Vinaya Pitaka (1): The Analysis of Monks’ Rules (Bhikkhu-vibhanga)

by I. B. Horner | 2014 | 345,334 words | ISBN-13: 9781921842160

The English translation of the Bhikkhu-vibhanga: the first part of the Suttavibhanga, which itself is the first book of the Pali Vinaya Pitaka, one of the three major ‘baskets’ of Therevada canonical literature. It is a collection of rules for Buddhist monks. The English translation of the Vinaya-pitaka (first part, bhikkhu-vibhanga) contains many...

Monks’ Expiation (Pācittiya) 1

Bu-Pc.1.1.1 Vin.4.1 BD.2.164 At that time the enlightened one, the lord, was staying at Sāvatthī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapiṇḍika’s monastery. Now at that time Hatthaka,[1] the son of the Sakyans,[2] came to be overthrown in debate.[3] He, talking with followers of sects holding other views, having denied, acknowledged, having acknowledged, denied, he shelved the question by (asking) another,[4] he told a conscious lie,[5] having made a rendezvous,[6] he deceived with words.[7] The followers of sects holding other views looked down upon, criticised, spread it about, saying:

BD.2.165 “How can this Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans, talking together with us, having denied, acknowledge, having acknowledged, deny, shelve the question by (asking) another, tell a conscious lie, having made a rendezvous, deceive with words?”

Monks heard these followers of sects holding other views who looked down upon, criticised, spread it about. Then these monks approached Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans, and having approached, they spoke thus to Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans:

“Is it true, as is said, that you, reverend Hatthaka, talking together with followers of sects holding other views, having denied, acknowledged … deceived with words?”

“Your reverences, these followers of sects holding other views should be vanquished in some way; victory should not be given to them thus.”

Those who were modest monks looked down upon, criticised, spread it about, saying: “How can this Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans, talking together with followers of sects holding other views, having denied, acknowledge, Vin.4.2 having acknowledged, deny, shelve the question by (asking) another, tell a conscious lie, having made a rendezvous, deceive with words?”

Then these monks told this matter to the lord. Then the lord on this occasion, in this connection, having had the Order of monks convened, questioned Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans:

“Is it true, as is said, that you, Hatthaka, talking together with followers of sects holding other views, having denied, acknowledged … deceived with words?”

“It is true, lord,” he said.

The enlightened one, the lord, rebuked him, saying:

“How can you, foolish man, talking together with followers of sects holding other views, having denied, acknowledge … having made a rendezvous, deceive with words? It is not, foolish man, for pleasing those who are not (yet) pleased … And thus, monks, this rule of training should be set forth:

BD.2.166In telling a conscious lie,[8] there is an offence of expiation.[9]


Bu-Pc.1.2.1 Telling a conscious lie means: the words, the utterance, the speech, the talk, the language, the intimation, the un-ariyan statements[10] of one intent upon deceiving with words, saying: “I have seen what I have not seen, heard what I have not heard, sensed[11] what I have not sensed, cognised what I have not cognised.[12] I have not seen what I have seen, not heard what I have BD.2.167 heard, not sensed what I have sensed, not cognised what I have cognised.”

Not seen means: not seen by the eye. Not heard means: not heard by the ear. Not sensed means: not smelt by the nose, not tasted by the tongue, not felt[13] by the body. Not cognised means: not cognised by the mind.

Seen means: seen by the eye. Heard means: heard by the ear. Sensed means: smelt by the nose, tasted by the tongue, felt by the body. Cognised means: cognised by the mind.


Bu-Pc.1.2.2 There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie[14] that, “In three ways I have seen what I have not seen”: before he has lied he knows, “I am going to lie”; while lying he knows, “I am lying”; having lied he knows, “I lied.”

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In four ways I have seen what I have not seen”: before he has lied he knows, “I am going to lie”; while lying he knows, “I am lying”; having lied he knows, “I lied,” misrepresenting his opinion.

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In five ways … I lied,” misrepresenting his opinion, misrepresenting his approval. Vin.4.3

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In six ways … I lied,” misrepresenting his opinion, misrepresenting his approval, misrepresenting his pleasure.

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In seven ways … I lied,” misrepresenting his opinion, misrepresenting his approval, misrepresenting his pleasure, misrepresenting his intention.

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have heard what I have not heard” … “… sensed what I have not sensed” … “… cognised what I have not cognised”: before he has lied he knows, “I am going to lie”; while lying he knows, “I am lying”; having lied he knows, “I lied.”

BD.2.168 There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In four ways … in five ways … in six ways … in seven ways …” misrepresenting his intention.


Bu-Pc.1.2.3 There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have seen and heard what I have not seen “… for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have seen and sensed what I have not seen” … “… I have seen and cognised what I have not seen” … “… I have seen and heard and sensed what I have not seen” … “… I have seen and heard and cognised what I have not seen” … “… I have seen and heard and sensed and cognised what I have not seen.”

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have heard and sensed what I have not heard” … “… I have heard and cognised what I have not heard” … “… I have heard and seen what I have not heard” … “… I have heard and sensed and cognised and seen what I have not heard.”

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have sensed and cognised what I have not sensed” … “… I have sensed and cognised and heard and seen what I have not sensed.”

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have cognised and seen what I have not cognised” … “… In three ways I have cognised and seen and heard and sensed what I have not cognised.”


Bu-Pc.1.2.4 There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have seen what I have not seen … heard what I have not heard … sensed what I have not sensed … cognised what I have not cognised.”


Bu-Pc.1.2.5 There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have seen what I have heard BD.2.169 … I have seen what I have sensed … I have seen what I have cognised.”

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways I have seen what I have heard and what I have sensed … I have seen what I have heard and what I have cognised … I have seen what I have heard and what I have sensed Vin.4.4 and what I have cognised” … “… I have cognised what’I have seen and what I have heard and what I have sensed.”


Bu-Pc.1.2.6 There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In three ways he is in doubt as to what he has seen: he does not trust what he has seen, he does not remember what he has seen, he becomes confused as to what he has seen.[15] He is in doubt as to what he has heard: he does not trust what he has heard, he does not remember what he has heard, he becomes confused as to what he has heard. He is in doubt as to what he has sensed … He is in doubt as to what he has cognised … he becomes confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and seen by me’; he becomes confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and heard by me’; he becomes confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and sensed by me’; he becomes confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and seen and heard by me’; he becomes confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and seen and sensed by me’; he becomes confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and seen and heard and sensed by me.’”

There is an offence of expiation for telling the conscious lie that, “In four ways … in five ways … in six ways … in seven ways he is confused as to what he has cognised, saying: ‘It was cognised and seen and heard and sensed by me.’” (These are the seven ways): before he has lied he knows, “I am going to lie”; BD.2.170 while he is lying he knows, “I am lying”; having lied he knows, “I lied,” misrepresenting his opinion, misrepresenting his approval, misrepresenting his pleasure, misrepresenting his intention


Bu-Pc.1.2.7 There is no offence if he speaks in jest,[16] if he speaks in fun. He speaks in jest means he speaks in haste[17]; he speaks in fun means, saying: ‘I will speak of this,’ he speaks of that[18]; if he is mad, if he is the first wrong-doer.

The First

Footnotes and references:

1.

Probably not the Hatthaka of Āḷavī, see AN.i.26, AN.i.88, AN.i.136, also AN.i.278 (devaputta), AN.iv.218. But probably the same as the Hatthaka concerning whom Dhp.264 (na muṇḍakena samaṇo) was uttered. For Dhp-a.3.390, which, though longer, is very similar to Vin-a.736, says that whenever Hatthaka was defeated in argument he would make another appointment with his opponents, then precede them to the appointed place and say: “The followers of other sects are so frightened of me that they dare not meet me; this is like a defeat on their part.” This fits in well with Vinaya story told above.

2.

Vin-a.735, Sakyānaṃ putto ti Sakyaputto.

3.

vādakkhitto.

4.

āññaṃ aññam paṭicarati. Vin-a.735 says, aññena kāraṇena aññaṃ kāraṇaṃ paṭicarati paṭicchādeti ajjhottharati, he answered one question by another, hid it, covered it up. Cf. DN.i.94, AN.i.187, AN.i.198, MN.i.250, Vin.4.35. “To meet one question with an answer of quite different contents” (Critical Pali Dictionary), but at Vin.4.35 Channa meets questions by putting other questions.

5.

sampajānamusā bhāsati.

6.

saṃketaṃ katvā. Cf. Vin.3.53, Vin.3.78.

7.

visaṃvādeti. Forestalling his opponents at the rendezvous, he said that they were defeated.

8.

sampajānamusāvāde. Cf. Vin.3.59, Vin.3.66, Vin.3.93f., where this rule has been anticipated; and see BD.1.xxv, Bu-Pj.4 for offences involving defeat for telling a conscious lie. Here Kankhā-vitaraṇī, Simon Hewavitarne Bequest, p.83, says that all conscious lying is a pācittiya. It, however (p.82), draws attention to the fact that the conscious lie of claiming a state of further-men is a pārājika (4); that falsely to accuse someone of a pārājika is a saṅghādisesa (8); that unfoundedly to accuse someone of a saṅghādisesa is a pācittiya (76); that falsely to accuse someone of a failure in morality is a dukkaṭa (Bu-Pc.76, Vin.4.148).

9.

pācittiya. See above, BD.2.3, n.4.

10.

anariya-vohārā. The above eight are enumerated at Vin.5.125, DN.iii.232, AN.ii.246, Vb.376.

11.

amutaṃ mutaṃ me. Mutaṃ translated at Dialogues of the Buddha 3.127 “felt,” Dialogues of the Buddha 3.223 “thought of,” Further Dialogues of the Buddha 1.3 and GS.2.251 “sensed,” Sacred Books of the East X, 2nd edition, 198 “thought.” Geiger, Pali Literature, gives “gedacht.” The Old Commentary’s definition of muta shows that the sense-functions of nose, tongue and body had been differentiated by the time that it was compiled. Hence I have translated muta by “sensed” and not by “thought,” although etymologically “thought” may be more correct. Possibly muta, as a term covering these three sense-functions, dates from a time prior to their differentiation. That muta does not include the sense-functions of the eye and ear suggests that these were recognised earlier than the others, their specific terminology emerging earlier. Cf. Vin-a.736; and Buddhist Psychological Ethics, 2nd edition, p.221, n.1, for muta pointing to an older tradition of a time when the five senses had not been co-ordinated.

12.

diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññāta, combined at DN.iii.232, MN.ii.231, MN.iii.29, Snp.1086, Snp.1122, Ds.961, It.121. At eight Sutta-nipāta passages d°, s°, m° are combined, sometimes with other items, but not with . The first three may therefore belong to some old tradition, originally threefold, viññāta being added later with the rise of interest in mind, manas, of which viññāta is here a function. See SN.i.270 = Thag.1216, where d°, s°, m° are combined with paṭigha; and cf. SN-a.i.270. See also Psalms of the Bretheren 398, n.9, KS.i.237, n.1; and Buddhist Psychological Ethics, 2nd edition, p.221, n.1, for Upaniṣad references.

13.

phuṭṭhaṃ.

14.

From here to end of Bu-Pc.1.2.6 cf. BD.1.162–171.

15.

Cf. BD.1.284.

16.

davā.

17.

sahasā; Vin-a.737, without considering or reflecting.

18.

As saying cīvaraṃ for cīraṃ, Vin-a.737. It is very unusual, if not unique, for commentarial exegesis to occur in the “no offence” paragraph.