Visuddhimagga (the pah of purification)

by Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu | 1956 | 420,758 words | ISBN-10: 9552400236 | ISBN-13: 9789552400236

The English translation of the Visuddhimagga written by Buddhaghosa in the 5th Century. It contains the essence of the the teachings found in the Pali Tripitaka and represents, as a whole, an exhaustive meditation manual. The work consists of the three parts—1) Virtue (Sila), 2) Concentration (Samadhi) and 3) Understanding (Panna) covering twenty-t...


[1]. Exact dates are not agreed. The Sri Lanka Chronicles give the lengths of reigns of kings of Sri Lanka back to the time of the Buddha and also of kings of Magadha from Asoka back to the same time. Calculated backwards the list gives 543 BCE as the year of the Buddha’s parinibbāna (see list of kings in Codrington’s Short History of Ceylon, Macmillan 1947, p. xvi.). For adjustments to this calculation that bring

[2]. See also A Record of Buddhist Religion by I-tsing, translation by J. Takakusu, Claren do Press, 1896, p. xxiii, where a geographical distribution of various schools gives Mūlasarvāstivāda mainly in the north and Ariyasthavira mainly in the south of India. I-tsing, who did not visit Sri Lanka, was in India at the end of the 7th cent.; but he does not mention whether the Ariyasthavira (Theravāda) Nikāya in India pursued its studies in the Pali of its Tipiṭaka or in Sanskrit or in a local vernacular.

[3]. In the epilogues and prologues of various works between the 5th and 12th centuries there is mention of e.g., Badaratittha (Vism-a prol.: near Chennai), Kañcipura (A-a epil.: = Conjevaram near Chennai), and other places where different teachers accepting the Great Monastery tradition lived and worked. See also Malalasekera, Pali Literature of Ceylon, p. 13; E.Z., IV, 69-71; Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. XIX, pp. 278f.

[4]. Possibly the Vinaya summaries, Mūlasikkhā and Khuddasikkhā (though Geiger places these much later), as well as some works of Buddhadatta Thera. It has not been satisfactorily explained why the Mahāvaṃsa, composed in the late 4th or early 5th cent., ends abruptly in the middle of Chapter 37 with Mahāsena’s reign (the Chronicle being only resumed eight centuries later).

[5]. The Gandhavaṃsa also gives the Apadāna Commentary as by him.

[6]. Other readings are: Mayūrarūpaṭṭana, Mayūradūtapaṭṭana. Identified with Mylapore near Chennai (J.O.R., Madras, Vol. XIX, p. 281).

[7]. Identified with Conjevaram near Chennai: PLC, p. 113. Ācariya Ānanda, author of the sub-commentary to the Abhidhamma Pitaka (Mūla Ṭīkā), also lived there, perhaps any time after the middle of the 5th century. The Elder Dhammapāla sometimes refers to the old Sinhalese commentaries as if they were still available to him.

[8]. Other readings are: Moraṇḍakheṭaka, Mudantakhedaka, Muraṇḍakheṭaka, etc.; not yet identified. Refers more probably to his birthplace than to his place of pabbajjā. See also J.O.R., Madras, Vol. XIX, p. 282, article “Buddhaghosa—His Place of Birth” by

[9]. A definite statement that the Dhp-a was written later by someone else can hardly avoid the inference that the “postscript” was a fraud, or at least misleading.

[10]. Adikaram, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, pp. 3 and 86.

[11]. Paritta or “protection”: a name for certain suttas recited for that purpose. See M-a IV 114. xxxviii

[12]. See Vism epilogue.

[13]. For instance, Prof. Kosambi, in his preface to the Visuddhimagga, Harvard ed., overlooks these considerations when he says: “More positive evidence (that he was not a North-Indian Brahman) is in the passage ’Uṇhassa ti aggisantāpassa. Tassa vanadāhādisu sambhavo veditabbo’ (I.86).’Heat: the heat of fire, such as occurs at the time of forest fires, etc.’” This is a comment upon protection against heat given by a cīvara. His explanation is obviously ridiculous: “It is not known to Indian southerners that a bare skin is sure to be sunburnt in the northern summer” (p. xii). And Professor Kosambi has not only overlooked the fact that it is almost certainly translated material that he is criticizing as original composition, but he appears not to have even read the whole passage. The sutta sentence (M I 10) commented on in the Visuddhimagga (I.86-87) contains two words uṇha and ātapa. If, before condemning the explanation as “ridiculous,” he had read on, he would have found, a line or two below, the words Ātapo ti suriyātapo (“‘Burning’ is burning of the sun”—I.87). xl

[14]. The allusion is to the author of various Pali works including the Abhidhammāvatāra;see n. 4.

[15]. Saṅgharāja (“Ruler of the Community”—a title existing in Thailand today): possibly a mistake for Saṅghapāla here (see Vis. epil.).

[16]. A learned allusion to VIII.1.

[17]. Hastings’ Encyclopaedia of Religion, article “Buddhaghosa” by T. W. Rhys Davids. Note also that another elder of the same name invited the writing of the Sammohavinodanī. The problem is discussed at some length by Prof. Niharranjan Ray, Theravada Buddhism in Burma, pp. 24ff.

[18]. The legitimateness of the mental moment of “presence” (ṭhiti) as deducible from A I 152 is questioned by Ācariya Ānanda (Vibh-ṭ), who wrote early in the Middle Period; he cites the Yamaka (refs.: II 13–14; and I 216-17) against it.

[19]. The Elder Dhammapāla, commenting on Vism XXI.77, takes the reading phuṭṭhantaṃ sacchikato and explains that (cf. Mūla Ṭīkā, Pug-ṭ 32), but the Elder Mahānāma, commenting on the Paṭisambhidāmagga from which the passage is quoted, takes the reading phuṭṭhattā sacchikato and comments differently (Paṭis-a 396, Hewavitarne ed.). Again, what is referred to as “said by some (keci)” in the Elder Dhammapāla’s comment on the Visuddhimagga (see Vism VIII, n.46) is put forward by the Elder Mahānāma with no such reservation (Paṭis-a 351). It is the usual standard of strict consistency that makes such very minor divergences noticeable. These two commentators, though, rarely reproduce each other verbatim. Contrastingly, where the Paramatthamañjūsā and the Mūlaṭīkā similarly overlap, the sentences are mostly verbatim, but the former, with extra material, looks like an expanded version of the latter, or the latter a cut version of the former.

[20]. See A II 56; Paṭis II 92f.

[21]. In the present work the development of serenity (concentration) is carried to its limit before insight (understanding) is dealt with. This is for clarity. But in the commentary to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (DN 22, MN 10) either the two are developed contemporaneously or insight is allowed to precede jhāna concentration. According to the Suttas, concentration of jhāna strength is necessary for the manifestation of the path (see e.g. XIV.127; XV, n.7; D II 313 = M III 252; A II 156, quoted at Paṭis II 92f.).

[22]. Reprinted by the Pali Text Society as Path of Purity, 1922–31.

[23]. Exceptions are certain early works of Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids. See also discussions in appendixes to the translations of the Kathāvatthu (Points of Controversy, PTS) and the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (Compendium of Philosophy, PTS). lii

[24]. “From a visible datum sometimes as far down as a mental datum, or vice versa, following the order of the six kinds of objects of consciousness as given in the teaching” (Vism-mhṭ 5, see XV.32).

[25]. The Great Monastery (Mahāvihāra) at Anurādhapura in Sri Lanka.

[26]. “The words ‘insight alone’ are meant to exclude not virtue, etc., but serenity (i.e. jhāna), which is the opposite number in the pair, serenity and insight. This is for emphasis. But the word ‘alone’ actually excludes only that concentration with distinction [of jhāna]; for concentration is classed as both access and absorption (see IV.32). Taking this stanza as the teaching for one whose vehicle is insight does not imply that there is no concentration; for no insight comes about without momentary concentration. And again, insight should be understood as the three contemplations of impermanence, pain, and not-self;not contemplation of impermanence alone” (Vism-mhṭ 9–10).

[27]. “‘Develops’ applies to both ‘consciousness’ and ‘understanding.’ But are they mundane or supramundane? They are supramundane, because the sublime goal is described; for one developing them is said to disentangle the tangle of craving by cutting it off at the path moment, and that is not mundane. But the mundane are included here too because they immediately precede, since supramundane (see Ch. III n. 5) concentration and insight are impossible without mundane concentration and insight to precede them; for without the access and absorption concentration in one whose vehicle is serenity, or without the momentary concentration in one whose vehicle is insight, and without the gateways to liberation (see XXI.66f.), the supramundane can never in either case be reached” (Vism-mhṭ 13). “With triple root-cause” means with non-greed, none-hate, and non-delusion.

[28]. One who is virtuous has nothing to be remorseful about.

[29]. The three kinds of clear-vision are: recollection of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings (divine eye), and knowledge of destruction of cankers (M I 22–23). The six kinds of direct-knowledge are: knowledge of supernormal power, the divine ear element, penetration of minds, recollection of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings, and knowledge of destruction of cankers (M I 34–35). The four discriminations are those of meaning, law, language, and intelligence (A II 160).

[30]. “Consciousness-concomitants” (cetasikā) is a collective term for feeling, perception, and formation, variously subdivided; in other words, aspects of mentality that arise together with consciousness.

[31]. Sīlana and upadhāraṇa in this meaning (cf. Ch. I, §141 and sandhāraṇa, XIV.61) are not in PED.

[32]. The three kinds of profitable bodily kamma or action (not killing or stealing or indulging in sexual misconduct), the four kinds of profitable verbal kamma or action (refraining from lying, malicious speech, harsh speech, and gossip), and right livelihood as the eighth.

[33]. Uposatha (der. from upavasati, to observe or to prepare) is the name for the day of “fasting” or “vigil” observed on the days of the new moon, waxing half moon, full moon, and waning half moon. On these days it is customary for laymen to undertake the Eight Precepts (sīla) or Five Precepts. On the new-moon and full-moon days the Pātimokkha (see note 11) is recited by bhikkhus. The two quarter-moon days are called the “eighth of the half moon.” The Full-moon day is called the “fifteenth” (i.e. fifteen days from the new moon) and is the last day of the lunar month. That of the new moon is called the “fourteenth” when it is the second and fourth new moon of the fourmonth season (i.e. fourteen days from the full moon), the other two are called the “fifteenth.” This compensates for the irregularities of the lunar period.

[34]. The Suttavibhaṅga, the first book of the Vinaya Piṭaka, contains in its two parts the 227 rules for bhikkhus and the rules for bhikkhunīs, who have received the admission (upasampadā), together with accounts of the incidents that led to the announcement of the rules, the modification of the rules and the explanations of them. The bare rules themselves form the Pātimokkha for bhikkhus and that for bhikkhunīs. They are also known as the “two codes” (dve mātikā). The Pātimokkha is recited by bhikkhus on the Uposatha days of the full moon and new moon.

[35]. The “ten instances of talk” (dasa kathāvatthūni) refer to the kinds of talk given in the Suttas thus: “Such talk as is concerned with effacement, as favours the heart’s release, as leads to complete dispassion, fading, cessation, peace, direct knowledge, enlightenment, Nibbāna, that is to say: talk on wanting little, contentment, seclusion, aloofness from contact, strenuousness, virtue, concentration, understanding, deliverance, knowledge and vision of deliverance” (M I 145; III 113).

[36]. See Ch. IV n. 27.

[37]. “‘On seeing a visible object with the eye”: if the eye were to see the visible object, then (organs) belonging to other kinds of consciousness would see too;but that is not so. Why? Because the eye has no thought (acetanattā). And then, were consciousness itself to see a visible object, it would see it even behind a wall because of being independent of sense resistance (appaṭighabhāvato);but that is not so either because there is no seeing in all kinds of consciousness. And herein, it is consciousness dependent on the eye that sees, not just any kind. And that does not arise with respect to what is enclosed by walls, etc., where light is excluded. But where there is no exclusion of light, as in the case of a crystal or a mass of cloud, there it does arise even with respect to what is enclosed by them. So it is as a basis of consciousness that the eye sees.

“‘When there is the impingement of door and object’: what is intended is: when a visible datum as object has come into the eye’s focus. ‘One sees’: one looks (oloketi); for when the consciousness that has eye-sensitivity as its material support is disclosing (obhāsente) by means of the special quality of its support a visible datum as object that is assisted by light (āloka), then it is said that a person possessed of that sees the visible datum. And here the illuminating is the revealing of the visible datum according to its individual essence, in other words, the apprehending of it experientially (paccakkhato).

“Here it is the ‘sign of woman’ because it is the cause of perceiving as ‘woman’ all such things as the shape that is grasped under the heading of the visible data (materiality) invariably found in a female continuity, the un-clear-cut-ness (avisadatā) of the flesh of the breasts, the beardlessness of the face, the use of cloth to bind the hair, the un-clear-cut stance, walk, and so on. The ‘sign of man’ is in the opposite sense.

[38]. To expect to find in the Paramatthamañjūsā an exposition of the “cognitive series” (citta-vīthi), and some explanation of the individual members in addition to what is to be found in the Visuddhimagga itself, is to be disappointed. There are only fragmentary treatments. All that is said here is this:

“There is no unvirtuousness, in other words, bodily or verbal misconduct, in the five doors; consequently restraint of unvirtuousness happens through the mind door, and the remaining restraint happens through the six doors. For the arising of forgetfulness and the other three would be in the five doors since they are unprofitable states opposed to mindfulness, etc.; and there is no arising of unvirtuousness consisting in bodily and verbal transgression there because five-door impulsions do not give rise to intimation. And the five kinds of non-restraint beginning with unvirtuousness are stated here as the opposite of the five kinds of restraint beginning with restraint as virtue” (Vism-mhṭ 42). See also Ch. IV, note 13.

[39]. This apparently incomplete sentence is also in the Pāḷi text. It is not clear why. (BPS Ed.)

[40]. The formula “kuhana kuhāyanā kuhitattaṃ,” i.e. verbal noun in two forms and abstract noun from pp., all from the same root, is common in Abhidhamma definitions. It is sometimes hard to produce a corresponding effect in English, yet to render such groups with words of different derivation obscures the meaning and confuses the effect.

[41]. The renderings “scheming” and so on in this context do not in all cases agree with PED. They have been chosen after careful consideration. The rendering “rejection of requisites” takes the preferable reading paṭisedhana though the more common reading here is paṭisevana (cultivation).

[42] The Pali is: “Icchāpakatassā ti icchāya apakatassa; upaddutassā ti attho.” Icchāya apakatassa simply resolves the compound icchāpakatassa and is therefore untranslatable into English. Such resolutions are therefore sometimes omitted in this translation.

[43] “‘Putrid urine’ is the name for all kinds of cow’s urine whether old or not” (Vismmhṭ 45). Fermented cow’s urine with gallnuts (myrobalan) is a common Indian medicine today.

[44] It is not always certain now what kind of buildings these names refer to.

[45] Nahanā—tying, from nayhati (to tie). The noun in not in PED.

[46] The story of the oil-seller is given in the Sammohavinodanī (Vibh-a 483), which reproduces this part of Vism with some additions: “Two bhikkhus, it seems, went into a village and sat down in the sitting hall. Seeing a girl, they called her. Then one asked

[47]. For attention (manasi-kāra) as the means (upāya) and the way (patha) see M-a I 64.

[48]. Avadhi—“limit” = odhi: this form is not in PED (see M-a II 292).

[49]. “Child’s flesh” (putta-maṃsa) is an allusion to the story (S II 98) of the couple who set out to cross a desert with an insufficient food supply but got to the other side by eating the flesh of their child who died on the way. The derivation given in PED, “A metaphor probably distorted from pūtamaṃsa,” has no justification. The reference to rafts might be to D II 89.

[50]. “‘Making the whole rock resound’: ‘making the whole rock reverberate as one doing so by means of an earth tremor. But some say that is was owing to the cheering of the deities who lived there’” (Vism-mhṭ 58).

[51]. “Four-sweets”—catumadhura: a medicinal sweet made of four ingredients: honey, palm-sugar, ghee and sesame oil.

[52]. “The Elder Mahā Tissa, it seems, was going on a journey during a famine, and being tired in body and weak through lack of food and travel weariness, he lay down at the root of a mango tree covered with fruit. There were many fallen mangoes here and there” (Vism-mhṭ 60). “Through ownerless mangoes were lying fallen on the ground near him, he would not eat them in the absence of someone to accept them from” (Vismmhṭ 65). “Then a lay devotee, who was older than he, went to the elder, and learning of his exhaustion, gave him mango juice to drink. Then he mounted him on his back and

[53]. The figures depend on whether koṭi is taken as 1,000,000 or 100,000 or 10,000.

[54]. “Comprehending” (sammasana) is a technical term that will become clear in Chapter XX. In short, it is inference that generalizes the “three characteristics” from one’s own directly-known experience to all possible formed experience at all times (see S II 107). Commenting on “He comprehended that same illness” (§138), Vism-mhṭ says: “He exercised insight by discerning the feeling in the illness under the heading of the feeling [aggregate] and the remaining material dhammas as materiality” (Vism-mhṭ 65).

[55]. A story of the Jambu River and its gold is given at M-a IV 147.

[56]. This list describes, in terms of abandoning, etc., the stages in the normal progress from ignorance to Arahantship, and it falls into the following groups: I. Virtue: the abandoning of the ten unprofitable courses of action (1–10). II. Concentration: A. abandoning the seven hindrances to concentration by means of their opposites (11–17); B. The eight attainments of concentration, and what is abandoned by each (18–25). III. Understanding: A. Insight: the eighteen principal insights beginning with the seven contemplations (26–43). B. Paths: The four paths and what is abandoned by each (44–47).

[57]. Sabbhāva—“presence” (= sat + bhāva): not in PED. Not to be confused with sabhāva—“individual essence” (= sa (Skr. sva) + bhāva, or saha + bhāva).

[58]. The seven consisting of pārājikā, saṅghādisesā, pācittiyā, pāṭidesanīyā, dukkaṭā, thullaccayā, dubbhāsitā (mentioned at M-a II 33).

[59]. An allusion to the Gosiṅga Suttas (MN 31, 32).

[60]. Nibbacana—”derivative name (or verbal derivative)”; gram. term not in PED; M-a I 61,105; Vism XVI.16.

[61]. Patati”to gather (or to wander)”: not in PED.

[62]. Avakhaṇḍana—”hiatus” and dāna”gap”: not in PED.

[63]. Such references to “the Commentary” are to the old Sinhalese commentary, no longer extant, from which Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa drew his material.

[64]. “‘Ekasaṅgītika’: one who knows one of the five collections (nikāya) beginning with the Collection of Long Discourses (Dīgha Nikāya). (Vism-mhṭ 76)”

[65]. “That elder, it seems, was a sitter, but no one knew it. Then one night the other saw him by the light of a flash of lightning sitting up on his bed. He asked, ‘Are you a sitter, venerable sir?’ Out of fewness of wishes that his ascetic practice should get known, the elder lay down. Afterwards he undertook the practice anew. So the story has come down. (Vism-mhṭ 77)”

[66]. “The name of a street in Mahāgāma (S.E. Sri Lanka). Also in Anurādhapura, they say” (Vism-mhṭ 77).

[67]. On certain occasions, when the going forth was given by the Buddha with only the words, “Ehi bhikkhu (Come, bhikkhu),” owing to the disciple’s past merit robes appeared miraculously upon him (see e.g. Vin Mahāvagga, Kh. 1).

[68]. Apādana—”institution (or production),” not in PED.

[69]. Tatraṭṭhaka-paccattharaṇa—”a bedspread that remains there”; “A name for what has been determined upon as a bedspread in one’s own resting place or in someone else’s. They say accordingly (it is said in a commentary) that there is no breach of the ascetic practice even when these two, that is, the bedspread and the undyed cloth, are kept as extra robes” (Vism-mhṭ 78–79). For tatraṭṭhaka (fixture) see also §61.

[70]. “A meal to be given by setting it out in a principal house only.” (Vism-mhṭ 79) This meaning of dhura-bhatta not in PED.

[71]. “Tickets that are not for actual food, but deal with medicine, etc.” (Vism-mhṭ 79) Paṭikkamana—”refectory” (28) = bojun hal (eating hall) in Sinhalese translation.

[72]. Sakkarā—”sugar”: spelt sakkharā in PED.

[73]. Subbata—”truly devoted”: fm. su + vata (having good vows). See also §59.

[74]. Reading acchinna-mariyādaṃ with Vism-mhṭ, which says: “‘Without a drip-ledge cut (acchinna-mariyādaṃ)’ means without a drip-ledge (mariyāda) made above, which might come under the heading of a drip-ledge (mariyāda-saṅkhepena) made to prevent rain water from coming in. But if the rain water comes under the overhang (pabbhāra) and is allowed to go in under it, then this comes under the heading of the open air (abbhokāsika-saṅkhepa)” (Vism-mhṭ 84). This seems to refer to the widespread habit in ancient Sri Lanka of cutting a drip-ledge on overhanging rocks used for bhikkhus’ dwellings so that the rain that falls on top of the rock drips down in front of the space under the overhang instead of trickling down under the rock and wetting the back and

floor. Pabbhāra in this context is “over hang” rather than “slope.”

[75]. “He should not go into families’ houses because he smells of the dead and is followed by pisāca goblins” (Vism-mhṭ 84).

[76]. Āyogapatta—”a binding-strap”: this is probably the meaning. But cf. Vin II 135 and Vin-a 891.

[77]. For the triads of the Abhidhamma Mātikā (Abhidhamma Schedule) see Ch. XIII, n.20. “‘Those who hold’: a reference to the inhabitants of the Abhayagiri Monastery at Anurādhapura. For they say that ascetic practice is a concept consisting in a name (nāma-paññatti). That being so, they could have no meaning of shaking off defilements, or possibility of being undertaken, because in the ultimate sense they would be nonexistent [concepts having no existence]” (Vism-mhṭ 87). Cf. IV.29.

[78]. Āpajjati (and its noun āpatti) is the normal word used for undesirable consequences that follow on some unsound logical proposition. See XVI.68f. This meaning is not in PED.

[79]. Idamatthitā—”that specific quality”: “Owing to these profitable states it exists, (thus it is ‘specific by those’; imehi kusaladhammehi atthi = idam-atthi). The knowledge by means of which one who has gone forth should be established in the refuse-rag-wearer’s practice, etc., and by means of which, on being so instructed one undertakes and persists in the ascetic qualities—that knowledge is idamatthitā” (Vism-mhṭ 88).

[80]. See XXI.117.

[81]. The answer to question (vii) stretches from III.27 to XI.119. That to question (viii) from XI. 120 up to the end of Ch. XIII.

[82]. “Cittass’ ekaggatā” is rendered here as “unification of mind” in the sense of agreement or harmony (cf. samagga) of consciousness and its concomitants in focusing on a single object (see A I 70). It is sometimes rendered “one-pointedness” in that sense, or in the sense of the focusing of a searchlight. It may be concluded that this term is simply a synonym for samādhi and nothing more, firstly from its use in the suttas, and secondly from the fact that it is given no separate definition in the description of the formations aggregate in Ch. XIV. Cf. gloss at M-a I 124.

[83]. In loose usage pīti (happiness) and sukha (pleasure or bliss) are almost synonyms. They become differentiated in the jhāna formulas (see IV.100), and then technically pīti, as the active thrill of rapture, is classed under the formations aggregate and sukha under the feeling aggregate. The valuable word “happiness” was chosen for pīti rather than the possible alternatives of “joy” (needed for somanassa), “interest” (which is too flat), “rapture” (which is overcharged), or “zest.” For sukha, while “pleasure” seemed to fit admirably where ordinary pleasant feeling is intended, another, less crass, word seemed necessary for the refined pleasant feeling of jhāna and the “bliss” of Nibbāna (which is not feeling aggregate—see M I 400). “Ease” is sometimes used.

“Neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is intended here by ‘equanimity’ (upekkhā, lit, onlooking); for it ‘looks on’ (upekkhati) at the occurrence of [bodily] pleasure and pain by maintaining the neutral (central) mode” (Vism-mhṭ 92).

[84]. Samatha—”serenity” is a synonym for absorption concentration, and “insight” (vipassanā) a synonym for understanding. Samatha is sometimes rendered by

“tranquillity” (reserved here for passaddhi) or “calm” or “quiet.”

[85]. One of the principal monasteries in Anurādhapura.

[86]. Dve mātikā—the “two codes”: see Ch. I, n. 11. But Vism-mhṭ says here: “‘Observers of the codes’ are observers of the codes (summaries) of the Dhamma and Vinaya” (Vism-mhṭ 117).

[87]. Pavāraṇa: ceremony held at the end of the rains, during three months of which season bhikkhus have to undertake to live in one place in order to avoid travel while crops are growing. It consists in a meeting of the bhikkhus who have spent the rains together, at which each member present invites (pavāreti) the Community to point out his faults (breaches of Vinaya rules) committed during the preceding three months (Vin I 155).

[88]. “Pācinakhaṇḍarājā ti puratthimadisāya pabbatakhaṇḍānaṃ antare vanarājīṭṭhānaṃ” (Vism-mhṭ 97).

[89]. For the first five years after the admission (upasampadā) a bhikkhu is called a “new (nava) bhikkhu”; from five to ten years he is called a “middle (majjhima) bhikkhu”; with ten or more years’ seniority he is called an “elder (thera) bhikkhu.”

[90]. The last sentence here might refer to a free mass distribution of gruel (yāgu), which appears to have been more or less constantly maintained at Anurādhapura.

[91]. It is usual to render the set phrase paṇītaṃ khādanīyaṃ bhojanīyaṃ by some such phrase as “sumptuous food both hard and soft,” which is literal but unfamiliarsounding.

[92]. “The way of the Rathavinīta (Rathavinīta-paṭipadā)”: this is a reference to certain suttas that were adopted by bhikkhus as a “way” (paṭipadā) or guide to practice. The suttas mentioned here are Rathavinīta (M I 145), Nālaka (Sn, p. 131), Tuvaṭaka (Sn 179), Noble One’s Heritages (ariyavaṃsa—A II 27). Others are mentioned at M-a I 92; III 6; S-a III 291. The Ariyavaṃsa Sutta itself has a long commentary on practice, and it is mentioned in the Commentaries as a popular subject for preaching (see e.g. commentary to AN III 42).

[93]. Sīmā—”boundary”: loosely used in this sense, it corresponds vaguely to what is meant by “parish.” In the strict sense it is the actual area (usually a “chapter house”) agreed according to the rules laid down in the Vinaya and marked by boundary stones, within which the Community (saṅgha) carries out its formal acts.

[94]. Atthayitabba—”needed”: not in PED, not in CPD.

[95]. Māna, usually rendered by “pride,” is rendered here both by “pride” and “conceit.” Etymologically it is derived perhaps from māneti (to honour) or mināti (to measure). In sense, however, it tends to become associated with maññati, to conceive (false notions, see M I 1), to imagine, to think (as e.g. at Nidd I 80, Vibh 390 and comy.). As one of the “defilements” (see M I 36) it is probably best rendered by “pride.” In the expression asmi-māna (often rendered by “the pride that says ‘I am’”) it more nearly approaches maññanā (false imagining, misconception, see M III 246) and is better rendered by the “conceit ‘I am,’” since the word “conceit” straddles both the meanings of “pride” (i.e. haughtiness) and “conception.”

[96]. “‘Some’ is said with reference to the Elder Upatissa. For it is put in this way by him in the Vimuttimagga. The word ‘apparently’ indicates dissent from what follows” (Vism-mhṭ 103). A similar passage to that referred to appears in Ch. 6 (Taisho ed. p. 410a) of the Chinese version of the Vimuttimagga, the only one extant.

[97]. Sīlaka—”good-tempered”—sukhasīla (good-natured—see §83), which = sakhila (kindly—Vism-mhṭ 104). Not in PED.

[98]. Ukkuṭika”springy” is glossed here by asamphuṭṭhamajjhaṃ (“not touching in the middle”—Vism-mhṭ 106). This meaning is not in PED.

[99]. See Sn-a 544, A-a 436.

[100]. Siṅga—”foppery” is not in PED in this sense. See Vibh 351 and commentary.

Cāpalya (cāpalla)—”personal vanity”: noun from adj. capala. The word “capala” comes in an often-repeated passage: “saṭhā māyāvino keṭubhino uddhatā unnalā capalā mukharā” (M I 32); cf. S I 203; A III 199, etc.) and also M I 470 “uddhato hoti capalo,” with two lines lower “uddhaccaṃ cāpalyaṃ.” Cāpalya also occurs at Vibh 351 (and M II 167). At Ma I 152 (commenting on M I 32) we find: capalā ti pattacīvaramaṇḍanādinā cāpallena yuttā (“interested in personal vanity consisting in adorning bowl and robe and so on”), and at M-a III 185 (commenting on M I 470): Uddhato hoti capalo ti uddhaccapakatiko c’eva hoti cīvaramaṇḍanā pattamaṇḍanā senāsanamaṇḍanā imassa vā pūtikāyassa kelāyanamaṇḍanā ti evaṃ vuttena taruṇadārakacāpallena samannāgato (“‘he is distracted—or puffed up—and personally vain’: he is possessed of the callow youth’s personal vanity described as adorning the robe, adorning the bowl, adorning the lodging, or prizing and adorning this filthy body”). This meaning is confirmed in the commentary to Vibh 251. PED does not give this meaning at all but only “fickle,” which is unsupported by the commentary. CPD (acapala) also does not give this meaning.

As to the other things listed here in the Visuddhimagga text, most will be found at M I 36. For “holding on tenaciously,” etc., see M I 43.

[101]. Jatukā—”a bat”: not in PED. Also at Ch. XI. §7.

[102]. Jalapūvasadisa—”like a net cake”: “A cake made like a net” (Vism-mhṭ 108); possibly what is now known in Sri Lanka as a “string hopper,” or something like it.

[103]. Surabhi—”scented, perfume”: not in PED; also at VI.90;X.60 and Vism-mhṭ 445.

[104]. “‘Kasiṇa’ is in the sense of entirety (sakalaṭṭhena)” (M-a III 260). See IV.119.

[105]. Here ten kinds of foulness are given. But in the Suttas only either five or six of this set appear to be mentioned, that is, “Perception of a skeleton, perception of the worminfested, perception of the livid, perception of the cut-up, perception of the bloated. (see A I 42 and S V 131; A II 17 adds “perception of the festering”)” No details are given. All ten appear at Dhs 263–64 and Paṭis I 49. It will be noted that no order of progress of decay in the kinds of corpse appears here; also the instructions in Ch. VI are for contemplating actual corpses in these states. The primary purpose here is to cultivate “repulsiveness.”

Another set of nine progressive stages in the decay of a corpse, mostly different from these, is given at M I 58, 89, etc., beginning with a corpse one day old and ending with bones turned to dust. From the words “suppose a bhikkhu saw a corpse thrown on a charnel ground … he compares this same body of his with it thus, ‘This body too is of like nature, awaits a like fate, is not exempt from that’”(M I 58), it can be assumed that these nine, which are given in progressive order of decay in order to demonstrate the body’s impermanence, are not necessarily intended as contemplations of actual corpses so much as mental images to be created, the primary purpose being to cultivate impermanence. This may be why these nine are not used here (see VIII.43).

The word asubha (foul, foulness) is used both of the contemplations of corpses as here and of the contemplation of the parts of the body (A V 109).

[106]. Also quoted in A-a V 79 on AN 11:9. Cf. Sn 1119. A similar quotation with Sopāka is found in Vism-mhṭ 334–35, see note 1 to XI.2.

[107]. The full story, which occurs at M-a III 382–83 and elsewhere, is this: “It seems that when the Karavīka bird has pecked a sweet-flavoured mango wth its beak and savoured the dripping juice, and flapping its wings, begins to sing, then quadrupeds caper as if mad. Quadrupeds grazing in their pastures drop the grass in their mouths and listen to the sound. Beasts of prey hunting small animals pause with one foot raised. Hunted animals lose their fear of death and halt in their tracks. Birds flying in the air stay with wings outstretched. Fishes in the water keep still, not moving their fins. All listen to the sound, so beautiful is the Karavīka’s song. Dhammāsoka’s queen Asandhamittā asked the Community: ‘Venerable sirs, is there anything that sounds like the Buddha?’—‘The Karavīka birds does.’—‘Where are those birds, venerable sirs?’—‘In the Himalaya.’

[108]. “It is because only an abstract (parikappaja) object can be extended, not any other kind, that he said, ‘it is not possible to extend a state consisting in an individual essence’” (Vism-mhṭ 110).

[109]. The word “nimitta” in its technical sense is consistently rendered here by the word “sign,” which corresponds very nearly if not exactly to most uses of it. It is sometimes rendered by “mark” (which over-emphasizes the concrete), and by “image” (which is not always intended). The three kinds, that is, the preliminary-work sign, learning sign and counterpart sign, do not appear in the Piṭakas. There the use rather suggests association of ideas as, for example, at M I 180, M I 119, A I 4, etc., than the more definitely visualized “image” in some instances of the “counterpart sign” described in the following chapters.

[110]. Na-vattabba—”not so-classifiable” is an Abhidhamma shorthand term for something that, when considered under one of the triads or dyads of the Abhidhamma Mātikā (Dhs 1f.), cannot be placed under any one of the three, or two, headings.

[111]. “‘The festering’ is a mobile object because of the oozing of the pus, ‘the bleeding’ because of the trickling of the blood, ‘the worm-infested’ because of the wriggling of the worms. The mobile aspect of the sunshine coming in through a window opening is evident, which explains why an object consisting of a circle of sunlight is called mobile” (Vism-mhṭ 110).

[112]. “In addition to the five things” (not quoted) dealt with earlier in the sutta, namely, perfection of virtue, good friendship, hearing suitable things, energy, and understanding. 37. “‘Cryptic books’: the meditation-subject books dealing with the truths, the dependent origination, etc., which are profound and associated with voidness” (Vismmhṭ 111). Cf. M-a II 264, A-a commentary to AN 4:180.

[113]. “They say it is the Dakkhiṇagiri in the Magadha country” (Vism-mhṭ 116). There is mention of a Dakkhiṇagiri-vihāra at M-a II 293 and elsewhere.

[114]. Read pamukhesu sosayanti. Pamukha not thus in PED.

[115]. “A ‘water port of entry’ is a port of entry on the sea or on an estuary. A ‘land port of entry’ is one on the edge of a forest and acts as the gateway on the road of approach to great cities” (Vism-mhṭ 116).

[116]. “Said in the Old Commentary. ‘One who is learning the earth kasiṇa’: one who is apprehending, grasping, an earth kasiṇa as a ‘learning sign’. The meaning is, one who is producing an earth kasiṇa that has become the sign of learning; and here ‘arousing’ should be regarded as the establishing of the sign in that way. ‘In earth’: in an earth disk of the kind about to be described. ‘Apprehends the sign’: he apprehends in that, with knowledge connected with meditative development, the sign of earth of the kind about to be described, as one does with the eye the sign of the face in a looking-glass. ‘Made up’: prepared in the manner about to be described. ‘Not made up’: in a disk of earth consisting of an ordinary threshing-floor disk, and so on. ‘Bounded’: only in one that has bounds. As regard the words ‘the size of a bushel’, etc., it would be desirable that a bushel and a saucer were of equal size, but some say that ‘the size of a saucer’ is a span and four fingers, and the ‘the size of a bushel’ is larger than that. ‘He sees to it that that sign is well apprehended’: that meditator makes that disk of earth a well-apprehended sign. When, after apprehending the sign in it by opening the eyes, and looking and then closing them again, it appears to him as he adverts to it just as it did at the moment of looking with open eyes, then he has made it well apprehended. Having thoroughly established his mindfulness there, observing it again and again with his mind not straying outside, he sees that it is ‘well attended to’. When it is well attended to thus by adverting and attending again and again by producing much repetition and development instigated by that, he sees that it is ‘well defined’. ‘To that object’: to that object called earth kasiṇa, which has appeared rightly owing to its having been well apprehended. ‘He anchors his mind’: by bringing his own mind to access jhāna he anchors it, keeps it from other objects” (Vism-mhṭ 119).

[117]. “Gaṅgā (= ‘river’) is the name for the Ganges in India and for the Mahavaeligaṅgā, Sri Lanka’s principal river. However, in the Island of Sri Lanka there is a river, it seems, called the Rāvanagaṅgā. The clay in the places where the banks are cut away by its stream is the colour of dawn” (Vism-mhṭ 119).

[118]. “‘Apprehend the sign’: apprehend with the mind the sign apprehended by the eye in the earth kasiṇa. ‘And develop it’: the apprehending of the sign as it occurs should be continued intensively and constantly practiced” (Vism-mhṭ 120).

[119]. “Just as one who sees his reflection (mukha-nimitta—lit. “face-sign”) on the surface of a looking-glass does not open his eyes too widely or too little (in order to get the effect), nor does he review the colour of the looking-glass or give attention to its characteristic, but rather looks with moderately opened eyes and sees only the sign of his face, so too this meditator looks with moderately opened eyes at the earth kasiṇa and is occupied only with the sign” (Vism-mhṭ 121).

[120]. “The dawn colour that is there in the kasiṇa should not be thought about, though it cannot be denied that it is apprehended by eye-consciousness. That is why, instead of saying here, ‘should not be looked at,’ he says that it should not be apprehended by reviewing. Also the earth element’s characteristic of hardness, which is there, should not be given attention because the apprehension has to be done through the channel of seeing. And after saying, ‘while not ignoring the colour’ he said, ‘relegating the colour to the position of a property of the physical support,’ showing that here the concern is not with the colour, which is the channel, but rather that this colour should be treated as an accessory of the physical support; the meaning is that the kasiṇa (disk) should be given attention with awareness of both the accompanying earthaspect and its ancillary colour-aspect, but taking the earth-aspect with its ancillary concomitant colour as both supported equally by that physical support [the disk]. ‘On the concept as the mental datum since that is what is outstanding’: the term of ordinary usage ‘earth’ (pathavī) as applied to earth with its accessories, since the prominence of

[121]. North or south to avoid facing the rising sun in coming or going. Kosa is not in PED; “one and a half kosa = 3,000 bows” (Vism-mhṭ 123).

[122]. Twenty-six kinds of “aimless” (lit. “animal”) talk are given in the Suttas (e.g. M II 1; III 113), which the commentary increases to thirty-two (M-a III 233). The ten instances of talk are those given in the Suttas (e.g. M I 145;III 113). See Ch. I, n.12.

[123]. “One who is occupied with exercising and caring for the body” (Vism-mhṭ 124).

[124]. Buddha—“possessed of wit”: not in PED; see M-a I 39.

[125]. “It guards the line (gaṃ tāyati), thus it is lineage (gotta). When it occurs limitedly, it guards the naming (abhidhāna) and the recognition (buddhi) of the naming as restricted to a definite scope (ekaṃsa-visayatā). For just as recognition does not take place without a meaning (attha) for its objective support (ārammaṇa), so naming (abhidhāna) does not take place without what is named (abhidheyya). So it (the gotta) is said to protect and keep these. But the limited should be regarded as the materiality peculiar to sensesphere states, which are the resort of craving for sense desires, and destitute of the exalted (fine-material and immaterial) or the unsurpassed (supramundane). The exalted lineage is explainable in the same way” (Vism-mhṭ 134).

[126]. See XVII.189 and note.

[127]. “The intention is that it is as if the sixth and seventh impulsions had lapsed since impulsion beyond the fifth is exhausted. The elder’s opinion was that just as the first impulsion, which lacks the quality of repetition, does not arouse change-of-lineage because of its weakness, while the second or the third, which have the quality of repetition, can do so because they are strong on that account, so too the sixth and seventh fix in absorption owing to their strength due to their quality of repetition. But it is unsupported by a sutta or by any teacher’s statement in conformity with a sutta. And the text quoted is not a reason because strength due to the quality of repetition is not a principle without exceptions (anekantikattā); for the first volition, which is not a repetition, has result experienceable here and now, while the second to the sixth, which are repetitions, have result experienceable in future becomings” (Vism-mhṭ 135).

[128]. “‘Either in the fourth or the fifth,’ etc., is said for the purpose of concluding [the discussion] with a paragraph showing the correctness of the meaning already stated.—Herein, if the sixth and seventh impulsions are said to have lapsed because impulsion is exhausted, how does seventh-impulsion volition come to have result experienceable in the next rebirth and to be of immediate effect on rebirth?—This is not owing to strength got through a repetition condition.—What then?—It is owing to the difference in the function’s position (kiriyāvatthā). For the function [of impulsion] has three positions, that is, initial, medial and final. Herein, experienceability of result in the next rebirth and immediateness of effect on rebirth are due to the last volition’s final position, not to its strength … So the fact that the sixth and seventh lapse because impulsion is used up cannot be objected to” (Vism-mhṭ 135). See Table V.

[129]. “‘The normal extent does not apply’ here ‘in the seven instances’ because of the immeasurability of the conscious moment in some, and the extreme brevity of the moment in others; for ‘extent’ is inapplicable here in the sense of complete cognitive series, which is why ‘in fruition next to the path,’ etc., is said” (Vism mhṭ 136).

[130]. The five (see e.g. Paṭis II 220; M-a I 85) are suppression (by concentration), substitution of opposites (by insight), cutting off (by the path), tranquillization (by fruition), and escape (as Nibbāna); cf. five kinds of deliverance (e.g. M-a IV 168). The three (see e.g. Nidd I 26; M-a II 143) are bodily seclusion (retreat), mental seclusion (jhāna), and seclusion from the substance or circumstances of becoming (Nibbāna).

[131]. Here saṅkappa (“thinking”) has the meaning of “hankering.” Chanda, kāma and rāga and their combinations need sorting out. Chanda (zeal, desire) is much used, neutral in colour, good or bad according to context and glossed by “desire to act”; technically also one of the four roads to power and four predominances. Kāma (sense desire, sensuality) loosely represents enjoyment of the five sense pleasures (e.g. sense-desire sphere). More narrowly it refers to sexual enjoyment (third of the Five Precepts). Distinguished as subjective desire (defilement) and objective things that arouse it (Nidd I 1; cf. Ch. XIV, n.36). The figure “five cords of sense desire” signifies simply these desires with the five sense objects that attract them. Rāga (greed) is the general term for desire in its bad sense and identical with lobha, which latter, however, appears technically as one of the three root-causes of unprofitable action. Rāga is renderable also by “lust” in its general sense. Kāmacchanda (lust): a technical term for

[132]. Ūhana—“hitting upon”: possibly connected with ūhanati (to disturb—see M I 243; II 193). Obviously connected here with the meaning of āhananapariyāhanana

(“striking and threshing”) in the next line. For the similes that follow here, see Peṭ 142. 26. Of the Aṅguttara Nikāya? [The original could not be traced anywhere in the Tipiṭaka, Aṭṭhakathā, and other texts contained in the digitalised Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana edition of the Vipassana Research Institute. Dhs-a 114 quotes the same passage, but gives the source as aṭṭhakathāyaṃ, “in the commentary.” BPS ed.]

[133]. These two sentences, “So hi ekaggo hutvā appeti” and “So hi ārammaṇaṃ anumajjati,” are not in Be and Ae.

[134]. Puggalādhiṭṭhāna—“in terms of a person”; a technical commentarial term for one of the ways of presenting a subject. They are dhammā-desanā (discourse about principles), and puggala-desanā (discourse about persons), both of which may be treated either as dhammādhiṭṭhāna (in terms of principles) or puggalādhiṭṭhāna (in terms of persons). See M-a I 24.

[135]. The four assemblies (parisā) are the bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, laymen followers and laywomen followers.

[136]. For this word play see also XVII.48. Khaṇati is only given in normal meaning of “to dig” in PED. There seems to be some confusion of meaning with khayati (to destroy) here, perhaps suggested by khādati (to eat). This suggests a rendering here and in Ch. XVII of “to consume” which makes sense. Glossed by avadāriyati, to break or dig: not in PED. See CPDavadārana.”

[137]. Kantāra-khinna—“exhausted in a desert”; khinna is not in PED.

[138]. Four unities (ekatta) are given in the preceding paragraph of the same Paṭisambhidā ref.: “The unity consisting in the appearance of relinquishment in the act of giving, which is found in those resolved upon generosity (giving up); the unity consisting in the appearance of the sign of serenity, which is found in those who devote themselves to the higher consciousness; the unity consisting in the appearance of the characteristic of fall, which is found in those with insight;the unity consisting in the appearance of cessation, which is found in noble persons” (Paṭis I 167). The second is meant here.

[139]. “The inmates of the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anurādhapura” (Vism-mhṭ 144).

[140]. “‘Its’: of that jhāna consciousness. ‘At that moment’: at the moment of dissolution; for when the moment of arising is past, repetition occurs starting with the moment of presence” (Vism-mhṭ 145). A curious argument; see §182.

[141]. The quotation is incomplete and the end should read, “… ekarasaṭṭhena bhāvanāvasena paññāvasena paññindriyaṃ adhimattaṃ hoti.”

[142]. “In the sense of the jhāna’s entire object. It is not made its partial object” (Vism-mhṭ 147).

[143]. Kāya-duṭṭhulla“bodily irritability”: explained here as “bodily disturbance (daratha), excitement of the body (kāya-sāraddhatā)” by Vism-mhṭ (p.148); here it represents the hindrance of ill will; cf. M III 151, 159, where commented on as kāyālasiya—“bodily inertia” (M-a IV 202, 208). PED, only gives meaning of “wicked, lewd” for duṭṭhulla, for which meaning see e.g. A I 88, Vin-a 528; cf. IX.69.

[144]. For pamukha—“veranda” see n. 2 above. Pariveṇa—“surrounding space”: this meaning, not given in PED, is brought out clearly in XI.7.

[145]. Samabbhāhata—“stretch flat”: not in this sense in PED. This word replaces the word suvihata used at M III 105 where this clause is borrowed from. At XI.92, the same word (apparently in another sense) is glossed by pellana = “pushing” (not in PED) at Vism-mhṭ 362. M-a IV 153 glosses suvihata with “pasāretvā suṭṭhu vihata” which suggests “stretched” rather than “beaten”; harati rather than hanati.

[146]. What the story is trying to illustrate is the rapidity with which the elder entered the jhāna, controlled its duration, and emerged, which is the necessary preliminary to the working of a marvel (the creation of a rock in this case;XII.57). The last remark seems to indicate that all the others would have been too slow (see Vism-mhṭ 150).

[147]. See XIV.192 and note.

[148]. In the Pali, sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ: cetaso (“of mind”) comes between sampasādanaṃ (“confidence”) and ekodibhāvaṃ (“singleness”) and so can be construed with either.

[149]. Appita—“done away with”: Appitā ti vināsaṃ gamitā (“Appita” means “made to go to annihilation”) (Vism-mhṭ 153). This meaning, though not in PED, is given in CPD.

[150]. Sampiṇḍana—“conjunction”: gram. term for the word ca (and). This meaning not given in PED. Cf. M-a I 40.

[151]. The “eight kinds” are those connected with the eight jhānas, the “ten kinds” those connected with the four paths, the four fruitions, the void liberation, and the signless liberation.

[152]. Avatthā—“position, occasion.” Not in PED; see CPD.

[153]. Sovatthika-ttaya—”three marks;” cf. XXI.49.

[154]. For consciousness-originated materiality see XX.30 ff.

[155]. “They say that with the words, ‘There could be the arising of the pain faculty,’ it is shown that since grief arises even in obtainers of jhāna, it is demonstrated thereby that hate can exist without being a hindrance just as greed can; for grief does not arise without hate. Nor, they say, is there any conflict with the Paṭṭhāna text to be fancied here, since what is shown there is only grief that occurs making lost jhāna its object because the grief that occurs making its object a jhāna that has not been lost is not relevant there. And they say that it cannot be maintained that grief does not arise at all in those who have obtained jhāna since it did arise in Asita who had the eight attainments (Sn 691), and he was not one who had lost jhāna. So they say. That is wrong because there is no hate without the nature of a hindrance. If there were, it would arise in finematerial and immaterial beings, and it does not. Accordingly when in such passages as, ‘In the immaterial state, due to the hindrance of lust there is the hindrance of stiffness and torpor … the hindrance of agitation, the hindrance of ignorance’ (Paṭṭh II 291), ill will and worry are not mentioned as hindrances, that does not imply that they are not hindrances even by supposing that it was because lust, etc., were not actually hindrances and were called hindrances there figuratively because of resemblance to hindrances. And it is no reason to argue, ‘it is because it arose in Asita,’ since there is falling away from jhāna with the arising of grief. The way to regard that is that when the jhāna is lost for some trivial reason such men reinstate it without difficulty” (Vism-mhṭ 158–59).

[156]. Gopa—“cowherd (or guardian)”: not in PED.

[157]. Kuṇḍika—“a four-footed water pot”: not in PED.

[158]. English cannot really furnish five words for water.

[159]. Vaṇṇa-dhātu—“colour element” should perhaps have been rendered simply by “paint.” The one Pali word “nīla” has to serve for the English blue, green, and sometimes black.

[160]. Pattaṅga: not in PED. Āsana—“altar”: not in this sense in PED.

[161]. In the Suttas the first eight kasiṇas are the same as those given here, and they are the only ones mentioned in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (§160–203) and Paṭisambhidā (Paṭis I 6). The Suttas give space and consciousness as ninth and tenth respectively (M II 14–15; D III 268; Netti 89, etc.). But these last two appear to coincide with the first two immaterial states, that is, boundless space and boundless consciousness. The light kasiṇa given here as ninth does not appear in the Suttas. It is perhaps a development from the “perception of light” (āloka-saññā) (A II 45). The limited-space kasiṇa given here as tenth has perhaps been made “limited’ in order to differentiate it from the first immaterial state. The commentary on the consciousness kasiṇa (M-a III 261) says nothing on this aspect. As to space, Vism-mhṭ (p. 373) says: “The attainment of the immaterial states is not produced by means of the space kasiṇa, and with the words ‘ending with the white kasiṇa’ (XXI.2) the light kasiṇa is included in the white kasiṇa.” For description of space (ākāsa) see Dhs-a 325, Netti 29. Also Vism-mhṭ (p. 393) defines space thus: “Wherever there is no obstruction, that is called space.” Again the Majjhima Nikāya Ṭīkā (commenting on MN 106) remarks: “[Sense desires] are not called empty (ritta) in the sense that space, which is entirely devoid of individual essence, is called empty.”

[162]. The five kinds of bad kamma with immediate effect on rebirth are, in that order of priority: matricide, parricide, arahanticide, intentional shedding of a Buddha’s blood, and causing a schism in the Community, all of which cause rebirth in hell and remaining there for the remainder of the aeon (kappa), whatever other kinds of kamma may have been performed (M-a IV 109f.).

[163]. The no-cause view, moral-inefficacy-of-action view, the nihilistic view that there is no such thing as giving, and so on (see DN 2).

[164]. It is not possible to render such associative and alliterative derivations of meaning into English. They have nothing to do with the historical development of words, and their purpose is purely mnemonic.

[165]. Apavārita—“opened up”: not in PED.

[166]. This does not imply what we, now, might suppose. See the description of “brain” in VIII.126 and especially VIII.136. What is meant is perhaps that he might get a cold or catarrh.

[167]. Reference back to §19 requires sabhāvato upalakkhati rather than sabhāvato vavaṭṭhāpeti, but so the readings have it.

[168]. Vaṇita—“inflated”: glossed by Vism-mhṭ with sūna (swollen). Not in PED in this sense. 6. Vipphandana—“wrong kind of excitement”: Vism-mhṭ says here “Kilesaparipphandanass’ eva nimittaṃ hotī ti attho (the meaning is, it becomes the sign for interference by (activity of) defilement” (Vism-mhṭ 170). Phandati and vipphandati are both given only such meanings as “to throb, stir, twitch” and paripphandati is not in PED. For the sense of wrong (vi-) excitement (phandana) cf. IV.89 and XIV.132 and note. There seems to be an association of meaning between vipphāra, vyāpāra, vipphandana, īhaka, and paripphandana (perhaps also ābhoga) in the general senses of interestedness, activity, concern, interference, intervention, etc.

[169]. The Harvard text has ugghāṭita, but Vism-mhṭ (p. 170) reads “ugghāṇitā (not in PED) pī-tī uddhumātakabhāvappattā pi sabbaso kuthita-sarīrā-pī-ti attho.”

[170]. “Udara-pariyosānaṃ uparisarīram” (Vism-mhṭ 172). Pariyosāna here means “intensity” though normally it means “end”; but see PED pariyosita.

[171]. There is no sense of ajjhottharati given in PED that fits here. Cf. I.56.

[172]. Reading ekaṃsena (surely) with Harvard text rather than ekadesena (partly).

[173]. “He would come to handle it without disgust as a corpse-burner would” (Vism-mhṭ 176.).

[174]. Reading manussa with Sinhalese ed.

[175]. Aparisaṇṭhita—“turbulent.” Parisaṇṭhāti (to quiet) is not in PED. Aparisaṇṭhita is not in CPD.

[176]. The word dhamma—perhaps the most important and frequently used of Pali words—has no single equivalent in English because no English word has both a generalization so wide and loose as the word dhamma in its widest sense (which includes “everything” that can be known or thought of in any way) and at the same time an ability to be, as it were, focused in a set of well-defined specific uses. Roughly dhamma = what-can-be-remembered or what-can-be-borne-in-mind (dhāretabba) as kamma = what-can-be-done (kātabba). The following two principal (and overlapping) senses are involved here: (i) the Law as taught, and (ii) objects of consciousness. (i) In the first case the word has either been left untranslated as “Dhamma” or “dhamma” or it has been tendered as “Law” or “law.” This ranges from the loose sense of the “Good Law,” “cosmic law,” and “teaching” to such specific technical senses as the “discrimination of law,” “causality,” “being subject to or having the nature of.” (ii) In the second case the word in its looser sense of “something known or thought of” has either been left untranslated as “dhamma” or rendered by “state” (more rarely by “thing” or “phenomenon”), while in its technical sense as one of the twelve bases or eighteen elements “mental object” and “mental datum” have been used. The sometimes indiscriminate use of “dhamma,” “state” and “law” in both the looser senses is deliberate. The English words have been reserved as far as possible for rendering dhamma (except that “state” has sometimes been used to render bhāva, etc., in the sense of “-ness”). Other subsidiary meanings of a non-technical nature have occasionally been otherwise rendered according to context.

[177]. “‘Absolute confidence’ is the confidence afforded by the noble path. Development of the recollection comes to success in him who has that, not in any other” (Vism-mhṭ 181). “Absolute confidence” is a constituent of the first three “factors of streamentry” (see S V 196).

[178]. Cf. derivation of the word ariya (“noble”) at M-a I 21.

[179]. “Because of the words, ‘Also all dhammas of the three planes are sense desires (kāma) in the sense of being desirable (kamanīya) (Cf. Nidd I 1: sabbepi kāmāvacarā dhammā, sabbepi rūpāvacarā dhammā, sabbepi arūpāvacarā dhammā … kāmanīyaṭṭhena … kāmā), greed for becoming is sense-desire clinging’ (Vism-mhṭ 184). See XII.72. For the “way to the Brahmā-world” see M II 194–96; 207f.

[180]. “Is not unobstructed knowledge (anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa) different from omniscient knowledge (sabbaññuta-ñāṇa)? Otherwise the words “Six kinds of knowledge unshared [by disciples]” (Paṭis I 3) would be contradicted? [Note: The six kinds are: knowledge of what faculties prevail in beings, knowledge of the inclinations and tendencies of beings, knowledge of the Twin Marvel, knowledge of the attainment of the great compassion, omniscient knowledge, and unobstructed knowledge (see Paṭis I 133)].—There is no contradiction, because two ways in which a single kind of knowledge’s objective field occurs are described for the purpose of showing by means of this difference how it is not shared by others.

It is only one kind of knowledge; but it is called omniscient knowledge because its objective field consists of formed, unformed, and conventional (sammuti) [i.e. conceptual] dhammas without remainder, and it is called unobstructed knowledge because of its unrestricted access to the objective field, because of absence of obstruction. And it is said accordingly in the Paṭisambhidā: “It knows all the formed and the unformed without remainder, thus it is omniscient knowledge. It has no obstruction therein, thus it is unobstructed knowledge” (Paṭis I 131), and so on. So they are not different kinds of knowledge. And there must be no reservation, otherwise it would follow that omniscient and unobstructed knowledge had obstructions and did not make all dhammas its object. There is not in fact a minimal obstruction to the

[181]. Bhanti—“they shine”: this form is not given in PED under bhāti.

[182]. To take what is not self-evident in this paragraph, three kinds of feeling are pleasant, painful and neither-painful-nor-pleasant (see MN 59). Four kinds of nutriment are physical

[183]. The rendering of sadevamanussānaṃ by “with its princes and men” is supported by the commentary. See M-a II 20 and also M-a I 33 where the use of sammuti-deva for a royal personage, not an actual god is explained. Deva is the normal mode of addressing a king. Besides, the first half of the sentence deals with deities and it would be out of place to refer to them again in the clause related to mankind.

[184]. The references are these: Apalāla (Mahāvaṃsa, p. 242), “Dwelling in the Himalayas” (Vism-mhṭ 202), Cūḷodara and Mahodara (Mhv pp. 7–8; Dīp pp. 21–23), Aggisikha and Dhūmasikha (“Inhabitant of Sri Lanka”—Vism-mhṭ 202), Āravāḷa and Dhanapālaka (Vin II 194–96; J-a V 333–37), Saccaka (MN 35 and 36), Ambaṭṭha (DN 3), Pokkharasāti (D I 109), Soṇadaṇḍa (DN 4), Kūṭadanta (DN 5), Āḷavaka (Sn p. 31), Sūciloma and Kharaloma (Sn p. 47f.), Sakka (D I 263f.).

[185]. For the breaking up of this compound cf. parallel passage at M-a I 10.

[186]. Āvatthika—“denoting a period in life” (from avatthā, see IV.167); not in PED; the meaning given in the PED for liṅgika—“describing a particular mark,” is hardly adequate for this ref.; nemittika—“signifying a particular acquirement” is not in this sense in PED. For more on names see Dhs-a 390.

[187]. The commentarial name for the Elder Sāriputta to whom the authorship of the Paṭisambhidā is traditionally attributed. The Paṭisambhidā text has “Buddha,” not “Bhagavā.”

[188]. The three “abidings” are these: heavenly abiding = kasiṇa jhāna, divine abiding = loving-kindness jhāna, etc., noble abiding = fruition attainment. For the three kinds of seclusion, see IV, note 23.

[189]. Vism-mhṭ adds seven more plays on the word bhagavā, which in brief are these: he is bhāgavā (a possessor of parts) because he has the Dhamma aggregates of virtue, etc. (bhāgā = part, vant = possessor of). He is bhatavā (possessor of what is borne) because he has borne (bhata) the perfections to their full development. He has cultivated the parts (bhāge vani), that is, he has developed the various classes of attainments. He has cultivated the blessings (bhage vani), that is, the mundane and supramundane blessings. He is bhattavā (possessor of devotees) because devoted (bhatta) people show devotion (bhatti) to him on account of his attainments. He has rejected blessings (bhage vami) such as glory, lordship, fame and so on. He has rejected the parts (bhāge vami) such as the five aggregates of experience, and so on (Vism-mhṭ 241–46).

[190]. Anusandhi—“sequence of meaning”: a technical commentarial term signifying both a particular subject treated in a discourse, and also the way of linking one subject with another in the same discourse. At M-a I 175 three kinds are distinguished: sequence of meaning in answer to a question (pucchānusandhi—e.g. M I 36), that to suit a personal idiosyncrasy, (ajjhāsayānusandhi—e.g. M I 23) and that due to the natural course of the teaching (yathānusandhi—e.g. the whole development of MN 6).

[191]. Vyatti (byatti)—“particular distinction” (n. fm. vi + añj);not so spelt in PED but see viyatti. Glossed by Vism-mhṭ with veyyatti.

[192]. These “five aggregates” are those of virtue, concentration, understanding, deliverance, and knowledge and vision of deliverance.

[193]. Vatthika—“clothable”; not in PED.

[194]. Pakaṭṭha—“distant”; not in PED (= duraVism-mhṭ 297).

[195]. This passage is only loosely renderable because the exegesis here is based almost entirely on the substitution of one Pali grammatical form for another (padasiddhi). The reading opaneyyiko (for opanayiko) does not appear in any Sinhalese text (generally the most reliable); consequently the sentence “opanayiko va opaneyyiko” (see Harvard text) is absent in them, being superfluous. Vism-mhṭ’s explanations are incorporated. This paragraph depends on the double sense of upaneti (upa + neti, to lead on or induce) and its derivatives as (i) an attractive inducement and (ii) a reliable guide, and so the word induce is stretched a bit and inducive coined on the analogy of conducive. Upanaya (inducement) is not in PED, nor is upanayana (inducing) in this sense (see also XIV.68). Upanayana means in logic “application,” “subsumption”; and also upanetabba means “to be added”;see end of §72. For allīyana (“treating as one’s shelter”) see references in Glossary.

[196]. “In the Sarvāstivādin school and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 230).

[197]. Amplifications are from Vism-mhṭ, p. 236.

[198]. “The word ‘etc.’ includes Nanda-yakkha, Nanda-māṇava, and others” (Vism-mhṭ 236). See A-a II 104, and M-a IV 8.

[199]. For the expression upāya-manasikāra—“attention as a [right] means” see M-a I 64.

[200]. This line is not in the Sutta-nipāta, but see D II 120, note.

[201]. The Emperor Asoka is referred to. His name Asoka means “Sorrowless.” This story is in the Asokāvadāna and Divyāvadāna, pp. 429–434.

[202]. The references for the names here and in the following paragraphs are: Mahāsammata (J-a III 454; II 311), Mandhātu (J-a II 311), Mahāsudassana (D II 169f.), Daḷhanemi (D III 59f.), Nimi (J-a VI 96f.), Jotika (Vism XII.41), Jaṭila (XII.41), Ugga (A-a I 394), Meṇḍaka (XII.41f.), Puṇṇaka (XII.42), Vāsudeva (J-a IV 81f.), Baladeva (J-a IV 81f.), Bhīmasena (J-a V 426), Yuddhiṭṭhila (J-a V 426), Cāṇura (J-a IV 81).

[203]. Pabhuti—“etc.”: this meaning is not in PED; see §121.

[204]. Virtue, concentration, understanding, deliverance, knowledge, and vision of deliverance.

[205]. Paṭihitāya—“drawing on”: not in PED; Vism-mhṭ (p. 240) reads paṇitāya and explains by paccāgatāya (come back).

[206]. Nāyare—“can know”: form not in PED; Vism-mhṭ explains by ñāyanti.

[207]. “‘Person’ (atta-bhāva) is the states other than the already-mentioned life, feeling and consciousness. The words ‘just these alone’ mean that it is unmixed with self (attā)

[208]. In the Aṅguttara text the negative and positive clauses are in the opposite order.

[209]. Agaru—“aloes”: not so spelled in PED; but see agalu.

[210]. Hatthasaṅkhalikā—“the fingers of a pair of clasped hands,” “a row of fingers (aṅgulīpanti) (Vism-mhṭ 246).

[211]. “For the penetration of the characteristic of foulness, for the observation of repulsiveness as the individual essence” (Vism-mhṭ 246).

[212]. “The higher consciousness” is a term for jhāna.

[213]. Vism-mhṭ explains “sati sati āyatane” (rendered here by “whenever there is occasion” with “tasmiṃ tasmiṃ pubbahetu-ādi-kāraṇe sati” (“when there is this or that reason consisting in a previous cause, etc.”); M-a IV 146 says: “Sati sati kāraṇe. Kim pan’ ettha kāraṇan’ti. Abhiññā’ va kāraṇaṃ (‘Whenever there is a reason. But what is the reason here? The direct-knowledge itself is the reason’).”

[214]. Ariṭṭhaka as a plant is not in PED; see CPD—Sinh penela uṭa.

[215]. There are various readings.

[216]. “Galavāṭaka,” here rendered by “nape of the neck,” which the context demands. But elsewhere (e.g. IV.47, VIII.110) “base of the neck” seems indicated, that is, where the neck fits on to the body, or “gullet.”

[217]. A measure of length, as much as a “louse’s head.”

[218]. Nisadapota—“rolling pin”: (= silā-puttakaVism-mhṭ 250) What is meant is probably the stone roller, thicker in the middle than at the ends, with which curry spices, etc., are normally rolled by hand on a small stone slab in Sri Lanka today.

[219]. Koṭṭhaṭṭhīni—“shoulder-blade bones”: for koṭṭha (= flat) cf. koṭṭhalika §97; the meaning is demanded by the context, otherwise no mention would be made of these two bones, and the description fits. PED under this ref. has “stomach bone” (?). Should one read a-tikhiṇa (blunt) or ati-khiṇa (very sharp)?

[220]. Duttacchita—“badly pared”: tacchita, pp. of tacchati to pare (e.g. with an adze);not in PED; see M I 31,124; III 166.

[221]. Pañjara—“frame”: not quite in this sense in PED.

[222]. Saṅkuṭitaghaṭapuṇṇapaṭalakhaṇḍa—“a piece of curled-up toffee flake.” The Sinhalese translation suggests the following readings and resolution: saṅkuthita (thickened or boiled down (?), rather than saṅkuṭita, curled up); ghata-puṇṇa ([toffee?] “full of ghee”); paṭala (flake or slab); khaṇḍa (piece).

[223]. Kilomaka—“midriff”: the rendering is obviously quite inadequate for what is described here, but there is no appropriate English word.

[224]. Obhagga—“looped”: not in this sense in PED; see obhañjati (XI.64 and PED).

[225]. Dakasītalika: not in PED; rendered in Sinhalese translation by helmaeli (white edible water lily).

[226]. Maṃsaka-sambupali-veṭhana-kiliṭṭha-pāvāra-pupphaka-sadisa: this is rendered into Sinhalese by kuṇu mas kasaḷa velu porōnā kaḍek pup (“an inflated piece (or bag) of cloth, which has wrapped rotten meat refuse”). In PED pāvāra is given as “cloak, mantle” and (this ref.) as “the mango tree”; but there seems to be no authority for the rendering “mango tree,” which has nothing to do with this context. Pupphaka (balloon) is not in PED (cf. common Burmese spelling of bubbuḷa (bubble) as pupphuḷa).

[227]. It would be a mistake to take the renderings of these worms’ names too literally. Gaṇḍuppada (boil-producing worm?) appears only as “earth worm” in PED, which will not do here. The more generally accepted reading seems to take paṭatantuka and suttaka (tape-worm and thread-worm) as two kinds rather than paṭatantusuttaka;neither is in PED.

[228]. Kuṇapa—“ordure”;PED only gives the meaning “corpse,” which does not fit the meaning either here or, e.g., at XI.21, where the sense of a dead body is inappropriate.

[229]. Kaṇḍūyati—“to itch”: the verb is not in PED; see kaṇḍu.

[230]. Reference is sometimes made to the “hand-grasping question” (hattha-gahaka pañhā). It may be to this; but there is another mentioned at the end of the commentary to the Dhātu-Vibhaṅga.

[231]. The allusion seems to be to the bases of mastery (abhibhāyatana—or better, bases for transcendence); see M II l3 and M-a III 257f.; but see §60.

[232]. “‘Some’ is said with reference to the inmates of the Uttara (Northern) monastery [in Anurādhapura]” (Vism-mhṭ 256).

[233]. “The words ‘in all its aspects’ refer to the sixteen bases; for these are only found in total in this dispensation. When outsiders know mindfulness of breathing they only know the first four modes” (Vism-mhṭ 257).

[234]. “‘The ascetic’ is a stream-enterer, the ‘second ascetic’ is a once-returner, the ‘third ascetic’ is a non-returner, the ‘fourth ascetic’ is an Arahant” (M-a II 4).

[235]. Kūṭa—“wild”: PED, this ref. gives “useless,” which misses the point. Cf. M-a II 82; IV 198.

[236]. The nine kinds of abode (resting place) are the forest and the root of a tree already mentioned, and a rock, a hill cleft, a mountain cave, a charnel ground, a jungle thicket, an open space, a heap of straw (M I 181).

[237]. “In the hot season the forest is favourable, in the cold season the root of a tree, in the rainy season an empty place. For one of phlegmatic humour, phlegmatic by nature, the forest is favourable, for one of bilious humour the root of a tree, for one of windy humour an empty place. For one of deluded temperament the forest, for one of hating temperament the root of a tree, for one of greedy temperament an empty place” (Vism-mhṭ 258).

[238]. “‘Zeal arises’: additional zeal, which is profitable and has the characteristic of desire to act, arises due to the satisfaction obtained when the meditation has brought progressive improvement. ‘More subtle than before’: more subtle than before the already-described zeal arose; for the breaths occur more subtly owing to the meditation’s influence in tranquilizing the body’s distress and disturbance. ‘Gladness arises’: fresh happiness arises of the kinds classed as minor, etc., which is the gladness that accompanies the consciousness occupied with the meditation and is due to the fact that the peacefulness of the object increases with the growing subtlety of the breaths and to the fact that the meditation subject keeps to its course. ‘The mind turns away’: the mind turns away from the breaths, which have reached the point at which their manifestation needs investigating (see §177) owing to their gradually increasing subtlety. But some say (see Paṭis-a Ce, p. 351): ‘It is when the in-breaths and outbreaths have reached a subtler state owing to the influence of the meditation and the counterpart sign; for when that has arisen, the mind turns away from the normal breaths.’ ‘Equanimity is established’: when concentration, classed as access and absorption, has arisen in that counterpart sign, then, since there is no need for further interest to achieve jhāna, onlooking (equanimity) ensues, which is specific neutrality” (Vism-mhṭ 260).

[239]. “‘In these nine ways’: that occur in the nine ways just described. ‘Long in-breaths and out-breaths are a body’: the in-breaths and out-breaths, which exist as particles though they have the aspect of length, constitute a ‘body’ in the sense of a mass. And here the sign that arises with the breaths as its support is also called ‘in-breath and out-breath.’ (cf. e.g. §206) ‘The establishment (foundation) is mindfulness’: mindfulness is called ‘establishment (foundation)—(upaṭṭhāna)’ since it approaches (upagantvā) the object and remains (tiṭṭhati) there. ‘The contemplation is knowledge’: contemplation

[240]. The beginning, middle and end are described in §197, and the way they should be treated is given in §199–201. What is meant is that the meditator should know what they are and be aware of them without his mindfulness leaving the tip of the nose to follow after the breaths inside the body or outside it, speculating on what becomes of them.

[241]. “‘In the first part of the system’: in the first part of the system of development;in the first two bases, is what is intended. Of course, arousing of knowledge must be admitted to take place here too because of the presence of awareness of the length and shortness of the breaths as they actually are (as they actually become); and it is not hard to do that, for it is merely the taking account of them as they occur. That is why it is put in the present tense here. But what follows is as hard as for a man to walk on a razor’s edge; which is why the future tense is used for the subsequent stages in order to indicate the need for exceptional prior effort” (Vism-mhṭ 263).

[242]. “‘Bodily formation’: the in-breath and out-breath (see M I 301). For although it is consciousness-originated, it is nevertheless called ‘bodily formation’ since its existence is bound up with the kamma-born body and it is formed with that as the means” (Vism-mhṭ 263).

[243]. “The faint sound itself as a sign is the ‘sign of the faint sounds’; it has that as its object. What is meant? Of course, the faint sounds have ceased too then; but the sign of the sounds has been well apprehended and so consciousness occurs with the sign of fainter sounds as its object. For as from the outset he ascertains with undistracted consciousness the sign of each sound as it ceases, eventually his consciousness occurs in the end with the sign of ultra-subtle sounds too as its object” (Vism-mhṭ 266).

[244]. “As a meditation subject for a beginner” is said with reference to the serenity (i.e. jhāna) meditation subject; but the insight meditation subject applies to the other tetrads too” (Vism-mhṭ 266).

[245]. “‘Buffeted by wind’: if he gives much attention to the wind that has gone inside, that place seems to him as if it were buffeted by the wind, as if filled with fat” (Vismmhṭ 268). No further explanation is given.

[246]. “‘Following (anugamana)’ is occurring along with (anu anu pavattana), going after (anugacchana), by means of mindfulness through making the breaths the object as they occur, Hence he said, ‘And that is not by following after the beginning, middle and end.’ ‘The navel is the beginning’ because of their first arising there. For the notion of a beginning (ādi cintā) is here in the sense of first arising, not in the sense of just arising [once only]. For they actually go on arising throughout [the whole length] from the navel to the nose-tip; and wherever they arise, there in that same place they dissolve, because there is no going (movement) of dhammas. The ordinary term ‘motion’ (gatisamaññā) refers to successive arisings in adjacent locations (desantaruppatti) according to conditions. ‘The heart is the middle’: near the heart, just above it is the middle. ‘The nose tip is the end’: the place where the nostrils are is the end; that is the limit of the application of the ordinary term ‘in-breaths and outbreaths,’ for it is accordingly that they are called ‘consciousness-originated,’ there being no production externally of what is consciousness-originated” (Vism-mhṭ 268).

[247]. Paṭis I 170–72; last line Dhp 172; whole verse Th 548.

[248]. Reading āgata-gata-vasena with Vism-mhṭ 271.

[249]. The point made here is that if the breaths themselves get temporarily too faint to be observed, he should carry on by observing the tip of the nose where they normally touch until they become apparent again. He brings the meditation back to mind for the moment, “as the place (desato)” where they were last noticed, instead of “as breaths,” which have temporarily vanished.

[250]. Those born in the world of unconscious beings in the fine-material Brahmā world (D I 28).

[251]. “‘The sign’ is the learning sign and the counterpart sign, for both are stated here together. Herein, the three similes beginning with cotton are properly the learning sign, the rest are both. ‘Some’ are certain teachers. The similes beginning with the ‘cluster of gems’ are properly the counterpart sign” (Vism-mhṭ 273).

[252]. “‘Because of difference in perception’: because of the difference in the manner of perceiving that occurred before the arising of the sign” (Vism-mhṭ 273).

[253]. Vibhāvayaṃ can mean “to do away with” or “to explain.” Either is applicable here according to Vism-mhṭ 274.

[254]. For the Wheel-turning Monarch (cakkavattin) see DN 26 and MN 129.

[255]. “‘With the object’: under the heading of the object. The happiness included in the jhāna that has that object is experienced ‘because of the experiencing of the object.’ What is meant? Just as, when a man who is looking for a snake discovers (experiences) its abode, the snake is, as it were, already discovered (experienced) and caught, owing to the ease with which he will then be able to catch it with charms and spells, so too, when the object, which is the abode of the happiness, is experienced (discovered), then the happiness itself is experienced (discovered) too, owing to the ease with which it will be apprehended in its specific and general characteristics. ‘By his penetration of its characteristics’: by penetration of the specific and general characteristics of happiness. For when the specific and general characteristics of anything are experienced then that thing is experienced according to reality” (Vism-mhṭ 276).

[256]. “‘Momentary unification of the mind’: concentration lasting only for a moment. For that too, when it occurs uninterruptedly on its object in a single mode and is not overcome by opposition, fixes the mind immovably, as if in absorption” (Vism-mhṭ 278).

[257]. “‘Delivering’: secluding, separating, by means of deliverance consisting in suppression; abandoning the hindrances, is the meaning. ‘At the actual time of insight’: at the time of contemplation of dissolution. For dissolution is the furthest extreme of impermanence. So the meditator who is contemplating dissolution by its means sees under the heading of consciousness the whole field of formations as impermanent, not as permanent; and because of the suffering inherent in what is impermanent, and because of the absence of self in what is painful, he sees that same whole field of formations as painful, not as pleasant, and as not-self, not as self. But since what is impermanent, painful, and not-self is not something to delight in, and what is not something to delight in is not something to be greedy for, consequently he becomes dispassionate towards that whole field of formations when it is seen in the light of dissolution as impermanent, painful, not-self, he does not delight in it, and his greed for it fades away, does not dye him. Now, as he thus becomes dispassionate and his greed fades away, it is firstly by means of

[258]. “What is called ‘permanent’ is what is lasting, eternal, like Nibbāna. What is called ‘impermanent’ is what is not permanent, and is possessed of rise and fall. He said ‘The five aggregates are “the impermanent,’” signifying that they are formed

[259]. Modern etymology derives the word Nibbāna (Skr. nirvāṇa) from the negative prefix nir plus the root (to blow). The original literal meaning was probably “extinction” of a fire by ceasing to blow on it with bellows (a smith’s fire for example). It seems to have been extended to extinction of fire by any means, for example, the going out of a lamp’s flame (nibbāyatiM III 245). By analogy it was extended to the extinction of the five-aggregate process on the Arahant’s death (see It 38). Nibbāna is not the “extinction of a self or of a living lasting being,” such a mistaken opinion being the annihilation view (see e.g. M I 140, S III 109).

[260]. Some texts add leṇa (another word for shelter). Still others are given in the Saṃyutta text.

[261]. “‘Fighting against the wall’: having undertaken the precepts of virtue and sat down on a seat in his room with the door locked, he was developing loving-kindness. Blinded by lust arisen under cover of the loving-kindness, he wanted to go to his wife, and without noticing the door he beat on the wall in his desire to get out even by breaking the wall down” (Vism-mhṭ 286).

[262]. Reading dāna-piyavacanādīni with Ce (see four saṅgahavatthūni—A II 32).

[263]. The Aṅguttara text has “Let him … reappear in a state of loss” and so on.

[264]. “The eight great hells beginning with that of Sañjīva (see J-a V 266, 270). At each of the four doors of the Great Unmitigated (Avīci) Hell there are the four beginning with the Ember (Kukuḷa) Hell (M III 185), which make up the sixteen prominent hells” (Vism-mhṭ 291).

[265]. Saṅku-patha—“set on piles”: Vism-mhṭ (p. 294) says: “Saṅku laggāpetvā te ālambhitvā gamanamaggo saṅkupatho.” This disagrees with PED for this ref.

[266]. Satta—“the bright principle”: Skr. sattva; one of the three principles in the Sāṅkhya system, the other two being rajas (Pali: rajo) or turbulence and tamas (Pali: tamo) or darkness. Not in PED.

[267]. “Here when the aggregates are not fully understood, there is naming (abhidhāna) of them and of the consciousness of them as self (attā), that is to say, the physical body or alternatively the five aggregates. ‘Derived from’: apprehending, gripping, making a support. ‘Since it is actually a mere concept’: because of presence (sabbhāvato) as a mere concept in what is called a being, though in the highest sense the ‘being’ is nonexistent” (Vism-mhṭ 298). See also Ch. VIII, note 11.

[268]. Harvard text reads byāpādarahita, which would be renderable as “free from ill will.” Vism-mhṭ (p. 299) supports a reading byābādha, which seems better.

[269]. For duṭṭhulla see Ch. IV, note 36. Here the meaning is more likely to be “bad” or “lewd” than “inert.”

[270]. Muditā—“gladness” as one of the divine abidings is always in the sense of gladness at others’ success. Sometimes rendered as “altruistic joy” and “sympathetic gladness.”

[271]. Kiṇāti—“it combats”: Skr. kºnāti—to injure or kill. PED gives this ref. under ordinary meaning “to buy,” which is wrong.

[272]. So Vism-mhṭ 309.

[273]. All texts read kassa (whose), which is confirmed in the quotation translated in note 20. It is tempting, in view of the context, to read kammassa (kamma’s), but there is no authority for it. The statement would then be an assertion instead of a question. 14. “Greed is the near enemy of loving-kindness since it is able to corrupt owing to its similarity, like an enemy masquerading as a friend” (Vism-mhṭ 309).

[274]. Paṭihaññati—“to be resentful”: not in PED; the verb has been needed to correspond to “resentment” (paṭigha), as the verb, “to be inflamed with greed” (rajjati) corresponds with “greed” (rāga).

[275]. Sambhāvetvā—“judging”: not in this sense in PED. Vism-mhṭ (p. 313) explains by parikappetvā (conjecturing).

[276]. “‘Thus developed’: just as a fire started with wood and banked up with cowdung, dust, etc., although it arrives at the state of a ‘cowdung fire,’ etc., (cf. M I 259) is nevertheless called after the original fire that was started with the wood, so too it is the basic concentration that is spoken of here, taking it as banked up with lovingkindness, and so on. ‘In other objects’ means in such objects as the earth kasiṇa” (Vism-mhṭ 315).

[277]. For the “ten powers” and “four kinds of fearlessness” see MN 12. For the “six kinds of knowledge not shared by disciples” see Paṭis I 121f. For the “eighteen states of the Enlightened One” see Cp-a.

[278]. “A dog, it seems, was attacked in the forest by a boar and fled. When it was dusk he saw in the distance a cauldron for boiling rice, and perceiving it as a boar, he fled in fear and terror. Again, a man who was afraid of pisāca goblins saw a decapitated palm stump at night in a place that was unfamiliar to him, and perceiving it as a pisāca goblin, he fell down in his fear, horror and confusion” (Vism-mhṭ 320).

[279]. PED, this ref. reads yānapuṭosā for yānapatoḷi, taking it as one compound (see under yāna and mutoḷī, but this does not fit the context happily. Vism-mhṭ (p. 321) has: “‘Yānappatoḷikumbhimukhādīnanti oguṇṭhana-sivikādi-yānaṃ mukhaṃ = yāna-mukhaṃ; patoḷiyā kuddakadvārassa mukhaṃ = patoḷi-mukhaṃ; kumbhi-mukhan ti paccekaṃ mukhasaddo sambandhitabbo.” This necessitates taking yāna separately.

[280]. These two quotations refer respectively to the first of the eight liberations and the first of the eight bases of mastery (See M-a III 255ff.).

[281]. This explanation depends on a play on the word saññā as the [subjective] perception and as the [objective] sign, signal or label perceived.

[282]. See XIV.129, description of perception aggregate, which is classified in the same way as the consciousness aggregate. Those referred to here are the fifteen finematerial kinds, corresponding to nos. (9–l3), (57–61) and (81–85) in Table III.

[283]. See XIV.96f. nos. (34–38) and (50–54) in Table III.

[284]. “A [formed] dhamma with an individual essence is delimited by rise and fall because it is produced after having not been, and because after having been it vanishes. But space is called boundless since it has neither rise nor fall because it is a dhamma without individual essence” (Vism-mhṭ 323).

[285]. “He should not give attention to it only as ‘Boundless, boundless;’ instead of developing it thus, he should give attention to it as ‘Boundless consciousness, boundless consciousness’ or as ‘Consciousness, consciousness’” (Vism-mhṭ 324).

[286]. There is a play on the words natthi kiñci (“there is nothing”) and akiñcana (“nonowning”). At M I 298 there occurs the expression “Rāgo kho āvuso kiñcano (greed, friend, is an owning),” which is used in connection with this attainment. The

[287]. Mahacca (see D I 49 and D-a I 148); the form is not given in PED; probably a form of mahatiya.

[288]. Sukhodaka—“tepid water”: see Monier Williams’ Sanskrit Dictionary; this meaning of sukha not given in PED.

[289]. “‘Twenty or thirty times’: here some say that the definition of the number of times is according to what is present-by-continuity (see XIV.188). But others say that it is by way of “warming up the seat” (see M-a I 255); for development that has not reached suppression of hindrances does not remove the bodily discomfort in the act of sitting, because of the lack of pervading happiness. So there is inconstancy of posture too. Then ‘twenty or thirty’ is taken as the number already observed by the time of setting out on the alms round. Or alternatively, from ‘going’ up to ‘smearing’ is one turn;then it is after giving attention to the meditation subject by twenty or thirty turns in this way” (Vism-mhṭ 339).

[290]. Paccattharaṇa—“carpet”: the word normally means a coverlet, but here, according to Vism-mhṭ, (p. 339) it is, “a spread (attharaṇa) consisting of a rug (cilimika) to be spread on the ground for protecting the skin.”

[291]. For pamukha—“doorstep,” perhaps an open upper floor gallery here, see XIII.6.

[292]. Jatukā—“bat” = khuddaka-vaggulī (Vism-mhṭ 339): not in PED; see XIII.97.

[293]. Pārāvata“pigeon”: only spelling pārāpata given in PED.

[294]. For this meaning of pariveṇa see Ch. IV, note 37.

[295]. Vitakka-māḷaka“debating lodge”: Vism-mhṭ (p. 339) says: “‘Kattha nu kho ajja bhikkhāya caritabban’ ti ādinā vitakkamāḷake” (“in a lodge for thinking in the way beginning ‘Where must I go for alms today?’”).

[296]. Piṇḍika-maṃsa—“flesh of the calves” = jaṅghapiṇḍikaṃamsapadesa. (Vism-mhṭ 340) Cf. VIII.97; also A-a 417. Not in this sense in PED.

[297]. Kummāsa“jelly”: usually rendered “junket,” but the Vinaya commentaries give it as made of corn (yava).

[298]. Nāgabalā—a kind of plant; not in PED.

[299]. Pavana—“draught”: not in this sense in PED; see XVI.37.

[300]. Dhātu—“ore”: not in this sense in PED. See also XV.20.

[301]. “‘A certain one’ is said with reference to the anal orifice. But those who are scrupulously clean by nature wash their hands again after washing the mouth, and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 342).

[302]. “‘That sign’: that object as the sign for development, which sign is called physical nutriment and has appeared in the repulsive aspect to one who gives his attention to it repeatedly in the ways already described. And there, while development occurs through the repulsive aspect, it is only the dhammas on account of which there comes to be the concept of physical nutriment that are repulsive, not the concept. But it is because the occurrence of development is contingent only upon dhammas with an individual essence, and because the profundity is due to that actual individual essence of dhammas that have individual essences, that the jhāna cannot reach absorption in it through apprehension of the repulsive aspect. For it is owing to profundity that the first pair of truths is hard to see” (Vism-mhṭ 342–43).

[303]. “‘By characterizing individual essences’: by making certain (upadhāraṇa) of the specific characteristics of hardness, and so on. For this meditation subject does not consist in the observing of a mere concept, as in the case of the earth kasiṇa as a meditation subject, neither does it consist in the observing of the colour blue, etc., as in the case of the blue kasiṇa as a meditation subject, nor in the observing of the general characteristics of impermanence, etc., in formations, as in the case of insight as a meditation subject; but rather it consists in the observing of the individual essences of earth, and so on. That is why ‘by characterizing individual essences’ is said, which means, ‘by making certain of the specific characteristics of hardness, and so on”(Vismmhṭ 344).

[304]. “Herein, as regards ‘earth element,’ etc., the meaning of element is the meaning of individual essence, the meaning of individual essence is the meaning of voidness, the meaning of voidness is the meaning of not-a-living-being. So it is just earth in the sense of individual essence, voidness and not-a-living-being that is the element; hence it is earth element; so too in the case of the water element, and the rest. The earth element is the element that is the foothold for the conascent material states. Likewise the water element is the element of their cohesion; the fire element is the element of their ripening; and the air element is the element of their conveyance and distension” (Vism-mhṭ 345).

To avoid confusion, it might be mentioned here that in “physical” earth, fire, water, and air, it would be held that all four elements are present in each equally, but that in “physical” earth the earth element is dominant in efficacy as the mode of hardness; and correspondingly with water and the rest. See e.g. XIV.45.

[305]. Kharigata—“harsh”: not in PED, but see khara.

[306]. “What occurs in attendance (adhikicca) upon self (attā) by its pertaining to the state that may be taken as self because it is included in one’s own continuity as internal (ajjhatta)” (Vism-mhṭ 347).

[307]. Jara—“fever”: not in PED; see A V 100; Nidd I 17.

[308]. Vitthambhana—“distension”: the word most usually employed to describe the air element. It is often rendered by “supporting,” a word earmarked here for nissaya. The twofold function of the air element is (a) to uphold (sandhārana) by distending (vitthambhana) and preventing collapse (§92), and (b) to move (samudīraṇa), or more strictly, cause the appearance of motion (calana, see n. 37). In XIV.61 it is said to cause thambhana, rendered by “stiffening”; but there is the description of the earth element as thaddha (e.g. §39; pp. of thambhati, from which the noun thambhana comes), rendered by “stiffenedness.” It may also be noted that the word sandhāraṇa (upholding) is used to describe both the earth element (XIV.47) and the air element (XIV.61).

[309]. Drava-bhāva—“fluidity”: not in PED.

[310]. Silesa—”cement”: not in this meaning in PED; M-a I 37 saṃsilesa.

[311]. Dhammani—“rat snake”: not in this sense in PED; see A-a 459.

[312]. Sippikā—“bag” (?): not in this sense in PED.

[313]. “‘Because of bearing their own characteristics’: these are not like the Primordial Essence (pakati—Skr. prakºti) and the self (attā) imagined by the theorists which are

[314]. Parissavati—“to run away”: not in PED;—vissarati (Vism-mhṭ 361).

[315]. “This is said with reference to the water element as a juice that helps growth” (Vism-mhṭ 361).

[316]. Samabbhāhata—“propelled”: see Ch. IV, note 38.

[317]. Abhinīhāra—“conveying”: not in this sense in PED. “‘Conveying’ is acting as cause for the successive arising at adjacent locations (desantaruppatti) of the conglomeration of elements (bhūta-saṅghāta)” (Vism-mhṭ 363). Elsewhere Vism-mhṭ (p. 359) says of the air element: “‘It blows’ (§87): it is stirred; the meaning is that the conglomeration of elements is made to move (go) by its action as cause for successive arising at adjacent locations (points),” and “Propelling (samabbhāhana) is the act of causing the successive arising at adjacent locations of material groups (rūpa-kalāpa)” (p. 362).

[318]. “A great primary (mahābhūta) is a great wonder (mahanto abbhuto) because it shows various unreal things (abhūta), various wonders (abbhuta), and various marvels (acchariya). Or alternatively: there are great wonders (abbhuta) here, thus there are magicians. And spirits, etc., are huge (mahant) creatures (bhūta) owing to being born from them, thus they are great primaries. Or alternatively: this term ‘great primary’ can be regarded as a generic term for all of them. But earth, etc., are great primaries because they deceive, and because, like the huge creatures, their standing place cannot be pointed to. The deception lies in causing the apparent individual essences of

[319]. This alludes to the length of duration of a moment of matter’s existence, which is described as seventeen times as long as that of consciousness (see Vibh-a 25f.).

[320]. “The term ‘producing condition’ refers to causing origination, though as a condition it is actually kamma condition. For this is said: ‘Profitable and unprofitable volition is

[321]. Ugghāta—“exhilarated” and nigghāta—“depressed”: neither word is in PED; Vismmhṭ glosses with ubbilāvitatta and dīnabhāvappatti respectively. 43. Reading yogivarasīhassa kīlitaṃ. Cf. NettippakaraṇaSīha-kīlana.”

[322]. The sense demands reading with Vism-mhṭ appanāpubba-bhāgacittesu as a single compound.

[323]. This is an allusion to M I 179, etc. “The process of existence in the round of rebirths, which is a very cramped place, is crowded by the defilements of craving and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 371).

[324]. Sūdana—“cleaning”: not in PED. See title of Majjhima Nikāya Commentary.

Another reading here is sodhana.

[325]. Āneñja—“imperturbability”: a term normally used for the four immaterial states, together with the fourth jhāna. See also §16f., and MN 106.

[326]. Giribhaṇḍavahanapūjā: Vism-mhṭ (p. 375) says: “Giribhaṇḍa-vahanapūjā nāma Cetiyagiriṃ ādiṃ katvā sakaladīpe samudde ca yāva yojanā mahatī dīpapūjā (‘it is a name for a great island-offering starting with the Cetiyagiri (Mihintale) and extending over the whole island and up to a league into the sea’).” Mentioned in A-a to AN 1:1; M-a II 398; and Mahāvaṃsa XXXIV.81.

[327]. These are the four headings of the roads to power (see §50).

[328]. I.e. one wants it to be known that he can practice jhāna.

[329]. “It counter-strikes (paṭiharati), thus it is a counter-stroke (pāṭihāriya—metamorphosis = miracle). What strikes out (harati), removes, what is counter to it (paṭipakkha) is therefore called counter-striking (paṭihāriya), since what is counter-striking strikes out anything counter (paṭipakkha) to itself. Paṭihāriya (counter-striking) is the same as pāṭihāriya (counter-stroke = metamorphosis = miracle)” (Vism-mhṭ 379).

[330]. Sītā: not in this sense in PED. Vism-mhṭ (p. 383) says, “It is the path traversed by a ploughshare in ploughing that is called a sītā.” Another reading is karīsa (an area of land).

[331]. Visavitā—“majesty”: not in PED; cf. passavati. Vism-mhṭ (p. 385) glosses with iddhiyā vividhānisaṃsa-pasavanāya. Cf. Dhs-a 109; Dhs-ṭ (p. 84) glosses thus visavitāyā ti arahatāya.

[332]. Further explanatory details are given in the commentary to the Iddhipāda Vibhaṅga.

[333]. Aneja (or aneñja)—“unperturbed”: form not in PED.

[334]. Aṅgīrasa—“the One with Radiant Limbs”: one of the epithets for the Buddha. Not in PED; see A III 239.

[335]. Dedication of what is to be given accompanied by pouring water over the hand.

[336]. “‘They become of the kinds desired’: they become whatever the kinds that were desired: for they come to possess as many varieties in appearance, etc., as it was wished they should have. But although they become manifold in this way by being made the object in different modes of appearance, nevertheless it is only a single resolution consciousness that occurs. This is its power. For it is like the single volition that produces a personality possessed of many different facets (see Ch. XIV, n. 14). And there it is the aspiration to become that is a condition for the differentiation in the kamma;and kamma-result is imponderable. And here too it is the preliminary-work consciousness that should be taken as a condition for the difference. And the field of supernormal power is imponderable too.” (Vism-mhṭ 390)

[337]. Certain grammatical problems arise about the case of the words āvibhāvaṃ, etc., both in the sutta passage and (more so) in the Paṭisambhidā passage; they are examined by Vism-mhṭ (p. 390) but are not renderable into English.

[338]. Kūṭāgāra—“palanquin”: not in this sense in PED. See story at M-a V 90, where it is told how 500 of these were made by Sakka’s architect Vissakamma for the Buddha to journey through the air in. The same word is also commonly used in the Commentaries for the portable structure (catafalque) in which a bier is carried to the pyre. This, built often in the form of a house, is still used now in Sri Lanka and called ransivi-ge. See A-a commentary to AN 3:42, and to AN 1:38; also Dhp-a III 470. Not in this sense in PED. 15. The only book in the Tipiṭaka to mention the Twin Miracle is the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Paṭis I 53).16 Anāthapiṇḍika’s younger brother (Vism-mhṭ 391).

[339]. Anāthapiṇḍika’s younger brother (Vism-mhṭ 391).

[340]. Okāseti—“to scatter”: PED, this ref., gives “to show,” which does not fit the context.

Vism-mhṭ glosses with pakirati.

[341]. Vism-mhṭ (p.394): “Vadhūkumārikaññā-vatthāhi tividhāhi nāṭakitthīhi.”

[342]. “‘The ramparts of Sineru’: the girdle of Sineru. There are, it seems, four ramparts that encircle Sineru, measuring 5,000 leagues in breadth and width. They were built to protect the realm of the Thirty-three against nāgas, garudas, kumbhaṇḍas and yakkhas.

They enclose half of Sineru, it seems” (Vism-mhṭ 394).

[343]. “Only this is correct because instances of clung-to (kammically acquired) materiality do not arise owing to consciousness or to temperature. Or alternatively, ‘clung-to’ is intended as all matter that is bound up with faculties (i.e. ‘sentient’), too. And so to

[344]. “This should be regarded as implying that there is no sex or life faculty in it either.” (Vism-mhṭ 398).

[345]. “With the consciousness belonging to the particular concentration that constitutes the preliminary work. The meaning is: by means of consciousness concentrated with the momentary concentration that occurs in the form of the preliminary work for knowledge of the divine ear element. The occasion of access for the divine ear element is called preliminary-work consciousness, but that as stated refers to multiple advertings” (Vism-mhṭ 401).

[346]. “The sound sign is the sound itself since it is the cause for the arising of the knowledge. Or the gross-subtle aspect acquired in the way stated is the sound sign” (Vism-mhṭ 402).

[347]. “This is momentary-concentration consciousness, which owing to the fact that the preliminary work contingent upon the sound has been performed, occurs in one who has attained the basic jhāna and emerged for the purpose of arousing the divine ear element” (Vism-mhṭ 402).

[348]. “‘Becomes merged’ is amalgamated with the divine ear element. He is called an obtainer of divine-ear knowledge as soon as the absorption consciousness has arisen. The meaning is that there is now no further need of development for the purpose” (Vism-mhṭ 403).

[349]. The “matter of the heart” is not the heart-basis, but rather it is the heart as the piece of flesh described as resembling a lotus bud in shape outside and like a kosātakī fruit inside (VIII.111). For the blood mentioned here is to be found with that as its support. But the heart-basis occurs with this blood as its support” (Vism-mhṭ 403).

[350]. “Of one who has not done any interpreting (abhinivesa) reckoned as study for direct-knowledge” (Vism-mhṭ 407). A rather special use of the word abhinivesa, perhaps more freely renderable here as “practice.”

[351]. For the term chinna-vaṭumaka (“one who has broken the cycle of rebirths”) as an epithet of former Buddhas, see M III 118.

[352]. Saṃvaṇṇita—“given in detail”; Vism-mhṭ glosses by vitthāritan ti attho. Not in this meaning in PED. See prologue verses to the four Nikāyas.

[353]. A commentarial account of the behaviour of lions will be found in the Manorathapurāṇī, commentary to AN 4:33. Vism-mhṭ says: Sīh-okkamana-vasena sīhātipatanavasena ñāṇagatiyā gacchati (p. 408).

[354]. Ugghaṭetvā: see X.6; the word is obviously used here in the same sense.

[355]. “The ‘ordinary sun’ is the sun’s divine palace that arose before the emergence of the aeon. But like the other sense-sphere deities at the time of the emergence of the aeon, the sun deity too produces jhāna and reappears in the Brahmā-world. But the actual sun’s disk becomes brighter and more fiery. Others say that it disappears and another appears in its place” (Vism-mhṭ 412).

[356]. The five are the Ganges, Yamunā (Jumma), Sarabhu, Sarassatī, and Mahī (Vism-mhṭ 412).

[357]. Haṃsapātana is another name for Maṇḍākinī. (Vism-mhṭ) For seven Great Lakes see A IV 101.

[358]. “At the place where the Yāma Deities are established. The places where the Cātumahārājika and Tāvatiṃsa heavens become established do not reappear at first because they are connected with the earth” (Vism-mhṭ 412).

[359]. Khārudaka—“caustic waters”: the name given to the waters on which the worldspheres rest (see M-a IV 178).

[360]. Kūṭāgāra: see Ch. XII, n.14; here this seems the most likely of the various meanings of the word.

[361]. “‘He cannot see them with the divine eye’—with the knowledge of the divine eye—because of the extreme brevity and extreme subtlety of the material moment in anyone. Moreover, it is present materiality that is the object of the divine eye, and that is by prenascence condition. And there is no occurrence of exalted consciousness without adverting and preliminary work. Nor is materiality that is only arising able to serve as object condition, nor that which is dissolving. Therefore, it is rightly said that he cannot see with the divine eye materiality at the moments of death and reappearance. If the knowledge of the divine eye has only materiality as its object, then why is it said that he ‘sees beings’? It is said in this way since it is mainly concerned with instances of materiality in a being’s continuity, or because that materiality is a reason for apprehending beings. Some say that this is said according to conventional usage” (Vism-mhṭ 417).

[362]. In rendering yathābhataṃ here in this very idiomatic passage M-a II 32 has been consulted.

[363]. For the word aya see XVI.17.

[364]. See Abhidhamma Mātikā (“schedule”), Dhs 1f. This consists of 22 sets of triple classifications (tika) and 100 sets of double ones (duka). The first triad “profitable, unprofitable, and [morally] indeterminate,” and the first dyad is “root-cause, notroot-cause.” The Mātikā is used in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī (for which it serves as the basic structure), in the Vibhaṅga (in some of the “Abhidhamma Sections” and in the “Questionnaires”) and in the Paṭṭhāna. All dhammas are either classifiable according to these triads and dyads, under one of the headings, if the triad or dyad is allembracing, or are called “not-so-classifiable” (na-vattabba), if the triad or dyad is not. The four triads mentioned here are: no. 13, “dhammas with a limited object, with an exalted object, with a measureless object”; no. 16, “dhammas with a path as object, with a path as root-cause, with path as predominance”; no. 19, “dhammas with a past object, with a future object, with a present object”; and no. 21, “dhammas with an internal object, with an external object, with an internal-external object.”

[365]. The “word in the accusative case” is in the first instance “body,” governed by the verb “converts” (kāyaṃ pariṇāmeti); see Vism-mhṭ.

[366]. Vism-mhṭ comments: “Although with the words: ‘These perfumes,’ etc., he apprehends present perfumes, etc., nevertheless the object of his resolving consciousness is actually their future materiality that is to be associated with the distinction of not drying up. This is because the resolve concerns the future … ‘Cream of curd’: when resolving, his object is the future appearance of curd.”

[367]. Vism-mhṭ adds: “Some however explain the meaning in this way: It is as long as, when one has stepped on the dry bank with a wet foot, the water line on the foot does not disappear.”

[368]. The residents of the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anurādhapura (Vism-mhṭ).

[369]. Cf. Paṭis I 42, etc.;Abhidhamma definitions very commonly make use of the Pali forms of verbal nouns, here instanced by paññā (understanding = state of understanding) and pajānana (understanding = act of understanding), both from the verb

[370]. “In arisings of consciousness with two root-causes [i.e. with non-greed and nonhate but without non-delusion], or without root-cause, understanding does not occur” (Vism-mhṭ 432). “Just as pleasure is not invariably inseparable from happiness, so perception and consciousness are not invariably inseparable from understanding. But just as happiness is invariably inseparable from pleasure, so understanding is invariably inseparable from perception and consciousness” (Vism-mhṭ 432).

[371]. “A phenomenon’s own essence (sako bhāvo) or existing essence (samāno vā bhāva) is its individual essence (sabhāva)” (Vism-mhṭ 433). Cf. Ch. VIII, note 68, where Vismmhṭ gives the definition from saha-bhāva (with essence).

[372]. Paṭisambhidā is usually rendered by “analysis” (see e.g. Points of Controversy—Kathāvatthu translation—pp. 377ff). But the Tipiṭaka explanations of the four paṭisambhidā suggest no emphasis on analysis rather than synthesis. Vism-mhṭ gives the following definition of the term: “Knowledge that is classified (pabheda-gata = put into a division) under meaning (attha) as capable of effecting the explanation and definition of specific

[373]. The word abhinivisati with its noun abhinivesa means literally “to dwell on,” and so “to adhere,” or “insist.” In the Tipiṭaka it always appears in a bad sense and always

[374]. This quotation has been filled out from the Vibhaṅga text for clarity.

[375]. “The ‘Chapter of Similes’ is the Chapter of Twin Verses in the Dhammapada (Dhp 1–20), they say. Others say that it is the Book of Pairs in the First Fifty (MN 31–40)” (Vism-mhṭ 436).

[376]. “Here the first-mentioned characteristic of the eye is described according to the kamma that produces a selfhood, and is common to all of it, and this without touching on differentiation is the cause. The second is according to the specialized kamma generated thus, “Let my eye be thus.” This is what they say. But it can be taken that the first-mentioned characteristic is stated as sensitivity’s interest in lighting up its own objective fields, the five senses’ state of sensitivity being taken as a generality; and that the second is stated as the seeing that is due to the particular division of its own cause, the sensitivities’ cause as the state of kamma being taken as a generality or as a unity. The same method applies to the ear and so on.

“Here it may be asked, ‘Is the arising of the faculties of the eye, etc., due to kamma that is one or to kamma that is different?’ Now, the Ancients say, “In both ways.” Herein, firstly, in the case of the arising of an eye, etc., due to kamma that is different there is nothing to be explained since the cause is divided up. But when their arising is due to kamma that is one, how does there come to be differentiation among them? It is due to dividedness in the cause too. For it is craving, in the form of longing for this or that kind of becoming that, itself having specific forms owing to hankering after the sense-bases included in some kind of becoming or other, contrives, acting as decisivesupport, the specific divisions in the kamma that generates such a kind of becoming. As soon as the kamma has acquired the differentiation induced by that [hankering] it generates through effort consisting in appropriate ability a multiple fruit with differentiated individual essences, as though it had itself taken on a multiple form. And the ability here need not be understood as anything other than the able state; for it is simply the effort of producing fruit that is differentiated by the differentiation due to the differentiation in its cause. And the fact of this differentiating effort on the part

[377]. The four primaries are held to be inseparable and not to exist separate from each other; cf. quotation from the “Ancients” in §45. Vism-mhṭ says: “Excess is in capability, not in quantity, otherwise their inseparability would be illogical” (Vism-mhṭ 451).

[378]. “‘From finding visibility, etc., [respectively] in a state of excess’: from finding them associated with these differences, namely, the bright visible datum in fire, sound audible through its individual essence in air, the odour beginning with surabhi perfume in earth, and the sweet taste in water, thus ‘visible data, etc., are the [respective] qualities of these.’ This is according to the first theory, and he has stated the conclusion (uttara) that follows, beginning with ‘we might assume’ in terms of that. The second is confuted in the same way. Or alternatively, ‘Then they may say,’ etc., can be taken as said emphasizing, in order to confute it, the theory of Kaṇāda, which asserts that the eye, etc., are respectively made by fire, space, earth, water, and air, that have visible data, etc., as their respective qualities” (Vism-mhṭ 445).

[379]. In the P.T.S. text and Sinhalese Hewavitarne text the word ekakalāpe, “that form a single group,” occurs in this sentence but is not in the Harvard text.

[380]. See also §134 and notes 60, 61. The amplification in this paragraph is from Vismmhṭ, which continues: “There is another method: the eye and the ear have non-contiguous objective fields because arising of consciousness is caused while their objective fields are separated by an interval and apart (adhika). Some say that the ear has a contiguous objective field. If it did, then sound born of consciousness would not be the object of ear-consciousness, for there is no arising externally of what is consciousness-originated. And in the texts sound as object is spoken of as being the object of ear-consciousness without making any distinction. Besides, there would be no defining the direction and position of the sound because it would then have to be apprehended in the place occupied by the possessor of the objective field, as happens in the case of an odour. Consequently it remains in the same place where it arose, if it comes into focus in the ear avenue (so the Burmese ed.). Are not the sounds of washermen [beating their washing on stones] heard later by those who stand at a distance? No; because there is a difference in the way of apprehending a sound according to the ways in which it becomes evident to one nearby and to one at a distance. For just as, because of difference in the way of apprehending the sound of words according to the ways in which it becomes evident to one at a distance and to one nearby, there comes to be [respectively] not apprehending, and apprehending of the differences in the syllables, so also, when the sound of washermen (a) becomes [an occurrence] that is evident throughout from beginning to end to one who is nearby, and (b) becomes an occurrence that is evident in compressed form in the end or in the middle to one who is at a distance, it is because there is a difference in the

[381]. Upādiṇṇa (also upādiṇṇaka) is pp. of upādiyati (he clings), from which the noun upādāna (clinging) also comes. Upādiṇṇa-(ka-)rūpa (clung-to matter) = kammaja-rūpa (kamma-born matter): see Dhs §653. It is vaguely renderable by “organic or sentient or living matter”; technically, it is matter of the four primaries that is “clung to” (upādiṇṇa) or “derived” (upādāya) by kamma. Generally taken as a purely Abhidhamma term (Dhs 1), it nevertheless occurs in the Suttas at M I 185 in the same sense.

[382]. Ee reads añnamaññaṃ saṅkaro natthi. Ae omits saṅkaro natthi. The word saṅkara in the sense of “confounding” or “error” is not in PED; see Vism concluding verses, PTS ed., p.711:

[383]. In actual fact the heart-basis is not in the Piṭakas as such.

[384]. “‘Some’ are the inmates of the Abhayagiri Monastery at Anurādhapura” (Vismmhṭ 455). A long discussion on this follows in Vism-mhṭ, not given here.

[385]. “‘Sensed (muta)’ means apprehendable by sensing (mutvā), by reaching; hence he said ‘because they are the objective fields of faculties that take contiguous [objective fields]’ (cf. §46). But what is it that is called a tangible datum? It is the three elements, earth, heat, and air. But why is the water element not included here? Is not cold apprehended by touching; and that is the water element? Certainly it is apprehended but it is not the water element. What is it then? It is just the fire element. For there is the sensation (buddhi) of cold when heat is sluggish. There is no quality that is called cold; there is only the assumption (abhimāna) of coldness due to the sluggishness of the state of heat. How is that to be known? Because of the unreliability of the sensation of cold,

[386]. “‘Sense sphere’ (kāmāvacara): here there are the two kinds of sense desire (kāma), sense desire as basis (vatthu-kāma) and sense desire as defilement (kilesakāma). Of these, sense desire as [objective] basis particularized as the five cords of sense desire (pañca-kāma-guṇa = dimensions of sensual desires), is desired (kāmiyati). Sense desire as defilement, which is craving, desires (kāmeti). The sense sphere (kāmāvacara) is where these two operate (avacaranti) together. But what is that? It is the elevenfold sense-desire becoming, i.e. hell, asura demons, ghosts, animals, human beings, and six sensual-sphere heavens. So too with the fine-material sphere and the immaterial sphere, taking “fine-material” as craving for the fine-material too, and “immaterial” as

[387]. The meaning of the expression tathābhāva-paccupaṭṭhāna appears more clearly where it is used again at §108. In this definition (sādhana) the function (kicca-rasa) in fact describes the verb action (kicca) while the manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna) describes the relevant nounal state (bhāva). So “tathābhāva” means that what has just been taken as a function (e.g. “receiving”) is to be taken also as a state (“reception”).

[388]. “To the six kinds of objects all classed as limited, etc., past, etc., internal, etc” (Vism-mhṭ 474).

[389]. Registration consciousness does not, it is stated, occur with an object of exalted consciousness—see Vibh-a 154.

[390]. “‘The source it has come from, and so on’ means the source it has come from and its condition. Here, in the opinion of certain teachers the result of the unprompted profitable is unprompted and the result of the prompted is prompted, like the movement of the face’s reflection in a looking-glass when the face moves; thus it is due to the source it has come from. But in the opinion of other teachers the unprompted arises due to powerful kamma as condition and the prompted does so due to weak kamma; thus it is due to its condition” (Vism-mhṭ 474).

[391]. “With respect to such unsublime objects as the forms of skeletons or ghosts” (Vism-mhṭ 476). See e.g. Vin III 104.

[392]. See also M-a IV 124f. “Here ‘kamma’ is stored-up profitable kamma of the sense sphere that has got an opportunity to ripen; hence he said ‘that has appeared.’ ‘Sign of kamma’ is the gift to be given that was a condition for the volition at the moment of accumulating the kamma. ‘Sign of destiny’ is the visible-data base located in the destiny in which he is about to be reborn” (Vism-mhṭ 477). See XVII. 136ff.

[393]. “‘The sign of kamma” here is only the kamma’s own object consisting of an earth kasiṇa, etc” (Vism-mhṭ 478).

[394]. “‘With that same object’: if kamma is the life-continuum’s object, then it is that kamma; if the sign of the kamma, or the sign of the destiny, then it is one of those” (Vism-mhṭ 478).

[395]. “‘Occurring endlessly’: this is, in fact, thus called ‘bhavaṅga’ (life-continuum, lit. ‘limb’ (or ‘practice’—see II. 11) of becoming) because of its occurring as the state of an aṅga (‘limb’ or ‘practice’) of the rebirth-process becoming (uppatti-bhava)” (Vism-mhṭ 478).

For the commentarial description of dream consciousness and kamma effected during dreams, see Vibh-a (commentary to Ñāṇa-Vibhaṅga, Ekaka) and A-a, (commentary to AN 5:196) which largely but not entirely overlap. Vism-mhṭ says here: “The seeing of dreams is done with consciousness consisting only of the functional” (Vism-mhṭ 478).

[396]. “‘A disturbance in the life-continuum’ is a wavering of the life-continuum consciousness; the meaning is that there is the arrival at a state that is a reason for dissimilarity in its occurrence twice in that way. For it is called disturbance (calana) because it is like a disturbance (movement) since there seems to be a cause for an occasion (avatthā) in the mind’s continuity different from the previous occasion. Granted, firstly, that there is impact on the sensitivity owing to confrontation with an object, since the necessity for that is established by the existence of the objective field and the possessor of the objective field, but how does there come to be disturbance (movement) of the life-continuum that has a different support? Because it is connected with it. And here the example is this: when grains of sugar are put on the surface of a drum and one of the grains of sugar is tapped, a fly sitting on another grain of sugar moves” (Vism-mhṭ 478).

[397]. “‘Next to adverting’ means next to five-door adverting. For those who do not admit the cognitive series beginning with receiving, just as they do not admit the heart basis, the Pali has been handed down in various places in the way beginning, ‘For the eye-consciousness element as receiving (sampaṭicchanāya cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā)’ (see Ch. IV, n. 13); for the Pali cannot be contradicted” (Vism-mhṭ 479). The quotation as it stands is not traced to the Piṭakas.

[398]. See Ch. IV, note 13.

[399]. “‘If … vivid (lit. large)’: this is said because it is the occurrence of consciousness at the end of the impulsions that is being discussed. For an object is here intended as ‘vivid’ when its life is fourteen conscious moments;and that should be understood as coming into focus when it has arisen and is two or three moments past” (Vism-mhṭ 479). 50. “This includes also the preliminary-work and the cleansing (see Ch. XXII, note 7), not change-of-lineage only” (Vism-mhṭ 479). See also IV.74 and XXI. 129.

[400]. “‘That obtains a condition’: any impulsion that has obtained a condition for arising next to change-of-lineage, as that of the fine-material sphere, and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 479).

[401]. “‘A very vivid one’ is one with a life of sixteen conscious moments. For registration consciousness arises with respect to that, not with respect to any other. ‘Clear’ means very evident, and that is only in the sense sphere;for registration arises with respect to that” (Vism-mhṭ 479).

[402]. “‘Previous kamma’: this is said in order to show the differences in kinds of registration; for kamma that generates rebirth-linking is not the only kind to generate registration; other kinds of kamma do so too. But the latter generates registration unlike that generatable by the kamma that generates rebirth-linking. ‘Impulsion consciousness’: this is said in order to show what defines the registration; for it is said, ‘Registration is definable by impulsion’ (?). The word ‘etc.’ includes rebirth-linking, however; for that is not a condition for registration that is more outstanding than itself. ‘Any condition’: any condition from among the desirable objects, etc., that has combined (samaveta) to produce the arising of registration” (Vism-mhṭ 479).

[403]. “This should be regarded as a secondary characteristic (upalakkhaṇa) of profitable feeling, that is to say, the fact that whatever profitable feeling there is, is all associated with profitable consciousness. That, however, is not for the purpose of establishing its profitableness. For the profitableness of profitable feeling is not due to its association with profitable consciousness, but rather to wise attention and so on. That is why he said ‘as to kind.’ So too in the case of the unprofitable and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 481).

[404]. Sambhoga—“exploiting”: not in this sense in PED (see also XVII.51).

[405]. “Pleasure and pain respectively gratify and afflict by acting in one way on the body and in another way on the mind, but not so equanimity, which is why the latter is described as of one class.

“Just as, when a man places a piece of cotton wool on an anvil and strikes it with an iron hammer, and his hammer goes right through the cotton and hits the anvil, the violence of the blow is great, so too because the violence of the impact’s blow is great, body-consciousness is accompanied by pleasure when the object is a desirable or desirable-neutral one, and by pain when the object is an undesirable or undesirableneutral one. [It is the impact of primary matter (tangible object) on the primaries of the body.]

[406]. “‘As the act of touching too’: by this he shows that this is its individual essence even though it is immaterial. And the characteristic of touching is obvious in its occurrence in such instances as, say, the watering of the mouth in one who sees another tasting vinegar or a ripe mango, the bodily shuddering in a sympathetic person who sees another being hurt, the trembling of the knees in a timid man standing on the ground when he sees a man precariously balanced on a high tree branch, the loss of power of the legs in one who sees something terrifying such as a pisāca (goblin)” (Vism-mhṭ 484–85).

[407]. For “non-adherent” see §46. “‘On any one side’ means on any one side of itself, like a pair of planks and so on. ‘Non-adherent’ means not sticking (asaṃsilissamāna). It is only the impact without adherence that contact shares with visible data and sound, not the objective field. Just as, though eye and ear are non-adherent respectively to visible data and sounds still they have the word ‘touched’ used of them, so too it can be said of contact’s touching and impinging on the object. Contact’s impinging is the actual concurrence (meeting) of consciousness and object” (Vism-mhṭ 485).

[408]. Adhiṭṭhāna—“habitat” (or site or location or foundation): this meaning not given in PED.

[409]. The four factors of stream-entry (see S V 347) are: waiting on good men, hearing the Good Dhamma, wise attention, and practice in accordance with the Dhamma. Again they are: absolute confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha, and possession of noble virtue (S V 343).

[410]. “Apilāpana (‘not wobbling’) is the steadying of an object, the remembering and not forgetting it, keeping it as immovable as a stone instead of letting it go bobbing about like a pumpkin in water” (Vism-mhṭ 487).

[411]. “And here by tranquilization, etc., of consciousness only consciousness is tranquillized and becomes light, malleable, wieldy, proficient and upright. But with tranquilization, etc., of the [mental] body also the material body is tranquillized, and so on. This is why the twofoldness of states is given by the Blessed One here, but not in all places” (Vism-mhṭ 489).

[412]. “‘The act of resolving’ should be understood as the act of being convinced (sanniṭṭhāna) about an object, not as trusting (pasādana)” (Vism-mhṭ 489). See §140.

[413]. “Because the path consciousnesses have Nibbāna as their object and because compassion, gladness, etc., have living beings as their object, there is no compassion, etc., in the path” (Vism-mhṭ 491).

[414].”Because the paralysis (saṃhanana) of consciousness comes about through stiffness, but that of matter through torpor like that of the three aggregates beginning with feeling, therefore torpor is manifested as nodding and sleep” (Vism-mhṭ 493).

[415]. Kukata is not in PED. It is impossible to render into English this “portmanteau” etymology, e.g. kucchita-kata—kukata, kukutatākukkucca, which depends mostly on a fortuitous parallelism of meaning and verbal forms in the Pali. While useless to strict modern etymologists, it has a definite semantic and mnemonic use.

[416]. “‘Mere steadiness in occurrence’ is mere presence for a moment. That it is only “mere steadiness in occurrence” owing to the mere condition for the steadiness of the mind (ceto) is because of lack of real steadiness due to absence of decidedness (nicchaya), and it is incapable of being a condition for such steadiness in continuity (see §188) as the steadiness of consciousness stated thus: ‘like the steadiness of a flame sheltered from a draught’ (XIV.139)” (Vism-mhṭ 495).

[417]. “Here when the time is delimited by death and rebirth-linking the term ‘extent’ is applicable. It is made known through the Suttas in the way beginning ‘Was I in the past?’ (M I 8); for the past state is likewise mentioned as ‘extent’ in the Bhaddekaratta Sutta too in the way beginning, ‘He does not follow what is past (the past extent)’ (M III 1 88). But when it is delimited in the ultimate sense as in the Addhāniruttipatha Sutta thus, ‘Bhikkhus, there are three extents, the past extent, the future extent, and the present extent’ (It 53), then it is appropriate as delimited by moment. Herein, the existingness of the present is stated thus, ‘Bhikkhus, of matter that is born … manifested, it is said that: “It exists”’ (S IV 72), and pastness and futureness are respectively called before and after that” (Vism-mhṭ 496).

[418]. “Cold temperature is like with cold, and hot with hot. But that temperature which falls on the body, whether hot or cold, and occurs as a continuity in one mode, being neither less nor more, is called ‘single temperature.’ The word ‘single’ is used because of the plurality of ‘like’ temperature. So too with nutriment. ‘In one cognitive series, in one impulsion’ refers respectively to five-door and mind-door consciousness. The explanations of continuity and period are given in the Commentaries for the purpose of helping the practice of insight” (Vism-mhṭ 496).

[419]. In these two paragraphs “past” and “future” refer not to time, as in the other paragraphs, but to the materiality.

[420]. “‘Cause(hetu) is what gives birth (janaka);condition (paccaya) is what consolidates (upatthambhaka). Their respective functions are arousing and consolidating. Just as the seed’s function is to arouse the sprout and that of the earth, etc., is to consolidate it, and just as kamma’s function is to arouse result as matter that is due to kamma performed, and that of nutriment is to consolidate it, so the function of those [conditions] that give birth to each material group and each thought-arising and serve as kamma and proximity-conditions, etc., for them, and the function of those that consolidate them and serve as conascence, prenascence, and postnascence conditions for them may be construed accordingly as appropriate.

“Because there is similarity and dissimilarity in temperature, etc., in the way stated, the pastness, etc., of material instances originated by it are stated according to continuity. But there is no such similarity and dissimilarity in the kamma that gives birth to a single becoming, so instead of stating according to continuity the pastness, etc., of material instances originated by that, it is stated according to what consolidates. However, when there comes to be reversal of sex, then the male sex disappears owing

[421]. “The feeling that accompanies the faith, etc., occurring in one who sees an image of the Buddha or who hears the Dhamma, even for a whole day, is ‘present’” (Vismmhṭ 499).

[422]. “Consciousness dominates because of the words, ‘Dhammas have mind as their forerunner’ (Dhp l), ‘Dhammas (states) that have parallel turn-over with consciousness’ (Dhs §1522), and ‘The king, lord of the six doors (?)’” (Vism-mhṭ 503).

[423]. Sammohavinodanī (Be) (Khandha Vibhaṅga Commentary) in the identical passage, reads vedanādayo anāsavā pi sāsavā pi atthi. Ee and Ae read vedanādayo anāsavā pi atthi.

[424]. Avarodha—“inclusion”: not in PED. The term etaparama—“the widest limit” is not mentioned in PED. See M I 80, 339; S V 119; M-a III, 281. Cf. also etāvaparama, M I 246. 81. “When all formed dhammas are grouped together according to similarity, they naturally fall into five aggregates. Herein, it is the items that are the same owing to the sameness consisting respectively in ‘molesting,’ etc., that are to be understood as ‘similar.’ Among them, those that are strong in the volition whose nature is accumulating with the function of forming the formed, are called the formations aggregate. And the others, that is, contact, etc., which are devoid of the distinguishing characteristics of ‘being molested,’ etc., may also be so regarded under the generality of forming the formed. But the similarities consisting in touching are not describable separately by the word ‘aggregate,’ and so that is why no aggregates of contact, etc., have been stated by the Perfect One who knows the similarities of dhammas. ‘Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics or brahmans there are who are asserters of eternity and declare the self and

[425]. Ākara means either a mine or a store (PED apparently believes in mining for pearls—see ratanākara).

[426]. “Because of the absence of anything whatever not included in the twelve bases, there is no arguing that they are more than twelve” (Vism-mhṭ 510).

[427]. “‘In other words, the life-continuum mind’: that which occurs twice in disturbance (see Ch. XIV, note 46). Only when there has been the occurrence of the life-continuum in a state of disturbance (in a state of dissimilar occurrence) is there the arising of adverting, not otherwise. Taking it thus as the reason for adverting, what is called ‘life-continuum mind’ is a door of arising. ‘Not common to all’ means not common to eye-consciousness and the rest” (Vism-mhṭ 510). See M I 293.

[428]. “‘Condition’ is kamma, etc., ‘destiny’ is from hell upwards; ‘order [of beings]’ refers to such species as elephants, horses, etc., or to the castes of the khattiyas (warrior nobles), and so on; ‘person’ refers to any given living being’s continuity” (Vism-mhṭ 511).

[429]. There are eighty-one mundane sorts of consciousness; and since there is no path or fruition without jhāna, when the four paths and four fruitions are multiplied by the five jhānas, there are forty kinds of supramundane consciousness: 81+40 = 121.

[430]. “‘Physical basis’ is that consisting of the eye, etc.; according to that ‘Progress’ is a painful progress, and the other three. ‘And so on’ refers to jhāna, predominance, plane, object, and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 512).

[431]. “Blue is similar to blue; it is dissimilar to any other colour. ‘Condition’ is kamma, and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 512).

[432]. The verb dahati, the basis of all these derivatives, means literally “to put.” “There are five meanings stated, since the word dhātu (element, sort, ‘putting’) has its form established (siddha) here by (a) the transitive (kattu), (b) the intransitive (kamma), (c) the abstract noun (bhāva), (d) the instrumental case (kāraṇa), and (e) the causative voice (adhikaraṇa). Supramundane elements do not sort out (vidahanti) the suffering of the round of rebirths; on the contrary, they destroy (vidhaṃsenti) it. That is why ‘mundane’ is specified” (Vism-mhṭ 513).

[433]. “‘Are elements since they cause [a state’s] own individual essence to be borne’: here, while the establishment of the word’s form should be understood as “dadhātī ti dhātu (it puts, sorts, thus it is an element),’ still taking the word dhā to share the meanings [of both dadhāti and dhāreti (see XI.104)], there is also the meaning of the active voice different from the first, because the meanings of vidhāna (sorting out) and dhāraṇa (causing to bear) are unconnected. The causing of the bearing of mere individual essences without any permanent living being, is a basic meaning of the word dhātu (element), and so it is stated separately” (Vism-mhṭ 513).

[434]. “‘Are elements like those elements’: here, just as the word “lion” (sīha), which is properly applicable to the bearer of a mane, [is used] of a man, so too the word ‘element,’ which is properly applicable to the constituents of marble, is used of the eye and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 513).

[435]. “‘Successive definition of cause and fruit’ is just the state of cause and fruit” (Vismmhṭ 514).

[436]. “It is the mere cessation of the mind-consciousness element and mental-data element because it is the ceasedness of thought-arisings in the fourth immaterial state” (Vism-mhṭ 514).

[437]. In XIV.35–70, the material instances listed total 28, that is, 4 primary elements, 9 sense faculties (excluding the tangible-data faculty, which is the 3 elements except water), and 15 kinds of subtle materiality beginning with the femininity faculty (cf. treatment at Dhs §596). Other lists, however, sometimes give a total of 26 kinds, that is, 10 sense faculties (including the tangible-data faculty, which is the 3 primary elements) and 16 kinds of subtle materiality, that is, the above-mentioned 15 plus the water element, which is listed then after the space element (cf. treatment at Dhs §653 and list at M-a II 261). See Table I.

[438]. “Here the word ‘etc.’ stands for the mind-consciousness element’s states where suitable as root-cause, predominance, kamma, kamma-result, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, and path conditions” (Vism-mhṭ 516).

[439]. “I.e. subtle materiality and Nibbāna” (Vism-mhṭ 516).

[440]. “‘Life-continuum mind’ is the life-continuum consciousness occurring twice in disturbance” (Vism-mhṭ 516).

[441]. “Formed elements are secluded in both instances (i.e. when past and future) because their individual essences are unapprehendable then” (Vism-mhṭ 516).

[442]. Adharāraṇi (adho-araṇi)—“lower fire-stick” and uttarāraṇi (uttara-araṇi)—“upper fire-stick” are not in PED as such.

[443]. “In the noble path moment’s initial stage” (Vism-mhṭ 519).

[444]. The words siṭṭha (prepared—sajjita, uppādita Vism-mhṭ 520), and juṭṭha (fostered—sevita, Vism-mhṭ 520) are not in PED. The Pali is: indaliṅgaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho, indadesitaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho, indadiṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho, indasiṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho, indajuṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; cf. Pāṇini V 2,93: Indriyam indraliṅgam indradºåṭam indrasºåṭam indrajuåṭam indradattam iti vā.

[445]. Anuvattāpana—“causing occurrence parallel to”: not in PED; not in CPD.

[446]. Aya—“reason”: not in PED in this sense.

[447]. Cāraka—“prison”: not in PED in this sense; see XIV.221.

[448]. “‘Signless’: being secluded from the sign of the five aggregates, it is taken as having no graspable entity (aviggaha)” (Vism-mhṭ 525).

[449]. “Sickness is not included here (as at D II 305 for example) because no particular person is meant, and there are persons in whom sickness does not arise at all, like the venerable Bakkula (MN 124); otherwise it may be taken as already included by suffering itself; for in the ultimate sense sickness is bodily pain conditioned by disturbance of elements” (Vism-mhṭ 527).

[450]. Pavana—“stench”: not in PED, in this sense. The Sammohavinodanī (Be) reproducing this passage inserts the word asuci (impurity), lacking in Ee and Ae eds. of Vism. Kuṇapa is only given the meaning of “corpse or carcass” in PED; but Vism-mhṭ says, “various ordures (kuṇapa) such as bile, phlegm, pus, blood, excrement, gorge and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 529). “Whether the mother is [twenty], [thirty], or [forty] years old, it is ‘as exceptionally loathsome’ as an excrement bucket that has not been washed for a like number of years” (Vism-mhṭ 529).

[451]. Ee and Ae read uddhapādaṃ (or uddhaṃ pādaṃ) papatanti, but Vibh-a (Be) reads chinnapapātaṃ papatanti. The former reading is favoured by Vism-mhṭ.

[452]. Vibh-a (Be) adds telādīnaṃ; not in Ee and Ae texts.

[453]. Anutthunana—“brooding”: not in PED = anto nijjhāyana (Vism-mhṭ 532).

[454]. “Just as a lion directs his strength against the man who shot the arrow at him, not against the arrow, so the Buddhas deal with the cause, not with the fruit. But just as dogs, when struck with a clod, snarl and bite the clod and do not attack the striker, so the sectarians who want to make suffering cease devote themselves to mutilating the body, not to causing cessation of defilements” (Vism-mhṭ 533).

[455]. Nippapañca (non-diversification) is one of the synonyms for Nibbāna. The word papañca is commonly used in the Commentaries in the sense (a) of an impediment or obstacle (Dhp-a I 18), and (b) as a delay, or diffuseness (XVII.73). The sense in which the word is used in the Suttas is that of diversifying and is best exemplified at M I 111: “Friends, due to eye and to a visible object eye-consciousness arises. The coincidence of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What a man feels that he perceives. What he perceives he thinks about. What he thinks about he diversifies (papañceti). Owing to his having diversified, the evaluation of diversifying perceptions besets a man with respect to past, future, and present visible objects,” and so on. This kind of papañca is explained by the Commentaries as “due to craving, pride and views” (M-a I 25; II 10; II 75, etc.), and it may be taken as the diversifying action, the choosing and rejecting, the approval and disapproval (M I 65), exercised by craving, etc., on the bare material supplied by perception and thought. Consequently, though it is bound up with craving, etc., a false emphasis is given in rendering papañca in these contexts by “obsession” as is done in PED. Nippapañca as a term for Nibbāna emphasizes the absence of that.

[456]. “It is clung-to (upādiyati) by the kinds of clinging (upādāna), thus it is ‘result-ofpast-clinging’ (upādi): this is the pentad of aggregates [as objects] of clinging. Taking Nibbāna, which is the escape from that, as its stilling, its quieting, since there is remainder of it up till the last consciousness [of the Arahant], after which there is no remainder of it, the Nibbāna element is thus conventionally spoken of in two ways as ‘with result of past clinging left’ (sa-upādi-sesa) and ‘without result of past clinging left’ (an-upādi-sesa)” (Vism-mhṭ 547).

[457]. “‘Subject to destruction’ (khaya-dhamma) means that its individual essence is the state of being destroyed (khayana-sabhāva)” (Vism-mhṭ 549). The other expressions are explained in the same way.

[458]. Paṭicco as a declinable adjective is not in PED. Patīyamāna (“when it is arrived at”): “When it is gone to by direct confrontation (paṭimukhaṃ upeyamāno) by means of knowledge’s going; when it is penetrated to (abhisamiyamāna), is the meaning” (Vismmhṭ 555). The word paṭicca (due to, depending on) and the word paccaya (condition) are both gerunds of paṭi + eti or ayati (to go back to).

[459]. “The doctrine of eternalism is that beginning ‘The world and self are eternal’” (D I 14). That of no-cause is that beginning, ‘There is no cause, there is no condition, for the defilement of beings’ (D I 53). That of fictitious-cause holds that the world’s occurrence is due to Primordial Essence (prakºti), atoms (aṇu), time (kāla), and so on. That of a power-wielder asserts the existence of an Overlord (issara), or of a Worldsoul (Puruåa), or of Pajāpati (the Lord of the Race). Also the doctrines of Nature (sabhāva, Skr. svabhāva = individual essence), Fate (niyati), and Chance (yadicchā), should be regarded as included here under the doctrine of no-cause. Some, however, say that the doctrine of fictitious-cause is that beginning with ‘The eye is the cause of the eye,’ and that the doctrine of the power-wielder is that beginning, ‘Things occur owing to their own individual essence’ (see Ch. XVI, n. 23)” (Vism-mhṭ 557).

[460]. “Such terms as ‘woman,’ ‘man,’ etc., are local forms of speech (janapada-nirutti) because even wise men, instead of saying, ‘Fetch the five aggregates,’ or ‘Let the

[461]. “Formations ‘accumulate,’ work, for the purpose of rebirth. So that is their function. To accumulate is to heap up. Consciousness’s function is ‘to go before’ since it precedes mentality-materiality at rebirth-linking. Mentality’s function is ‘to associate’ since it joins with consciousness in a state of mutuality. ‘Inseparability of its components’ is owing to their having no separate existence [mentality here being feeling, perception, and formations]. Materiality is dispersible since it has in itself nothing [beyond the water element] to hold it [absolutely] together, so ‘its function is to be dispersed’; that is why, when rice grains, etc., are pounded, they get scattered and reduced to powder. It is called ‘indeterminate’ to distinguish it from mentality, which is profitable, etc., at different times” (Vism-mhṭ 571).

[462]. “‘No theory’ is unknowing about suffering, etc., ‘wrong theory’ is perverted perception of what is foul, etc., as beautiful, etc., or else ‘no theory’ is unassociated with [false] view, and ‘wrong theory’ is associated with it” (Vism-mhṭ 751). This use of the word paṭipatti as “theory,” rare in Pali but found in Sanskrit, is not in PED. An alternative rendering for these two terms might be “agnosticism” and “superstition” (see also XIV.163, 177).

[463]. “‘With the nature of result, and so on’: the words ‘and so on’ here include ‘neithertrainer-nor-non-trainer,’ (Dhs 2) ‘conducive to fetters’ (Dhs 3), and so on. [§54] ‘Mundane resultant and so on’: the words ‘and so on’ here include ‘indeterminate’ (Dhs 2), ‘formed’ (Dhs 2), and so on. ‘With root-cause and without root-cause, and so on’: the words ‘and so on’ here include ‘prompted,’ ‘unprompted,’ and so on” (Vism-mhṭ).

[464]. “This refers to the teacher Revata” (Vism-mhṭ 582).

[465]. “‘Which are contingent upon other such states’: because it is said without distinction of all visible-data bases … and of all mental-data bases, there is consequently no dhamma (state) among the formed, unformed, and conceptual dhammas, classed as sixfold under visible data, etc., that does not become an object condition” (Vism-mhṭ 584).

[466]. “Proximity and contiguity conditions are not stated in accordance with the distinction between making occur and giving opportunity, as the absence and disappearance conditions are: rather they are stated as the causes of the regular order of consciousness [in the cognitive series]” (Vism-mhṭ 585).

[467]. “This refers to the Elder Revata too” (Vism-mhṭ 586).

[468]. “The state of proximity condition is the ability to cause arising proximately (without interval) because there is no interval between the cessation of the preceding and the arising of the subsequent. The state of contiguity condition is the ability to cause arising by being quite proximate (without interval) through approaching, as it were, identity with itself owing to absence of any distinction that ‘This is below, above, or around that,’ which is because of lack of any such co-presence as in the case of the [components of the] material groups, and because of lack of any co-positionality of the condition and the conditionally arisen. And [in general], because of the uninterestedness of [all] states (dhamma), when a given [state] has ceased, or is present, in a given mode, and [other] states (dhamma) come to be possessed of that particular mode, it is that [state’s] mode that must be regarded as what is called ‘ability to cause arising’” (Vism-mhṭ 586).

[469]. “Reviewing change-of-lineage” (the consciousness that precedes the path consciousness) applies to stream-enterers. “Reviewing cleansing” (the “cleansing” that consists in attaining a higher path than the first) applies to once-returners and non-returners (see Vism-mhṭ 589).

[470]. “The presence (atthi) condition is not applicable to Nibbāna. For a presence condition is that which is unhelpful by its absence of existingness (atthi-bhāvābhāva) and becomes helpful by obtaining existingness. And Nibbāna does not, after being unhelpful by its own absence of existingness to those states that have Nibbāna as their object, become helpful to them by obtaining existingness. Or alternatively, the presence condition, which by its non-existingness is the opposite of helpfulness to those states that are associated with arising, etc., is helpful to them by its existingness. So Nibbāna is not a presence condition” (Vism-mhṭ 597).

It may be noted that atthi has more than one use, among which the following two may be mentioned: (1) atthi (is) = upalabbhaniya (is (a) “apprehendable,” and (b) not a self-contradictory impossibility)—“atthi, bhikkhave, ajātaṃ—There is an unborn' (Ud 80), and the discussion on the existence of Nibbāna (XVI.67ff.). (2) Atthi (is) = uppanna (arisen)—see “Yaṃ, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ jātaṃ pātubhūtaṃ atthī ti tassa saṅkhā—Of the materiality that is born, manifested, it is said that ‘It is’” (S II 71f.). The atthi-paccaya (presence condition), being implicitly equated with the latter, cannot be applied to Nibbāna because Nibbāna is not subject to arising (A I 152).

[471]. “The assertion of a single cause (kāraṇa) is undesirable because it follows that there would be production of everything all the time, and because it follows that there would be a single homogeneous state;” (Vism-mhṭ 599) cf. XIX.3.

[472]. Parihāra-vacana—“explanation”: not in PED in this sense.

[473]. Avi—“a goat or sheep”: not in PED. The Vism text reads “golomāvilomavisāṇadadhitilapiṭṭhādīni ca dubbāsarabhūtanakādīnaṃ.” Vism-mhṭ explains thus: “Golomāvilomādī ti ādisu golomāvilomāni dubbāya avī ti rattā eḷakā veditabbā visāṇaṃ sarassa dadhitilapiṭṭhagūlāni bhūtiṇakassa sevālaṃ taṇḍuleyyakassa kharavalavā assatarassā ti evam ādi ādisaddena saṅgahito,” which renders thus: “As to ‘Ox hair and ram’s hair, etc.,’ and the rest: ox hair and ram’s hair [are conditions for the unlike] dubbā (dabba) grass—a ram (avi) should be understood as a red sheep (eḷakā); horn is for reeds (sara);curds, sesame flour and molasses are for bhūtiṇaka grass; moss is for the taṇḍuleyyaka plant; a she donkey is for a mule; and so on in this way as included by the word ‘etc.’” (Vism-mhṭ 601). Except for the last-mentioned, it seems problematical why these things, if rightly interpreted, should be conditions for the things mentioned.

[474]. For five-constituent becoming, etc., see §§253–54. “Unprofitable resultant eyeconsciousness, etc. sometimes arise even in Brahmās when undesirable visible data, etc., come into focus” (Vism-mhṭ 604); cf. §180.

[475]. This refers to the old Sinhalese commentary no longer extant.

[476]. Vibh-a (Be) adds “suddhāya va javanavīthiyā” here, as in §140 below in all texts.

[477]. “‘With the appearance of fire and flames, etc., in the hells’ is said owing to likeness to that; appearance of hell and fire does not itself come into focus for him then” (Vism-mhṭ 607).

[478]. The Sammohavinodanī adds more details here: “When hell appears it does so like a metal cauldron; when the human world appears, the mother’s womb appears like a woollen slipper (kambala-yāna—for yāna as footwear or sandals see M-a III 222); when the heavenly world appears, wishing trees, divine palaces and couches, etc., appear.”

Vism-mhṭ remarks here: “By the words ‘the appearance of the mother's womb,’ etc., only visual appearance is given as the sign of destiny. Herein, in the first place it would be logical that sound has not been given in the Commentaries as a sign of destiny because it is included in the happy destinies as not-clung-to, but the reason for odour, etc., not having been given, will be inquired into” (Vism-mhṭ 609). This question is in fact dealt with at length at Vism-mhṭ 611, but the arguments are not reproduced here. See note 26 below.

[479]. Sa-bhāva (with sex) and a-bhāva (without sex) are not to be confused with sabhāva (individual essence) and abhāva (absence, non-existence).

[480]. Vism-mhṭ (p. 611) has a long discussion here of the difficulty of speaking of the Brahmā-world (where there are only the senses of seeing and hearing) in terms of the decads, which contain the components of odour and flavour. (§156) It ends by defending the Visuddhimagga standpoint.

[481]. Sammohavinodanī (Be) has “rebirth-linking with a past, not so-classifiable, and present object next to” and so on.

[482]. See the classification of kamma at XIX.74ff. “Repeated” (samāsevita) kamma is not mentioned there as such. Of “near” kamma Vism-mhṭ says, “It is that performed next to death, or which is conspicuous in the memory then, whenever it was performed” (Vism-mhṭ 617).

[483]. “‘Sign of the kamma’ is the event (vatthu) by means of which a man accumulates kamma through making it the object at the time of accumulation. Even if the kamma was performed as much as a hundred thousand eons ago, nevertheless at the time of its ripening it appears as kamma or sign of kamma. The ‘sign of the destiny’ is one of the visual scenes in the place where rebirth is due to take place. It consists in the visual appearance of flames of fire, etc., to one ready to be reborn in hell, and so on as already stated” (Vism-mhṭ 617).

[484]. “Owing to craving being unabandoned, and because the previously-arisen continuity is similarly deflected, consciousness occurs inclining, leaning and tending

[485]. Paṭisiddhattā—“because … excluded”: paṭisiddha is not in PED. Abhisaṅkhāra here might mean “planting work,” not “formative processes.”

[486]. Vism-mhṭ points out that this is generally but not always so, since deities see such portents of their death as the fading of their flowers, etc., which are undesirable visible data (see note 43).

[487]. A Sinhalese text adds the following paragraph: “Also the bodily formation, when giving rebirth-linking, gives the whole of its results in the sense-sphere becoming alone in the four generations, in the five destinies, in the first two stations of consciousness, and in two abodes of beings. Therefore it is a condition in the way already stated for the twenty-three kinds of consciousness in one kind of becoming, four generations, five destinies, two stations of consciousness, and two abodes of beings, both in rebirth-linking and in the course of an existence. The same method applies to the verbal formation. But the mental formation does not fail to ripen anywhere except in one abode of beings. Therefore it is a condition in the way already stated for the thirty-two kinds of resultant consciousness, as appropriate, in the three kinds of becoming, four generations, five destinies, seven stations of consciousness, and eight abodes of beings, both in rebirth-linking and in the course of an existence. There is no consciousness with formations as condition in the non-percipient abode of beings. Furthermore, in the case of non-percipient beings, the formation of merit is a condition, as kamma condition acting from a different time, for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed.”

[488]. Resolve compound agahitagahaṇena as gahitassa a-gahaṇena, not as a-gahitassa gahaṇena; i.e. it is “by not taking what is taken,” not “by taking what has not been taken”; cf. IV.75.

[489]. “This means, due to the heat element in the materiality that arose together with the rebirth-linking consciousness. It is because the heart-basis is arisen only at that very moment, that there is weakness of the physical basis” (Vism-mhṭ 622).

[490]. Vāhanika—“having a float”: not in PED. The context suggests a catamaran, universal in Indian waters.

[491]. The expression “ekadesasarūpekasesa” is grammatically explained at Vism-mhṭ 623; see allied expressions, “katekasesa” (§204) and “ekasese kate” (§223). Cf. Pāṇini I 2, 64.

[492]. Rasāyana—“elixir”: not in PED; cf. D-a 568 and Ud-a (commentary to Ud 8.5)

[493]. “‘Though feeling is condition’ is said in order to prevent a generalization from the preceding words ‘With feeling as condition’ to the effect that craving arises in the presence of every condition accompanied by feeling—But is it not impossible to prevent over-generalization in the absence of any such statements as ‘Feeling accompanied by inherent tendency is a condition for craving’?—No;for we are dealing with an exposition of the round of rebirths. Since there is no round of rebirths without inherent tendencies, so far as the meaning is concerned it may be taken for granted that the condition is accompanied by inherent tendency. Or alternatively, it may be recognized that this condition is accompanied by inherent tendency because it follows upon the words ‘With ignorance as condition.’ And with the words ‘With feeling as condition, craving’ the ruling needed is this: ‘There is craving only with feeling as condition,’ and not ‘With feeling as condition there is only craving’” (Vism-mhṭ). For inherent tendencies see XXII.45, 60; MN 64. The Arahant has none.

[494]. Upakuṭṭha—“great pox” or “great leprosy”: not in PED; see kuṭṭha.

[495]. Ee has “sassatan ti”; Ae has “sā’ssa diṭṭhī ti”; Vibh-a (Be), “na sassatadiṭṭhī ti.”

[496]. Their flowers wither, their clothes get dirty, sweat comes from their armpits, their bodies become unsightly, and they get restless (see M-a IV 170).

[497]. As regards these four paragraphs from the Paṭisambhidā (see §§292, 294, 296, and 297), all four end with the word ‘paccayā’ (nom. pl. and abl. s. of paccaya = condition). In the first and third paragraphs (§§292 and 296) this is obviously nom. pl. and agrees with ‘ime pañca dhammā’ (these five things). But in the second and fourth paragraphs the context suggests vipākā (results) instead of conditions. However, there is no doubt that the accepted reading is paccayā here too; for the passage is also quoted in XIX.13, in the Sammohavinodanī (Paccayākāra-Vibhaṅga commentary = present context), and at M-a I 53. The Paramatthamañjūsā and Mūla Ṭīkā do not mention this point. The Saddhammappakāsinī (Paṭisambhidā commentary) comments on the first paragraph: “Purimakammabhavasmin ti atītajātiyā kammabhave karīyamāne pavattā; idha paṭisandhiyā paccayā ti paccuppannā paṭisandhiyā paccayabhūtā,” and on the second paragraph: “Idh’upapattibhavasmiṃ pure katassa kammassa paccayā ti paccuppanne vipākabhave atītajātiyaṃ katassa kammassa paccayena pavattī ti attho.” The Majjhima Nikāya Ṭīkā (M-a I 53) says of the second paragraph: “Ime paccayā ti ime viññāṇādayo pañca koṭṭhāsikā dhammā, purimabhave katassa kammassa, kammavaṭṭassa, paccayā, paccayabhāvato, taṃ paṭicca, idha, etarahi, upapattibhavasmiṃ upapattibhavabhāvena vā hontī ti attho.” From these comments it is plain enough that “paccayā” in the second and fourth paragraphs is taken as abl. sing. (e.g. avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā). There is a parallel ablative construction with genitive at Paṭis II 72, 1.8: “Gatisampattiyā ñāṇasampayutte aṭṭhannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā uppatti hoti.” Perhaps the literal rendering of the second and fourth paragraphs’ final sentence might be: “Thus there are these five things here in the [present] rebirth-process becoming with their condition [consisting] of kamma done in the past,” and so on. The point is unimportant.

[498]. “Sorrow, etc., have already been established as ignorance; but death consciousness itself is devoid of ignorance and formations and is not a condition for the next becoming; that is why ‘because it assures sorrow, etc.’ is said” (Vism-mhṭ 640).

[499]. Avatthā—“occasion”: not in PED.

[500]. Avyāpāra—“uninterest”: here the equivalent of anābhoga, see IV.171 and IX.108. The perhaps unorthodox form “uninterest” has been used to avoid the “unselfish” sense sometimes implied by “disinterestedness.” Vyāpāra is clearly intended throughout this work as “motivated action” in contrast with “blind action of natural forces.” The word “interest” has therefore been chosen to bring out this effect.

[501]. The dependent origination, or structure of conditions, appears as a flexible formula with the intention of describing the ordinary human situation of a man in his world (or indeed any conscious event where ignorance and craving have not entirely ceased). That situation is always complex, since it is implicit that consciousness with no object, or being (bhava—becoming, or however rendered) without consciousness (of it), is impossible except as an artificial abstraction. The dependent origination, being designed to portray the essentials of that situation in the limited dimensions of words and using only elements recognizable in experience, is not a logical proposition (Descartes’ cogito is not a logical proposition). Nor is it a temporal cause-and-effect chain: each member has to be examined as to its nature in order to determine what its relations to

[502]. “Mentality should be taken here as the four aggregates beginning with feeling and belonging to the three planes, not omitting consciousness as in the case of ‘With consciousness as condition, mentality-materiality’ and not including the supramundane aggregates associated with Nibbāna” (Vism-mhṭ 744 (Be)).

[503]. Serenity (samatha) is a general term for concentration, as the complement of insight (vipassanā), which is roughly the equivalent of understanding (paññā).

[504]. “One who is beginning this work has difficulty in discerning the highest form of becoming, that is, the base consisting of neither perception nor non-perception” (Vismmhṭ 744). This is owing to the diminished perception (see M III 28).

[505]. See S II 23f. “Bending in the direction of the object means that there is no occurrence without an object; it is in the sense of that sort of bending, or it is in the sense of bestowing a name (nāma-karaṇa)” (Vism-mhṭ 744). “Name-and-form” has many advantages over “mentality-materiality” if only because it preserves the integrity of nāma and excludes any metaphysical assumption of matter existing as a substance behind apparent forms.

[506]. “Because sweat, etc., arise owing to heat, fatigue, etc., and owing to mental perturbation, they are called ‘originated by temperature and by consciousness’” (Vismmhṭ 745). There are seven kinds of decads: those of the physical basis of mind (heart), sex, living, physical eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. The first nine components of a decad are the same in all instances, and by themselves they are called the “life ennead.” The first eight components by themselves are called the “octad-with-nutritive-essenceas-eighth.” This octad plus sound is called the “sound ennead.” In general these are called “material groups” (rūpa-kalāpa). But this kind of group (kalāpa) has nothing to do with the “comprehension by groups” (kalāpa-sammasana) of Ch. XX, which is simply generalization (from one’s own particular experience to each of the five aggregates as past, etc., i.e. as a “group”). The “material groups” are not in the Piṭakas.

[507]. The ten are four aspects of the fire element and six aspects of the air element;what heats, what consumes, what burns up, what digests; up-going winds (or forces), down-going winds, winds in the stomach, winds in the bowels, winds in the limbs, breath. See XI.37, 82.

[508]. “The exalted consciousness of the fine-material and immaterial spheres is only quite plain to one who has attained the attainments” (Vism-mhṭ 746).

[509]. “As well as by means of the elements, etc., materiality can also be discerned through the faculties, the truths, and the dependent origination. How?

“Firstly, through the faculties. These seven, namely, the five beginning with the eye plus femininity and masculinity are materiality; the eleven consisting of the mind faculty, the five feeling faculties, and the five beginning with faith, are mentality; the life faculty is both mentality and materiality. The last three, being supramundane, are not intended here. The truth of suffering is both mentality and materiality; the truth of origin is mentality; the other two are not intended here because they are supramundane. “In the structure of conditions, the first three members are mentality; the fourth and

[510]. “‘All states of the three planes’ is said all-inclusively owing to the necessity not to omit anything suitable for comprehension. For it must be fully understood without any exception, and greed must be made to fade away absolutely so that the mind may be liberated by the fading away of greed. That is why the Blessed One said: ‘Bhikkhus, without directly knowing, without fully understanding all, without causing the fading away of greed for it, without abandoning it, the mind is incapable of the destruction of suffering. Bhikkhus, it is by directly knowing, by fully understanding all, by causing the fading away of greed for it, by abandoning it, that the mind is capable of the destruction of suffering’ (S IV 17). If all the states of the three planes are taken as mentality-materiality without exception, then how should one deal with what has been conceived by those outside the Dispensation as verbal meanings, such as the Primordial Essence (pakati), etc. [e.g. of the Sāṃkhya], the substance (drabya), etc. [e.g. of the Vaiśeåika], the soul (jīva), etc., and the body (kāya), etc. [?] Since these are like the hallucination of lunatics and are taught by the not fully enlightened, what other way of dealing with them is there than to ignore them? Or alternatively, their existence or non-existence can be understood as established by their inclusion within mentalitymateriality” (Vism-mhṭ 751f.). There follows a long paragraph showing how the concepts of these systems are to be assimilated into mentality-materiality whereby they lose their significance and are shown to be impermanent and formed. Vism-mhṭ concludes by saying, “Wherever the verbal meaning of self is expressed by some such metaphor as world-soul (purisa), self (attā, ātman), soul (jīva), etc., these being themselves conceived in their various ways on the basis of mere mentality-materiality, are mere mentality-materiality, too” (Vism-mhṭ 754f.).

[511]. “If the fruit were to arise from present kamma, the fruit would have arisen in the same moment in which the kamma was being accumulated; and that is not seen, nor is it desirable. For in the world (i.e. among non-Buddhists) kamma has never been shown to give fruit while it is actually being effected; nor is there any text to that effect—But is it not also the fact that no fruit has ever been shown to come from a

[512]. “To be experienced here and now” means kamma whose fruit is to be experienced in this present selfhood. “To be experienced on rebirth” means kamma whose fruit is to be experienced [in the becoming] next to the present becoming. “To be experienced in some subsequent existence” means kamma whose fruit is to be experienced in some successive selfhood other than either that here and now or next to that here and now. “Lapsed kamma” is kamma of which it has to be said, “There has been kamma, but there has not been, is not, and will not be kamma-result.”

“The volition of the first impulsion, which has efficient power by not being prevented by opposition and by having acquired the distinction of a condition, and which has definitely occurred as a prior kamma-formation of the appropriate kind, giving its fruit in this same selfhood, is called ‘to be experienced here and now.’ For while that firstimpulsion volition, being effective in the way stated, is helpful to what is associated with its special qualities in the impulsion continuity, yet because it wields little power over aspects and because it has little result owing to lack of repetition, it is not, like the other two kinds, kamma that looks beyond the occurring continuity and looks to obtain an opportunity; it gives its fruit here only as mere result during the course of becoming, like a mere flower. ‘But if it cannot do so’: kamma’s giving of result comes about only through the due concurrence of conditions consisting of (suitable) essentials of becoming, means, etc., failing which it is unable to give its result in that selfhood. ‘That accomplishes its purpose’: that fulfils its purpose consisting in giving, etc., and in killing, etc. For the seventh impulsion to which this refers is the final impulsion in the series, and when it has acquired distinction in the way already stated and has acquired the service of repetition by the previous impulsions, it gives its result in the next selfhood and is called ‘to be experienced on rebirth‘” (Vism-mhṭ 769).

[513]. “‘Weighty’ kamma is very reprehensible unprofitable kamma and very powerful profitable kamma. ‘Habitual’ kamma is what is habitually, continually done and repeated. ‘Death-threshold’ kamma is what is remembered with great vividness at the time next before death; what is meant is that there is no question about what is done at the time of death. ‘That has been often repeated’: he draws a distinction between this kind of kamma as stated and the ‘habitual’ kind and he likewise excludes kamma to be experienced here and now from it because the bringing on of rebirth-linking is admitted; for the tetrad beginning with the ‘weighty’ is stated as productive of rebirth-linking.

“Herein, the weighty ripens first of all and that is why it is so called. When weighty kamma is lacking, what has been much done ripens. When that is lacking, death-threshold kamma ripens. When that too is lacking, then kamma done in previous births, which is called ‘kamma [stored up] by being performed,’ ripens. And the last three when produced can be strong or weak” (Vism-mhṭ 769ff.). Vism-mhṭ then cites various Birth Stories and MN 136 in order to show how, for various reasons, the result of one kind of kamma may be delayed or displaced by the result of another. Vismmhṭ concludes: “This is the province of the Tathāgata’s Knowledge of the Great Exposition of Kamma, in other words, the mastery of the order of ripening of such and such kamma for such and such reasons.”

[514]. “‘Productive’ kamma is what produces resultant continuity by providing rebirthlinking and so on. ‘Consolidating’ kamma prolongs the occurrence of the continuity of pleasure or pain, or the endurance of materiality. ‘Frustrating’ kamma slowly diminishes the endurance of pleasure or pain when they occur. It cuts off the result of other kamma without giving any result of its own. ‘Supplanting’ kamma, however, cuts off weak kamma and makes its own result arise. This is their difference” (Vism-mhṭ 771).

[515]. See the various meanings of “arisen” given in XXII.81f.

“Another method is this: when some kamma has been done and there is, either in rebirth-linking or in the course of an existence, the arising of material instances due to the result of kamma performed, that kamma is ‘productive.’ When some kamma has been performed and the desirable or undesirable fruit generated by other kamma has its production facilitated and its endurance aided and lengthened by the suppression of conditions that would interfere with it and by the arousing of conditions that would strengthen it, that kamma is ‘supporting.’ When some kamma has been performed and profitable fruit or unprofitable fruit generated by productive kamma is obstructed by it respectively in the form of sickness or of disquieting of elements, that is ‘frustrating’ kamma. But when some kamma has been done by which the fruit of other kamma is ruined and cut off by being supplanted by what cuts it off although it was fit for longer endurance because of the efficacy of the kamma that was producing it, that kamma is ‘supplanting’” (Vism-mhṭ 772).

[516]. “Because it is a speciality of the Buddha and because it is the province of the knowledge that is not shared by disciples (see Paṭis I 121f.), it is called ‘not shared by disciples.’ That is why only a part can be known; it cannot all be known because it is not the province of such knowledge” (Vism-mhṭ 772).

[517]. “Comprehension by placing together in groups (totals) the states that are differentiated into past, future and present is ‘comprehension by groups.’ This, it seems, is the term used by the inhabitants of Jambudīpa (India). However, insight into states by means of the method beginning, ‘Any materiality whatever’ (M III 16) is ‘inductive insight.’ This, it seems, is the term used by the inhabitants of Tambapaṇṇidīpa (Sri Lanka). That is why he said “to inductive insight called comprehension by groups’” (Vism-mhṭ 778).

[518]. Tīraṇa could also be rendered by “judging.” On specific and general characteristics Vism-mhṭ says: “Hardness, touching, etc., as the respective characteristics of earth, contact, etc., which are observable at all three instants [of arising, presence and dissolution], are apprehended by their being established as the respective individual essences of definite materialness. But it is not so with the characteristics of impermanence, and so on. These are apprehended as though they were attributive material instances because they have to be apprehended under the respective headings of dissolution and rise and fall, of oppression, and of insusceptibility to the exercise of mastery” (Vism-mhṭ 779). See Ch. XXI, note 3. The “planes” given here in §4 are not quite the same as described in XXII.107.

[519]. “‘Contemplating as impermanent’ is contemplating, comprehending, formations in the aspect of impermanence. ‘The perception of permanence’ is the wrong perception that they are permanent, eternal; the kinds of consciousness associated with wrong

[520]. “‘Liking that is in conformity’ is a liking for knowledge that is in conformity with the attainment of the path. Actually the knowledge itself is the ‘liking’ (khanti) since it likes (khamati), it endures, defining by going into the individual essence of its objective field. The ‘certainty of rightness’ is the noble path; for that is called the rightness beginning with right view and also the certainty of an irreversible trend” (Vism-mhṭ 784).

[521]. Upasaṭṭhatā—“being menaced;” abstr. noun fr. pp. of upa + saj; not as such in PED.

[522]. The eight worldly states are: gain and non-gain, fame and non-fame, blame and praise, and pleasure and pain (D III 160).

[523]. Avatthā—“occasion”: not in PED.

[524]. Allīyituṃ—“to give shelter”: not in PED, but see leṇa.

[525]. Allīnānaṃ—“for the unsheltered”: allīna = pp. of ā + līyati (see note 8 above), the “un-sheltered.” Not in PED. Not to be confused with allīna = adherent (pp. of ā + līyati, to stick, to be contiguous); see e.g. XIV.46.

[526]. Vism-mhṭ has “Jāti-ādi-bhayānaṃ hiṃsanaṃ vidhamanaṃ bhayasāraṇattaṃ,” which suggests the rendering “because of not being a refuge from fear.”

[527]. Ādīna—“misery” or “miserable”: not in PED. Ādīna—“misery” or “miserable”:

not in PED.

[528]. Abyosāna—“not stopping halfway” (another less good reading is accosāna): not in PED;but it is a negative form of vosāna (q.v.), which is used of Devadatta in the Vinaya Cūḷavagga (= It 85) and occurs in this sense at M I 193. Not in CPD.

[529]. “First it has to be seen by inference according to the texts. Afterwards it gradually comes to be seen by personal experience when the knowledge of development gets stronger” (Vism-mhṭ 790).

[530]. “It is first generated from kamma because the temperature-born kinds, etc., are rooted in that” (Vism-mhṭ 790).

[531]. The relationship of the duration of moments of matter and moments of consciousness is dealt with in greater detail in the Sammohavinodanī (Vibh-a 25f.). See also Introduction, note 18.

[532]. “‘By obtaining as its condition kamma-born materiality that is clung-to’: by this he points out that external un-clung-to nutritive essence does not perform the function of nourishing materiality. He said ‘and basing itself on that’ meaning that its obtaining of a condition is owing to its being supported by what is kamma-born. And ‘clung-to’ is specifically mentioned in order to rule out any question of there being a ‘kammaborn’ method for ‘materiality originated by consciousness that has kamma as its condition’ just because it happens to be rooted in kamma [There is no such method]” (Vism-mhṭ 793f.).

[533]. “What is intended is head hair, body hair, nails, teeth, skin, callosities, warts, etc., which are separate from the flesh in a living body; otherwise a corpse, and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 795).

[534]. “When the generation of materiality is seen its dissolution also is seen, and so he said, ‘One who sees the generation of materiality thus is said to comprehend the material at one time’ because of the brevity of states’ occurrence; for it is not the seeing of mere generation that is called comprehension but there must be seeing of rise and fall besides.

So too the apprehending of generation in the other instances” (Vism-mhṭ 795).

[535]. “This refers to determining” (Vism-mhṭ 795).

[536]. “No one, not even the Blessed One, has such mastery; for it is impossible for anyone to alter the three characteristics. The province of supernormal power is simply the alteration of a state” (Vism-mhṭ 797).

“‘Because of precluding a self’ means because of precluding the self conceived by those outside the Dispensation; for the non-existence in dhammas of any self as conceived by outsiders is stated by the words, ‘because void’; but by this expression [it is stated] that there is no self because there is no such individual essence” (Vism-mhṭ 797).

[537]. Vītiharaṇa—“shifting sideways,” sannikkhepana—“placing down,” and sannirujjhana—“fixing down,” are not in PED; cf. M-a I 260.

[538]. Omatta—“subordinate”: not in PED.

[539]. The “contact pentad” (phassa-pañcamaka) is a term used for the first five things listed in Dhs §1, that is, contact, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness, which are invariably present whenever there is consciousness.

[540]. The “Discourse on Purification” (visuddhi-kathā) and the “Discourse on the Noble Ones’ Heritages” (ariyavaṃsa-kathā) are presumably names of chapters in the old Sinhalese commentaries no longer extant.

[541]. “Said in the Discourse on the Noble Ones’ Heritages” (Vism-mhṭ 804).

[542]. The first seven of the eighteen principal insights are known as the “seven contemplations”; see 20.4. Further descriptions are given in XXII.113f. 28. For Vism-mhṭ’s comments on the first seven see note 3 to this chapter.

Contemplation of destruction’ is the contemplation of the momentary dissolution of formations. ‘Perception of compactness’ is the assumption of unity in a continuity or mass or function or object. ‘Contemplation of destruction’ is contemplation of nonexistence after having been, they say. Contemplation of destruction is the understanding by means of which he resolves the compact into its elements and sees that it is impermanent in the sense of destruction. Its completion starts with contemplation of dissolution, and so there is abandoning of perception of compactness then, but before that there is not, because it has not been completed. (9) The seeing of the dissolution of formations both by actual experience and by inference and the directing of attention to their cessation, in other words, their dissolution, is contemplation of fall;through it accumulation [of kamma] is abandoned; his consciousness does not incline with craving to the occurrence of that [aggregate-process of existence] for the purpose of which one accumulates [kamma]. (10) Seeing change in the two ways through aging and through death in what is born, or seeing another essence subsequent to the delimitation of such and such [an essence supervening] in what was discerned by means of the material septad, and so on, is ‘contemplation of change’; by its means he

[543]. See XXII.113f. “When (1) the contemplation of impermanence is established, then the contemplations of (6) cessation, (8) destruction, (9) fall, and (10) change are

[544]. “With the seeing of rise and fall not only the characteristics of impermanence and pain become evident, but also the characteristics, in other words, the individual essences, of earth, contact, etc., termed hardness, touching, etc., respectively, become clearly evident and discrete (avacchinna) in their individual essences” (Vism-mhṭ 814). 32. “The inclusion of only rise and fall here is because this kind of knowledge occurs as seeing only rise and fall, not because of non-existence of the instant of presence” (Vism-mhṭ 814). See Introduction, note 18.

[545]. “He adverts to it as Nibbāna or as the path or as fruition” (Vism-mhṭ 816). “The agitation, the distraction, that occurs about whether or not the illumination, etc., are noble states is ‘agitation about higher states’” (Vism-mhṭ 815). In this connection Vismmhṭ quotes the following text: “Friends, any bhikkhu or bhikkhunī who declares the attainment of Arahantship in my presence has always arrived there by four paths or by one of them. What four? Here, friends, a bhikkhu develops insight preceded by serenity. While he is developing insight preceded by serenity the path is born in him. He cultivates, develops, repeats that path. As he does so his fetters are abandoned and his inherent tendencies are brought to an end. Again, friends, a bhikkhu develops serenity preceded by insight … He develops serenity and insight yoked equally. Again, friends, a bhikkhu’s mind is seized by agitation about highest states. When that consciousness settles down internally, becomes steady, unified and concentrated, then the path is born in him … his inherent tendencies are brought to an end” (A II 157).

[546]. “‘Illumination due to insight’ is the luminous materiality originated by insight consciousness, and that originated by temperature belonging to his own continuity. Of these, that originated by insight consciousness is bright and is found only in the meditator’s body. The other kind is independent of his body and spreads all round over what is capable of being experienced by knowledge. It becomes manifest to him too, and he sees anything material in the place touched by it” (Vism-mhṭ 816).

[547]. Caturaṅga-samannāgataṃ tamaṃ—“four-factored gloom” is mentioned also at S-a I 170, M-a V 16 (c. andhakāra), and Ud-a 66, 304.

[548]. Okkhandati—“to descend into”: not in PED; see XXII.34 and M-a I 238.

[549]. “‘Equanimity about insight’ is neutrality in the investigation of formations owing to the objective field having been already investigated. But in meaning, when it occurs thus, it is only neutrality. The volition associated with mind-door adverting is called ‘equanimity (upekkhā) in adverting’ because it occurs in adverting as onlooking (ajjhupekkhana)” (Vismmhṭ 819).

[550]. Be Vism-mhṭ reads “ayaṃ kho so” instead of the “ayaṃ kho me” in the Ee and Ae editions.

[551]. “He calls conformity knowledge ‘knowledge in conformity with truth’ because it is suitable for penetrating the truths owing to the disappearance of the grosser darkness of delusion that conceals the truths” (Vism-mhṭ 822). The term saccānulomikañāṇa—“knowledge in conformity with truth,” occurs at Vibh 315. The term anulomañāṇa—“conformity knowledge,” occurs in the Paṭṭhāna (Paṭṭh I 159), but not elsewhere in the Piṭakas apparently.

[552]. “Knowledge of rise and fall that has become familiar should be understood as belonging to full-understanding as abandoning. The contemplation of only the dissolution of formations is contemplation of dissolution; that same contemplation as knowledge is knowledge of contemplation of dissolution. One who, owing to it, sees things as they are is terrified, thus it is terror. The knowledge that seizes the terrifying aspect of states of the three planes when they appear as terrifying is knowledge of appearance as terror. One desires to be delivered, thus it is one desiring deliverance: that is, either as a consciousness or as a person. His (its) state is desire for deliverance. That itself as knowledge is knowledge of desire for deliverance. Knowledge that occurs in the mode of reflecting again is knowledge of contemplation of reflection. Knowledge that occurs as looking on (upekkhanā) at formations with indifference (nirapekkhatā) is knowledge of equanimity (upekkhā) about formations” (Vism-mhṭ 822–23).

[553]. Cf. Peṭ 128. In the commentary to the Āyatana-Vibhaṅga we find: “Impermanence is obvious, as when a saucer (say) falls and breaks; … pain is obvious, as when a boil (say) appears in the body; … the characteristic of not-self is not obvious; … Whether Perfect Ones arise or do not arise the characteristics of impermanence and pain are made known, but unless there is the arising of a Buddha the characteristic of not-self is not made known” (Vibh-a 49–50, abridged for clarity).

Again, in the commentary to Majjhima Nikāya Sutta 22: “Having been, it is not, therefore it is impermanent; it is impermanent for four reasons, that is, in the sense of the state of rise and fall, of change, of temporariness, and of denying permanence. It is painful on account of the mode of oppression; it is painful for four reasons, that is, in the sense of burning, of being hard to bear, of being the basis for pain, and of opposing pleasure … It is not-self on account of the mode of insusceptibility to the exercise of power; it is not-self for four reasons, that is, in the sense of voidness, of having no owner-master, of having no Overlord, and of opposing self (M-a II 113, abridged for clarity).

Commenting on this Vism paragraph, Vism-mhṭ says: “‘When continuity is disrupted’ means when continuity is exposed by observing the perpetual otherness of states as they go on occurring in succession. For it is not through the connectedness of states that the characteristic of impermanence becomes apparent to one who rightly observes rise and fall, but rather the characteristic becomes more thoroughly evident through their disconnectedness, as if they were iron darts. ‘When the postures are exposed’ means when the concealment of the pain that is actually inherent in the postures is exposed. For when pain arises in a posture, the next posture adopted removes the pain, as it were, concealing it. But once it is correctly known how the pain

[554]. “The keenness of knowledge comes about owing to familiarity with development. And when it is familiar, development occurs as though it were absorbed in the object owing to the absence of distraction” (Vism-mhṭ 825).

[555]. “‘Arising’ is the alteration consisting in generation. ‘Presence’ is the arrival at presence: ageing is what is meant. ‘Occurrence’ is the occurrence of what is clung to. ‘The sign’ is the sign of formations; the appearance of formations like graspable entities, which is due to compactness of mass, etc., and to individualization of function, is the sign of formations” (Vism-mhṭ 826). See also n.12.

“It is momentary cessation that is in other words ‘cessation as destruction, fall and breakup’” (Vism-mhṭ 826).

[556]. Etasmiṃ khaṇe (or etasmiṃ ṭhāne) seems a better reading here than ekasmiṃ khaṇe’; cf. parallel phrases at the end of §29, 30, 31.

[557]. “‘He contemplates as impermanent’ here not by inferential knowledge thus, “Impermanent in the sense of dissolution”, like one who is comprehending formations by groups (XX.13–14), nor by seeing fall preceded by apprehension of rise, like a beginner of insight (XX.93ff.); but rather it is after rise and fall have become apparent as actual experience through the influence of knowledge of rise and fall that he then leaves rise aside in the way stated and contemplates formations as impermanent by seeing only their dissolution. But when he sees them thus, there is no trace in him of any apprehension of them as permanent” (Vism-mhṭ 827).

[558]. “‘Causes cessation’: he causes greed to reach the cessation of suppression; he suppresses it, is the meaning. That is why he said ‘by means of mundane knowledge.’ And since there is suppression, how can there be arousing? Therefore he said ‘not its origination’” (Vism-mhṭ 828).

[559]. “Here in this world there is no self that is something other than and apart from the aggregates” (Vism-mhṭ 830). Cf. also: “When any ascetics or brahmans whatever see self in its various forms, they all of them see the five aggregates, or one of them” (S IV 46).

[560]. “As a skilled man drilling a gem with a tool watches and keeps in mind only the hole he is drilling, not the gem’s colour, etc., so too the meditator wisely keeps in mind only the ceaseless dissolution of formations, not the formations” (Vism-mhṭ 830).

[561]. The Harvard text reads “khayato vayato suññato ti—as destruction, as fall, as void.” But Vism-mhṭ says: “‘The three appearances’: in the threefold appearance as impermanent and so on. For appearance as destruction and fall is appearance as impermanent, appearance as terror is appearance as pain, and appearance as void is appearance as not-self (Vism-mhṭ 830).

[562]. Vism-mhṭ defines the three kinds of worldliness (āmisa) as follows: Worldliness of the round (vaṭṭāmisa) is that of the threefold round of past, future and present becoming; worldliness of the world (lokāmisa) is the five cords of sense desire (i.e. objects of sense desire including food, etc.) because they are accessible to defilements; worldliness of defilement (kilesāmisa) is the defilements themselves (see Vism-mhṭ 836).

[563]. The reference is to the happy destinies of the sense-desire world (human beings and deities), the fine-material Brahmā-world, and the immaterial Brahmā-world.

[564]. For “ten kinds of elephants” of which the Chaddanta (Six-toothed) is the “best” see M-a II 25. Cf. also the description of the elephant called “Uposatha,” one of the seven treasures of the Wheel-turning Monarch (M II 173). On the expression “with sevenfold stance” (sattappatiṭṭha) Vism-mhṭ says “Hatthapāda-vālavatthikosehi bhūmiphusanehi sattahi patiṭṭhito ti sattapatiṭṭho” (Vism-mhṭ 838).

[565]. Rāhu is the name for the eclipse of the sun or moon, personalized as a demon who takes them in his mouth (see S I 50–51 and M I 87).

[566]. The sense seems to require a reading, “Kāmañ ca na paṭhamaṃ”…

[567]. Dvikoṭika (“double logical relation”) and catukoṭika (“quadruple logical relation”): Skr. catuýkoṭi (cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, pp. 60–61, note 5).

[568]. There are a number of variant readings to this sutta passage (which is met with elsewhere as follows: A I 206; II 177; cf. III 170). There are also variant readings of the commentary, reproduced at M-a IV 63–65 and in the commentary to A II 177. The readings adopted are those which a study of the various contexts has indicated. The passage is a difficult one.

The sutta passage seems from its various settings to have been a phrase current among non-Buddhists, as a sort of slogan for naked ascetics (A I 206); and it is used to describe the base consisting of nothingness (M II 263), in which latter sense it is incorporated in the Buddha’s teaching as a description that can be made the basis for right view or wrong view according as it is treated.

The commentarial interpretation given here is summed up by Vism-mhṭ as follows: “‘Nāhaṃ kvacini’: he sees the non-existence of a self of his own. ‘Na kassaci kiñcanat’asmiṃ’: he sees of his own self too that it is not the property of another’s self. ‘Na ca mama’: these words should be construed as indicated. ‘Atthi’ applies to each clause. He sees the nonexistence of another’s self thus, ‘There is no other’s self anywhere.’ He sees of another that that other is not the property of his own self thus, ‘My owning of that other’s self does not exist.’ So this mere conglomeration of formations is seen, by discerning it with the voidness of the quadruple logical relation, as voidness of self or property of a self in both internal and external aggregates’” (Vism-mhṭ 840–41 = ṭīkā to MN 106).

[569]. Bhātiṭṭhāne—“in the case of a brother”: the form bhāti is not given in PED.

[570]. Reading “… ṭhapetvā na ca kvacini (:) parassa ca attānaṃ kvaci na passatī ti ayaṃ attho; idāni …” with Ce of M-a and A-a

[571]. M-a Sinhalese (Aluvihāra) ed. has kiñcanabhāvena here instead of kiñcana-bhāve.

[572]. Sinhalese eds. of M-a and A-a both read here: “… upanetabbaṃ passati, na parassa attānaṃ passati, na parassa attano kiñcanabhāve upanetabbaṃ passati,” which the sense demands.

[573]. The cause and the fruit being secluded from each other (see Vism-mhṭ 842).

[574]. “A meaning such as ‘what in common usage in the world is called a being is not materiality’ is not intended here because it is not implied by what is said;for the common usage of the world does not speak of mere materiality as a being. What is intended as a being is the self that is conjectured by outsiders” (Vism-mhṭ 842). 26. “This is not in the text. If it were there would be forty-three ways” (Vism-mhṭ 842). 27. “Although it has already been described as a danger in order to show it as such, the word is used again in order to show that it is opposed to enjoyment (satisfaction)” (Vism-mhṭ 843).

[575]. Vism-mhṭ (p. 843) seems to suggest that this is quoted from the Niddesa, but it is not in Nidd II in this form. Cf. Nidd II 162 (Be): Atha vā, vedanaṃ aniccato … dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato … pe … nissaraṇato passanto vedanaṃ nābhinandati …

[576]. Sn 1119: Nidd II 190 (Se); Nidd II 278 (Ee)

[577]. Kūpaka-yaṭṭhi—“mast-head” (?): the word kūpaka appears in PED, only as an equivalent for kūpa = a hole. Cf. D I 222 for this simile.

[578]. Vaṭṭayamāna—“sifting”: not in PED; Vism-mhṭ glosses with niccoriyamāna, also not in PED. Nibbaṭṭita—“picked out”: not in PED. Vism-mhṭ glosses nibbaṭṭita-kappāsaṃ with nibaṭṭita-bīja-kappāsaṃ.” Vihaṭamāna—“carding”: not in PED; glossed by Vismmhṭ with dhūnakena (not in PED) vihaññamānaṃ viya (Vism-mhṭ 844).

[579]. When insight reaches its culmination, it settles down in one of the three contemplations [impermanence, pain, or not-self] and at this stage of the development the “seven contemplations” and the “eighteen contemplations” (or “principal insights”) are all included by the three (see Vism-mhṭ 844).

[580]. “Contemplation of impermanence sees formations as limited by rise in the beginning and by fall in the end, and it sees that it is because they have a beginning and an end that they are impermanent. ‘Into the signless element’: into the unformed element, which is given the name ‘signless’ because it is the opposite of the sign of formations. ‘To the entering of consciousness’: to the higher consciousness’s completely going into by means of the state of conformity knowledge, after delimiting. ‘Into the desireless’: into the unformed element, which is given the name ‘desireless’ owing to the non-existence of desire due to greed and so on. ‘Into the void’: into the unformed element, which is given the name ‘void’ because of voidness of self” (Vism-mhṭ 845). 34. “One who is pursuing insight by discerning formations according to their sign by means of the contemplation of impermanence and resolves according to the signless aspect thus, ‘Where this sign of formations is entirely nonexistent, that is, the signless Nibbāna’ joins insight leading to emergence with the path. Then the path realizes Nibbāna for him as signless. The signless aspect of Nibbāna is not created by the path or by insight; on the contrary, it is the establishment of the individual essence of

[581]. “‘From the object interpreted as the sign’: from the pentad of aggregates as the object of insight; for that pentad of aggregates is called the ‘object interpreted’ on account of the interpreting, in other words, on account of being made the domain of insight. And although it is included in one’s own continuity, it is nevertheless called ‘external’ because it is seen as alien to it; it is that too which in other contexts is spoken of as ‘externally from all signs’ (Paṭis I 71). ‘Internally from occurrence’: from the occurrence of wrong view, etc., in one’s own continuity, and from the defilements and from the aggregates that occur consequent upon them. For it is stated in this way because there is occurrence of defilement in one’s own continuity and because there is occurrence of clung-to aggregates produced by that [defilement] when there is no path development. And emergence consists both in making these the object and in producing their non-liability to future arising” (Vism-mhṭ 853).

[582]. “‘Emerges from the internal’ is said figuratively owing to the fact that in this case the insight leading to emergence has an internal state as its object. In the literal sense, however, the path emerges from both” (Vism-mhṭ 853).

[583]. “Said in the Discourse on Purification (visuddhi-kathā)” (Vism-mhṭ 855). See XX.77.

[584]. “The first ‘some’ refers to the Elder Tipiṭaka Cūḷa-Nāga. The second ‘some’ refers to the Elder Mahā Datta, dweller at Moravāpi. The third ‘some’ refers to the Elder Tipiṭaka Cūḷa Abhaya” (Vism-mhṭ 856).

[585]. The four predominances are those of zeal (desire), energy, consciousness, and inquiry. Cf. four roads to power (Dhs §73–74; Vibh 216 and Comy.).

[586]. “If this is so, then is the path that follows on the contemplation of impermanence not included in the Abhidhamma?—That is not so; for it is included in the method of ‘simple progress’ (suddhika paṭipadā—see Dhs §§339–340)” (Vism-mhṭ 861).

[587]. “‘Maintaining the continuity of consciousness’ by absence of interruption, in other words, of occurrence of dissimilar consciousness. For when the life-continuum [which is mind-consciousness element] is displaced by the functional mind element [of fivedoor adverting (70)], the occurrence of the functional consciousness makes an interruption, an interval, between the occurrence of the resultant consciousness [i.e. the life-continuum and the consciousness that follows]. But this is not so with minddoor adverting (71) [which is mind-consciousness element]” (Vism-mhṭ 862). See Table V, Cognitive Series.

[588]. “Aloofness”—atammayatā: not in PED. See also M III 43. The word is made up of a + taṃ + maya + tā = “not-made-of-that-ness.” Its meaning is non-attachment to any form of being.

[589]. The word vodāna (“cleansing”) is used, in its loose sense of “purifying” in general, in I.143. For its technical Abhidhamma sense here see Ch. XXII note 7.

[590]. “‘Of emerging and turning away from the external’: it is the understanding of turning away that is being effected, which turning away is emergence from the field of formations; it is termed external because the unformed element’s existence is external” (Vism-mhṭ 866). The unformed element (=Nibbāna) is classed as “external” under the internal (ajjhattika) triad of the Abhidhamma Mātikā (see Dhs 2 and p. 241). 2. Pakkhandati—“enters into is glossed there by anupavisati (enters in Vism-mhṭ (p. 566), which is the sense required and may be taken as based on the idiom in the Suttas, “Cittaṃ pakkhandati pasīdati santiṭṭhati adhimuccati—the mind enters into [that], becomes settled, steady and resolute” (M I 186), which is obviously inappropriate here.

[591]. Phalakasataṃ—“target”: not in PED. Vism-mhṭ says “Phalakasatan ti asana-sāramayaṃ phalakasataṃ—a “phalakasata” is one made of the heart (pith) of the asana tree.” The “wheel contrivance” resembles a potter’s wheel according to Vism-mhṭ (p.867).

[592]. The seven (noble) treasures are: faith, virtue, conscience, shame, learning, generosity, and understanding (D III 251).

[593]. See the five kinds of enmity and fear at S II 68f. Vism-mhṭ, however, says: “The five kinds of enmity beginning with killing living things and the twenty-five great terrors (mahā-bhayāni) are what constitute ‘all enmity and fear’” (Vism-mhṭ 867).

[594]. For the use of the expression “brings to bear”—samodhāneti in this sense see Paṭis I 181.

[595]. “Here ‘change-of-lineage’ means ‘like change-of-lineage’; for the knowledge that ushers in the [first] path is called that in the literal sense because it overcomes the ordinary man’s lineage and develops the Noble One’s lineage. But this is called ‘change-of-lineage’ figuratively because of its similarity to the other. It is also called ‘cleansing’ (vodāna) because it purifies from certain defilements and because it makes absolute purification its object. Hence it is said in the Paṭṭhāna, ‘Conformity is a condition, as proximity condition, for cleansing’ (Paṭṭh I 59). But ‘next to change-of-lineage’ is said here because it is said in the Paṭisambhidāmagga that for the purpose of ‘overcoming arising,’ etc., ‘eight states of change-of-lineage arise through concentration’ and ‘ten states of change-of-lineage arise through concentration’ and ‘ten states of change-of-lineage arise through insight’ (Paṭis I 68–69), and it is given in the same way in this page” (Vism-mhṭ 869).

[596]. The four foundations of mindfulness are fully commented on in the commentary to MN 10 (= commentary to DN 22). The right endeavours are fully commented on in the commentary to the Sammappadhāna Vibhaṅga (cf. M-a II 243ff.; also A-a commenting on AN 1:II 1). The four roads to power are briefly commented on at M-a II 69 and fully in the commentary to the M-a I 82f. and more fully in the commentary to the Bojjhaṅga Vibhaṅga. The Noble Eightfold Path is commented on at M-a I 105

[597]. “Emergence from the sign consists in relinquishing the sign of formations and making Nibbāna the object. Emergence from occurrence consists in entering upon

[598]. “‘Wrong knowledge,’ which is wrong because it does not occur rightly [i.e. in conformity with the truth], and is wrong and mistaken owing to misinterpretations, etc., is just delusion. ‘Wrong deliverance’ is the wrong notion of liberation that assumes liberation to take place in a ‘World Apex’ (lokathūpika–see XVI.85), and so on” (Vism-mhṭ 886).

[599]. The meaning of this paragraph is made clearer by reference to the Atthasālinī (Dhs-a 48) and Mūla Ṭīkā (Dhs-ṭ 51), where the use of ā as an adverb in the sense of “as far as” indirectly with the ablative (gotrabhuto, etc.) is explained; the abl. properly belongs to savana (i.e. exudations from). Vism-mhṭ only says: “‘Exudations’ (savana) because of occurring [due to], savanato (“because of exuding”) is because of flowing out as filth of defilement. Savanato (“because of producing”) the second time is because of giving out (pasavana)” (Vism-mhṭ 876. Cf. also M-a I 61).

[600]. “The intention is: or it follows that there is dissociation of defilements from consciousness, like that of formations according to those who assert that formations exist dissociated form consciousness. He said, ‘there is no such thing as a present defilement dissociated from consciousness’ in order to show that that is merely the opinion of those who make the assertion. For it is when immaterial states are actually occurring by their having a single basis and being included in the three instants that they are present; so how could that be dissociated from consciousness? Consequently there is no dissociation from consciousness here” (Vism-mhṭ 878).

[601]. “‘Shackled’: one whose consciousness is shackled by conceit (pride)” (Vism-mhṭ 878).

[602]. “‘In any given plane’ means aggregates as objects of clinging, reckoned as a human or divine person” (Vism-mhṭ 879).

[603]. “By the words ‘which are the object of insight’ he points out the non-fullyunderstood state of the aggregates, not merely the fact that they are the object of insight, which is proved by his taking only the three planes. For it is not-fullyunderstood aggregates among the aggregates constituting the [subjective] basis that are intended as the ‘soil of defilements’” (Vism-mhṭ 880).

[604]. “No one would be able to abandon the root of becoming if it were in another’s continuity. ‘With respect to the basis [for them in oneself]’ means as the place of their arising; in that particular becoming or continuity” (Vism-mhṭ 880).

[605]. “‘With the contact of knowledge by personal experience’ means by personal experience of it as object, which is what the ‘contact of knowledge’ is called. The words, ‘By personal experience’ exclude taking it as an object by inference. For what is intended here as the ‘contact of knowledge’ is knowing by personal experience through reviewing thus, ‘This is like this’” (Vism-mhṭ 888).

[606]. The first elision here—“The eye … ageing-and-death”—is explained in XX.9. The second elision—“One who sees suffering … One who sees Nibbāna, which merges in the deathless in the sense of end …”—covers all things listed from Paṭis I 8, line 18 (N.B. the new para in the Paṭis text should begin with the words “dukkhaṃ abhiññeyyaṃ” up to p. 22, line 11, amatogadhaṃ nibbānaṃ pariyosānatthaṃ abhiññeyyaṃ). In this case, however (Paṭis I 35), sacchikātabba (“to be realized”), etc., is substituted for abhiññeyya (“to be directly known”).

[607]. “It is the Andhakas, etc., who maintain this; for they take the sutta wrongly which says, ‘“Arahantship” is said, friend Sāriputta; what is Arahantship?—The destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, the destruction of delusion: that is what is called Arahantship” (S IV 252), taking it literally and asserting that nothing exists called Arahantship and that it is only the abandoning of defilements that is so called by common usage. And they deny that there are any other fruitions” (Vism-mhṭ 891).

[608]. The quotation in the Vism texts does not quite agree with the Paṭis text (Ee) where (as the sense demands) the words “bahiddhā saṅkhāranimittaṃ” do not follow the four fruitions and the two abidings but only the four paths.

[609]. “Although they are resultant states, nevertheless the states of fruition attainment occur in the noble person only when he chooses since they do not arise without the preliminary work and do so only when they are given predominance” (Vism-mhṭ 895).

[610]. “Why does change-of-lineage not have Nibbāna as its object here as it does when it precedes the path? Because states belonging to fruition are not associated with an outlet [as in the case of the path]. For this is said: ‘What states are an outlet? The four unincluded paths’ (Dhs §1592)” (Vism-mhṭ 895).

[611]. “Those of the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anurādhapura” (Vism-mhṭ 895).

[612]. “The ‘volition’ is attaining after deciding the time limit in this way, ‘When the moon, or the sun, has gone so far, I shall emerge,’ which is an act of volition” (Vism-mhṭ 897).

[613]. “It is because he is called ‘emerged from attainment’ as soon as the life-continuum consciousness has arisen that ‘he brings to mind that which is the object of the life-continuum’ is said. Kamma, etc., are called the object of the life-continuum (see Ch. XVII, §133ff.)” (Vism-mhṭ 897).

[614]. The list in brackets represents in summarized form the things listed at Paṭis I 94–95, repeated in this context in the Paṭisambhidā but left out in the Vism quotation.

[615]. The serenity shown here is access concentration (see Vism-mhṭ 899).

[616]. The nine are the four fine-material jhānas, the four immaterial jhānas, and the access concentration preceding each of the eight attainments, described in the last sentence and counted as one.

[617]. “The word ‘profitable’ used in this Paṭṭhāna passage shows that it app1ies only to non-returners, otherwise ‘functional’ would have been said” (Vism-mhṭ 902).

[618]. “They say so because of absence of heart-basis; but the meaning is because of absence of basis called physical body. For if anyone were to attain cessation in the immaterial worlds he would become indefinable (appaññattika) owing to the nonexistence of any consciousness or consciousness concomitant at all, and he would be as though attained to final Nibbāna without remainder of results of past clinging; for what remainder of results of past clinging could be predicated of him when he had entered into cessation? So it is because of the lack of the necessary factors that there is no attaining of the attainment of cessation in the immaterial worlds” (Vism-mhṭ 902).

[619]. “‘Reaching the cessation that is Nibbāna’: as though reaching Nibbāna without remainder of result of past clinging. ‘In bliss’ means without suffering” (Vism-mhṭ 902).

[620]. “‘It should be resolved’: the thought should be aroused. For here the resolve consists in arousing the thought. In the non-arising of consciousness-originated materiality, etc., and in the absence of support by a postnascence condition, etc., the physical body continues the same only for seven days; after that it suffers wastage. So he limits the duration to seven days when he attains cessation, they say” (Vism-mhṭ 903).

[621]. Paribhaṇḍa—“repair work”: this meaning is not given in PED; cf. M-a IV 157 (patching of old robes), and M-a I 291.

[622]. The word atthuppatti (“the origin being a need arisen”) is a technical commentarial term. “There are four kinds of origins (uppatti) or setting forth of suttas (suttanikkhepa): on account of the speaker’s own inclination (attajjhāsaya), on account of another’s inclination (parajjhāsaya), as the result of a question asked (pucchāvasika), and on account of a need arisen (atthuppattika)’ (M-a I 15, see also Ch. III.88).

[623]. “‘Vital formations’ are the same as 1ife span; though some say that they are the life span, heat and consciousness. These are the object only of his normal consciousness. There is no death during cessation because dying takes place by means of the final life-continuum [consciousness]. He should attain only after adverting thus, ‘Let sudden death not occur.’ For in the case of sudden death he would not be able to declare final knowledge, advise the bhikkhus, and testify to the Dispensation’s power. And there would be no reaching the highest path in the case of a non-returner” (Vism-mhṭ 904).

[624]. The subtleties of the word nipphanna are best cleared up by quoting a paragraph from the Sammohavinodanī (Vibh-a 29): “The five aggregates are positively-produced (parinipphanna) always, not un-positively-produced (aparinipphanna); they are always formed, not unformed. Besides, they are produced (nipphanna) as well. For among the dhammas that are individual essences (sabhāva-dhamma) it is only Nibbāna that is un-positively-produced and un-produced (anipphanna).” The Mūla Ṭīkā comments on this: “What is the difference between the positively-produced and the produced? A dhamma that is an individual essence with a beginning and an end in time, produced by conditions, and marked by the three characteristics, is positively produced. But besides this, what is produced [but not positively produced] is a dhamma with no individual essence (asabhāva-dhamma) when it is produced by the taking of a name or by attaining [the attainment of cessation]” (Vibh-a 23). Cf. also XIV.72 and 77.

[625]. See Ch. XIV. (Adapted from Nyanatiloka Mahāthera's Buddhist Dictionary.)

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