3. The test of the Truth of Knowledge

What is the criterion of truth? The Western philosophers answer this question by giving two theories known as Correspondence test of truth and Coherence test of truth. In Indian philosophy, these two theories are known as parataḥprāmāṇyavāda and svataḥprāmāṇyavāda. According to the former, we have to rely upon outside test for the verification of the validity or the invalidity of knowledge, but for latter the knowledge is itself valid or invalid one need not to rely on anything for its verification.

In this regard, the Indian schools of philosophy maintain different theories. The Sāṃkhyas believe that both validity and invalidity are already there in the cognition itself whereas Naiyāyikas maintain validity and invalidity are proved by some external conditions. The Buddhists believe that invalidity is self-evident but validity is maintained by extraneous conditions. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntis believe that validity is inherent and invalidity is established by extraneous factors.^[1]

According to the Jains, truth is not comprehensible. The nature of truth is completely dialectical. What is true for one may be is false for other because it may be the case that the aspect of truth which is grasped by one who is regarded it to be true is not grasped by other. So, knowledge is both partially true and partially false. Truth and falsity both are the two aspects of reality. Both are inherent in the cognition. This theory is called the theory of intrinsic truth and intrinsic falsity.^[2] The Sāṃkhyas also believe in this theory but they provide different reason. They maintain that the “self-luminous consciousness” reveals reality with both its truth and its falsity.

According to Nyāya, knowledge is neither intrinsically true nor intrinsically false. Truth and falsity are maintained by experience. They ask if one’s perception of something is true in itself why is it that one always has a feeling of uncertainty whether it is right or not. This reveals that truth and falsity are extrinsic to knowledge. Cognition is called valid when it reaches to a fruitful result. Additionally, knowledge is right when it is not contradicted by experience. The theory of correspondence is the criterion of truth.

Thirdly, Buddhist maintains that all apprehension is erroneous and becomes valid through extraneous conditions. When knowledge reaches to a successful purposive action we consider it as true while the efficiency of knowledge has not been acquired on reasonable grounds we cannot say that it is true. For instance: poison (which creates unconsciousness, disturbance in mind and sometimes death). We call it poison when we see the effect of it. Therefore, knowledge is extrinsically true or valid and intrinsically false or invalid.

Further, the theory of intrinsically validity of knowledge cannot make the difference between truth and falsity. Due to this theory, cognitions which are full of error and illusion become true as their truth is inherent in them (which are not the case in real). Knowledge cannot be called true unless it clears the test of uncontradicted experience and creates efficient effect. The truth of knowledge cannot be discovered by itself. It is discovered by non-contradiction and its effect. This indicates that the truth of knowledge depends extrinsically.

Fourthly, Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntis believe that knowledge is intrinsically true. One cannot doubt that knowledge is false as knowledge is knowledge not error. Knowledge can be illusory and erroneous only if a person suffers from disease or some obstacle included in knowledge. For instance: when a person suffers from jaundice, everything appears to be yellow in front of him. Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntis believe that knowledge is intrinsically true and extrinsically false.

There is a biggest controversy between the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyikas about the validity of knowledge. Nyāya upholds the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge which is known as Parataḥprāmānyavāda.^[3] According to this theory, knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. The concept of validity and invalidity come into existence when knowledge has arisen. Knowledge must correspond with its object and the test of truth is fruitful effect. If knowledge make us reaches to successful activity then it becomes valid if it does not then it is invalid. Validity and invalidity are not intrinsically associated with knowledge. But they are the outcome of a subsequent test. Knowledge is valid, when causes of knowledge are without any defects and knowledge is invalid when causes of knowledge are defective. Knowledge originates as knowledge, its validity and invalidity depends on external conditions. But this school disagrees with Naiyāyikas regarding the nature of validity of knowledge. According to them, knowledge is intrinsically valid. If the validity of knowledge is similar to its invalidity relies on external conditions, then no knowledge will become valid. For Naiyāyikas, knowledge arises simply as knowledge and its validity and invalidity matters after its origination. It is neutral when it is originated. For Mīmāṃsaka, knowledge can be valid or invalid. There is not any third option. We cannot apprehend knowledge which is neutral. To say it is to maintain the contradictory statement that knowledge when it originates is devoid of all logical value. So, neutral knowledge is not any knowledge. All knowledge must be either valid or invalid. Mīmāṃsaka agrees with Naiyāyikas with regard to the invalidity of knowledge. That knowledge is invalid when there are some defects in the instrument of knowledge. Otherwise knowledge is valid intrinsically. It must be considered as self-valid. The so called external conditions like compatibility, correspondence means true nature of a thing. These things are important conditions which give rise to valid knowledge. In their absence no valid knowledge can arise. They are internally associated with the causes that generate valid knowledge. So here, Mīmāṃsakas reject the Naiyāyikas view of validity of knowledge as Prataḥprāmāṇyavāda.^[4]

The Nyāya theory of Prataḥprāmāṇyavāda is sometimes compared with the western theory of correspondence. Similarly the Mīmāṃsaka theory of Svataḥprāmāṇyavāda is compared with the western theory of coherence in logic. As per western realism, the nature and validity of knowledge is correspondence with external reality, whereas according to western idealism, the nature and validity of knowledge is coherence or self-consistency. According to the theory of correspondence, our knowledge in order to be right or valid must correspond to the reality which is external. This theory is denied on the basis that completely external relation is not meaningful and also not possible. If the terms connected are apprehended as ultimate simple and independent entities, there can be no relation between them. The things, being independent, the relation cannot inhere in either or in both and if the connection falls outside them both, then the connection itself turn into a third entity and requires another relation to relate it to the first two and so on ad infinitum. Again, the external things or factors are those things which are not knowable. Then how can we validate our knowledge with those things which are not knowable? If one does not know the original, how can one say that our knowledge is a duplicate of the real? Again, correspondence itself must exist for a mind which reveals truth and does not discover it. So, the so-called correspondence becomes subsequent experience and when one says that knowledge corresponds with external reality what really mean is that our two experiences are not inconsistent and uncontradictory.

The coherence theory of western logic is supported by the idealists. Idealists state that reality is a concrete identity in-difference. A real as a whole is naturally inherent in all its parts and those parts are related to real in an organic manner. Reality is selfconsistent and coherent. It is away from the reach of contradictions and knowledge or truth is the coherence which is a quality of a significant whole. This theory is denied on the basis that according to this theory no knowledge is completely true, because coherence, being in discursive judgments, fails of concrete coherence which is the ultimate truth. Coherence can be the test of knowledge but it cannot be considered as the nature of knowledge or truth, because if we accept it as the nature of knowledge or truth, then no “truth” becomes completely true. Coherence is mediate and if validity of truth is mediate, and then no knowledge can be ultimately valid.^[5]

So, the Nyāya theory can be similar to the theory of correspondence. As Nyāya, school being realistic pluralism supports or similar in the thought with the western realists that correspondence is the only test of knowledge. Both agree that when knowledge corresponds with reality it becomes valid. But whereas the Western realists make correspondence also the test of truth, the Nyāya realizes the difficulty and accepts an indirect test which is consistent and fruitful activity. Here, Naiyāyikas advocate the theory of pragmatism. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsa admit self-consistency. The Mīmāṃsa theory of Svataḥprāmāṇyavāda may be compared to the theory of coherence, but there are some differences also. The theory of coherence is adopted by idealism.

Whereas the Mīmāṃsā being a system of rank realism states that all knowledge indicates external object which is beyond it. Mīmāṃsā like Naiyāyikas states that knowledge in order to be valid truly points the external object, that correspondence with the external things is the nature of valid knowledge.^[6] It also agrees with Naiyāyikas in stating that invalidity of knowledge is because of external conditions. It only admits that knowledge is valid intrinsically. The causes and conditions like free from defects, noncontradiction being satisfied, all knowledge originates as self-valid. Coherence and selfconsistency is the test of valid knowledge. But this coherence of the Mīmāṃsā is not coherence like western theory of coherence. Mīmāṃsā being realistic never agree with real coherence, but it takes all knowledge as intrinsically valid it simply accepting selfconsistent as the test for knowledge. They also accept non-contradiction and correspondence with the object which is external as the nature of truth. Again, by adopting the idea that cognition is direct apprehension, the Mīmāṃsa’s theory is away from the reach of criticism.^[7]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

C.L. Tripathi,op.cit, p.50

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

C.D. Sharma, op.cit., p.216.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Ibid., p. 216.

[6]:

Yathārtham jñānam pramāṇam.

[7]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit, p51.