The Great Chariot

by Longchenpa | 268,580 words

A Commentary on Great Perfection: The Nature of Mind, Easer of Weariness In Sanskrit the title is ‘Mahāsandhi-cittā-visranta-vṛtti-mahāratha-nāma’. In Tibetan ‘rDzogs pa chen po sems nyid ngal gso’i shing rta chen po shes bya ba ’...

Part 2a - By knowing or not knowing what we are

By knowing or not knowing what we are[1] there are liberation or confusion.

Now the basis and way of confusion are extensively taught, as follows:

The changeless nature of mind, perfection, dharmakaya,
By ignorant fixation, takes on habits of false conception.
Involving confused appearance of impure relativity.[2]
Dualistic appearance of objects as being self and other,
Then come to be grasped as really being two.
Intrinsically this presents itself as limitless suffering.

When we have realized the ever-changeless nature of mind,
By the path of meditation on this unerring perfection,
We will properly reach the field of pure relativity.
Easing the weariness of the village of samsara.

Here three great doctrines of the yoga practice (yogachara) tradition are taught. These are false conceptions, relativity, and the perfectly established, in Sanskrit, parikalpita, paratantra, and parinishpanna, and in Tibetan kun btags,, gzhan dbang, and yongs grub. 

There are two kinds of false conceptions, false conceptions lacking true characteristics,[3] and accountable/classifying false conceptions.[4]

By false conceptions lacking true characteristics, from someone's viewpoint something is conceptually imputed, even though it is non-existent, such as the horns of a rabbit or the alleged ego. This includes any bad doctrines and all the names and meanings of this and that established from them that may be presented by such a mind.

What is this like? Some search for the real bodily existence of that to which the name "lion" is imputed, in all parts of its body, but do not find it. Though the phenomenal meaning has been presented as "this," from mere arrogance, giving individual characteristics without any real remembered mental object, they may say “It is like fire."

Accountable false conceptions are various aspects of the environment and inhabitants of the phenomenal world arising from the temporary viewpoint of confusion--pleasure and pain, the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas and so forth. Because they really do not exist, but only appear like a dream from the confused viewpoint of mind, they are called “accountable false conceptions.” While all these things are natureless, they appear from the viewpoint of confusion. Since they are exaggerations, they are called false conceptions, in Tibetan kun tak,[5] literally all-imputation or all-labeling.

The Bodhisattvabhumis says:

As for the false conceptions of parikalpita
Though non-existent, they are produced by the mind of confusion.

There are also two kinds of relativity, pure and impure. Impure relativity is earth, stones, mountains rocks and so forth arising from the maturation of habitual patterns. As the impure phenomena of the environment and inhabitants of the phenomnal world, these are confused appearances arining in the individual doors of the senses.

Pure relativity is the pure buddha fields and the objects of the pure seeing of the buddhas, appearances that arise of buddha fields, the seven precious things,[6] and divine palaces of pure light.

Regarding this, some say, the relativity of yogachara tradition is unsuitable “because all is included in being only one’s own appearance.” those who argue that it is so included do not see it properly, for reasons as follows:

The aspect of habitual patterns is not assimilated within one from one’s own awareness. It is also not like the reflection that is in a mirror, when engendered by the conditions of the phenomena of a face.

Whether “everything is included within personal appearance” should be analyzed. Either mind is included within mere appearance, or appearance is included within mind.

If it is like the first, at the time of mere appearance, there is no discernible boundary between phenomena that are included and those that are not included. Therefore "included" is a mere word, having nothing to do with real phenomena.[7]

If it is like the second, how can this be suitable? Someone might say, "Since appearance arises from mind, it too is mind."

Then a boy child that comes from a woman would also be a woman, but this is not so. Excrement comes from the body, so it would be the body. This is clearly not the case.

Someone also might say, "Appearance is mind, because it appears in mind."

Then form would be visual consciousness, because it appears in visual consciousness. Buddhas that appear to erroneous sentient beings would be the minds of those beings. Fallaciously, these sentient beings with their erroneous minds would be  buddhas. Since  sentient beings also appear to  these buddhas, the whole realm of sentient beings would all be buddhas. Moreover, this fault that spotless buddhas are also defiled sentient beings could never be abandoned. This is because if buddhas were not samsaric mind, they could not arise at all.

If someone is attached to maintaining that phenomena are mind, then what is really cause and fruition would be a single thing. If this thing did not exist, neither could arise. Thus, an enemy and one's anger at the enemy would be the same single thing. Therefore, without the enemy, there could be no anger at the enemy.

Nor is it right to say, "Phenomena are mind because they are produced by mind." Then the details of a painting would be the painter, because the painter produced them.

How is it right to maintain that external earth, stones, mountains, and rocks are mind? Admit that their arising from the habitual patterns of mind is confused appearance. If this were not so, when a hundred people look at one vase, the vase that is seen by them all would be their awareness. All those hundred beings would be a single awareness. If this is maintained, it would be correct reasoning that if one of them gets enlightened, they would all be enlightened. If one went to the lower realms, they would all go there. If it is like these notions, of sentient beings in the world like you and me not more than one would exist, since all that appears like that would be other than one's own mind.

Moreover, it would not be suitable that there were any other buddhas besides the single one Shakyamuni. This is because all objects seen by him would be his awareness. If one maintains that, clearly all of us are him. These days many people fixate such approaches and completely obscure the meaning of the Mahayana.

From what they say, a huge body could be covered by one the size of a lotus. A flower could have ear- rings. and abundant golden facial ornaments. An elephant would be just the sound of trumpeting.

If you ask, “What are pure appearances,” since false phenomena that are mind-only are immaculately pure, with that proclamation one enters into proper reasoning.

That tradition says:

These appearances of each person are each person’s mind, but the apparent object is not mind.

The Yogachara Levels (Yogacharya bhuumi : rnal a’byor spyod pa’i sa mang po) says:

As many things as appear, that many things are mind.
But that is not the case for apparent objects themselves.
Confused by habitual patterns from beginningless time,
We are shaggy, as it were, with hairs before the eyes.[8]

Appearance and the apparent object are distinguished. Some may think, "The apparent object of a mountain is a mountain!" but it is otherwise. Clearly grasped in apprehension, the appearances of mind arise in dependence on the faculty of sight. However, the objects we directly encounter, the phenomena actually fixated by our minds, are our own appearances. Then when other objects are encountered, the apparent object does not follow it outward. Rather, habitual patterns of former eye consciousness fixate apparent objects, former perceptions of the eye consciousness.

A generalized image,[9] a conceptualized mental object, a luminous appearance of what does not exist, vividly appears in the mental sense. Therefore, even if appearances apprehended by the mind and the fixator of them, as well as appearances of things that are other and the fixator of them are all mind, the object which arises for and is directly perceived by the mind is classified as an apparent object. All the objects of the five gates appear even though they do not exist, like shaggy hairs before the eyes, because of beginningless habitual patterns.

It may  be asked,  “if so,  and  they are  two, are  not  appearance and  apparent object  established  as different?”

For you also they are two. This is because you maintain that appearances exist externally to the mind in which they appear, and within the fixating mind.[10] These both are one within the mind, but are called "two."[11]

It may be asked, "according to proper reasoning are they one?

Here while neither the apparent object caused by confused habitual patterns nor the ascertaining appearance that grasps it exists,[12] the appearance and the phenomena from confused habitual patterns conventionally are not different. Since these two objects really do not exist, they are established to be not-two in nature.

For those of us who profess madhyamaka, if we analyze, not only is the thing which is the apparent object, maintained not to be mind, but the appearance as well. This is because mind is inner and does not exist externally and appearances of external objects that arise within the individual senses are analyzed as being within the mind. If appearances remained outside, then peoples' consciousness could be two at the same time, or they themselves would be material things. There would be many such fallacies.

Therefore, the fixator of appearance and non-appearance is mind, but appearance itself is not established as mind. Though what is or is not the word "tail" is grasped by the listening consciousness, listening consciousness itself is not established as the word, "tail."

In brief, one's own mind, though seemingly externally projected does not really go outward. Therefore, external phenomena really do appear inwardly. However, an appearance of an external object is never internal mind. Why? Because what appears does not exist. A variety of such things, white and red, arise,[13] as for one who has diseased eyes due to a disorder of the phlegm hairs seem to be drifting downward before the eyes, objects which are completely non-existent nevertheless appear, externally, internally and between. These are said to be natureless or empty of essence. However, neither establising them as mind and establising them as other than mind are liberated from attachment to truly existent self-nature. In that respect they are indistinguishable.

Some one may say, "Isn't this assertion that there are external objects—real things that are not directly known, like that of the hearers’ particularist (shraavaka vaibhashika) school?

It is not the same. The vaibhashikas proclaim that these objects are established to have individual characteristics of material things. We, on the other hand, say that habitual patterns of confused appearance, appear to mind even though what seems to be there is non-existent like a dream. This approach is not refuted by those of the middle way school (madhyamaka), and so it is suitable.

Someone may ask why what has been proclaimed by us is not refuted by the consequentialist middle way (prasangika madhyamaka) school. Mere appearance is not refuted, but attachment to its true existence is refuted.

The teacher Nagarjuna says:

Thus though appearance itself is not to be refuted,
Eliminate thoughts that conceptualize this as truly existent.

The yoga practice school true-aspectarians (yogachara saakaaravaadin, sems tsam pa rnam bden pa) proclaim that phenomena are mind. Both the true and false aspectarians assert the refuted tenet that the absolute is truly established as self-insight (rang rig).

Then how will they deny that confused appearances of habitual patterns arise while they are non-existent and that classifications of existents are really entered into? This is because these would be made into the classification of relative truth (kun rdzob) at the same time.

Thus outer relativity (gzhan dbang) and the relativity of mind or insight (sems rig pa), arising after the former. Since it is an appearance that is a likeness, depending on other previous objects, it is called “relativity.[14]

This must be analyzed in terms of its internal logical implications. If seeming appearance of before and after is being imputed, the name alone is the meaning, and so they accord. If the meaning is maintained to be other and different from what is present, that which is apprehended in insight cannot be established as a characteristic of something other than itself, because the very assertion is contradictory. This is not good reasoning.

The former text says:

Thus all these various different kinds of appearances,
Because they seem to be phenomena that are other,
Are the impure relativity of grasping and fixation.

The pure has been also said to be relativity,
But what becomes through external power is never pure.
This is explained as appearance as something that is other.

The perfectly established is changeless and unerring. As for this changeless, completely established nature, whether at the time of confusion or non-confusion, the naturally pure nature of dharmas has emptiness as an intrinsic aspect.

Without distinction of earlier and later, this changeless perfectly established is the quintessential natural state. Regarding this, its emptiness is classified as as threefold. It is empty of itself, other, and both.

As for emptiness of itself, while things do not exist, they appear, like the moon in water. Real individual characteristics are abandoned, and divided aspects of self and other do not exist. However, as spontaneously present dharmas are not put aside, there are imputations both of these and the emptiness of their self-nature.

Emptiness of other is the other emptiness of not having a certain characteristic or the other emptiness of truly existing accountable dharmas.

Emptiness of both self and other has both emptiness of dualistic accountables and emptiness of the words and meaning of individual characteristics.

This luminous nature of mind, the nature, the dhatu, the essence, is empty of all fallacious things. It has the characteristics of the buddha qualities. Its purity of essence is beyond faults and virtues, or establishing or clearing away.

Various defiled dharmas of confused appearance, red and white, arise. These false conceptions, the eight consciousnesses, are natureless. Their self-nature is empty. Accountable[15] like a pillar or a vase, they are empty and fallacious. The pure nature is beyond faults and virtues, establishing or clearing away. The paths too are empty of their own nature and have some virtuous and some faulty aspects. But the pure essence is beyond faults and virtues.

At the time of the ultimate purity, all injurious faults together with their habitual patterns are empty. Whatever qualities of the absolute dhatu exist are also ultimate manifestations, and therefore these are not empty. The pure essence is beyond faults and virtues, establishing and clearing away.

In brief, as for self-emptiness, the nature of dharmas of this and that has no true existence. From the two divisions, as for characteristics being empty of their own essence, any characteristic described is non- existent like the horns of a rabbit. Though appearing from the viewpoint of confusion, it is without nature or reality, empty like the moon in water.

Emptiness of imputed self-nature is emptiness of what is imputed by names, words, and letters. Except as mere mental constructions, the individual characteristics of these objects do not exist, as for small children what is imputed by the name "lion" really has a turquoise mane. What is actually denoted by the word used by these small children has a body without such a mane, but since the understanding producing name can have an understood symbolic meaning even when it is empty, all imputations have an effect-producing power.

In emptiness of other, a dharma is imputed to be empty of another dharma. From the two divisions, in other emptiness of not having the sun is said to be empty of in the sense of not having darkness, a pillar, a blanket, and so forth. Here, the dharmas that are non-existent within the sun are all other real individual natures.

As for emptiness of accountable others, "the sun" and "light-producer," and "the one with seven horses" are general accountable imputations. Since none of the natures[16] and particular included examples expressed coincide with the individuating characteristics that are the meaning of the sun, it is empty of them.

What is empty of both self and other, is a Dharma that has neither. From the two divisions. There are accountable imputations and real individual characteristics.

Within the one involving accountable imputations, are the skandhas, dhatus, ayatanas and so forth, which are imputed by samsaric confusion. All such things are also empty of the individual characteristics of the three realms, since they are constructions of conventional mind in names. As for emptiness of individual characteristics, since there are no individual characteristics, they are empty in two ways, like the son of a barren woman and like the water in a mirage. Though they are empty of any truly any existing nature, they unobstructedly appear, vividly luminous, with an emptiness like that of relativity.

If the three essences[17] are divided in this way, there are six sorts of things of which there is emptiness. Though these are expressed, what is empty is also completely pure; and since this includes the two modes of being empty of accountable expressions and beyond mind, all dharmas should be realized also to be empty in this manner.

As for what is said by exponents of nihilistic emptiness, since that style of emptiness is impossible, their Dharma is like that of the outsider materialists, the charvakas. There is emptiness; but this non-empty emptiness is merely partial emptiness. It accords with the Dharma of those of the eternalistic view and the shravakas and pratyekabuddhas, and therefore it falls into both the eternalistic and nihilistic extremes, and simply should not be relied upon.

Correct perfect establishment is the path of true liberation. In realizing the natural state as it is, since the phenomena of appearance are not put aside, in the relative merit can be accumulated. The contemplated nature of emptiness is the accumulation of wisdom within the absolute. Try hard to produce this nature of dharmas like the sky free from one and many.

The former text says:

"Correct" is genuinely gathering the truths of the path.

In brief, we enter into the nature of mind, the changeless luminosity of suchness in which all dharmas are realized to be empty in the sense of being mere false conceptions. Then, if we meditate on the path, impure confused appearance, along with the mind of false conceptions, is transformed or purified. Then the primordial state has been reached.

One becomes a perfect master of the inexhaustible body, speech, and mind of the sphere of the ornament, the pure buddha fields. The teachings of holy Dharma are combined into one.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

rang ngo. Our own nature.

[2]:

gzhan dbang: Literally other powerdness.”

[3]:

mtshan nyid chad pa'i kun brtags.

[4]:

mtshan nyid, rnam grangs. mtshan nyid is the same word logicians use for the defining characteristics discovered by valid reasoning. The word is one of the categories refuted by madhyamaka (what isn't?) but even there it is allowed validity conventionally. Here, provocatively, it is simply equated with being wrong, and distinguished from the accountable, which here is the sphere of conventional truth and falsity.

[5]:

kun btags.

[6]:

rin po che sna bdun.

[7]:

It could also be said that if everything is mind, the term makes no distinction and is meaningless.

[8]:

Illusory hairs, “floaters” in the eyes.

[9]:

don spyi.

[10]:

This appears to be addressed to an exponent of madhyamaka who holds that external objects truly exist from a conventional viewpoint, though not from the viewpoint of analysis for the absolute.

[11]:

Ordinary language distinguishes my sensations (personal appearances) of this flower from the flower itself, although there is no double vision of both at once. For example, if I close my eyes, the sensations vanish, but the flower does not.

[12]:

gnyis med can mean either both are not (existent) or not two = non-dual.

[13]:

Red and white can have the sense subjective and objective.

[14]:

Literally gzhan dbang, “other power” or -dependent.

[15]:

Or “categorized.”

[16]:

khams.

[17]:

false conceptions, relativeity and complete perfection.

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