by Satkari Mookerjee | 1935 | 152,014 words | ISBN-10: 8120807375
A systematic and clear presentation of the philosophy of critical Realism as expounded by Dignaga and his school. The work is divided into two parts arranged into 26 chapters. Part I discusses the Nature of Existence, Logical Difficulties, Theory of Causation, Universals, Doctrine of Apoha, Theory of Soul and Problem of After-life. Part II deals wi...
Chapter XXVI - Negative Judgment
There is a wide divergence of opinion among philosophers regarding the nature and status of negative judgment and the problem can be studied with profit by way of division into an epistemological and a metaphysical aspect; and though these two aspects are intimately inter-related, the epistemological aspect of the question will be primarily discussed by us and the metaphysical aspect will be considered in so far as it will be found to be germane to the determination of the negative judgment as an epistemological problem. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, at least in its later offshoot, believes in the ontological reality of negation as an additional category and the knowledge of negation in the primary stage is derived by it from sense-perception. Kumārila does not think negation to be an independent reality, but only as an aspect of the positive locus in which it is cognised. The metaphysical issue apart, the knowledge of negation is not believed to be perceptual in character, but rather as a kind of experience to be classed apart from the accepted modes of knowledge, for which a distinctive instrument of knowledge, viz., non-perception, is postulated. The Buddhist philosopher, so far at any rate as the original formulation is concerned, has sought to derive the knowledge of negation from inference.
Prabhākara does not believe in the metaphysical reality of negation and the epistemological problem simply does not exist in his view. Negation according to him is nothing but the absence of a knowable fact and the knowledge of negation is but the absence of the knowledge of this fact. To take a concrete example, the proposition, ‘there is no pen on the table,’ simply means that the pen, an objective fact, is not present and consequently no knowledge of the pen arises. It h is been argued that though the pen is not present, the absence of the pen at any rate exists and for the knowledge of this absence, wh:ch is as much an objective fact as the pen, we must posit an instrument just as we have to postulate the visual organ for visual knowledge. Prabhākara scouts this attitude as uncritical inasmuch as it seeks to make out that absence of cognition is a positive cognition and that absence of a fact is the presence of a fact—the absurdity of which is obvious on the face of it. The Mīmāṃsists of the Bhāṭṭa school have, however, laid emphasis upon the differences in the modes of knowing and this has led them to a different conclusion. According to them the negation of a particular object is nothing but a determination of the locus and is not anything distinct from it, as the Naiyāyikas would make out. But though not distinct from the locus, the Bhāṭṭas would insist upon its being regarded as a character or a mode of the locus quite distinct and different from its positive character or 'mode. Every reality is believed to be possessed of a dual nature—one positive and the other negative. The negative aspect is cognised only through reference to a perceivable object felt to be uncognised in the locus, whereas the perception of the positive aspect is entirely independent of any such foreign reference. The conditions of negative cognition are thus seen to vary from those of a positive fact and this makes the postulation of a separate cognitive instrument a necessity. But Prabhākara contends that variation in the mode of knowledge cannot be regarded ās sufficient warrant for the postulation of a separate cognitive instrument (pramāṇa) unless it can be shown that there is a corresponding variation in the objective order, which Prabhākara refuses to believe. We shall return to this question at a later stage.
Kumārila has given the most careful consideration to this problem and it will be found in the course of our enquiry that rival philosophers have totally failed to assail the arguments of Kumārila, which have been substantially adopted by them. The Buddhist logician had to re-state his position in the light of Kumārila’s hostile criticism and the Naiyāyikas had substantially to agree with the latter in his findings subject to this reservation, viz., that negative judgment is believed by them to be perceptual in nature. To revert to the epistemological problem, what is the means of our cognition of the absence of a particular object, say, a jar? Kumārila gives the answer in the following words: the judgment ‘there is no jar on the ground can be arrived at only if we are assured that all instruments; of cognition, competent to envisage a positive fact, are not in operation to cognise the positive fact. This non-operation of cognitive instruments is to be regarded as the instrument of the cognition of the absence of the jar. To be precise, the nonproduction of the cognitive activity of the subject, further defined as the non-perception of a perceptible fact, is here the means of cognition and the judgment of the absence is the resultant knowledge. Unless the validity of negative judgments be admitted, the mutual distinction of entities would not be cognised and consequently all selective activity, which makes practical life and conduct possible, would come to a cessation. But what is the means of ascertaining the validity of negative judgments and. what. again is the ground of this validity? These questions arise inevitably and demand a solution.
The negative judgment can be proved to be true and valid if it can be shown that it corresponds with an objective fact—in other words, if there is such a thing as negation in its own right and not as a subjective construction as the Buddhist and idealists would have it. Kumārila therefore legitimately starts with an enquiry into the validity of negative judgments and the question of its conditions and content are discussed after this. The question of. validity is necessarily bound up with, the question of fact, correspondence to which constitutes the truth of a judgment and so a consideration of this metaphysical, problem should not be looked upon as an illogical divagation fr 6 m the logical issue. Kumārila maintains that negation is as much a part and parcel of an objective fact as the fact of its positive existence. Unless negation be admitted as a necessary element in an existent, the distinction of one thing from another would be impossible and distinction means negation of what it is not , Determinatio est negatio.
The admission of negation as an element in existent facts is not only necessary for distinction, but its reality is also proved by other arguments.
- Negation is amenable to division into four kinds, viz.,
- the negation of the effect in the cause (prāgabhāva);
- the negation of the cause in the effect (pradhvaṃsābhāva);
- the negation of things in one another, i.e., mutual exclusion (anyonyābhāva);
- and absolute negation, e.g., of colour in air (atyantābhāva).
Certainly these divisions and classifications are not applicable to fictions. Moreover, the concept of negation is common to all these distinctive kinds of negation and so identity and difference are found as elements in its constitution and this is the characteristic of positive facts also. We must therefore accord an objective status to negation, otherwise we shall face the risk of denying validity to all selective and exclusive usages and the result will be a condemnation of all our activity. So negation and affirmation are equally elements in an existent and even when one is perceived the other also is felt. Determinate cognition of a thing is possible if there is a cognition of the negative element serving to separate it from the rest. And the cognition of negation is possible only through reference to an existent positive fact, either as its object or as its locus.
Having thus established the objective reality of negation Kumārila now addresses himself to the question as to how the knowledge of negation arises. What is the instrument or condi tion of this cognition? Is it the same as that of perception, or of inference or any other? The cognition of negation cannot be regarded as perceptual in character since no relation can be conceived between negation and the sense-organ. The element of negation is something destitute of form and colour and these are invariably found to be the conditions of perception. The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have postulated a relation between negation and its locus, viz., of the substantive-adjective type. It is contended that when we negate a pen on the table, the table is not regarded simply as table, but as a table qualified by the absence of the pen. The absence of the pen serves to determine the locus as an adjectival element, and so when the sense-organ is connected with the locus, it becomes automatically connected with the adjectival element present in it and thus the condition of perception being present in the shape of the sense-object contact, the perception of the negative element becomes irresistible. But this contention of the Naiyāyika is inspired more by his love of a pet theory than by his regard for truth. The adjectival relation of negation to the locus can be maintained only if another relation can be demonstrated. What is the nature of an adjective? It is nothing but what is predicated of the subject and a thing can be predicated of another only if there is a relation between the two. In the case of a negative judgment the negative element is predicated of the locus as the subject, as for instance, in the judgment ‘the table is without a pen;’ and if the clause ‘without a pen’ is to be looked upon as the adjectival factor of the table, it must be shown in what precise relation the adjective stands to the subject as ‘its qualifying condition. That such relation is the conditio sine qua non of substantive-adjective or subject-predicate relation in a judgment will be quite manifest from an analysis of other similar judgments. To cite concrete examples: ‘The flower is red,’ ‘The man is with an umbrella’ and so on. Now, the adjective ‘red’ is predicated of the flower, because there is a factual relation of inherence between the two. The quality of redness is actually present in the relation of inherence in the flower and the proposition only states this relation. The other example too exhibits the relation of conjunction (saṃyoya). In all these propositions it is quite apparent that the adjectival element is predicated of the subject only on the basis of an actual relation.. It will not be fair to say that the relation is simply one of subject and predicate, substantive and adjective because this relation is only secondary to, and derivative from, the original relation and presupposes the original relation as its condition precedent. But no such relation can be made out to exist between the locus and negation and so there is absolutely no raison d’être of the secondary relation.
In the second place, the negative judgment being a judgment presupposes the previous knowledge of its constituent terms and their relation To revert to our old example, ‘The table is without-a-pen here, the clause ‘without-a-pen’ is predicated of the table and this predication presupposes the previous knowledge of the predicate. Now what is the source of this previous knowledge? It may be said to be perception, because the judgment is at once borne upon us when we look at the empty table, according to the Naiyāyika. But the Naiyāyika cannot reasonably maintain that the judgment is entirely perceptual. The knowledge of the table may be derived from sight, but this is not possible of the absence of the pen. The Naiyāyika posits the simple indeterminate apprehension (nirvikalpaka) of terms as the condition precedent of a perceptual judgment. If the negative judgment be perceptual in nature, the perceptual cognition of the adjectival term should be shown to be antecedent to it. But this is impossible in the case of the negative term, because negation is intelligible only if it is understood as negation of something and as such there can be no simple non-relational cognition of it. The Mīmāṃsist however has an easy explanation in his theory of non-perception as a separate pramāṇa, which is ex hypothesi believed to be capable of giving this relational knowledge of the negative factor. The Naiyāyika is precluded by his theory of perception from giving this explanation, as determinate perceptual judgment, which negative judgment is believed to be, is possible only if there is a previous simple apprehension of the adjectival term. But this is impossible from the very nature of negation.
Now what is this non-perception which is postulated by the Mīmāṃsist to account for negative judgments? A negative judgment is formed in the mind when the locus (of negation) is cognised and the object to be negated is remembered and this knowledge of absence is purely due to a mental activity and not conditioned by a sense-organ. That is to say, the knowledge of negation is never sensuous but always dental. What is the organon of this knowledge? Pārthasārathi Miśra elucidates this question thus:—‘Non-percept ion is not mere absence of perception but non-perception of a thing competent to be perceived. When the locus is perceived and the object of negation is remembered, the non-perception, as defined above, sets the mind to activity and the mind so activated produces the knowledge of negation just as a sense-organ functions in regard to its object. The knowledge of negation seems to follow upon the sense-organ in function and this has caused the Naiyāvika to regard it as sensuous. But the sense-organ is employed upon the locus and has no competency with regard to negation. The judgment follows as the result of the combination of the two factors—the locus and the negative element, which combination takes place in the mind entirely unaided by the sense-organ so far at any rate as the negative element is concerned. The negation and its relation to the locus is cognised by non-perception as defined above and the sense-organ only gives us the cognition of the locus. The negative judgment that follows should be affiliated to non-perception as its condition and not to sense-activity, because the latter is incompetent to envisage negation and its relation, for which non-perception as the conditioning factor has to be postulated. When two factors co-operate to bring about a single judgment, the result is to be affiliated to that factor alone which is capable of cognising the relation. For instance inference is brought about by the co-operation of perception of the subject (pakṣa) and the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāptijñāna). But the knowledge of the conclusion is not believed to be perceptual in nature, because the perceptual cognition of the subject is not competent to envisage the relation of the probandum with the subject. With equal logic the negative judgment, though produced by the cooperation of two factors, perception and non-perception both, should be affiliated to the latter, because the relation was incompetent to be cognised by the perceptual cognition of the locus. The contention of the Naiyāyika that negative judgment is given by the sense-organ aided by competent non-perception and hence is perceptual in character betrays slipshod observation, inasmuch as this would lead him to characterise inferential knowledge also as perceptual in character—an undesirable consequence in all conscience. The Naiyāyika has been guided by considerations of economy to subsume non-perception under perception by reducing the former to the status of an auxiliary. But why should he not extend the economy further afield and reduce inference to a mode of perceptual knowledge by regarding the condition of inference as an auxiliary to sense-organ?
We propose now to consider the question whether negative judgment can be equated with inferential knowledge. Now non-perception has been included by the Buddhists in the list of hetus (probanses) and knowledge of negation is regarded as the product of the knowledge of this probans—in other words, as inferential in character. This is at any rate a prima facie plausible interpretation of the Buddhist position though we shall find that the Buddhists have given an altogether different orientation to their solution of the problem which is different from the position criticised by Kumārila. If the negative judgment is believed to be reached by inference, we shall have to find out the probans. To take a typical case of negative judgment, ‘there is no jar on the ground,’ which of the constituent terms of the judgment may be regarded as the probans? The ‘jar’ is not the probans, as the jar is not cognised and an uncognised term cannot be a probans of any thing. The cognition of the jar, on the contrary, would make its noncognition impossible and as a consequence the negative judgment will not be reached. Nor can the locus, the ground, function as the probans, as the locus cannot be understood as the property of the negation, as a qualifying adjunct, unless negation is known to be present, but in that case inference will have no object, as negation, the professed objective of inference, is already known. Thus there will be no minor premise if we seek to make the locus the probans of negation. Not only this, the major premise, the universal proposition, too, cannot be made out, as the concomitance of the locus and negation cannot be proved. The jar may be present or absent in the locus and its presence or absence does not make any difference to the ground qua locus. The locus may be cognised together with the jar and also independently of it in its absence. The relation of the locus to absence of a particular object is thus seen to be accidental and variable and so with regard to absence in general, unqualified and unconditioned by any object. The cognition of the locus therefore cannot be maintained to be the ground of inference of negation.
Moreover, the position that negation is always inferred leads to contradiction, irrespective of the consideration whether there is a competent probans possible or not. Inference is possible only if there is a knowledge of universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum at its back and if negation is to be inferred, its concomitance with a probans has to be demonstrated as possible of knowledge. And the knowledge of concomitance can be possible only if there is a knowledge of the terms and knowledge of negation as a term in universal concomitance cannot be reached through inference, as the inference in question presupposes the knowledge of negation in the universal concomitance as its condition. In the final analysis the knowledge of negation has to be reached independently of inference through the aid of some other pramāṇa and so the position of the Buddhist falls to the ground that negation is judged through inference.
The Buddhist logician however is not dismayed by this array of arguments and considers the knowledge of negation as capable of a syllogistic demonstration and there is neither lack of the universal proposition nor of the minor premise, as a competent probans is always found in the shape of non-perceptiou. Now, non-perception is not a negation of perception, but perception of only one of the terms that are capable of being perceived together. For instance, when the jar on the ground is perceived, we perceive ‘the jar’ and ‘the ground’ together and when the jap is absent, we perceive the ground alone; this perception of the solitary ground is an act of positive perception and this positive perception is construed as the non-perception of the jar. The non-perception of the jar is invariably concomitant with negation of the jar and the relation constitutive of this invariable concomitance is found on examination to be a relation of identity of essence (tādātmya or svabhāva). The question may be raised, how can there be identity between negation and non-perception? Non-perception, as interpreted by the Buddhist, is a positive perception and a psychical event, whereas negation is an objective fact. How can there be identity between an objective and a subjective fact, between an object and its awareness, unless the position of extreme subjectivism is adopted? The answer is however simple. The Sautrāntikas believe in the external world, no doubt, but they do not believe in the objective existence of negation. Negation according to them is a conceptual construction and a logical fiction, and so when negation is predicated, it is to be understood merely as the knowledge of negation (asadvyavahāra) and not as an objective fact. But the question may arise, that though negation be a subjective construction, the awareness of negation cannot be equivalent to awareness of a positive fact, to which non-perception or, to be precise, competent non-perception, has been reduced. The answer is that though perception of one of the terms of a complex situation, for instance of the ground-surface alone as bereft of a jar, is not numerically identical with cognition of negation, still the former has the competency (yogyatā) to be converted into the negative judgment and this competency is not anything distinct from the positive perception. The equation is between competent positive perception and negative judgment and thus the relation of identity being established between these two pieces of knowledge, the inference of negation is admissible. The knowledge of negation is thus not anything distinct from the perception of one aspect of a complex situation, of one of the several terms capable of being cognised in association at one sweep if they are present together, and this perception being a positive experience is felt of itself, as all knowledge is self-revealing. If the knowledge of negation were conceived to be the absence of knowledge of a perceptible fact, this would make a regressus ad infinitum inevitable, as absence, whether of a knowledge or of a fact, could be known through competent nonperception and that being again of the nature of absence could be known through another non-perception and so on to infinity. But this objection cannot be advanced against the conception of non-perception interpreted as a positive perceptional experience.
The Mīmāṃsist is not satisfied with this explanation of the Buddhist and regards it only as a pretence and delusion, which will be exposed if the nature of non-perception is subjected to a critical analysis. Now, non-perception cannot be taken in an unqualified absolute sense, nor can negation be understood absolutely without reference to a context, even if such things are admitted to be conceivable. The negation to be inferred is to be understood as the negation of a particular object and this cannot be supposed to be inferred from unqualified non-perception, because unqualified non-perception is not incompatible with the presence of the object to be negated. There may be presence of a jar and the absence of a pen and the like in the same place. So non-perception has to be interpreted as non-perception of the thing, the negation of which is to be inferred. That is to say, the absence of a jar can be inferred from the non-perception of a jar. But what is this non-perception of the jar? If it is identical with the perception of the locus, say the ground-surface, then there will be no knowledge of negation, as the locus is perceived even when the jar is present. If you say that this non-perception consists in the perception of one of the possibly co-presentable factors, this too does not make negation intelligible, as it is not a peculiar characteristic of negation that one of the terms is perceived. The perception of the term in question takes place also when both the terms are perceived. To take a concrete example, the jar and the ground are perceived together and if negation of the jar consisted in the perception of the ground, the said negation should be cognised even when the jar is present, as the presence of the jar does not preclude the perception of the ground. Thus the attempt on the part of the Buddhist logician to equate negative cognition with cognition of one of the possibly co-presentable terms fails to explain the raison d’être of negative judgment and he will have to admit that non-perception of the jar means the nonorigination of the perception of the jar. And non-origination being a negative fact has to be inferred on the basis of nonperception and the latter too will be subject to the same difficulty. The result will be a vicious infinite series. The same difficulty confronts the fact of negation, when its concomitance with non-perception has to be understood. Moreover, inferential knowledge is generated by the knowledge of the probans endowed with triple condition and when non-perception is admitted to be nothing but a case of non-origination of perception and nonorigination is not an effect, how can this be considered to be generated by the knowledge of the aforesaid probans? Nonperception therefore has to be admitted as generative of the knowledge of negation on its own account without its being a logical probans—in other words, negative judgment is to be believed in the last analysis as non-inferential knowledge.
Non-perception has been proved to be a separate source of knowledge and the possibility of its functioning as a logical probans has been totally demolished on the basis of infinite regressions to which it leads as an inevitable consequence. The same result can be reached through other considerations also, calculated to prove the absence of all the conditions of inference. The impossibility of the knowledge of universal concomitance of non-perception with negation has been demonstrated up to the hilt. This means the lack of the universal proposition, without which no inference is admissible. But this is not the only drawback, the minor premise too (pakṣadharmatā) will be found to be equally an impossible phenomenon on examination. Now, what can be the subject (pakṣa or minor term), of which nonperception as the logical probans can be predicable? It cannot be ‘negation,’ because this is the very objective of inference. Moreover, negation cannot be understood, as has been shown above, without reference to the place and time and the object to be negated. And if for the sake of argument ‘negation’ as qualified by these conditions is admitted to be known as the subject of the predicate of ‘non-perception’ as the logical probans, there will be no matter left for inference to prove, as the knowledge of the minor premise will give us the knowledge of negation, for which inference would be in request. Nor can the locus (of negation) be accepted to be the subject, because nonperception cannot belong to it, as it is directly perceived and as such cannot be thought to be unperceived without involving self-contradiction. Nor can the object of negation, e.g., the jar whose negation has to be proved, be accepted to be the subject, because no relation can be conceived between the object and nonperception. Non-perception cannot be regarded as the attribute of the object, say, the jar, because the jar is a real objective fact and never fails to be perceived when it is present together with the conditions of perception. It cannot be contended that nonperception may be an attribute of the absent jar, because the contention is suicidal to the opponent’s position. If the jar is known to be absent antecedently to inference, the problem is solved and inference will have no subject-matter. It may be maintained that the subject is the jar as such without any reference to its positive or negative aspect, its presence or absence, and of this subject, negation can be proved by a regular syllogistic argument: for example, ‘The jar is not on the ground, because it is not perceived though competent to be perceived.’ But this is only a hoax, simply because the probans, ‘is not perceived,’ is an unproved assumption and it has been shown how it leads to infinite regression. It may be urged that ‘negation’ can function as the subject, inasmuch as they are related as subject (viṣayī) and object (viṣaya), negation being known through non-perception. But this too will not help the cause of the opponent. The relation in question is understood after negation is known through nonperception and not before and so it cannot be a contributory factor to the knowledge of negation. Nor can any other type of relation be maintained between negation and non-perception. Even if it is conceded for argument’s sake that a relation is possible, still the knowledge of the minor premise, in which the relation is stated, will give us the knowledge of negation and inference will have no scope. The absurdity of the opponent’s position that negation is known through inference has been exposed thoroughly and the question has been discussed threadbare. The Buddhists found themselves in an awkward predicament and Dharmottara has substantially admitted the justice and cogency of Kumārila’s contention by trying to make out a case in favour of Dharmakīrti. But we shall presently see that his defence has served to expose the weakness of the Buddhist position by depriving it of all logical value.
Dharmottara was absolutely convinced of the cogency of Kumārila’s arguments and realised that the Buddhist position was entirely indefensible as it stood. He therefore tried to give an altogether different orientation substantially accepting the justice and correctness of Kumārila’s animadversions. The interpretation of non-perception as perception of one of the possibly associable factors cannot be converted into perception of absence and even if it were possible, there would not be a whit of necessity for inference as a medium of the knowledge of absence, which is already derived from perception. The absence of the effect means the presence of the cause and the cause-as-present is known through perception, and so there is nothing to be known through inference or any other mode. Dharmottara admits that knowledge of the absence of the jar follows upon the perception of the vacant ground and so the former should be set down as the result of perceptual experience and what is derived from perceptual experience does not stand in need of being proved by inference. The knowledge of absence or negation therefore should not be regarded as inferential in character. But inference comes into play when an undisputed pragmatic usage is made of this perceptual knowledge. And pragmatic usage of negation may be of three distinct, but allied, varieties: firstly, the logical conviction that a thing is non-existent; secondly, linguistic usage expressing this fact of non-existence through a proposition; and thirdly, practical behaviour following upon it. Although non-perception is competent to give rise to knowledge of negation, the result cannot be susceptible of pragmatic applications unless non-perception is reinforced by a knowledge of the competency of the object to be perceived, because even imperceptible things may escape perception, but this failure of perception is not capable of being construed as evidence of their absence. Of course the deliverance of perceptual evidence that a particular object is absent in a particular context of place and time is competent to give rise to these pragmatic uses, but the knowledge of absence is placed on a footing of absolute certainty when it is re-certified by inference. Thus, the absence of the pen on the table is known through perception of the empty table, no doubt. But the knowledge of this absence is made absolutely certain when the, inferential knowledge brings up the rear in the following order: ‘Certainly the pen does not exist upon the table. Were it present, it could not but be perceived as it is competent to be perceived like the table.’ Though this process of inference does not give us the knowledge of an unknown fact, it certainly makes this knowledge absolutely free from doubt and as such makes it an instrument for practical behaviour and linguistic usage.
This defence of Dharmottara virtually amounts to a confession of the futility of non-perception as an instrument of inference. He has tried to prove the obvious, which Kumārila and others have not denied. The main contention of Kumārila is that non-perception has got to be admitted as an independent means of knowledge of absence without being a logical probans at the primary stage and this contention is admitted to be valid by Dharmottara. The admission of non-perception as an independent probans by Dharmakīrti has therefore no logical sanction behind it and only subserves the interests of perception. The Naiyāyika was fully conscious of the subservient character of non-perception and has accordingly relegated it to the rank of an auxiliary factor, as tarka, which is denied independent validity and probative value by them. The attempt on the part of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to reduce nonperception to the status of the non-perception of the effect and thus to make knowledge of negation as inferential knowledge of the absence of the cause from the absence of the effect, has equally failed to save the Buddhist position.
“The absence of the jar,” argues Kamalaśīla,
“is proved from the bare perception of the empty ground and this bare perception is nothing but the non-perception of the effect, viz., knowledge of the jar.”
Knowledge of the jar is produced by the jar when it is present together with other conditions of perception and so the absence of the knowledge of the jar must be set down as due to the absence of the jar in the same or similar context. Therefore non-perception, which is set down as the natural correlate of absence of a perceptible fact (svabhāvānupalabdhi), should be equated with non-perception of an effect (kāryānupālabdhi). We must.confess that this argument of Kamalaśīla does not improve the Buddhist position in the least. It leaves the problem, as to how the knowledge of negation whether of a fact or knowledge is ultimately derived, absolutely cold. The knowledge of the absence of the jar cannot be inferentially derived from knowledge of the absence of the perception of the jar and even if it were possible, the knowledge of the absence of perceptual knowledge cannot at any rate be reached through inference. So the Buddhist has got to admit that knowledge of absence, at least in the primary stage, is not derived from inference. In fact, the Buddhist does not believe in the ontological reality of negation and so the knowledge of negation is believed to be an intellectual construction, following in the trail of the perception of the empty locus. But though an intellectual construction, it cannot be placed upon the same footing with the determinate judgmental knowledge of perceptual facts, albeit knowledge of negation follows upon the perception of the bare locus. For there is a pronounced difference between a positive judgment and a negative judgment, although all judgments are intellectual constructions in the view of the Buddhist logician. The positive judgment, which follows upon the perception of a positive fact, has got an objective reference and serves to clarify the perceptual experience by emphasising the objective content as a distinct element in it, whereas the negative judgment is entirely devoid of an objective reference, at least one that is derived from the primal perceptual experience. The perceptual experience, which eventuates in the negative judgment, was cognisant of the locus which is a positive fact, and did not contain any reference to negation. Negation, both as content and as a judgment, has no existence outside the subjective experience, whereas the objective reference of positive perceptual judgments is remotely grounded in an objective fact, directly perceived in the indeterminate simple experience preceding it. The Buddhist philosopher could justify his position if he placed negative judgments in the same category with knowledge of word imports (apoha), which, notwithstanding their pragmatic efficiency, have been regarded by him as unmitigated subjective constructions.
We made a brief reference to Prabhākara’s theory of negation just in the beginning of our present dissertation and we propose to resume the discussion in view of its pronounced affinities with the Buddhistic position. Śālikanātha Miśra in his Prakaraṇapañcikā has given an elaborate treatment of this problem and after representing the orthodox Mīmāṃsist’s position he sets out the position of his school, which is entitled to careful consideration in view of its ingenuity. Negation according to Prabhākara is nothing but the presence of a positive fact. The negation of the jar on the ground does not connote the presence of an additional fact save and except the ground itself. The cognition of the locus is interpreted as the cognition of the absence of the jar, but this absence is never a fact and as such is not amenable to cognition. The cognition of the locus takes place both in association with an object existing in it and also by itself when any such object is not in existence. The cognition of the locus by itself may or may not be followed by a reference to an object which is not present in it, but which, if present, would be surely perceived. When the cognition of the locus is accompanied by a reference to an absent perceivable object, the knowledge of its absence is seen to follow upon it. This knowledge of absence is nothing but the knowledge of the solitary locus with reference to a perceivable object. Kumārila admits the knowledge of the empty locus together with a memory-reference to a perceivable object as the condition of the knowledge of the absence. But Prabhākara would stop short with this condition alone and regard it as the knowledge of the absence. The condition of Kumārila, that is to say, the knowledge of the locus by itself followed by reference through memory to a perceivable object is construed as the knowledge of the negation and this knowledge has for its content the locus alone. Negation is only a designation of this perception of a positive fact followed by a reference to a perceivable object and is not an additional entity. Negation is not believed to be a presentable datum and if it were conceived to be presented it must be held to be identical with the locus itself. The negation of the pen is nothing but the presentation of the table or any other positive fact, without which no negation is conceivable. Kumārila too admits the presentation of a positive datum as the condition of the knowledge of negation and we may legitimately enquire as to what sort of a positive datum is regarded as the condition. Is it the positive datum perceived together with the object of negation? This is certainly absurd, as in the presence of the object the knowledge of its absence cannot arise. Nor can the positive datum, cognised together with negation as its qualifying adjunct, be conceived to serve as the precondition of the knowledge of negation. For, the knowledge of negation would be already achieved by the knowledge of the adjectival element and there would be no other negation to be cognised with the help of it. So it must be admitted that the knowledge of the positive datum without reference to any other element, positive or negative, is the condition of the knowledge of negation, but this condition has nothing further to produce as its effect. The cognition of the positive datum alone, as distinguished from the object of negation, should be recognised as the cognition of negation. The judgment ‘there is no jar on the ground’ when analysed, will be found to mean nothing but this: that the ground by itself is cognised in spite of the fact that the jar is susceptible of perception. The Buddhist also regards the perception of the positive fact by itself as tantamount to perception of negation and in this there is entire agreement between Prabhākara and the Buddhist philosophers. But the Buddhist goes a step further. The knowledge of negation qua the perception of the positive fact is perceptual in character and as such is based upon an objective datum. The negative judgment which follows upon this perceptual cognition is only an intellectual construction and ‘negation’ as its objective is purely an illusion, as there is no such thing as objective negation. Negation superadded to the positive perceived fact is only an ideational fiction quite as much as universals and other concepts, which have been proved to be mere ideas without any objective basis and has nothing corresponding to it in the objective order. But Prabhākara being an uncompromising realist cannot be expected to believe in unfounded ideas and he denies knowledge of the negation in the sense of its being anything in excess of the knowledge of positive datum. Prabhākara denies knowledge of negation together with negation as an objective category and though the Buddhist denies the latter, he leaves room for the possibility of negative judgments as subjective constructions, since realism of the Sautrāntika accepts the reality of particulars alone.
We now propose to discuss the Naiyāyika’s view of negation. The Naiyāyikas believe in the objective existence of negation, but does not think it necessary to posit another pramāṇa (cognitive instrument) for its cognition. Negation according to the Naiyāyika may be perceived by the sense-organ when it is situated within its province, and when it is placed outside its province it may be cognised by inference or verbal knowledge. In any event it does not necessitate the postulation of a distinct kind of knowledge. The main ground of difference between the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsist consists in the contention of the former that negation is directly perceived by the sense-organ, whereas the latter denies the possibility of sensuous cognition of negation. The Mīmāṃsist contends that no sensuous cognition can take place unless a recognised relation between the sense-organ and the perceivable object can be shown to exist and this very condition of perception is absent in the case of negation, as negation is neither a substance nor an attribute with which alone the sense-organ can be related. The relation of the subject predicate or substantive-adjective type between negation and the locus has been shown to be impossible, as such a relation is only incidental to an original relation behind it and no such, original relation is capable of being shown by the Naiyāyika. The sense-organ is profitably employed upon the locus and has no competency with regard to negation, as it is neither related to the locus nor to the sense-organ.
Udayana in his Nyāyakusumāñjali has made a desperate attempt to show that the perception of the locus is absolutely irrelevant to the perception of negation and so the explanation of the Mīmāṃsist that the sense-organ is employed only upon the locus falls to the ground. Udayana cites the concrete case of the cognition of the cessation of sound in support of his position. Suddenly a noise ceases and we directly experience it. The experience of the sudden cessation of noise is certainly perceptual just as the experience of noise is perceptual. The sense-organ was active a moment before and cannot be supposed to have ceased to function just when the noise ceases. If the activity of the sense-organ were absolutely irrelevant to the experience of the cessation of the sound, a deaf man also could have an experience of it. The supposed absence of relation between the auditory organ and the extinction of sound cannot be made the ground of denying the perceptual character of the experience. The relation is always inferred from the experience and is an epistemological device to explain the origin of experience and is never uniform and identical. The relation in the case of perception of substance is different from the relation with attributes. The visual organ is supposed to be related to the jar in tbe relation of conjunction (saṃyoga), but to its redness in the relation of conjoined inherence (saṃyukta - samavāya) and so on, simply because the attribute redness is never perceived apart from the substance. But in the case of fragrance, which is an attribute, it is perceived apart from the substance and the relation between the olfactory organ and fragrance is supposed to be simply inherence (samavāya). So with regard to sound, which is believed to be an attribute of ether (ākāśa) by the Naiyāyika, the relation between the auditory organ and sound is regarded as pure inherence. These relations are sometimes simple, at other times complex and all these are epistemological hypotheses, varying according to the nature of the objects to be perceived. Nor are these relations universally accepted. The philosophers of different schools have differently conceived them in accordance with their philosophical persuasions; but so far as the psychological status of experience is concerned there is absolutely no difference of views. None denies that visual knowledge is perceptual. The absence of the recognised relations in the case of negative knowledge should not cause difficulty, as we can easily conceive of a suitable relation. If the lack of uniformity in relations is no objection to the perceptuality of visual, auditory and olfactory experiences, no objection should be raised if the relation in negative cognition is different from the accepted kinds. The relation of negation with the locus is a peculiar relation, designated as the substantive adjectival relation. The negation is adjectival to the locus, exactly like the positive object residing in it. The jar on the ground distinguishes it from the ground that is without it and so the absence of the jar distinguishes the ground from the ground that is possessed of a jar. The jar is thus the distinguishing feature of the ground and so also the absence of the jar and the relation between the two terms is thus seen to be one of distinguisher and distinguished, qualifier and qualified, adjective and substantive. The relation between the sense-organ and negation will be a corresponding relation of the, substantive-adjectival type.
The objection of the Mīmāṃsist, that the substantive-adjectival relation is only a derivative relation from an original relation existing between the terms and can never be an original relation, is based upon an accident. There is no logical necessity that the adjective should stand to the substantive in an additional relation. Of course the quality of redness is actually seen to inhere in the flower and the umbrella is conjoined to the bearer, but this relation of inherence or conjunction is not constitutive of the adjectival relation, but rather accidental. The relation of inherence or conjunction is found to exist from direct experience and so also the adjectival relation; and we do not see any reason why the one should be regarded as the primary and the other secondary. After all a relation is posited to bring two terms together and if the terms are not naturally related, the position, of a further relation will be useless. In the case of negation, it is by its very constitution related to the locus and hence it does not stand in need of a foreign relation, which will bring the terms together. Moreover, if negation were supposed to be related to the locus by way of conduction or inherence, it would become a positive entity like substance or attribute and we shall have no criterion to distinguish existence from non-existence. We cannot appreciate the logical propriety of the Mīmāṃsist’s objection that negation cannot be perceived as ah adjectival element in the absence of an additional relation at its back. Is not negation the distinguishing characteristic of the locus? Do we not distinguish an empty bag from one that is full? And if we do distinguish, what is the criterion of distinction? Certainly the absence of contents distinguishes the empty bag from the full one and so to deny that absence can be the qualifying adjective will be tantamount to denying the plain verdict of experience and this means self-contradiction. The Mīmāṃsist cannot deny this adjectival relation of negation to the locus and he will have to fall back upon an original relation to explain this. If the Mīmāṃsist can trot out an original relation, the Naiyāyika too may accept it provided it does not violate logical propriety. The relation of negation and the locus is regarded as one of identity (tādātmya) by the Mīmāṃsist and if this relation were logically consistent with the terms, we could also accept it and satisfy the scruples of the Mīmāṃsist. But identity between an existent and a non-existent is inconceivable and if the non-existent were simply an aspect of the existent the non-existent could be perceived in the same fashion as the existent. The Naiyāyika does not believe in the relation of identity between negation and the positive locus as the foundation of the substantive-adjectival relation simply because the foundational relation supposed by the Mīmāṃsist involves self-contradiction. The substantive-adjectival relation can subsist between two terras without any other relation. In fact this relation cannot be denied by the Mīmāṃsist, as we have shown above, on pain of self contradiction and to fall back upon the relation of identity as the basic relation equally leads to a quagmire. Moreover, this search for a foundational relation is entirely unprofitable. The Mīmāṃsist has not succeeded in making out the logical necessity why one relation should be regarded as more fundamental than the other and the argument from the analogy of cases where the two relations are found together is at best of an empirical value.. It has been shown that experiences are not uniform and they are all of equal logical value, unless it can be found that one is sublated by the other. If the adjectival relation is not fundamental, why should the other relation be so? If the. relation of inherence is self-sufficient, why should the adjectival relation be; condemned? And if relations as such are condemned as illogical, makeshifts, an infinite regression and a consequent denial of the validity of all judgments will be the inevitable consequence—in other words, philosophy will wander, into the cul de sac of scepticism, to which the Mīmāṃsist of all persons cannot bo a party.
The Mīmāṃsist declares that the cognition of negation is non-perceptual and our feeling of its being an immediate perceptual experience is only a psychological error due to confusion with the perception of the locus. But the argument seems to move in a vicious circle. Why should, the felt immediacy be erroneous, because the sense-organ is not in contact with negation and why should such contact fail, because the felt immediacy, is erroneous? Nor can the Mīmāṃsist deny sensuous cognition of negation on the ground of its lack of sensible qualities. The Mīmāṃsist believes that time and space are perceived though they have no sensible qualities. Why should he then go out of his way to condemn the felt immediate experience of negation as a psychological error? We open our eyes and see that the air is colourless. The absence of colour is felt to be visually perceived. Why should you condemn it as false perception? Why again do we not have this experience with our eyes shut up? The eye certainly functions and it cannot function upon the locus, the air, as it is visually unperceivable. If it is not engaged in the perception of negation, it will have no employment. If it is supposed to be engaged upon the surrounding objects, we do not see how the seeing of other objects can have a bearing upon the negative cognition. But it has been contended by the Mīmāṃsist that the visual organ has got to function in order to complete the conditions of competent non-perception, which is the instrument for the cognition of negation. What are the conditions constitutive of competency? Competency is constituted by the presence of all the conditions of perception save and except the object and the consequent sense-object contact. One can be sure of the absence of the jar upon the near ground-surface only if one is fully persuaded that there is full light, alert attention, the fit visual organ in function and still the jar is not perceived. If any one of these conditions be absent, the absence of the jar cannot be categorically affirmed, as non-perception may be due to the lack of an essential condition of perception and not to the absence of the object. The visual organ thus has got to function in order to fulfil the conditions that go to make the non-perception of the object, say the jar, a fit and competent instrument for the deliverance of the negative cognition. The Naiyāyika opines that this explanation is rather tortuous and deliberately makes a plain situation complex. The visual organ may be believed to cognise the absence of the object and thus have an utility of its own.
The Naiyāyika further argues that perceptual knowledge is invariably seen to be caused by an uncognised instrument and non-perceptual knowledge is always conditioned by some knowledge of fact. The negative cognition is caused by an instrument unperceived by us and this instrument is not, whatever else it might be, a knowledge of fact. We should regard negative cognition to be perceptual in character as it is not conditioned by a knowledge of fact. The Mīmāṃsist is not satisfied by this analogical argument and thinks that the universal proposition, ‘all knowledge that is caused by a non-cognitional instrument (jñānākaraṇakajñāna) is perceptual in character, is vitiated by the case of memory, which, though caused by memory-impression (saṃskāra), which is not a cognition, is not perceptual in character.
The next argument of Udayana also proceeds upon analogy. All knowledge of external objects is seen to be generated by the mind when it is influenced and directed by a positive cognitive instrument. Thus the visual knowledge of external objects is seen to be produced by the mind under the direction of the visual organ, which is a positive instrument. In verbal knowledge of external objects, the mind is guided by the knowledge of the word and conventional relation, and so also in inference the mind is under the guidance of the knowledge of the probans, with universal concomitance—all positive facts. In our external knowledge of absence too the mind should be under the influence of a positive cognitive instrument, viz., the sense-organ and not non-perception, which is a negative fact. The cogency of this argument is not admitted by the Mīmāṃsist. What cognitive instrument is employed to bring about a kind of knowledge can be determined from the nature of the knowledge that follows and from the nature of the object to be cognised. And the relation of a particular- cognitive instrument to a particular species of knowledge is a relation of causality and it can be determined exactly in the same way as other causal relations are determined. It might be a fact that our knowledge of external positive entities is achieved by a positive cognitive instrument. But there is no logical necessity that the same condition should prevail in negative cognitions too. It might be argued with equal plausibility that negative cognition should be generated by an instrument other than a sense-organ, because this is found to be the case in our inference of negation. These are arguments by analogy, pure and simple, and have no logical necessity, as the contrary possibility is not barred out by a reductio ad absurdum.
The Naiyāyika further argues that the competency of the sense-organ in respect of negation should be admitted exactly like its competency in respect of the relevant positive entity. The jar is cognised by the visual organ and the absence of the jar too should be believed to be so cognised. It is no argument that a positive cognitive instrument is competent to cognise positive objects alone. What about the verbal knowledge of negation? When we hear a trustworthy person say that John is not at home, we at once have a knowledge of John’s absence. What is the instrument of our knowledge of absence in this case? Certainly the aforsaid proposition, not anything negative. So also when a man proves by argument that the sun does not move or that the Arabs are not civilised and so on, our knowledge of negation is certainly inferential. The Mīmāṃsaka may contend that in all these cases inference or verbal communication serves to give rise to an idea of non-cognition of the positive fact, e.g., of the conditions of motion in the sun or of civilization among the Arabs and the negative judgment is thus the result of noncognition. Inference or verbal knowledge only serves to communicate this fact of non-cognition and has no bearing upon the negative judgment following upon it.
The Naiyāyika next fights on the issue of illusory cognition of negation and its opposite in places where the opposites are present. The pen may actually exist on the table, but we may miss it through a defect in the sense-organ and think that there is no pen on the table. Contrariwise through a defect in the organ we may see a ghost though there is none. The error is not confined to the. visual organ alone. We may miss a sound through a defect in the organ of hearing, say partial deafness, and we may judge that there was no sound. It is common knowledge that the malaria patient after having taken a strong dose of quinine seems to bear continuous sounds, though there are none. What are these illusions due to? Certainly these aberrations are caused by defects in the sense-organs. And if defective sense-organ can envisage illusory negation, we do not see any earthly reason why the healthy organ should not cognise real negation. But the Mīmāṃsist argues that the function of the organ comes into request only to fulfil the conditions of competency of non-perception and in erroneous cognitions of negation the defective sense-organ is responsible for the illusion of this competency and does not proceed further. The negative judgment follows as the result of non-perception.
As regards the charge that the negative judgment cannot be maintained to be perceptual in nature as it is not preceded by the simple perceptual apprehension of the negative term, which is found to be the invariable condition of perceptual judgments, the Naiyāyikas admit the truth of the accusation, but they deny that this lack of condition makes the negative judgment non-percēptual in character. A judgment is made possible by the antecedent knowledge of terms in isolation and when there is no such antecedent simple apprehension of the terms, the judgment cannot take place. This rule holds good only in the case of those terms whose isolated apprehension is possible, but it does not apply to those relative terms, which are by their very nature incompetent to be cognised by themselves without reference to some other terms, with which they are constitutionally bound up. Negation, for instance, is one such term and is understandable only with reference to the object to be negated. So a simple isolated apprehension of negation is impossible and whenever it is comprehended, it is comprehended in relation and never out of it. This objection, the Naiyāyika contends, is suicidal and the Mīmāṃsist too cannot give a more satisfactory explanation. The rule that a judgment is preceded by simple apprehension of the terms is not confined to perceptual judgments alone, but to all judgments. Even inferential and verbal judgments are in the ultimate analysis traceable to simple non-relational knowledge of the terms. And if the rule were absolute and did not brook exception, the Mīmāṃsist too would have to find an explanation of the anomaly presented by negative judgments. The Mīmāṃsist cannot make out that negation is apprehended in isolation at any stage and he will have to admit that negative judgment is reached at one sweep and not step by step. The contention, that perceptual judgment alone is subject to this contingency and the difficulty will not arise if negative judgment is recognised as non-perceptual in character to be reached by non-perceptual evidence, is not tenable, as all judgments have been shown to be ultimately traceable to perceptual knowledge of terms. If an exception is allowed in favour of negative judgments, the Naiyāyika too will have the benefit of it, and the question of its etiology is irrelevant. If ‘non-perception’ is believed to be capable of giving simple knowledge of negation, the sense-organ too may be credited with such capacity. The question is whether negation permits of being simply apprehended and if the possibility is admitted, the instrument in question, be it sense-organ or non-perception, will be supposed to yield this requisite knowledge.
Now to sum up the results: The main contention of the Mīmāṃsist is that the sense-organ is employed elsewhere to constitute the competency, without which non-perception is incompetent to give knowledge of absence. The Naiyāyika would make the sense-organ yield this knowledge, although he also admits the instrumentality of non-perception. The difference seems to be a question of emphasis. The Naiyāyika will make non-perception only an auxiliary factor to the sense-organ and the Mīmāṃsist would make it the self-sufficient condition and for this very purpose he will relegate the sense-organ to a subordinate rank as serving to prepare the ground for non-perception to take effect. The sense-organ is only in request to assure the subject that non-perception is present inspite of the presence of the conditions of perception. Udayana has made a vigorous plea in favour of the sense-organ being the instrument of negative judgment and he seeks to demolish the contention that the sense-organ is employed upon the locus. The perception of locus is not indispensable to the cognition of negation of those objects, which can be perceived without reference to the locus. Sound, for instance, is perceived without reference to its locus. Sound is cognised by the auditory organ which is incompetent to cognise its locus, ether (ākāśa), which is not amenable to perception. Smell, again, is perceived without reference to its locus, which, though cognisable by other organs, is not liable to be cognised by the olfactory organ. In the case of negations of these perceptible objects, the knowledge of the locus is either impossible or unnecessary. Accordingly the sense-organ will have no employment upon the locus and still it is seen to be in function, otherwise the negation of these objects will not be cognised. For instance, the extinction of sound is cognised only by a person who possesses a sound auditory organ and when that organ is in actual operation. Similarly with regard to the extinction of smell the function of the olfactory organ is seen to be necessary for knowledge of such extinction and yet the sense-organ cannot be supposed to be employed elsewhere. The Mīmāṃsist has sought to explain these difficulties by regarding these negative cognitions as the result of inference. ‘The subject, who was perceiving the sound but suddenly ceases to perceive it, infers the absence of the sound from the absence of sound-cognition, which could not but take place if the sound were there.’ The Mīmāṃsist therefore can maintain his position only by explaining away these simple experiences as inferential judgments. But what about the sense-organs all this while? The Mīmāṃsist will have to admit that they remain active, otherwise the non-cognition of sound or smell may be attributed to the aberration of the sense-organs and thus knowledge of negation will be precarious. The Naiyāyikas contend that the activity of the sense-organ is necessary for the negative cognition, but-the Mīmāṃsist will explain it away as a constitutive factor of the competency, which makes non-perception an effective instrument of negative cognition. The quarrel seems to be endless as neither party will yield. But to a dispassionate critic it appears that both parties have made, a good case for. themselves and the difference seems to be reducible to a question of attitude and emphasis. The Naiyāyikas seem to have the support of psychology in their favour and their position will readily command the assent of the avarage man. But the quarrel of philosophers is not at all a simple affair. The Mīmāṃasist has made capital out of the peculiar character of negation, which is neither a substance nor an attribute, nor even a relation. It has no shape, no colour, in short, none of the sensible qualities and the commonplace, work-a-day man. will find it difficult to believe that such an amorphous thing is capable of being directly perceived. But tbe Mīmāṃsist thinks time and space to be amenable to perception and it does not lie in him to impugn its perceivability on the ground of its lack of sensible qualities. The Buddhist and Prabhākara, particularly the latter, bave cut the Gordian knot by declaring negation to be non est and the problem of epistemology is simply given a wide berth. We purposely refrain from entering into the metaphysical issues. We have laid bare the epistemological problem, with the solutions offered.by the rival philosophers and we hope this comparative study, has served to put. the Buddhist position in a clear perspective.
- The Ślokavārttika—Chapter on Abhāva.
- Nyāyaratnākara — Do.
- The Prakaraṇapañcikā—pp. 118-25.
- Nyāyabindū—Chapters II and III.
- Nyāyabindu ṭīkā—Do.
- Nyāyakusumāñjali—Ch. II, pp. 16-30; Ch. Ill, pp. 98-107.
- Tattvasaṅgraha—Śls. 1648-98.
- Do. Pañjikā—Do.
- Mānameyodaya—pp. 58-64.
- Tattvacintāmaṇi—pp. 673-719.
- Nyāyāmañjarī—pp. 49-63.
- Bṛhatī—pp. 118-23.
- Nyāyamañjarī—pp. 49-63.
Footnotes and references:
Bṛhatī with Pañcikā, pp. 118 et seq.
gṛhitvā vastusadbhābaṃ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam |
mānasaṃ nāstitājñānaṃ jāyate’kṣānapekṣayā ||
S.V., śl. 27, p. 482.
gṛhite cā ’śraye pratiyogini ca smṛte ’kṣasthānīyena dṛśyādarśana sahāyena manasai ’vā ’bhāvajanmopapātteṛ ne ’ndriyasyā’ bhāve śaktiḥ śakyā kalpayitum. āparokṣyaṃ tu bhāvāṃśa eva nā ’bbāvāṃśe tad asti...... dṛś ādarśanam akṣaṃ ca sahitam abhāvaviśiṣtam bhāvaṃ bodhayati, tatra bhāvāṃśe ’kṣasya vyāpāraḥ, abhāvāṃśatatsambandhayos tv anupalabdhir vyāpriyate.
N.R., pp. 482-83.
yatra hi viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhaḥ pratyakṣaḥ, tatrai’va viśiṣṭasvarūpasya pratyakṣatvam, anyatra tu yenai’va pramāṇena sambandhagrahaṇam, tad eva viśiṣṭasvarūpasya pramāṇam. tathā cā’gnisambandhasyā’numānikatvāt viśiṣṭarūpam ānumānikam ity uktam. atrā’py abhāvasambandhasyā’bhāvapramāṇagamyātvād abhāvaviśiṣṭabhūtalādibodho’bhāvapramāṇaka eva.
tathā ce’ndriyāṇām abhāvapratyakṣe jananīye yogyānupalabdheḥ sahakāritāmātreṇa nirvāhe’ tiriktapramāṇakalpanam anucitain.
Din., p. 264 (Bom. edn.).
tasmād ekasya yā dṛṣṭiḥ sai’vā’nyādṛṣṭir ucyate |
sa ca svatantrasaṃsiddhiḥ svarūpeṇā’jadaivataḥ ||
T. S, 1683.
tathā yai’vai’kajñānasaṃsarginor anyataropalbdhiḥ sai’ve’tarasyā’nupalabdhir na tū’palabdhyabhāvo nāma kaścid upalabdhivyatirekeṇā’nupalabdhisaṃjño’sti, yatas tasyā’nupalabdhyantarāpekṣyayā’navasthā syāt. yā cā’sāv anyataropalabdhiḥ sā svasaṃvedyai’ve’ti nā’navasthā.
N. R., pp. 486-87.
Vide. S. V., śls. 38-44 and N. R. thereunder.
Op. cit., śls. 50-53.
kāryādīnām abhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ kāraṇādinā |
sa cā’paravivīktātmā pratyakṣeṇai’va gamyate ||
T.S., śl. 1671.
N.B.T., pp. 32-84.
yatrā ’pi kevalapradeśopalambhād ghaṭābhāvasiddhiḥ, sā ’pi ghaṭo palambhākhyakāryānupalabdhir eva......... tasmāt sarvai ’va svabhāvānupalabdhir asadvyavahārahetuḥ, paramārthataḥ kāryānupalabdhir eva draṣṭavyā.
T..S. P., p. 481.
Ante, Chapter VI.
abhāvo yady atiriktasambandhavān syāt sattāvān syāt ity avyavasthā.
Ny. Ku. P., p. 108,. Ch. III.
Cf. āparokṣyaṃ tu bhāvāṃśa eva nā’ bhāvāṃśe tad asti.
N. R., p. 483.
bhūtalādea tv aparokṣatvād abhāvasyā’pi tattvabhrama evā’yuṣmatām.
Mān. Me, p. 60