9. Language, Thought, and Language of Thought

Does the language we speak influence the thoughts we think? There have been three possible constructions outlined by Lucy (1996); that is, (i) there may be effects of language on thought which derive from having a language versus not having one -the enabling function of language, (ii) there may be effects on thought which derive from speaking one language rather than another–the shaping function of language, and (iii) there may be effects within a given language community from using language in one way or another–the facilitating function of language. It may true that thinking persons can know by introspection that they think many things, and can know that they are indeed thinking beings. This section will be examining an argument for the language of thought.

Orders of Priority

Should questions in the theory of thought -questions about intentionality, beliefs and concept possession, for example -be approached directly or indirectly via questions about language? Suppose that John believes that kangaroos seldom kick, and expresses this thought in the English sentence: ‘Kangaroos seldom kick’. Which takes priority, the meaning of the English sentence or the content of John’s thought?

A claim of priority is the converse of a claim of one-way dependence: X enjoys priority over Y if Y depends on X but X does not depend on Y. So, any question of the relative priority of X and Y has four possible answers: (i) X has priority; (ii) Y has priority; (iii) X and Y are mutually dependent (inter-dependent); (iv) X and Y are independent. But the question of the relative priority of thought and language is unclear until the relevant kind of priority has been specified. For this, Davies (1992) suggests that it is useful to distinguish three kinds of priority question: ontological, epistemological, and analytical (see Avramides (1989), for a similar distinction).

According the discussion of Davies (1998), to say that thought enjoys ontological priority over language is to say that language is ontologically dependent on thought, while thought is not so dependent on language. That is, there cannot be language without thought, but there can be thought without language. To say that thought enjoys epistemological priority over language is to say that the route to knowledge about language, specifically about linguistic meaning, goes via knowledge about thought, specifically about the contents of thought, while knowledge about thought can be had without going via knowledge about language.

As for ontological priority, Davidson (1975) argues that there cannot be thought without language: in order to have thoughts (specifically, beliefs), a creature must be a member of a language community, and an interpreter of the speech of others. As for epistemological priority, his (1974) argues that it is not possible to find out in detail what a person believes without interpreting that person’s speech.

The third kind of priority, analytical priority, is priority in the order of philosophical analysis or elucidation. To say that X is analytically prior to Y is to say that key notions in the study of Y can be analysed or elucidated in terms of key notions in the study of X, while the analysis or elucidation of the X notions does not have to advert to the Y notions. If we fix on the notion of thought content, or intentionality, as a key notion in the study of thought, and the notion of linguistic meaning as a key notion in the study of language, then the four possible positions on the relative analytical priority of thought and language can be sketched as follows.

1. Priority for thought

This is the view that a philosophical account of the content of thoughts can be given without essential appeal to language, and that the notion of linguistic meaning can then be analysed or elucidated in terms of the thoughts that language is used to express. Paul Grice’s programme in the philosophy of language (Grice, 1989; Schiffer, 1972) was aimed, not merely at elucidation, but, more boldly, at an analysis of public language meaning in terms of the beliefs and intentions of language users. Grice (1989) did not, himself, offer any elucidatory account of the intentionality of mental states. But recent work in the philosophy of mind has brought forward several proposals for explaining the intentionality of mental states without appeal to linguistic meaning, including accounts in terms of causal covariation, of teleology, and of functional role. So, we could imagine an elucidatory programme coupling one of these accounts of thought content with a Gricean analysis of linguistic meaning in terms of mental notions. In fact, it is now widely agreed that the Gricean analytical programme cannot be carried through (Schiffer, 1987). But, even if this is right, it need not rule out the possibility that thought enjoys analytical priority over language, provided that there is some other way of elucidating the notion of linguistic meaning in terms of thought content. Such an elucidation might follow the Gricean model by adverting very directly to the communicative use of language. But, in principle, it might equally proceed in two stages, first introducing a notion of idiolect meaning, and then explaining the idea of a public communicative practice in terms of shared, or overlapping, idiolects (see Laurence, 1996).

2. Priority for language

On this, opposite, view, an account of linguistic meaning can be given without bringing in the intentionality of thoughts, and what a person’s thoughts are about can then be analysed in terms of the use of language. This view can be found in Dummett’s works (Dummett, 1973, 1991, 1993). If a theorist attempts to give a substantive account of linguistic meaning in accordance with this view then the resources that can be invoked are seriously limited, since the account cannot presume upon everyday psychological notions such as belief and intention. Because of this, it would not be surprising to find hints of behaviourism in work that is influenced by this view.

3. No priority (inter-dependence)

This is the view that there is no way of giving an account of either intentionality or linguistic meaning without bringing in the other member of the pair. The two notions have to be explained together. This is the view of Davidson (1984), who thus maintains a combined ontological, epistemological and analytical no-priority position. These three no-priority claims go together quite naturally, but it is important to note that they are separable, and presumably logically independent, claims. The analytical no-priority claim is not entailed by the ontological no-priority claim, nor by the epistemological no-priority claim, nor by the two together.

4. No priority (independence)

This is the view that the notions of thought content and of linguistic meaning are unrelated. This position might be defended if a language is considered as an abstract entity, composed of a set of expressions together with a function that assigns a value to each expression. On such a conception, meaning is a purely formal notion. But for the notion of linguistic meaning as it applies to a natural language in use, this fourth view is implausible.

The point that ontological, epistemological, and analytic priority claims are independent of each other is a quite general one. It would be consistent to maintain, for example, that thought enjoys ontological priority over language (that there can be thought without language, but not language without thought), while denying that thought comes before language in the order of philosophical elucidation. Equally, it would be consistent to deny that thought enjoys ontological priority over language -insisting, instead, that there can be no thought without language while yet maintaining that thought comes first in the order of philosophical elucidation.

Indeed, it seems that these combinations remain consistent even if we consider ontological priority, or no-priority, claims that are supposed to be established by more or less purely philosophical arguments. Thus, for example, it would seem to be consistent to combine the claim that it is a conceptual truth that there can be thought without language (conceptually based ontological priority claim) with the claim that thought does not come first in the order of philosophical elucidation (analytical no-priority’ claim). Similarly, it would seem to be consistent to say both that it is a conceptual truth that there cannot be thought without language (conceptually based ontological no-priority claim) and that thought comes first in the order of philosophical elucidation (analytical priority claim). Such combinations of views may, though, be unattractive and difficult to motivate. Suppose, for example, that someone proposes a specifically Gricean version of the analytical priority of thought over language, according to which linguistic meaning involves a complex structure of beliefs and intentions in a population of language users. Then, an argument for the ontological no-priority claim (in particular, for the claim that there could not be thought without language) would have to show that there could not be any beliefs or intentions at all unless there was this complex structure of beliefs about beliefs about intentions; and it is far from easy to see how that could be shown.

The argument for the language of thought, to which we now turn, makes use of ideas that emerge within a framework that accords analytical priority to thought over language (Evans, 1982; Peacocke, 1992). While those ideas do not involve any specifically Gricean commitments, it would be fair to say that an assumption of ontological priority of thought over language is also in the background.