-point of numeral naya, a siddha has no form whereof he is imperceptible by the senses, but viewed from vyavahara stand-point he has a shadowy form of a human figure which is but an embodiment of Right-vision. Right-knowledge and Right-conduct in and through which a jīva attains to a state of perfection bliss and beatitude which is otherwise known Omniscience and Freedom Absolute.